ALAM MD MONSUR v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5563 · HCAL 646/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 646/2024
[2026] HKCFI 5563
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 646 OF 2024
BETWEEN
| |Alam Md Monsur |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 24 April 2024, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 12 April 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL00
0646_2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that he
was entitled to non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the
Board refused his appeal/petition against the decision of the Director
of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 25 October 2023 and confirmed
the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
The applicant’s case
3. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
4. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Bangladesh, he would be killed by members of the Awami
League (“AL”) for political reasons as they wanted him to leave Jamaat-
e-Islami (“Jamaat”). The applicant claimed to be a secretary of the
Jamaat at union level in their union called Pachgachia.
Oral hearings
5. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application.
However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 3 September 2026.
6. Upon enquiring with the Director, this court found that the applicant
had moved to another address. This court therefore arranged another
hearing on its own motion to hear the applicant.
7. At the rescheduled hearing on 24 September 2026, the applicant was
present.
8. When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on the grounds of his
intended judicial review that were contained in his supporting
affirmation dated 24 April 2024, the applicant confirmed that he would
rely on the grounds and said that he had political problem in his
country, his life would be in danger, he was tortured and his family
could not live in the family house but far away.
Grounds for judicial review
9. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
10. The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial
review in Form 86.
11. In his supporting affirmation dated 24 April 2024, under the heading
“GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW”, the applicant advanced 6 grounds for
judicial review. The grounds are summarised as follows:-
1) The adjudicator did not consider his claim;
2) The adjudicator did not accept his documents as the documents were in
his mother language;
3) The officer refused to give him time to translate the documents
because he had no time;
4) The translator did not help him at all and became angry if the
applicant did not understand;
5) The interpreter asked him not to take long time for interview as he
had another job; and
6) He asked the court to help him and save his life.
12. As aforesaid, the applicant confirmed at the oral hearing that he
would rely on the above-mentioned grounds. He added that he had
political problem in his country, his life would be in danger, he was
tortured and his family could not live in the family house but far
away.
Discussion
13. First of all, the applicant’s danger in his country had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If he intends to challenge the
Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for
judicial review.
14. All the matters that were stated as “GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW” in
his supporting affirmation (except ground (6) which is not a ground at
all) were asserted without any specificity. Many applicants in
similar applications used them like a template without any regard to
their own cases. The applicant is no exception.
15. He did not state: (1) how the adjudicator did not consider his claim
(apart from saying the adjudicator did not take time or did not think
about his life); (2) which part(s) of his claim was not considered;
(3) what documents he intended to submit were rejected as they were
not translated; (4) how the interpreter or translator’s attitude had
prejudiced him; and (5) what he wanted to tell the Board was not
presented because of the attitude of the interpreter or translator.
16. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
17. Thus, the general assertions that were contained in the applicant’s
affirmation cannot help him at all.
18. In fact, with regards to the two documents submitted by the applicant
during the adjournment of the Board’s hearings, the Board had
specifically mentioned them in paragraphs 13 to 14 of the Board’s
Decision. Contrary to the applicant’s assertion that the documents he
intended to submit were rejected as they were not translated, the
Board in fact questioned the applicant as to why the Discharge
Certificate allegedly issued by the New Upasham General Hospital Ltd
was written in English (see paragraph 14(c) of the Board’s Decision).
19. Moreover, the said document was rejected not because it was not
translated. The Board had given its reasons in paragraph 19(b) of the
Board’s Decision for the finding that the said document could not be
used to support his claim that he was assaulted on 25 December 2020.
20. Thus, it is simply groundless for the applicant to allege that the
Board did not accept his documents as the documents were in his mother
language and there was no time to do the translation.
21. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
22. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
23. In assessing the applicant’s appeal/petition, the Board held two oral
hearings on 31 January 2024 and 18 March 2024 respectively and the
applicant was present. Thus, the applicant was given the opportunity
to present his case to the Board in person.
24. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had given a
detailed analysis of the applicant’s claims and its reasoning in
rejecting the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection. The
Board had laid out its analysis of the applicant’s claim and its
assessment of the credibility of the applicant’s claim in details in
paragraphs 15 to 20 of the Board’s Decision.
25. In gist, the Board found parts of the applicant’s account in support
of his claim hard to believe. Some of his evidence was vague,
shifting, exaggerated, inherently inconsistent and/or defy logic.
26. As aforesaid, the Board found that the Discharge Certificate allegedly
issued by the New Upasham General Hospital Ltd could not be used to
support his claim that he was assaulted on 25 December 2020. As to
the Certificate the applicant claimed to be issued by Jamaat, the
Board noted that the said document stated that the applicant was
secretary of the Panchgachia Union of Jamaat from 1 January 2017 to 31
December 2018. The Board found the fact that the applicant was
attacked years after he was in office meant that the document could
not be used to prove that the attack he encountered related to his
role in Jamaat. Thus, the Board found the applicant’s claim that he
was attacked by six AL people on 25 December 2020 because they wanted
him to leave Jamaat was not proved. The applicant’s claim that he
then spent a week in hospital was also not proved.
27. Further, the Board found that the applicant had failed to prove the
incidents in June 2023 and August 2023 took place. The Board also
considered the applicant’s claim that he continued to receive threats
from the AL people after he had fled Bangladesh to be at best hearsay
and not supported by any documentary evidence.
28. With regards to its analysis of the applicant’s case on all the
applicable grounds under the USM, the Board found that the extent of
the applicant’s injuries as a result of the alleged assault in 2020
was not as severe as he had described. After due consideration of the
available country of origin information (“COI”), the Board considered
that the applicant would receive adequate state protection and that
would further reduce or even negate the risk of him being killed or
subjected to ill-treatment by the AL members.
29. The Board had also given its reasons in paragraph 30(j) of the Board’s
Decision for the finding that it would not be unduly harsh for the
applicant to relocate to Dhaka on his return to Bangladesh, if he
feared to stay in his home village.
30. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant had not substantiated a
case for non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds
under the USM.
31. The assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm was primarily within
the realm of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s
appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to come to its own
conclusion. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way
the Board reached its conclusion.
32. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
33. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
34. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 30th day of September 2026
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |on:30/09/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given | |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after | |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted |Applicant’s ref. no: |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); |Nil |solicitors on: |
| | |30/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | | |
|within 14 days after | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|the grant of leave and| |Board/Non-refoulement |
|serve it in accordance| |Claims Petition Office |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |Putative respondent’s |
|and | |ref. no.: |
| | |USM 22418 |
|c) supply to every | | |
|other party copies of | |Director of Immigration |
|every affidavit which | |Putative interested |
|the Applicant proposes| |party’s ref. no.: |
|to use at the hearing,| |QA T/C 1036/23 (formerly|
|including the | |RBCZ 5000969/23) |
|affidavit in support | | |
|of the application for| |Department of Justice, |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Senior Assistant Law |
|6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1