MIA RAJU v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 485/2021

[2021] HKCFI 2508

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 485 of 2021

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

	consideration of documents only; or
	consideration of documents and Applicant being present in open court;

1.      Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.      A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.  This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 30 March 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 632 of 2017 under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“the Ordinance”).

2.  The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.  At the hearing on 14 July 2021, the applicant submitted that he had just applied for legal aid.  The matter was adjourned for 42 days pursuant to section 15 and regulation 7A of the Legal Aid Ordinance, Cap. 91.  At the resumed hearing on 18 August 2021, the Legal Aid Department had not finished processing his application.  The applicant admitted that the purpose of applying for legal aid was for adjournment of the hearing.  The Court took the view that the matter should not be further delayed.  The matter proceeded.

The procedural history

4.  The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Bangladesh.  He had raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on 25 October 2013 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life risk under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 

5.  His claim was rejected by the Director by Notice of Decision dated 29 December 2015 and Notice of Further Decision dated 20 January 2017.

6.  He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”).  By its Decision dated 15 September 2017, the Board rejected his appeal.

7.  He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 3 July 2018.

8.  He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his appeal was dismissed on 20 December 2018.

9.  He applied by notice of motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal and his application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 1 April 2019.

10.  His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 18 August 2020.

11.  He applied to the Director for subsequent claim by letter dated 11 September 2020 and was rejected by the Director’s Decision.

The subsequent claim application

12.  The factual basis of his claim is that if he is refouled, he would be harmed or killed by members of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) as he was affiliated to its rival party Awami League Party (“AL”).

13.  The Director found that the level of risk of him being harmed or killed by his enemy if he returned to Bangladesh was assessed to be low; that the state was not involved and state protection would be available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him.

14.  The Board found that there was no evidence that he was an important person in his party; that he was not harmed or threatened by the BNP members; that his evidence in relation to the facts of the bomb incident, his intention of locating his family and his running away from his village were not logical and could not be believed; that state protection was available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him.

15.  Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

16.  The applicant relies upon the following new circumstances as he was told by his mother and his friend in support of his application:

a.     The BNP members are still looking for him and his family members had dispersed from home; and

b.     there is a certificate signed by the President of Bangladesh Awami League, certifying that he was a descendant of Awami League family and had worked with leaders of local Awami League.

17.  The immigration officer has considered his circumstances and does not consider that those are the changed circumstances in support of his subsequent claim and that he did not believe that the BNP people are still interested in him since he has left Bangladesh for 7 years.  The materials he supplied to him was hearsay materials only.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision

18.  The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application where he only exhibited the Director’s Decision without specifying any grounds to challenge the Director’s Decision.  In Court, he said that he had nothing to say.

19.  The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.

20.  The Director is entitled to reach his conclusion after considering his evidence.  The applicant has raised no valid challenge to the Director’s Decision or finding of the facts.

21.  The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision.  The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

22.  Since there is no reasonable prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

23.  In accordance with Practice Direction 11.3, RPO should be made under the following circumstances:

“8. In accordance with Ng Yat Chi, an RPO should only be made if the person to be subjected to the order has abused, and is likely to continue abusing, the Court's process by seeking persistently to re-litigate in fresh proceedings, without viable legal grounds, matters which have already been determined by the Court, in circumstances where an RPO would be a proportionate response.”

24.  As shown by the procedural history above, it is plain that the applicant refused to accept the unfavourable decisions made by the Director, the Board and the courts.  His reasons in support of his subsequent claim are clearly insufficient to overcome the reasons given by the Director and the Board in rejecting his claim.  He should be well aware of those reasons himself as he was legally represented for his subsequent claim.

25.  The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his claim for a subsequent claim, categorically fitting the description of

“the vexatious litigants typically acts in person and characteristically refuses to accept the unfavourable result of the litigation, obstinately trying to re-open the matter without any viable legal basis.”^[1]

The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him.^[2]

26.  RPO is appropriate for the present case.  See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

27.  In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process.  The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.  The Court should take preventive measures against any abuse.

28.  For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why a RPO should not be made against him.  The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing.

29.  Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said that he had nothing to say except that he wanted to stay longer in Hong Kong.

30.  Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts.  I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)     The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any
non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)     All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)     At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)     Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same.

(5)     All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct.

(6)     If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)     Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)     Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)     No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)     This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(11)     A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

31.  The applicant’s application is dismissed.

32.  A RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1

[1] Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1, §48

[2] Ibid §§7 & 8