RE HOSSAIN SADDAM

CACV 407/2018

[2019] HKCA 579

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 407 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 756 of 2017)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Andrew Chan J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 28 January 2019, this Court handed down our judgment[1] (the “Judgment”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock given on 10 August 2018 refusing him leave to apply for judicial review in relation to a claim for non-refoulement protection.

2.  By a Notice of Motion dated 20 February 2019, the applicant applied for leave to appeal against the Judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. 

3.  Pursuant to the directions given by the Registrar of Civil Appeals, the applicant has lodged a written submission dated 6 March 2019 to support his application.

4.  Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and his written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of his Notice of Motion and his written submission.

5.  Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 (the “Ordinance”), leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.  The Notice of Motion did not set out any proposed question for determination by the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant merely asserted that there were some errors in law in the decisions of the Director of Immigration and / or the Torture Claims Appeal Board rejecting his non-refoulement claim, and he reiterated his claim that his life would be in danger if he were to return to Bangladesh, his home country. 

7.  In his written submission, the applicant essentially adopted the same arguments in the written submission previously advanced in the appeal, which we had heard on 17 January 2019 and dismissed subsequently for reasons set out in the Judgment.

8.  Plainly, what was put forward by the applicant in the Notice of Motion and his written submission do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  Firstly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Ordinance.  The matters raised by the applicant were entirely and purely related to his personal circumstances.  Furthermore, both the Director of Immigration and the Torture Claims Appeal Board had found that there were no substantial grounds for believing that the applicant had ever been subject to torture or ill-treatment, or that, if he were refouled to Bangladesh, he would be at risk of being subjected to torture, persecution or ill-treatment or violation of his absolute and non-derogable rights.  In the circumstances, what the applicant has stated in the Notice of Motion and his written submission cannot stand.      

9.  We have also considered the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the Ordinance.  However, we do not see any basis giving rise to this limb for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.   

10.  For the above reasons, we conclude that the statutory criteria for granting leave to appeal are not met. Accordingly, we dismiss the Notice of Motion.