RE SATWINDER SINGH
[2026] HKCA 1893 · CACV 56/2026
Court of Appeal
CACV 56/2026, [2026] HKCA 1893 On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 353 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 56 OF 2026 (ON AN APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 2011 OF 2020) _____________________ _____________________ Before: Hon Chu VP and Cheng J in Court Date of Judgment: 30 October 2026 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Chu VP (giving the Judgment of the Court): On 13 April 2026, this court handed down a judgment ([2026] HKCA 493) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 15 January 2026 dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review. On 16 April 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal this court’s judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. He has also lodged a written submission to support the application. Having considered the Notice of Motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing. We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case. The background to this case and the applicant’s claim have been set out in our judgment. We will not repeat them. Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision. The Notice of Motion stated that: (1) there was some error in the decision of the applicant’s claim; (2) the decision just relied on country-of-origin information (“COI”) and facts that favoured the rejection of the applicant’s claim; (3) actual situation was different from what was stated in the COI; (4) the officer and the court ignored the overwhelming evidence of violence towards minorities; and (5) the decision betrayed a biased and formulaic approach which did not fairly access the danger to the applicant’s life and was unreasonable. The written submission repeated the written submission in support of the appeal before (see [7] of our judgment). It also stated that the applicant had never been accused, charged, interrogated, arrested, detained and imprisoned in India; and the Director of Immigration, the Torture Claims Appeal Board and the court had ignored various provisions in the Basic Law, Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations Convention Against Torture and authorities relating to high standards of fairness, state acquiescence and Wednesbury unreasonableness. We are of the view that the grounds put forward by the applicant do not constitute viable grounds for granting leave to appeal. Critically, all the grounds relate solely to the circumstances and facts of the applicant’s claim. No question of great general and public importance has been identified, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Ordinance. Further, the grounds are general assertions and do not engage the reasons we gave for dismissing the appeal. There is no explanation as to how the authorities, legislations and international conventions cited in the written submission relate to his claim. We also do not see any basis for the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b). As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, the Notice of Motion is dismissed. The applicant, unrepresented, acting in person.
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RE SATWINDER SINGH
CA · [2026] HKCA 1893
This judgment