HE WEI v. ZHAO JIANGONG

HCA 732/2025

[2026] HKCFI 1886

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 732 OF 2025

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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A. INTRODUCTION

1.  There are 2 matters before the Court:

(1) the Defendant’s appeal against the order of Master Kay Seto (“Master”) dated 17 September 2025 (“Order”), by which the Master dismissed the Defendant’s summons dated 27 May 2025 (“Stay Summons”), whereby the Defendant sought, inter alia, the following orders:

(a) to set aside the Writ of Summons filed on 11 April 2025 (“Writ”) and the service of it on the Defendant;

(b) further or in the alternative, a declaration that the Court has no jurisdiction over the Defendant; and

(c) further or in the alternative, a stay of the present proceedings in favour of Beijing No 4 Intermediate People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China (“Beijing Court”) on forum non conveniens grounds; and

(2) the Defendant’s summons dated 27 February 2026 (“New Evidence Summons”) to file the Defendant’s 2^nd Affirmation dated 26 February 2026 (“Zhao 2^nd”) together with the exhibits thereof (collectively “New Evidence”).

2.  As the appeal is made against the Master’s Order under Order 58 rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A) (“RHC”), the hearing before me is a rehearing of the Stay Summons.

3.  Further, as the Plaintiff has agreed that the New Evidence may be considered by the Court on a de bene esse basis, I will deal with the New Evidence Summons at the end of this Decision.

B. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

4.  The Plaintiff is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) residing in Beijing. She is a practicing lawyer and a partner of King and Wood Mallesons (“KWM China”) in Beijing.

5.  The Defendant is a Hong Kong permanent resident residing in Hong Kong.

6.  The Plaintiff’s case is that:

(1) The Defendant is an experienced financial investor in Hong Kong.

(2) In around January 2020, the parties verbally agreed that the Defendant would invest the Plaintiff’s monies, which was in his possession on the Plaintiff’s behalf, for 1 year and regardless of the investment result, the Defendant would pay to the Plaintiff the investment principal with a return of 10% after 1 year (“Alleged 1^st Agreement”).

(3) Subsequently:

(a) On 24 February 2020, with the Plaintiff’s consent, the Defendant converted all the Plaintiff’s monies in his possession at the time, into a sum of US$2,657,624.99. Amongst this sum, the Defendant transferred US$2,500,000 to his introducing broker account and utilised and/or invested US$2,500,000 (“Alleged 1^st Sum”). Regarding the remaining sum of US$157,624.99, the Defendant indicated to the Plaintiff on 20 March 2020 that he had converted the said sum into GBP135,067.77 (“Alleged 2^nd Sum”).

(b) On 23 and 24 February 2020, the Plaintiff made further transfers to the Defendant from her China Merchants Bank account in China (“P’s Merchants Account”) in the total amount of RMB3,500,000. The Defendant indicated to the Plaintiff that he had converted the said sum into US$505,342.19 in March 2020 for the purpose of investing on the Plaintiff’s behalf (“Alleged 3^rd Sum”).

(c) In May 2020, the Plaintiff made further transfers to the Defendant from P’s Merchants Account in the total amount of RMB5,000,000 and the Defendant indicated that he had converted the said sum into US$714,285.71 in May 2020 for the purpose of investing on the Plaintiff’s behalf (“Alleged 4th Sum”).

(d) On 5 November 2020 and 2 December 2020, the Plaintiff made further transfers to the Defendant from P’s Merchants Account in the total amount of RMB3,000,000. The Defendant indicated that he had converted the said sum into US$456,051.81 for the purpose of investing on the Plaintiff’s behalf (“Alleged 5^th Sum”).

(4) In particular, in respect of the Alleged 1^st Sum and the Alleged 2^nd Sum, a substantial source of them (i.e. US$2,657,624.99) came from HK$20,486,175.41 that the Plaintiff transferred from her account with Bank of East Asia in Hong Kong (“P’s BEA Account”) to the Defendant in Hong Kong.

(5) When the Alleged 1st Sum was about to mature in February 2021 under the Alleged 1^st Agreement, the parties agreed that the Defendant would continue to invest the Plaintiff’s monies, which was in his possession on the Plaintiff’s behalf, with the investment period be extended to 2 years and regardless of the investment result, the Defendant would pay to the Plaintiff the investment principal with an annual return interest of 10% when the investment matured (“Alleged 2^nd Agreement”). The Alleged 1^st Agreement and the Alleged 2^nd Agreement will hereinafter be collectively referred to as the “Alleged Agreements”.

(6) After the maturity of the investments of the Alleged 1^st Sum, the Alleged 2^nd Sum, the Alleged 3^rd Sum, the Alleged 4^th Sum and the Alleged 5^th Sum (together the “Alleged 5 Sums”), the Plaintiff requested the Defendant for repayments. However, the Defendant only made the following partial repayments to the Plaintiff:

(a) On 25 April 2022, the Defendant transferred HK$5 million to the Plaintiff’s account with Standard Chartered Bank in Hong Kong (“P’s SCB Account”);

(b) On 24 May 2022, the Defendant transferred HK$4 million to P’s SCB Account;

(c) On 13 June 2022, the Defendant paid HK$1.55 million and US$30,511 in cash;

(d) On 18 November 2022, the Defendant transferred HK$5 million to P’s SCB Account; and

(e) On 25 May 2023, the Defendant transferred HK$2.5 million to the Plaintiff’s account with Bank of China in Hong Kong.

(7) Accordingly, the Plaintiff commenced the present proceedings on 11 April 2025 claiming for the outstanding principal and interest from the Defendant. Further or alternatively, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant is liable in restitution for the money had and received, namely, the Alleged 5 Sums, together with interest thereon.

7.  After the Plaintiff filed the Writ, the following material events took place:

(1) On 27 May 2025, the Defendant issued the Stay Summons.

(2) On 17 September 2025, the Master made the Order dismissing the Stay Summons.

(3) On 29 September 2025, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal against the Order.

(4) On 27 February 2026 (i.e. 13 days before this hearing), the Defendant issued the New Evidence Summons.

C. THE STAY SUMMONS

C1. Relevant legal principles for forum non conveniens applications

8.  The legal principles for forum non conveniens applications are well-settled and have been summarised by the Court of Final Appeal in SPH v SA (2014) 17 HKCFAR 364 at §51 as follows:

“(1) The single question to be decided is whether there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of an action, i.e. in which the action may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice?

(2) In order to answer this question, the applicant for the stay has to establish that first, Hong Kong is not the natural or appropriate forum (‘appropriate’ in this context means the forum has the most real and substantial connection with the action) and second, there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong. Failure by the applicant to establish these two matters at this stage is fatal.

(3) If the applicant is able to establish both of these two matters, then the plaintiff in the Hong Kong proceedings has to show that he will be deprived of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage if the action is tried in a forum other than Hong Kong.

(4) If the plaintiff is able to establish this, the court will have to balance the advantages of the alternative forum with the disadvantages that the plaintiff may suffer. Deprivation of one or more personal advantages will not necessarily be fatal to the applicant for the stay if he is able to establish to the court’s satisfaction that substantial justice will be done in the available appropriate forum.” (emphasis added)

9.  In determining the appropriate forum, the approach is not simply an exercise in loading up factors which point to any jurisdiction. The Court is required to focus on the appropriateness of a forum from the point of view of the trial of the action: Rambas Marketing Co LLC v Chow Kam Fai David [2001] 3 HKC 250 at 255B-C per Recorder Ma SC (as he then was).

10.  Further, it has been held by Litton VP (as he then was) in The Kapitan Shvetsov [1997] HKLRD 374 at 377E-F that where a party has exercised an undoubted right of access to a preferred forum, the Court will not lightly disturb such a right. For that reason, the burden of proof on the defendant who has been served in Hong Kong in a stay application has been described as a “very high burden”: Chen Yu v Sky Merit Limited & Ors [2023] HKCFI 1638 at §20 per DHCJ H Au-Yeung (as he then was).

C2. Discussion

11.  To begin with, the Writ was properly served on the Defendant at his address in Hong Kong. The jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Court over the Defendant has thus been established “as of right” and there is no basis for the Defendant to set aside the Writ and the service of it, and to seek a declaration that the Court has no jurisdiction over the Defendant: 四川順利昌隆科技有限公司 v Sze Ming Yee & Ors [2021] HKCFI 2289 at §2 per Linda Chan J.

12.  Accordingly, the only matter in the Stay Summons requiring this Court’s de novo determination is whether the present proceedings should be stayed on the forum non conveniens grounds.

13.  As can be seen from §§8-10 above, given that the Writ was served as of right upon the Defendant, he has a very high burden to satisfy the Court that:

(1) Hong Kong is not the natural forum or the forum which has the most real and substantial connection with the present action; and

(2) The Beijing Court is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the Hong Kong Court.

(1) Is Hong Kong the natural or appropriate forum?

14.  The Defendant relies upon the following matters to support his case that Hong Kong is not the natural or appropriate forum which has the most real and substantial connection with the present action:

(1) The transactions in dispute took place in the PRC;

(2) Save for 1 single transaction for HK$20,486,175.41 (see §6(4) above), all transactions corresponding to the Plaintiff’s claim were denominated in Renminbi, which is the lawful currency of the PRC;

(3) The agreements concerning the transactions in dispute were established in the PRC;

(4) The applicable law to the transactions in dispute is the laws of PRC; and

(5) The Defendant commenced a claim against the Plaintiff in the Beijing Court on 24 February 2026 (“PRC Action”). It would be undesirable for the Hong Kong Court and the Beijing Court to arrive at different views on the financial dealings between the parties.

15.  As regards §14(1) above:

(1) It is the Plaintiff’s case that the intended and actual place of performance of the Alleged Agreements was Hong Kong by reason of the following matters:

(a) In respect of the Alleged 1^st Sum and the Alleged 2^nd Sum, HK$20,486,175.41 were transferred from P’s BEA Account in Hong Kong to the Defendant in Hong Kong (see §6(4) above);

(b) Although the Plaintiff made other transfers to the Defendant in the PRC, the Defendant had transferred the monies to Hong Kong, converted the monies into US dollars, invested the monies and is still possessing the monies in Hong Kong because:

(i) the Defendant is a permanent resident of Hong Kong who has been doing extensive investments in Hong Kong with his company, New Vision Group, which is based in Hong Kong;

(ii) the Defendant could only convert the monies into US dollars in the way he described in Hong Kong;

(iii) the Defendant indicated to the Plaintiff that he had transferred the Plaintiff’s monies to the Defendant’s introducing broker account. Since there was no individual introducing broker account as a matter of legal regulations in the PRC, the Defendant must have transferred the monies to his introducing broker account in Hong Kong; and

(iv) the Defendant made partial repayments to the Plaintiff in Hong Kong dollars by transferring the same to the Plaintiff’s bank account in Hong Kong.

(2) Despite having a very high burden to satisfy the Court that Hong Kong is not the natural or appropriate forum (see §10 above), the Defendant has not filed any evidence to deny any of the matters set out in §15(1) above in any of his affirmations. As such, it is difficult to see how the Defendant can contend that the transactions in dispute took place in the PRC.

(3) Further, Mr Ngai, appearing on behalf of the Defendant, sought to argue in §§18 and 19 of his skeleton submissions and at the hearing that (a) the Plaintiff has been cherry-picking transactions as she sees fit from the parties’ dealings to advance her claim based on the Alleged Agreements; (b) there are no documents suggesting the sum of HK$20,486,175.41 was “partly investment and partly repayment of a loan” from the Defendant; and (c) “not a single reference is found [in the bank statements, records and WeChat records] to support [the Plaintiff]’s case of repayments”. Again, none of these matters was raised in any of the Defendant’s affirmations and the Defendant has not adduced any evidence to explain how the Plaintiff has allegedly cherry-picked the transactions and what the sum of HK$20,486,175.41 and the alleged repayments were for (if they were not what the Plaintiff contends them to be).

(4) In these circumstances, based on the matters placed before the Court, I find that the intended and actual place of performance of the Alleged Agreements is likely to be Hong Kong.

16.  As regards §14(2) above:

(1) Contrary to the Defendant’s allegation, the alleged transactions did not only involve Renminbi save for 1 single transaction for HK$20,486,175.41. The transactions also involved US dollars and Great Britain pounds (see §6(3) above).

(2) In any event, even if the transactions were all denominated in Renminbi, this factor carries little weight as Hong Kong is an international financial centre, where multi-currency transactions are commonplace. In this Court’s view, the place of performance of the Alleged Agreements is of far greater significance, which for the reasons already set out in §15 above, is likely to be Hong Kong.

17.  As regards §14(3) above:

(1) It is the Plaintiff’s case that the Alleged Agreements were reached “over the phone” with the Plaintiff in Beijing and the Defendant in Hong Kong. The Defendant has not denied the same in any of his affirmations.

(2) Accordingly, the place where the Alleged Agreements were made is only a neutral factor in the forum non conveniens analysis.

18.  As regards §14(4) above:

(1) The governing law of a contract is determined by a 3-stage test:

(a) Whether the parties have expressly agreed upon the law to govern their contract;

(b) In the absence of an express choice, whether there is factual basis for inferring an agreement on the governing law; and

(c) Failing the above, a residual rule (i.e. a system of law by reference to which the contract was made or that with which the transaction has the closest and most real connection) applies.

See Johnston, The Conflicts of Laws in Hong Kong (4^th edn) at §§5.005 & 5.010.

(2) In determining the closest and most real connection, the place of intended performance is generally viewed as a very important factor: Johnston, The Conflict of Laws in Hong Kong, §5.011. As noted in §15 above, the place of intended performance is likely to be Hong Kong.

(3) Further, the Defendant is a permanent resident in Hong Kong and his repayments to the Plaintiff in Hong Kong in Hong Kong dollars are factors pointing to the transactions having their closest and most real connection to Hong Kong.

(4) Accordingly, I am of the view that based on the matters placed before this Court, there is at least a good arguable case that Hong Kong law is the system of laws with which the transactions in question have their closest and most real connection.

(5) In any event, even if the Alleged Agreements are governed by PRC law, this factor should carry little weight, as Hong Kong courts are accustomed to dealing with foreign laws including Mainland law: Rambas at 266H-I per Recorder Ma SC (as he then was); Pei Zheng Middle School v China Pui Ching Education Foundation Ltd (unrep, CACV 262/2005, 21.2.2006) at §20 per Cheung JA.

19.  As regards §14(5) above:

(1) The PRC Action was commenced by the Defendant and a company controlled by him, namely, 北京杰奕汇通谘询顾问有限公司 (“D’s Company”), on 24 February 2026 in the Beijing Court, seeking to recover a total sum of RMB19,661,352.36 from the Plaintiff, which allegedly represents the sum provided by the Defendant to the Plaintiff’s clients, namely, 张家港美景荣化学工业有限公司, 张家港市景荣化学工业有限公司 and 张家港华美生物材料有限公司(together “美景荣Group”) as litigation funding in the 美景荣case (“美景荣PRC Case”), interest on the litigation funding and the outstanding earnings together with costs.

(2) According to the materials placed before this Court, the 美景荣PRC Case involved美景荣 Group, which required funding to litigate in two rights-protection litigations. Upon the Plaintiff’s invitation, the Defendant and D’s Company provided around RMB3.68 million as litigation funding to 美景荣 Group. Subsequently, a settlement agreement was reached and the litigations were withdrawn by 美景荣Group, which led to the Defendant commencing an arbitration in 2023 against 美景荣 Group for a share of the settlement fee. The arbitral tribunal handed down its arbitral award dated 24 June 2024 (“Arbitral Award”) and enforcement award dated 9 May 2025 (“Enforcement Award”), awarding D’s Company around RMB4 million as the cost and interest of the litigation funding and RMB15 million as the Defendant’s share in the settlement fee.

(3) In this regard:

(a) As a general rule, the fact that to permit the Hong Kong action to be pursued would result in concurrent actions on the same subject matter proceeding in two different jurisdictions could not be sufficient to justify depriving the plaintiff of the advantage to which he was entitled to choose Hong Kong as a forum in which he preferred to litigate the matter. It is only in exceptional cases where the existence of parallel proceedings might cause unusual hardship to a defendant that an action might be stayed on that ground: Elite Consortium Limited & Ors v Yim Wan Por & Ors [2022] HKCFI 3303 at §§37-38 per Ng J.

(b) Further, as pointed out by Lord Goff of Chieveley in De Dampierre v De Dampierre [1988] AC 92 at 108C (cited by Kwan VP in Bright Shipping Ltd v Changhong Group (HK) Ltd (No. 2) [2019] 5 HKLRD 30 at §34), the existence of other relevant proceedings already pending in another forum “may be of no relevance at all, for example, if one party has commenced the proceedings for the purpose of demonstrating the existence of a competing jurisdiction, or the proceedings have not passed beyond the stage of initiating process” (emphasis added).

(4) In the present case, the PRC Action was only commenced on 24 February 2026 (i.e. 2 weeks before this hearing). The Defendant has simply stated in Zhao 2^nd that he has been “actively seeking legal advice” in the PRC upon commencement of the present action by the Plaintiff and his application in disputing the jurisdiction of Hong Kong Court without any explanation as to why he could not have commenced the PRC Action earlier, especially when the 美景荣PRC Case was concluded on 9 May 2025 (see §19(2) above).

(5) In these circumstances, I consider that the PRC Action was simply commenced by the Defendant shortly before this hearing for the purpose of demonstrating the existence of a competing jurisdiction and has no relevance in the forum non conveniens analysis in the present case.

(6) In any event, as submitted by the Plaintiff, the Statement of Claim for the PRC Action makes no reference to the Alleged 5 Sums. Therefore, the PRC Action does not appear to be relevant to the issues in the present action and hence the PRC Action and the current proceedings cannot be said to be concurrent actions on the same subject matter.

20.  For the above reasons and particularly in light of the evidence placed before this Court which suggest that the intended place of performance of the Alleged Agreements is likely to be Hong Kong and the governing law of the Alleged Agreements is Hong Kong law, I am not satisfied that Defendant has discharged the burden in showing that Hong Kong is not the natural or appropriate forum.

(2) Is Beijing Court clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong?

21.  For completeness, even though the Defendant has failed to establish that Hong Kong is not the natural or appropriate forum, I will briefly consider whether the Beijing Court is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong in the paragraphs below.

22.  The Defendant submits that the proceedings should be conducted in the Beijing Court or another PRC Court when considering the best interests and convenience of the parties to the proceedings. In particular, the Defendant relies upon the following, inter alia, matters:

(1) The Defendant would have difficulties in calling PRC witnesses (including staff from KWM China and PRC bank staff) and obtaining documents from KWM China and PRC banks;

(2) The Beijing Court is specifically available for disputes involving claims under RMB200 million and of concern with cross-border transactions with Hong Kong; and

(3) The question of the Plaintiff’s liability under PRC law for cross border financial arrangement would be bypassed and substantial injustice would be caused to the Defendant.

23.  In respect of §22(1) above:

(1) First, the Defendant has simply alleged that he would have difficulties in calling PRC witnesses without giving particulars as to who those witnesses are, what can they testify to and what are the difficulties in calling them. In these circumstances, I am not convinced that there is any need for the trial judge to hear evidence from any unknown witnesses residing in the PRC whom the Defendant may have difficulties in calling: Pei Zheng Middle School at §§21-22 per Cheung JA.

(2) Second, the mere fact of the foreign location of the relevant documents is not necessarily supportive of the proposition that the foreign court is the more appropriate forum to try the case. The Defendant should further show that, for example, there is at least a risk that some of these documents may not be made available if the trial is to be conducted locally: Rambas at 264B-C per Recorder Ma SC (as he then was). However, in respect of the documents allegedly to be obtained from KWM China and PRC banks, the Defendant has not explained in any of his affirmations as to what those documents are and what is their relevance to the present action: Pei Zheng Middle School at §22 per Cheung JA.

24.  In respect of §22(2) above, whilst the Beijing Court may be available for hearing the present dispute, a very important point to note is that the Defendant has been validly served in Hong Kong. As a result, the Plaintiff is entitled to proceed against the Defendant as of right here. This Court should not lightly interfere with such a right of the Plaintiff and the present case is clearly not a case which justifies such interference. In any event, the question is whether the Beijing Court is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong. Mere availability of the Beijing Court to hear the dispute does not meet such high threshold.

25.  In respect of §22(3) above:

(1) Such matter relates to the advantage that the Plaintiff may enjoy and the disadvantage that the Defendant may suffer if the matter were to be tried in Hong Kong. However, as can be seen from §8 above, if the Defendant cannot establish that Hong Kong is not the natural forum or the forum which has the most real and substantial connection with the action and Beijing Court is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong, then it is unnecessary for this Court to balance the advantages of the alternative forum with the disadvantages that the plaintiff may suffer.

(2) In any event, even if the issue of PRC foreign exchange control regulations may arise in the present proceedings, Hong Kong court is accustomed to dealing with PRC law issues: Rambas at 266H-I per Recorder Ma SC (as he then was); Pei Zheng Middle School at §20 per Cheung JA.

26.  In addition to the above matters, this Court has taken into account the fact that the Defendant is a permanent resident in Hong Kong. Further, whilst the Plaintiff is a resident in Beijing, she has indicated that she is willing to travel to Hong Kong for the purpose of conducting the present proceedings.

27.  Accordingly, even if the Defendant has shown that Hong Kong is not the natural or appropriate forum, I am not satisfied that the Defendant has discharged the burden in showing that the Beijing Court is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong.

28.  In these circumstances, it is unnecessary for me to consider the other issues set out in SPH v SA, including, inter alia, whether the Plaintiff will be deprived of any legitimate personal or juridical advantage if the action were to be tried in the Beijing Court.

29.  For completeness, I note the Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendant has no arguable defence. This issue was not raised by the Plaintiff in her affirmation. In any event, given my views above, it is unnecessary for this Court to deal with such a contention.

30.  For the reasons stated above, the Stay Summons must be dismissed.

D. THE NEW EVIDENCE SUMMONS

31.  Shortly before this hearing, the Defendant took out the New Evidence Summons.

32.  In gist, by the New Evidence Summons, the Defendant seeks to adduce evidence to show that the PRC Action was commenced on 24 February 2026.

33.  In this regard, Order 58 rule 1(5) of the RHC provides that no further evidence (other than evidence as to matters that have occurred after the date on which the judgment, order or decision was given or made) may be received on the hearing of an appeal except on “special grounds”.

34.  The principles relevant to the application of the exception have been summarised by Au JA in Re China Fishery Group Limited [2020] HKCA 169 at §26 as follows:

(1) The Court has a wide discretion in relation to admitting fresh evidence of matters which occurred after trial, but it should always be exercised sparingly with due regard to the need for finality in litigation.

(2) It is impossible to produce an exhaustive list of the considerations relevant to the exercise of that discretion, but relevant factors would include the timing when the new evidence emerged and the conduct of the parties.

(3) The evidence should be admitted in all cases where it would be an affront to one’s sense of fairness not to admit it. In applying that test, the Court takes into account all the circumstances, before, during and after trial.

(4) The new evidence must substantially affect a basic assumption made at the trial below: the matter is one of degree.

35.  In the present case, the PRC Action was commenced five months after the Order was given. Crucially, despite the fact that the Arbitral Award and the Enforcement Award were already handed down on 24 June 2024 and 9 May 2025 respectively (see §19(2) above), the Defendant only commenced the PRC Action two weeks before this hearing and has offered no credible explanation for this delay. In the absence of any such explanation, the only inference that this Court can draw is that the PRC Action was commenced tactically by the Defendant, merely to demonstrate a competing jurisdiction at this hearing. To admit evidence obtained in such a manner would be an affront to the need for finality in litigation. In any event, the New Evidence has no impact on the outcome of this appeal for reasons set out in §19 above.

36.  Accordingly, I refuse the New Evidence Summons.

E. CONCLUSION

37.  For the reasons given above, I dismiss the appeal and the New Evidence Summons.

38.  There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. I therefore make an order nisi that costs of the appeal and the New Evidence Summons be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff with certificate for one counsel, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.