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RE MOHIDEEN BAWA MOHAMED RAFEEK alias MOHAMED NIYAS MOHAMED NAWSAR alias MOHAMMED IBRAHIM MOHAMMED LATHIF alias MOHAMMED IBRAHIM LATHIF
RE MOHIDEEN BAWA MOHAMED RAFEEK alias MOHAMED NIYAS MOHAMED NAWSAR alias MOHAMMED IBRAHIM MOHAMMED LATHIF alias MOHAMMED IBRAHIM LATHIF
[2026] HKCA 2076 · CACV 31/2026
Court of Appeal
CACV 31/2026 [2026] HKCA 2076 On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 194 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 31 OF 2026 (ON AN APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 2062 OF 2020) _____________________ _____________________ Before: Hon Chu VP and Hon Cheng J in Court Date of Judgment: 4 November 2026 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Cheng J (giving the Judgment of the Court): By our judgment handed down on 13 April 2026 ([2026] HKCA 483) (“the Judgment”), we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 8 January 2026 dismissing the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review. On 8 May 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal against the Judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant also lodged written submissions to support the application. Having considered the Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing. We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case. The background to this case, the applicant’s claim and the reasons for refusing the application are set out in the Judgment and will not be repeated here, save to point out that the applicant sought in the appeal before us to adduce fresh evidence of a police report dated 8 July 2025 (“the 2025 Statement”), said to show that the applicant is still being pursued by his enemies in Sri Lanka. Our reasons for declining to admit the 2025 Statement were set out at [13] of the Judgment. Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision. In the Notice of Motion, the applicant states that he disagrees with the decisions of the court and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”), that the applicant’s claim was not properly scrutinised and that he would be killed by his enemies as the problem in his home country is severe. In his written submissions lodged on 21 May 2026, the applicant raised two questions said to be questions of great general or public importance, namely: (1) What is the correct legal test for admitting post-decision evidence and whether the three conditions in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 apply without modification, or whether a more flexible test as recognised in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Aziz [1999] INLR 355 and approved in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Azkhosravi [2001] EWCA Civ 977 is required, having regard to the duty of “high standards of fairness” and “anxious scrutiny” in Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289 and the unique nature of non-refoulement claims where the consequences of refusal may be irreversible? (2) Where an unrepresented litigant advances a non-refoulement appeal before the Court of Appeal, and where the grounds of appeal are expressed in general terms, what is the extent of the Court of Appeal’s duty to scrutinise the record of the Board and the Court of First Instance to identify arguable errors of public law, and does a failure by the Court of Appeal to give effect to that duty constitute a procedural irregularity or error of law? On Question (1), the applicant submitted that this question was of great general or public importance because: (i) the 2025 Statement post-dated the Board’s decision of 23 September 2020; (ii) the applicant was unrepresented with limited access to legal assistance in obtaining evidence from Sri Lanka; (iii) the difficulty in obtaining corroborative evidence in non-refoulement claims is recognised in various UNHCR guidance and case law, such that it would be an error of law to dismiss the applicant’s case purely on the basis of an absence of corroborative documentary evidence; (iv) if the 2025 Statement is not admitted, the applicant will face a risk of torture or death upon refoulement on the basis of an incomplete factual record of his claim; (v) we refused to admit the 2025 Statement solely by reference to the conditions in Ladd v Marshall without considering whether a modified or a more flexible approach should be adopted, as recognised in the English authorities in Aziz and Azkhosravi. On Question (2), the applicant submitted that there is a need for the courts to clarify (i) the requirement of an applicant to identify grounds with reasonable particularity; and (ii) what the duty of “high standards of fairness” and the requirement of “anxious scrutiny” entail for the appellate court in determining whether there is any arguable public law error in reviewing a refusal of leave. Discussion Regarding Question (1), we note the 2025 Statement was purportedly dated 8 July 2025. It therefore existed at the time of the hearing before the Judge on 12 December 2025. The applicant has not explained why he could not have adduced it at that hearing. He did not seek leave to present it when he attended the hearing before the Judge. The 2025 Statement was only produced for the first time in his submissions lodged for his appeal to the Court of Appeal on 16 February 2026. We can see no good or sufficient reason why the well-established Ladd v Marshall conditions should be inapplicable, or should be modified in appeals concerning non-refoulement cases, on the facts of the present case. For reasons given at [13] of our Judgment, the first and second conditions under Ladd v Marshall were not satisfied; the 2025 Statement could have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use in the court below, and it would not have influenced the outcome of his case. We note that if the evidence came into existence and related to events after the hearing below, whether it could have been adduced in evidence is not governed by the usual Ladd v Marshall conditions, but is subject to a wide discretion of this court, albeit exercised sparingly with due regard to the need for finality in litigation (Moazzam Firoze v Torture Claims Appeal Board & Ors [2025] HKCA 812 at [16], citing Re China Fishery Group Ltd [2020] HKCA 169 at [26]). As stated by the Court of Appeal in Fernandez Lonilyn Mabasa v Torture Claims Appeal Board & Ors [2021] HKCA 704 at [14], although the Court of Appeal has wider discretion to admit fresh evidence in an appeal from judicial review proceedings than in ordinary civil litigation, the applicant has to show wholly exceptional circumstances, or a strong public interest, to justify the court’s exercise of such wider discretion (Dr Kwong Kwok Hay v Medical Council of Hong Kong (No. 2) [2007] 4 HKC 446 at [10]-[11]). In other words, the Court of Appeal’s wider discretion in judicial review appeals is not unbounded. It is exercised sparingly and only where the interests of justice require it. The mere fact that the applicant is unrepresented and faces difficulties in obtaining evidence from his home country does not, without more, constitute wholly exceptional circumstances or a strong public interest sufficient to justify the admission of fresh evidence. In any event, even if the 2025 Statement could constitute evidence of threats to the applicant and his family, it would not have assisted the applicant’s case as the Board rejected his core claims of political persecution, abduction, the witnessing of the beheading of Mr R and his fear of the Buddhist extremists and Sri Lankan authorities on credibility grounds. The 2025 Statement is an attempt to relitigate the claim that his enemies are pursuing him and his family, which has already been rejected by the Board. Therefore, even if the 2025 Statement came into existence or related to events after the hearing below, the applicant fails to show that there are wholly exceptional or strong public interest to admit it. Furthermore, the cited authorities of R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Aziz [1999] INLR 355 and R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Azkhosravi [2001] EWCA Civ 977 do not advance the applicant’s case any further. In those cases, the courts recognised that the exercise of discretion to admit additional evidence has to be balanced against the credibility of the evidence or its cogency in relation to the main issues in the case. In the present case, we did not refuse to admit the 2025 Statement solely on the basis that the applicant could have obtained it earlier. We declined to admit it for the additional reason that it would not have influenced the findings of the Board or the outcome of the appeal. Thus, the issues arising in Aziz and Azkhosravi – that the tribunals had focused on why the additional evidence was not adduced earlier without considering the credibility or cogency of the evidence – simply do not arise in this case. Regarding Question (2), the applicant contended that there was no clarity as to the interaction between the requirement that an applicant has to identify grounds with reasonable particularity and the duty of anxious scrutiny owed to an unrepresented non-refoulement claimant. The question does not arise in the circumstances of this case. The Judge gave his independent consideration of the Board’s decision and found that it did not give rise to any arguable ground for applying for judicial review. He further noted that the applicant also did not identify any other ground for consideration. He therefore concluded that there was no arguable basis for the applicant’s intended challenge. In other words, anxious scrutiny was applied, in addition to considering any grounds put forward by the applicant. There is also nothing in the applicant’s argument that the courts have to “actively engage” with the 2025 Statement. The duty of “high standards of fairness” and “anxious scrutiny” requires the court to examine the decision under challenge with care and to consider whether there is any arguable public law error, not to assess the evidence or the claim afresh. The fact that the applicant was unrepresented on appeal does not alter the position. For these reasons, Questions (1) and (2) do not raise any question of great general or public importance that ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision. We also do not see any basis for the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b). As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, the Notice of Motion is dismissed. The applicant, unrepresented, acting in person.
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RE MOHIDEEN BAWA MOHAMED RAFEEK alias MOHAMED NIYAS MOHAMED NAWSAR alias MOHAMMED IBRAHIM MOHAMMED LATHIF alias MOHAMMED IBRAHIM LATHIF
CA · [2026] HKCA 2076
This judgment