LEUNG KIT HING, DORIS v. ELECTORAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION

CAMP 153/2020,
CAMP 196/2020,
CACV 8/2021,
CACV 9/2021 and
CAMP 62/2021
[2021] HKCA 1050

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 153 AND 196 OF 2020

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCB 5651/2020)

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AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO 8 AND 9 OF 2021

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1016/2017)

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AND

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 62 OF 2021

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

A.  Introduction

1.  CAMP 153/2020 was an application brought by Leung Kit-hing, Doris (“Doris Leung”)  by a summons dated 4 September 2020 to set aside a bankruptcy petition and proceedings brought by the Legislative Council Commission against Mr Leung Chung Hang, Sixtus (“Mr Leung”)  in HCB 5651/2020.  Doris Leung claimed to be a relative of Mr Leung. 

2.  In a judgment handed down on 6 November 2020 [2020] HKCA 893, this Court struck out Doris Leung’s summons dated 4 September 2020 as an abuse of process.

3.  In the same judgment, it was further observed that Doris Leung had made numerous unmeritorious applications to courts in respect of litigations involving Mr Leung in which she herself was not a party.

4.  These included proceedings against Mr Leung for recovery of remunerations in DCCJ 4497/2017, criminal proceedings against Mr Leung in KCCC 2035/2017 and bankruptcy proceedings against Mr Leung in HCB 5651/2020.  She also made some satellite judicial review applications in her own name in HCAL 1140/2017 and HCAL 419/2018 in respect of steps taken in KCCC 2035/2017 and in HCAL 1016/2017 in respect of the by-election to fill the vacant seats in the Legislative Council after the disqualification of Mr Leung.  All these applications were struck out as abuse of process and she took out unmeritorious appeals.  After her appeals were dismissed, she unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  Her applications were invariantly ill-formulated, unfocused and incoherent.  As such, the courts had to spend valuable and substantial judicial resources to process her vexatious proceedings and applications.  Such resources could and should be better deployed for other matters.  

5.  In the circumstances, the Court had to consider whether steps should be taken by way of Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”)  and/or Restricted Application Order (“RAO”)  to curtail Doris Leung’s persistent abuses of the court process. 

6.  Therefore, the Secretary for Justice (“SJ”)  was joined as a party to these proceedings to advance submissions on whether an RAO or RPO should be made against Doris Leung arising from matters or litigations involving Mr Leung.

7.  Doris Leung lodged submissions on 20 November 2020 opposing the making of RAO or RPO against her.

8.  Written Submissions for the SJ with proposed terms of the RAO and RPO were lodged on 14 January 2021.  In those submissions, there is an Annex setting out the chronology of events related to the proceedings of Doris Leung.  We found the chronology accurate and useful for present purposes.  The chronology is attached to this judgment as an Annex (see Annex 1).

9.  Doris Leung filed an 3^rd affidavit in CAMP 153/2020 on 8 February 2021 exhibiting her submissions in opposition.  

10.  By a letter dated 21 January 2021, the SJ informed the Court that Messrs Lo & Lo, solicitors for the Legislative Council Commission (“the LCC”)  in HCB 5651/2020 informed them that since the lodging of her written submissions, Doris Leung had commenced a number of proceedings in relation to matters set out in the proposed terms of the RPO and RAO.  As such, the SJ requested leave from this Court to lodge and serve supplemental submissions on RPO and RAO within 14 days of the order and Doris Leung to reply within 14 days thereafter.

11.  On 1 February 2021, this Court granted the leave sought by the SJ.  Supplemental submissions with amended proposed terms of the RAO and RPO were lodged on 10 February 2021 by the SJ.

12.  Instead of filing submissions in opposition to the supplemental submissions, Doris Leung filed a new application in CAMP 62/2021 on 19 February 2021 seeking to set aside the supplemental submissions and the proposed terms of the RAO and RPO.  She amended the summons on 25 February 2021.  As far as we can gather from the very confusing contents of the amended summons, the relief she sought were still directed against the supplemental submissions of the SJ.

13.  On 11 March 2021, this Court handed down another judgment in [2021] HKCA 259 dismissing Doris Leung’s various applications made under CACV 115/2020, CAMP 124/2020, CAMP 170/2020 and CAMP 178/2020.

14.  In that judgment, this Court made an interim order restraining Doris Leung from filing any proceedings and applications in the Court of Appeal on matters arising from proceedings involving Mr Leung pending determination on RPO and RAO.  If Doris Leung insisted on filing such proceedings or applications, they would be expunged from the court files with a direction that she can collect the same within 7 days, failing which they would be disposed of without being read by the Court.

15.  Before the making of the interim order, there were also a number of outstanding applications made by Doris Leung.  

16.  In this judgment, we shall address the same by reference to the following matters:

(1)  Whether or not an RAO/RPO should be made against Doris Leung;

(2)  The summonses dated 19 and 25 February 2021 filed by Doris Leung under CAMP 62/2021 (“the February Summonses”);

(3)  The summons filed by Doris Leung on 27 October 2020 and 18 December 2020 under CAMP 196/2020 (“the October and December Summonses”)

(4)  The summonses dated 6 and 13 November 2020 filed by Doris Leung under CAMP 153/2020 (“the November Summonses”)

(5)  The notice of motion filed on 11 November 2020 filed by Doris Leung under CAMP 153/2020; and

(6)  The notice of appeal and the amended notice of appeal filed on 11 January 2021, the supplementary notice of appeal filed on 12 January 2021, the two amended notices of appeal filed on 21 January 2021 and 16 April 2021, the summons filed on 11 January 2021 and the amended summons filed on 21 January 2021 under CACV 8/2021; and the notice of appeal filed on 11 January 2021, the two amended notices of appeal filed on 11 January 2021 and 16 April 2021, and the summons filed on 11 January 2021 in CACV 9/2021.

B.  Litigation History of Doris Leung

17.  Doris Leung commenced a litany of proceedings and made unmeritorious applications in other proceedings to which she was not a party and had no standing to intervene.  We shall summarize the essential history of her litigation below. 

B1.  DCCJ 4497/2017 and CACV 333/2018

18.  DCCJ 4497/2017 was brought by the LCC to recover remuneration paid to Mr Leung after his disqualification.  Doris Leung was not a party to that action but she made unsuccessful attempts to adduce evidence in the proceedings. 

19.  She brought various appeals at different levels of courts after her applications were dismissed. All applications and appeals were struck out as an abuse of process in CACV 333/2018: [2018] HKCA 600 at [8]; [2018] HKCA 921 at [7]; [2019] HKDC 1691 [32] to [33]; [2020] HKCA 377 at [12] and [20].  The history of the abusive proceedings by Doris Leung had been sufficiently set out in the judgments in [2018] HKCA 600, [2018] HKCA 921 and [2020] HKCA 377.

20.  On 5 May 2020, a default judgment was entered against Mr Leung (“the Default Judgment”). 

21.  Meanwhile, by a notice of appeal dated 11 May 2020 and an ex parte summons dated 22 July 2020, Doris Leung sought to appeal against the Default Judgment and she applied for a stay of execution of the Default Judgment.

22.  On 25 September 2020, District Judge KC Chan took the view that the notice of appeal and the summons were “clear, flagrant and repeated abuses of process” and dismissed them accordingly [2020] HKDC 827 at [48]. 

B2.  CACV 115/2020

23.  In CACV 115/2020, Doris Leung filed 2 notices of appeal on 14 May 2020 (“the 2 Notices of Appeal”)  to appeal against the order of District Court Registrar dated 5 May 2020 and the interlocutory orders made by District Judge A Li and District Judge H Leong in DCCJ 4497/2017. 

24.  In the context of CACV 115/2020, Doris Leung filed 4 summonses on 28 May 2020, 14, 15, and 16 July 2020 (collectively, “the 4 Summonses”)  seeking, inter alia, to set aside an order made by this Court in CACV 333/2018 dismissing her application for extension of time for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and stay of the execution of the Default Judgment. 

25.  By directions given to Doris Leung on 3 August 2020, the Registrar of Civil Appeals (“RCA”)  observed the 2 Notices of Appeal and the 4 Summonses were liable to be struck out.  The RCA pointed out that an appeal against an order of the District Court Registrar should be filed in the District Court by way of appeal to a District Judge, not the Court of Appeal; and appeals against orders or decisions of a District Judge required leave from the District Judge and in her case, no leave had been obtained.  Since then, Doris Leung filed two Amended Supplementary Notices of Appeal in CACV 115/2020. 

26.  We agreed with the reasons of the RCA and ordered on 11 March 2021 that the appeal and the 4 Summonses be struck out and dismissed in [2021] HKCA 259 at [19]. 

B3.  CAMP 124/2020 and CAMP 178/2020

27.  Doris Leung filed a summons on 10 August 2020 and an amended summons on 11 August 2020 under CAMP 124/2020 challenging the decisions of the District Court Registrar and District Judge Leong in DCCJ 4497/2017.

28.  On 25 September 2020, Doris Leung issued a summons in CAMP 178/2020 for leave to appeal against District Judge KC Chan’s judgment of that date in DCCJ 4497/2017. 

29.  This Court dismissed the summonses in CAMP 124/2020 and CAMP 178/2020 in [2021] HKCA 259.  At [22], we said:

“ …The fundamental and serious incurable defect in Ms Leung’s attempts to be engaged in these proceedings is, as this Court has repeatedly said in dismissing her earlier applications, that she simply has no locus in DCCJ 4497/2017. ...”

B4.  HCB 5651/2020 and CAMP 153/2020

30.  Bankruptcy petition was presented by the LCC against Mr Leung in HCB 5651/2020.  On 4 September 2020, Doris Leung filed a summons under CAMP 153/2020 seeking to set aside the proceedings.  She was not a party to HCB 5651/2020 and had not made any application in the bankruptcy court for joinder. 

31.  On 25 September 2020, the RCA intimated to Doris Leung that her summons dated 4 September 2020 was liable to be struck out because, inter alia, she was not a party to the bankruptcy proceedings and had no locus to set aside the petition.  The RCA directed Doris Leung to lodge her written submissions stating why the said summons should not be struck out.  Her submissions were lodged on 12 October 2020.

32.  On 6 November 2020, this Court rejected her submissions and struck out her summons of 4 September 2020 as an abuse of process (“the November Judgment”)  [2020] HKCA 893.

33.  On 11 November 2020, Doris Leung filed a notice of motion seeking, inter alia, (1)  leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the November Judgment; (2)  the November Judgment be varied, discharged and/or set aside; (3)  stay of the bankruptcy proceedings in HCB 5651/2020 pending “determination” by the Court of Final Appeal and the European Court of Human Rights; and (4)  paragraphs 11 to 18 of the November Judgment be set aside. 

34.  On 13 November 2020, Doris Leung filed yet another summons seeking, inter alia, (1)  leave to stay all bankruptcy proceedings against Mr Leung pending determination by the Court of Final Appeal and the European Court of Human Rights; (2)  the November Judgment be varied, discharged and/or set aside and (3)  the proposal of the Court of Appeal to grant the RAO and RPO against her be set aside. 

35.  On 20 November 2020, Doris Leung lodged written submissions on RAO and RPO.  She claimed that she was advancing public interest in pursuing these litigations and protecting the human rights of Mr Leung.  She also claimed to act as “a representative of majority voters of Mr Leung”.  It would appear that she had every intention of continuing to intermeddle in litigations regarding matters arising from Mr Leung’s disqualification.

36.  As mentioned, she filed another set of submissions on 8 February 2021 by way of exhibit to her 3^rd Affidavit.  In those submissions, apart from reiterating her arguments on her previous applications, she contended that the SJ pursued the applications for RAO and RPO by virtue of her litigation interest in the costs order made in HCAL 1016/2017, in respect of which Doris Leung is challenging in CACV 8/2021 and CACV 9/2021.  She also contended that she needed to proceed urgently in “two matters for family” and Mr Leung is one of the family members.  She did not give particulars for such family matters and how and why she needed to proceed urgently in those respects.  She only asserted that the proposed RPO would seriously affect “the interests of all parties including family and voters, citizens of public”, again without explaining how this would be so.

B5.  HCAL 1140/2017 and CACV 36/2018; HCAL 419/2018 and CACV  104/2018

37.  HCAL 1140/2017 and HCAL 419/2018 were applications by Doris Leung seeking leave to apply for judicial review of decisions of the magistrates in the Kowloon City Magistracy in a criminal case.  Her complaint arose out of her various attempts to produce evidence as an “informer” or a “witness” in criminal proceedings in KCCC 2035/2017 in which Mr Leung was one of the 5 defendants.  Doris Leung herself was not a party in the said criminal proceedings.

38.  HCAL 1140/2017, which was refused by Au J (as he then was)  on 3 January 2018.  The appeal against Au J’s decision in CACV 36/2018 was struck out by another division of this Court (Lam VP, Yuen and Poon JJA)  on 28 February 2018 due to the absence of a proper notice of appeal and her non-compliance with an unless order dated 20 February 2018 to seek extension of time to appeal [2018] HKCA 269.  Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed. 

39.  In HCAL 419/2018, Chow J considered her application not reasonably arguable and dismissed the same as an abuse of process on 12 April 2018: [2018] HKCFI 719. 

40.  Her subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal and application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal were also dismissed: [2018] HKCA 599; [2018] HKCA 919. 

B6.  HCAL 1016/2017

41.  HCAL 1016/2017 was an application by Doris Leung for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Electoral Affairs Commission (“the EAC”)  to arrange for a Legislative Council by-election to fill, inter alia, the vacant seats arising from the disqualification of Mr Leung. 

42.  Doris Leung also applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the EAC from holding the said by-election.  Both applications were dismissed on 9 February 2018 (“the February Order”): [2018] HKCFI 255 at [18].

43.  On 12 February 2018, Doris Leung took out a summons seeking (1)  to vary or discharge the February Order; (2)  stay of the application for judicial review pending clarifications from the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Final Appeal and (3)  an extension of time to serve the notice of appeal against the February Order.

44.  On 15 February 2018, the 12 February 2018 summons was dismissed. 

B7.  CACV 47/2018

45.  In CACV 47/2018, Doris Leung sought to appeal the February Order and the decision made on 15 February 2018.

46.  In the course of proceedings, a number of unless orders were made.  Doris Leung failed to comply with an unless order dated 17 August 2018 (“the Unless Order)  and the appeal was automatically dismissed on 23 August 2018. 

47.  On 4 September 2018, Doris Leung applied for relief from sanction for failing to observe the Unless Order.  The said application was dismissed on 10 December 2018: [2018] HKCA 922 at [22].

48.  By a notice of motion of 4 January 2019 and a summons 25 January 2019, Doris Leung applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 10 December 2018.  She further issued a summons on 18 January 2019 seeking to set aside the directions of the Registrar of Civil Appeals (“RCA”)  for the processing of the motion. 

49.  All her applications were dismissed: [2019] HKCA 330 at [11]. 

B8.  CAMP 177/2020 & CAMP 114/2020

50.  On 25 September 2020, Doris Leung filed a summons in CAMP 177/2020 seeking leave to appeal to this Court against the order of Chow J (as he then was)  of 16 September 2020 in HCAL 1016/2017 related to taxation of costs order previously made against her [2020] HKCFI 2377. 

51.  Prior to Chow J’s judgment of 16 September 2020, Doris Leung had issued a summons in CAMP 114/2020 on 31 July 2020 for leave to this Court seeking to, inter alia, set aside the taxation proceedings, stay of execution of costs orders, to vary and discharge Master J Wong’s decision of 17 July 2020 ([2020] HKCFI 1498)  as well as taxation hearings listed on 23 and 30 June 2020 before Master J Wong and to set aside all costs under HCAL 1016/2017 and CACV 47/2018. 

52.  On 14 January 2021, the applications in CAMP 114 and 177/2020 were dismissed by the Court of Appeal, [2021] HKCA 55.

B9.  CAMP 196/2020

53.  On 27 October 2020, Doris Leung filed a summons in CAMP 196/2020 seeking to, inter alia, set aside the bankruptcy petition against Mr Leung in HCB 5651/2020. 

54.  On 7 December 2020, the RCA directed that the summons in CAMP 196/2020 to be dealt with in conjunction with the RAO and RPO application in CAMP 153/2020.

55.  On 17 December 2020, without leave of the court, Doris Leung filed a bundle of documents seeking to “amend” the summons and leave to file a “supplementary notice of appeal”, which sought “immediate permanent stay or dismissal” of the bankruptcy petition made against Mr Leung.

B10.  HCMP 368/2020 & CAMP 170/2020

56.  On 27 April 2020, Doris Leung filed an ex parte application in HCMP 368/2020 purporting to appeal against refusal of legal aid for an appeal to the Court of Final Appeal in relation to DCCJ 4496/2017 and CACV 333/2018. 

57.  On 27 April 2018, Mimmie Chan J dismissed the application because any appeal against refusal of legal aid for appeal to the Court of Final Appeal should be to a committee under s.26A of the Legal Aid Ordinance, not to the duty judge of the Court of First Instance. 

58.  On 18 September 2020, Doris Leung took out a summons under CAMP 170/2020 seeking leave to appeal against the decision of Mimmie Chan J. 

59.  On 11 March 2021, this Court dismissed the application in CAMP 170/2020 in its entirety in [2021] HKCA 259 at [27]. 

B11.  CAMP 72/2021

60.  Doris Leung filed a summons on 8 March 2021 under CAMP 72/2021 for leave to appeal against various orders made by District Judge KC Chan in [2020] HKDC 827.  

61.  On 1 and 7 April 2021, Doris Leung filed separate summonses and further filed a notice of appeal on 9 April 2021, all of which purport to seek the setting aside or staying the execution of the Default Judgment. 

62.  As these documents were filed in contravention of the interim injunction granted in [2021] HKCA 259, the RCA directed on 11 May 2021 that the two summonses and the notice of appeal be expunged from the court file.  A bundle of documents lodged by Doris Leung on 28 April 2021 was also expunged.

63.  Another division of the Court of Appeal dismissed the leave application in CAMP 72/2021 on 1 June 2021, [2021] HKCA 768.

B12.  CACV 8/2021 and CACV 9/2021

64.  On 11 January 2021, Doris Leung filed a notice of appeal in CACV 8/2021.  Like many of her summonses or notices, the Notice of Appeal in CACV 8/2021 is a document very difficult to read because her handwritings scattered all over the page.  It seems that she brought this appeal in respect of the judgment of Deputy High Court Judge To of 21 September 2020 in HCAL 1016/2017.  There was actually no such decision.  The judgment included in the file of CACV 8/2021 was the judgment of Deputy High Court Judge To of 31 December 2020 in respect of her attempts to appeal against some decisions of masters in the taxation of costs ordered against her.

65.  Confusingly, in other documents filed in this appeal, Doris Leung referred to it as appeal from HCB 5651/2020: see her summons of 11 January 2021.  In that summons, she asked for stay of execution of the bankruptcy order made against Mr Leung on 6 January 2021.  

66.  For reasons she did not quite explain, Doris Leung also brought another appeal on 8 January 2021 in CACV 9/2021 against the same judgment of Deputy High Court Judge To.  On 16 April 2021, she filed an amended Notice of Appeal in this appeal.

C.  Discussion

C1.  Whether or not an RAO/RPO should be granted against Doris Leung

C1.1  Legal Principles on RAO/RPO

67.  It is well settled that the court has inherent power to make RAOs and RPOs to restrain a vexatious litigant from abusing the court’s process when such litigant has abused, and is likely to continue with abusing the court's process by persistently making unmeritorious applications to the court: see Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Ltd (2005)  8 HKCFAR 1.  As the Court of Final Appeal observed at [48]:

“ …The vexatious litigant typically acts in person and characteristically refuses to accept the unfavourable result of the litigation, obstinately trying to re-open the matter without any viable legal basis. Such conduct can become obsessive with the litigant not shrinking from making wild allegations against the court, or against the other side’s legal representatives … Numerous actions may be commenced and numerous applications issued within each action.”

68.  In Secretary for Justice v Ma Kwai Chun [2006] 1 HKLRD 539 at [37], Lam J (as Lam VP then was)  emphasized that the categories of abuse of process are never closed and vexatious proceedings can take many forms.  At [38] of the judgment, he identified different ways in which proceedings can be regarded as vexatious and the proceedings being prosecuted in vexatious manner.  And at [40], it was said:

“ … Given the infinite wisdom of a litigant, there is always scope for new forms of vexatious proceedings. Vexation can stem from the motive of the litigant, the merit of the claim or the manner in which the claim is prosecuted. Re-litigation of a subject that has been finally determined is a common feature, but there are vexatious proceedings which do not seek to re-litigate.”

And at [41]:

“ …Ordinarily, the vexatious nature should be apparent from reading the reasoned judgment and orders made in those proceedings … Hence, unless there are special reasons for reference being made to pleadings or other documents filed in the previous proceedings, the fact that such proceedings had been struck out by the court is good evidence of the vexatious nature of those proceedings.”

69.  In that case an order under Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance Cap 4 was made.  Similar principles are however applicable in an application for RAO or RPO: see Choy Bing Wing v Chief Executive of HKSAR [2006] 1 HKLRD 666 and Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee [2006] 1 HKLRD 679.  It was also emphasized in these cases that the court has to be proactive nowadays in curbing abusive proceedings which wasted much judicial resources.  In the latter case, it was also held that RPO can cover applications for judicial review.

70.  It was also held that an RAO or RPO should only be made if it is proportionate to do so having regard to the circumstances concerning the litigant in question. Practice Direction 11.3 sets out the relevant practice for the making of such orders and we have observed the same.

C1.2  Application of the principles to Doris Leung’s case

71.  From the various judgments we have already alluded to, it is clear that Doris Leung has been bringing vexatious proceedings and persistently conducted herself in those proceedings in vexatious manners.  In particular, she involved herself in proceedings concerning Mr Leung when she had no locus standi and no proper basis to be joined as a party.  She also habitually issued applications by summons and affidavits seeking relief not known to the law and advanced submissions in an unfocused, incoherent and sometimes incomprehensible manner with unmeritorious prolongation of proceedings in the pretext of seeking “clarifications from the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Final Appeal”.  

72.  We are satisfied that it is most likely that Doris Leung will continue in abusing the process of court if no RPO or RAO is granted: 

(1)  She made numerous attempts to intermeddle in litigations involving Mr Leung between 2017 and 2020 even though these attempts were devoid of merits and the courts had repeatedly held that she herself lacked the standing to take such steps or to bring proceedings to challenge the rejection of her claims:  see [2018] HKCFI 255 at [17]; [2018] HKCA 599 at [7]; [2018] HKCA 922 at [16]; [2020] HKDC 827 at [38] and [49]; [2020] HKCA 893 at [3], [5] and [10].

(2)  She habitually conducted litigations without regard to the procedural rules of the courts and the directions and orders made by the courts: see [2018] HKCA 269 at [1] to [3]; [2018] HKCA 600 at [1] to [7] and [9] to [13]; [2018] HKCA 922 at [1] to [3] and [11] to [12]; [2020] HKDC 827 at [50];

(3)  She habitually presented her materials in an unfocused and incomprehensible manner wasting valuable court resources.  In this respect, the papers filed in the present proceedings speak for themselves, see also [2018] HKCFI 719 at [3]; [2020] HKCA 893 at [3]; [2020] HKDC 827 at [11] and [51];

(4)  She has made repeated attempts to litigate issues which had been judicially determined against her, see [2018] HKCFI 255 at [15]; [2018] HKCFI 359 at [4]; [2018] HKCFI 719 at [5] and [6]; [2018] HKCA 599 at [5]; [2018] HKCA 922 at [18] and [2020] HKDC 827 at [29]. 

(5)  She habitually appealed against decisions made against her notwithstanding the obvious lack of merits;

(6)  As noted above, despite the interim order of March 2021, she continued to file summonses in April in the unmeritorious proceedings in CAMP 72/2021 which falls within the scope of the interim injunction granted by us on 11 March 2021;

(7)  She paid no heed to the judgments of the courts that her actions constituted abuse of process: [2019] HKDC 1691 at [21]; [2020] HKDC 827 at [48] and [51]; [2018] HKCA 600 at [3], [7]-[8] and [16]; [2020] HKCA 377 at [10]-[12]; [2018] HKCA 719 at [6]; [2018] HKCA 599 at [5]; and [2020] HKCA 893 at [9];

(8)  Due to her repeated flouting of directions from the courts as mentioned above, it is not possible for the courts to regulate the proper and orderly conduct of her litigations by issuing case management directions; and

(9)  Also, due to her unfocused and incoherent manner in the presentation of her arguments and materials, it is not possible to devise effective means for efficient distillation of relevant issues in her applications and proceedings and inevitably substantial judicial resources are wasted on the same. 

73.  We have perused the written submissions of Doris Leung.  The arguments therein are convoluted and unfocused.  Much of it repeats arguments she has made in her applications for appeal or leave to appeal.  For reasons already canvassed in previous judgments, Doris Leung simply had no locus standi in the various matters and proceedings concerning Mr Leung.  Her submission that she had interest as a representative of majority voters of Mr Leung is obviously unsustainable.  The disqualification of Mr Leung had been finally determined by the Court of Final Appeal.  Doris Leung had no valid basis for bringing the various applications for judicial review or making interlocutory applications in proceedings in which she was not a party and had no valid basis for being joined as a party.  Her intermeddling in such proceedings were repeatedly ruled by the courts as vexatious.  She was not acting in public interest as she claimed to be.

74.  Her contention that the SJ was acting in self-interest as opposed to safeguarding public interest is without foundation.  The need to consider the making of RAO and RPO arose in circumstances set out at the beginning of this judgment and it had nothing to do with CACV 8/2021 and CACV 9/2021.  The SJ was joined as a party to the present proceedings by the direction of this Court made on 6 November 2020.  At that time, Deputy High Court Judge To had not made his decision of 28 December 2020 and CACV 8 and 9/2021 were not in the radar of anybody.

75.  The submissions lodged by the SJ focused on the very issue which this Court directed her to consider. Though the scope of the RAO and RPO were expanded as a result of recent developments, they were legitimately connected with matters previously canvassed.  We do not find any basis for inferring that the SJ was acting in self-interest instead of public interest in advancing the submissions as the Senior Government Counsel did.

76.  The taxation proceedings pursuant to the order for costs made by Chow J in HCAL 1016/2017 were legitimate steps taken by the Department of Justice on behalf of the EAC to recover costs awarded in their favour.  The matters before Deputy High Court Judge To were appeals against case management decisions made by the taxing masters.  The previous attempts by Doris Leung to ask Chow J to strike out the Bill and Notice of Commencement of Taxation and to set aside the costs order were unsuccessful, see [2020] HKCFI 2377.  Doris Leung’s application for leave to appeal against that decision in CAMP 177/2020 was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 14 January 2021, [2021] HKCA 55.  Likewise, her misconceived application for leave to challenge the taxing master’s decision in CAMP 114/2020 was rejected in the same judgment of 14 January 2021.

77.  Deputy High Court Judge To had painstakingly explained in his judgment of 31 December 2020 to Doris Leung the lack of valid ground of objection to the taxation proceedings.  The judge also explained why Doris Leung’s belief that she had a good ground to set aside the bankruptcy petition against Mr Leung was ill-conceived.

78.  We have read the notices of appeal in CACV 8/2021 and CACV 9/2021, including the amended versions. As the RCA observed, the notices were beyond comprehension, convoluted and unintelligible.

79.  Further, since they are appealing against interlocutory decisions, leave to appeal has to be sought before an appeal can be competently brought.

80.  As mentioned, the decisions which were under challenge before Deputy High Court Judge To were case management decisions of taxing masters.  We cannot see any proper ground of appeal which warrant such matters being considered by the Court of Appeal.

81.  Pursuant to the directions of the RCA, Doris Leung had lodged submissions to explain what her appeals were about.  Despite those submissions, we failed to see any reasonably arguable basis for leave to appeal to be granted for challenging interlocutory case management decisions in the taxation proceedings.

82.  Against the above background, we do not see any merit in Doris Leung’s assertion that the SJ was not guided by public interest in the submissions advanced for the making of RAO and RPO.

83.  As regards Doris Leung’s unspecified and un-particularised need to take urgent steps in other proceedings concerning her family interest which may involve Mr Leung, we cannot accept such bare assertion.  This is particularly so in light of her previous litigation history regarding the grant of letters of administration in respect of the estate of her deceased brother: see Leung Kit-Hing, Doris v Cho Sik Han Yvette CACV 67/2013, 12 June 2015 which was another instance where she tried to intermeddle without proper basis.  

84.  In any event, if she had any legitimate ground to bring such proceedings or to take steps in such proceedings as she purported, she could apply for leave to do so before the designated judge.

85.  We are satisfied that it is proportionate to make RAO and RPO against Doris Leung.  The prohibitions will only bar her from making applications and bringing proceedings which (as the courts have repeatedly decided)  she has no locus standi to bring.  Most of the proceedings set out in the schedules to the RAO and RPO have been concluded with orders dismissing her claims.  Further, as mentioned, if there is any legitimate ground for her to take any step in matters involving Mr Leung or in such proceedings (like applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal or opposition to taxation of costs awarded against her), she can seek leave from the designated judge to do so.

86.  In the circumstances, we make the RAO and RPO against Doris Leung in the terms as annexed to this Judgment (See Annex 2). 

C2.  The February Summonses under CAMP 62/2021

87.  We can quickly dispose of the February Summonses in CAMP 62/2021.  The relief sought was to set aside the supplemental submissions of the Secretary of Justice which were lodged on 10 February 2021 pursuant to the directions of 1 February 2021. 

88.  The court does not have the power to set aside the submissions of a party lodged pursuant to the directions of the court.  Insofar as Doris Leung attempted also to challenge the direction of 1 February 2021, we cannot see any valid ground for doing so.

89.  The summonses in CAMP 62/2021 are dismissed.

C3.  The October and December Summonses under CAMP 196/2020

90.  By these summonses, Doris Leung is again seeking for an order to set aside the bankruptcy petition presented against Mr Leung.  For the reasons already given in [2020] HKCA 893, she had no locus standi to make such application. 

91.  We therefore strike out the October and December Summonses as an abuse of process and dismiss all the summonses in CAMP 196/2020 accordingly.

C4.  The November Summonses under CAMP 153/2020

92.  By these summonses, Doris Leung is in effect seeking an order to stay the bankruptcy proceedings against Mr Leung.

93.  It follows from the dismissal of her primary application in CAMP 153/2020 by the judgment of 6 November 2020 that such applications must fail given her lack of locus standi.  

94.  Insofar as necessary, we strike out and dismiss the summonses accordingly.

C5.   The Notice of Motion filed on 11 November 2020 in CAMP 153/2020

95.  Doris Leung failed to pinpoint any arguable grounds for challenging our determination on 6 November 2020. Doris Leung failed to meet the statutory threshold in section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484)  for leave to be granted.

96.  Leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal is therefore refused as this application is obviously vexatious. 

97.  We dismiss the Notice of Motion accordingly. 

C6.   CACV 8 and 9/2021

98.  For the reasons canvassed above, Doris Leung had not properly sought leave to appeal in respect of the interlocutory decision of Deputy High Court Judge To.  She had not advanced any arguable point for upsetting the case management decisions of the masters.  

99.  Her notices of appeal and summons in CACV 8 and 9/2021 are struck out and dismissed as abuse of process.  

D.  Conclusion

100.  In the circumstances, we make the following orders:

(1)  RAO and RPO against Doris Leung in the terms as annexed to this judgment (see Annex 2);

(2)  The February Summonses in CAMP 62/2021 are dismissed; 

(3)  The October and December Summonses in CAMP 196/2020 are dismissed;

(4)  The November Summonses in CAMP 153/2020 are dismissed;  

(5)  The Notice of Motion of 11 November 2020 in CAMP 153/2020 is dismissed;

(6)  All the notices of appeal and summonses under CACV 8 and 9/2021 are struck out and dismissed; and

(7)  Doris Leung shall pay the costs of the SJ in the RAO and RPO applications, such costs shall be fixed by gross sum assessment.  The SJ shall lodge the statement of costs, limited to 3 pages, by 28 July 2021 and Doris Leung shall lodge her objections (if any), limited to 3 pages, by 4 August 2021.

ANNEX 1

ANNEX 2

Restricted Application Order

1.  Leung Kit-hing, Doris (“Doris Leung”)  be prohibited from making any further or pursuing any issued application to the court in the proceedings set out in Schedule 1, whether before or after the Order hereof, without the leave of Deputy High Court Judge Winnie Tsui (“the designated judge”)  being first obtained (“the RAO”);

2.  All applications for leave to issue or pursue an application in the proceedings set out in Schedule 1 (“RAO leave application”)  must be made in writing to the designated judge (and not to any other judge or to a master)  without giving notice of the application to the intended respondent or defendant as the case may be;

3.  In the event that the designated judge is unavailable to deal with the RAO leave application, the same shall be dealt with by such other judge as the Chief Judge of the High Court may designate from time to time;

4.  All RAO leave applications and all matters ancillary thereto shall be dealt with on papers and without any oral hearing unless the designated judge otherwise directs;

5.  Where leave to the substantive application is granted, service of the order giving leave must accompany service of the substantive application in question, which substantive application shall be heard by a judge and not a master unless the designated judge otherwise directs;

6.  If, contrary to the RAO, Doris Leung issues or pursues an application in the proceedings set out in Schedule 1 without prior leave of the Court, the purported application shall forthwith be referred by the Registry to a master for such application to be dismissed in accordance with the RAO;

7.  If, contrary to the RAO, Doris Leung purports to serve any application in the proceedings set out in Schedule 1 on any respondent or defendant (as the case may be)  without at the same time serving on that respondent or defendant (as the case may be)  a copy of a sealed order giving leave to issue or pursue such application, such application shall automatically stand dismissed, so that neither that respondent/defendant nor the Court would be required to take any steps in response.

Restricted Proceedings Order

8.  Doris Leung be prohibited from bringing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, including judicial review proceedings, or appeal proceedings, in the High Court or District Court (collectively, “fresh proceedings”)  concerning any matters involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to or arising out of the proceedings set out in Part A of Schedule 2 (“the Relevant Proceedings”)  and/or the subject matters set out in Part B of Schedule 2 without the leave of the designated judge being first obtained (“the RPO”);

9.  All applications for leave to issue fresh proceedings covered or which may be covered by the RPO (“RPO leave applications”)  must be made in writing to the designated judge (and not to any other judge or to a master)  enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced;

10.  In the event that the designated judge is not available to deal with the RPO leave application, the same shall be dealt with by such other judge as the Chief Judge of the High Court may from time to time designate;

11.  At least 7 days before filing an RPO leave application, Doris Leung shall notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent (as the case may be)  of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by Doris Leung from any such intended defendant or respondent, she should file a copy thereof with her RPO leave application;

12.  Any intended defendant or respondent (as the case may be)  having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled, but under no obligation, to place before the Court any written representations regarding the same;

13.  All RPO leave applications and all matters ancillary thereto shall be dealt with on papers and without any oral hearing unless the designated judge otherwise directs;

14.  If, contrary to the RPO, Doris Leung purports to issue fresh proceedings covered or which may be covered by the RPO without prior leave of the Court, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the District Court, the Registrar of the High Court or any master or judge of these courts, such fresh proceedings shall be referred to the designated judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

15.  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated judge, if any intended defendant or respondent (as the case may be)  is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either a copy of a sealed order giving leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such intended defendant or respondent shall be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed to be extended accordingly;

16.  Notice of each decision by the designated judge made pursuant to this Order be given in writing to the Legislative Council Commission and to each intended defendant or respondent (as the case may be);

17.  Notification of this Order shall be given to the respective Registrars of the High Court and District Court, who shall take note of the terms hereof and shall take all necessary steps to ensure due compliance with this Order; and

18.  Except her written application to the Court for leave pursuant to this order, Doris Leung’s letters or faxes to the Court will not be read and there will not be any response thereto from the Court.

Schedule 1

1.  HCAL 1016/2017

2.  CACV 47/2018

3.  DCCJ 4497/2017

4.  CACV 333/2018

5.  CACV 115/2020

6.  CAMP 124/2020

7.  HCAL 419/2018

8.  CACV 104/2018

9.  HCAL 1140/2017

10.  CACV 36/2018

11.  CAMP 153/2020

12.  CAMP 196/2020

13.  HCB 5651/2020

14.  CACV 8/2021

15.  CACV 9/2021

16.  HCMP 368/2020

17.  CAMP 170/2020

18.  CAMP 114/2020

19.  CAMP 62/2021

20.  CAMP 72/2021

21.  CAMP 177/2020

22.  CAMP 178/2020

Schedule 2

Part A

1.  HCAL 1016/2017

2.  CACV 47/2018

3.  DCCJ 4497/2017

4.  CACV 333/2018

5.  CACV 115/2020

6.  CAMP 124/2020

7.  HCAL 419/2018

8.  CACV 104/2018

9.  HCAL 1140/2017

10.  CACV 36/2018

11.  CAMP 153/2020

12.  CAMP 196/2020

13.  HCB 5651/2020

14.  CACV 8/2021

15.  KCCC 2035/2017

16.  HCMP 368/2020

17.  CAMP 170/2020

18.  CAMP 114/2020

19.  CAMP 62/2021

20.  CAMP 72/2021

21.  CAMP 177/2020

22.  CAMP 178/2020

Part B

1.  The disqualification of Mr Leung Chung Hang, Sixtus (“Mr Leung’)  from assuming office as Legislative Council member.

2.  The vacation of office previously occupied by Mr Leung as Legislative Council member.

3.  The Legislative Council by-election held on 11 March 2018 to fill, inter alia, the vacant seat arising from the disqualification of Mr Leung from assuming office as Legislative Council member.

4.  The recovery of remunerations and advance of setting up and operating expenses paid by the Legislative Council Commission (“the LCC”)  to Mr Leung.

5.  The order of Registrar Lui made on 5 May 2020 in DCCJ 4497/2017 entering judgment against Mr Leung for the sum of HK$929,573.00 with interest and costs (“the Default Judgment”).

6.  All actions taken by the LCC and all proceedings commenced by the LCC for the purpose of enforcing the Default Judgment.

7.  All bankruptcy petition issued and bankruptcy proceedings brought by the LCC against Mr Leung.

8.  Bankruptcy order made against Mr Leung.

9.  All proceedings to which Mr Leung is a party and Doris Leung is not a party.