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ARSLAN SHARIF v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
ARSLAN SHARIF v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5508 · HCAL 590/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 590/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5508
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 590 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Arslan Sharif |Applicant |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Intersted Party|
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|(|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Andrew Li:
1. The Applicant’s Form 86 be amended to name only the Torture Claims
Appeal Board as the putative respondent and the Director of
Immigration as the putative interested party; and
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
INTRODUCTION
1. By a Form 86 filed on 18 April 2023 (“the Form 86”), the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision by the
Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 4 April 2023 (“the
Board’s Decision”), which affirmed a decision by the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 11 January 2022 in refusing the
applicant’s non-refoulement protection claim. He named the Director
and the Board as the putative respondents and the Board as interested
party.
2. I amended the Form 86 on my own motion to name only the Board as the
putative respondent and the Director as the putative interested party.
3. The applicant requested for a hearing and he attended the same.
However, when asked if he has anything to add besides the matters
stated in his application, the applicant answered in the negative.
BACKGROUND
4. The applicant is a national of Pakistan. He seeks non-refoulement
protection on the basis that if he is refouled, he would be harmed by
his girlfriend’s brothers. His personal background, the relevant facts
and relevant procedural history have been sufficiently set out in the
Board’s Decision, which can be accessed through a hyperlink[1]. I
shall not repeat the same here.
DISCUSSION
5. In a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of
appeal. Though in non-refoulement case an enhanced standard in
scrutinizing the decision of the Board is required given the
seriousness of the issue at hand, this court should not usurp the role
of the Board, which together with the Director are the primary
decision-makers. This court will not intervene by way of judicial
review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the decision of the Board (Nupur Mst v Director of
Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, [14(1)]). There must be a reasonably
arguable claim with a realistic prospect of success before leave for
judicial review will be granted (Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung &
Anor (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676).
6. In the Form 86 and his affirmation filed in support of the
application, the applicant has stated 4 different general grounds:-
1) The decisions of the Director and the Board were not reasonable
or fair in the Wednesbury sense [1];
2) The Director has “failed to appreciate or give the proper
importance or weightage to the presence of state Acquiescence”
in his decision [2];
3) The Director has failed to take into account of the above
argument or that he has failed to give enough weight to such
argument before reaching the Decision. Further, “although the
Director had listed relevant COIs which support the applicant’s
aversions that the police in his country would not be able to
protect. The Director failed to consider or give enough
weightage to that evidence and ruled otherwise.” [3];
4) The Director showed an “unfair attitude” towards the applicant
and had failed to attain the “high standard of fairness required
by the Wednesbury test in the decision with the arguments put
forward” by the applicant. [4].
7. Insofar as the above purported grounds of review were made against the
Director (including Ground [1], [2], [3] and [4] above), it has been
held that the Director’s decision is not susceptible to judicial
review once an appeal to the Board had been pursued: See Re Raschpal
Singh [2020] HKCA 978, per Lam VP (as he then was) at §§40-41. Thus,
there is no need for me to consider them. I only need to consider the
Board’s Decision under Ground [1] above.
8. Looking at the Board’s Decision, the Board bore in mind the correct
legal principles in respect of each of the four applicable grounds
under the USM.
9. Contrary to the applicant’s allegation, the Board had carefully taken
into consideration of the applicant’s case and evidence, including the
COI and the option of internal relocation.
10. After thoroughly analysing and assessing the above, the Board came to
the findings and conclusions that none of the grounds was made out.
11. Having looked at the Board’s Decision carefully, I am not able find
the Board has failed to consider any of the matters raised by the
applicant in his claims and/or failed to provide any adequate reasons
in its decision and/or in any way failed to exercise a high standard
of fairness.
12. Despite rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I could not find
any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the
Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s
Decision is not reasonably arguable and has no realistic prospect of
success.
CONCLUSION
13. For the above reasons, I am not satisfied that this court should
intervene by way of judicial review. I therefore dismiss the
application.
Dated the 5th day of October 2026
| |(Cheung Ho Yat, Annson) |
| |for Registrar, High Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |on 5/10/2026 |Respondent / the Putative |
|interested parties as | |Respondent’s solicitors / |
|may be directed by the |Arslan Sharif |such Putative Interested |
|Court the order | |Parties as may be directed |
|granting leave and any |Applicant’s ref. no.:|by the Court / the Putative|
|directions given within|Nil. |Interested Parties’ |
|14 days after the leave| |solicitors on 5/10/2026 |
|was granted (Order 53, | | |
|rule 4A); | |Torture Claims Appeal Board|
| | |/ Non-Refoulement Claims |
|b) issue the | |Petition Office |
|originating summons | |Putative Respondent’s ref. |
|within 14 days after | |no.: |
|the grant of leave and | |USM 19720 |
|serve it in accordance | | |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |Director of Immigration |
|and | |Putative Interested Party’s|
| | |ref. no.: |
|c) supply to every | |QA T/C 1972/21 (formerly |
|other party copies of | |RBCZ 338/21) |
|every affidavit which | | |
|the Applicant proposes | |Department of Justice, |
|to use at the hearing, | |Senior Assistant Law |
|including the affidavit| |Officer |
|in support of the | |(Civil Law) |
|application for leave | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | | |
____________________________________________________________________________
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1]
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL000590_
2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf