WELL HONOUR DEVELOPMENT LTD v. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS OF LANDS DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS

CACV 412/2024, [2026] HKCA 364

On Appeal From [2024] HKCFI 2221

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 412 OF 2024

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 2198 OF 2023)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Anthony Chan JA (giving the Judgment of the Court) :

1.  This is the Applicant’s Notice of Motion filed on 2 December 2025 seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal (“CFA”) in relation to this Court’s Judgment dated 4 November 2025 ([2025] HKCA 950) (“Judgment”).

2.  Three questions (“Questions (1) to (3)”) have been advanced which are said to be of great general or public importance (“GGPI”) which ought to be submitted to the CFA for determination pursuant to s.22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484, namely :

“1. In light of the following events :-

(a) The statutory offer pursuant to section 6(1)(a) of the Lands Resumption Ordinance (Cap.124) (“LRO”) was purportedly served on Madam Yeung Chi-king on 29 July 1976 when she had already passed away and the letters of administration had not been granted, such that the Applicant had no knowledge of and was not in a position to verify the same;

(b) In its claim for compensation under LRO, the Applicant did not specify the provision relied upon;

(c) Upon receipt of the claim, the Respondent never asked the Applicant to specify the provision relied upon;

(d) The Respondent’s decision in refusing the claim under LRO was based upon the view that the right of compensation is not assignable, rather than the distinction between sections 6 and 8 of the LRO;

(e) The ground upon which the application for judicial review was made was the Respondent’s erred view that the right of compensation is not assignable;

(f) The Respondent’s opposition to the judicial review (and hence the judge’s decision of dismissing of the judicial review) was based upon the view that upon proper construction of the LRO the right of compensation is not assignable, rather than the distinction between sections 6 and 8 of the LRO;

(g) On appeal, the Applicant was challenging the judge’s view that that the right of compensation is not assignable. The Respondent did not file any Respondent’s Notice to contend that the judge’s decision should be affirmed on the ground of the distinction between sections 6 and 8 of the LRO;

(h) On appeal, parties did not address the issue as to the distinction between sections 6 and 8 of the LRO in the written submissions;

(i) The issue as to the distinction between sections 6 and 8 of the LRO was only raised, for the first time, by the Court of Appeal during the hearing of appeal,

whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to affirm the judgment solely by reason of the distinction between sections 6 and 8 of the LRO (without considering the issue as to the assignability of the right of compensation upon proper construction of the LRO).

2. On the proper construction of the LRO, whether the right of compensation is assignable.

3. On the proper construction of the LRO, where a claim under section 8(1) of the LRO is rejected by the Director of Lands on the ground that the claimant has no estate or interest in the subject land, whether the proper avenue to challenge is for the claimant to submit the claim to the Lands Tribunal pursuant to section 8(2) of the LRO.”

3.  In respect of Question (1), we disagree with the suggestion that the Judgment below was affirmed by this Court on the distinction between ss.6 and 8 of the Lands Resumption Ordinance, Cap 124 (“LRO”). The relevant ratio of the Judgment was that the Applicant did not come within s.8 of the LPO on which its claim for compensation was based[1].

4.  Further, it was abundantly clear from the judgment below, [34] and [35], that the Applicant’s case was based on s.8. That remained the position before this Court. Any attempt to wriggle out of the stance taken is disingenuous.

5.  It might well be the case that the Applicant was surprised that it was called upon by this Court to justify its reliance on s.8, but it was given every opportunity to make out its case. Importantly, there is no suggestion in the submissions of the Applicant lodged for this application that it had a proper basis to rely on s.8. Plainly, it was right for this Court to ask the Applicant if it had a legitimate basis to make a claim for compensation under s.8.

6.  As formulated, Question (1) is heavily facts sensitive. It cannot be a question of GGPI. Further, it is both misconceived and without merit.

7.  Question (2) did not arise in the appeal before this Court (see Judgment, [28]).

8.  As regards Question (3), first, it was held by this Court that the Applicant had no valid claim under s.8, and there is no challenge to the holding. This question, as formulated, is therefore entirely academic. Second, there is no real attempt by the Applicant to address the relevant reasoning at Judgment, [31] to [35]. We are not satisfied that the issue raised is reasonably arguable.

9.  For these reasons, the Notice of Motion is dismissed. There is no apparent reason why costs should not follow the event. We order that the costs of this application, summarily assessed at HK$131,829 (based on the Statement of Costs lodged by the Respondent), be paid by the Applicant. Such order is made on nisi basis, which shall become absolute 14 days from the date of this Judgment in the absence of variation application.