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JARDINE MATHESON LTD (on its own behalf and on behalf of its current officers, employees and agents) AND OTHERS v. LYNETTE YEANG YEANG LOONG
JARDINE MATHESON LTD (on its own behalf and on behalf of its current officers, employees and agents) AND OTHERS v. LYNETTE YEANG YEANG LOONG
[2026] HKCFI 6269 · HCA 1140/2025
Court of First Instance
HCA 1140/2025 [2026] HKCFI 6269 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 1140 OF 2025 _____________ BETWEEN _____________ Before: Deputy High Court Judge Grace Chow in Chambers (By Paper Disposal) Date of Plaintiffs’ Submissions: 5 August 2026 Date of Decision: 13 November 2026 DECISION Introduction and Background I have before me an application by the Plaintiffs (collectively, “Ps”) by Summons dated 29 May 2026 (“SJ Summons”) for judgment be entered against the Defendant (“D”) under O.14, r.1 of the Rules of High Court, Cap. 4A. The SJ Summons is supported by: (1) the Affirmation of Matthew James Edward Bland; and (2) the Affirmation of Graham Timothy Baker, both filed on 29 May 2026. At the call-over hearing of the SJ Summons on 15 July 2026, I was satisfied that there had been proper service of the SJ Summons and supporting Affirmations on D but D did not appear. I granted directions for the disposal of the SJ Summons by way of paper disposal and directed inter alia that written submissions be lodged and served by Ps and D. In accordance with my directions, Ps have lodged their skeleton submissions. However, no written submissions were received from D. By Writ of Summons filed on 13 June 2025, Ps commenced the present action against D seeking various injunctive relief and damages to be assessed. In the Amended Statement of Claim dated 30 March 2026 (“ASOC”), essentially, it is pleaded that: Ps are all companies which are part of the Jardine Matheson Group (“JMG”), a well-established and reputable international group of companies which began as a partnership (“the Partnership”) founded by Mr William Jardine (“Mr Jardine”) and Sir James Matheson (“Sir Matheson”) in the 1800s but whom passed away in around 1843 and 1878 respectively; The Partnership was dissolved in 1906 and operations taken over by a limited liability company through the incorporation of the 2nd Plaintiff (“P2”); Since around 22 November 2023, the Defendant (“D”) started to send letters and emails to officers and employees of entities within JMG in Hong Kong including Ps (totaling 66 as set out in Schedule 1 to ASOC) asserting inter alia that she was the “re-incarnate” of Mr Jardine and Sir Matheson, and was authorised to act on behalf of the Partnership. She purported to give directions as to various matters concerning the affairs of the Partnership and/or JMG including demanding share certificates for her supposed interest, withholding dividends and/or making payments of such to herself, dismissing Ps’ key employees, her entitlement to occupy the entirety or parts of Jardine House (but Ps are not aware of and have seen no evidence of her being a registered shareholder, a partner of Ps or otherwise having any right/entitlement to her demands); Since 30 October 2024, D made unsolicited visits to JMG’s offices in Hong Kong (the “Jardine House Office” and “Devon House Office”) to seek out senior management of JMG and enforce her demands including on 30 October 2024, 15 November 2024 and 8 April 2025; D also sent letters and emails to companies within JMG, their officers and employees at addresses outside of Hong Kong as well as third parties on the pretext that she was the “reincarnate” of Mr Jardine and Sir Matheson or otherwise held herself out as a representative or authorised to act on behalf of the Partnership; In early 2025, D commenced a baseless and vexatious civil action in HCA 142/2025 against Mr Ben Keswick, executive Chairman of Jardine Matheson Holdings Limited, the ultimate holding company of JMG, claiming her name is or was “William Jardine” and requesting the Court prevent Mr Ben Keswick or certain entities within JMG from using certain assets and to close down the company. The action was struck out by Master Cruden on 17 November 2025 on the ground that D had no reasonable cause of action; D’s abovementioned course of conduct constitutes harassment in law against Ps’ officers and employees: (a) D’s course of conduct is unreasonable, oppressive, persistent and repetitive; (b) has caused, would cause and continues to cause worry, emotional distress, and/or annoyance to the officers and employees of Ps as well as operational burden on Ps; (c) D knows and/or ought to have known that her course of conduct constitutes harassment and would cause worry, emotional distress or annoyance to Ps and their officers and employees and (d) intended to cause, or was reckless as to the causing of such worry, emotional distress or annoyance; Ps, as employers of their employees, are obliged to take reasonable steps to prevent the harassment from recurring in the workplace and have an interest in protecting the safety of the workplace and to prevent or counteract the harassing conduct of D. Ps are therefore entitled to sue for a freestanding injunction to enjoin D from interfering with Ps’ provision of a safe working environment to its officers and employees; Ps also sue in a representative capacity for and on behalf of their current officers and employees for the purposes of seeking injunctive relief; Further or alternatively, D’s repeated unsolicited visits to the Jardine House Office and Jardine House amount to private nuisance to P2 as it interfered with P2’s enjoyment of the Jardine House Office as a lessee; Unless restrained by the Court, D threatens to and will continue to harass and/or cause nuisance to Ps and/or their current officers and employees; Accordingly, Ps seek a final injunction restraining D from interfering with Ps’ contractual and/or common law duty to provide a safe working environment for its officers and employees by harassment, including but not limited to doing any of the following acts: Intimidating, harassing, threatening or pestering Ps and their current officers and employees, including but not limited to, in particular, the following acts: (i) communicating with Ps and/or their current officers and employees by post, telephone, email, fax or other electronic means, or other writing; (ii) publishing, making, repeating or distributing by any means any statement or suggesting that she represents JMB, any entity thereof (including Ps) and/or JMG’s predecessors, has any entitlements to shares, information or assets held by or to dismiss the officers/employees of Ps, or has any entitlement to, will or would be occupying any premises of Ps (including but not limited to Jardine House Office and the Devon House Office); and (iii) entering or remaining at or coming within any premises leased, operated and/or occupied by Ps (including but not limited to Jardine House Office and the Devon House Office); Causing nuisance, annoyance or discomfort, or interfering with P2’s use, occupation and enjoyment of the Jardine House Office, including in particular requesting entry to or entering or remaining at or coming with the Jardine House Office; and Assisting, causing, counselling, procuring, instigating, inciting, aiding, abetting or authorizing others to commit or participate in any of the aforesaid acts. In D’s Affidavit filed on 25 August 2025 (“D’s Aff”), she asserted that her assertions that she was the “re-incarnate of Sir William Jardine” in her many letters and emails were true. In particular, she relied on her Statutory Declaration dated 10 December 2024 declaring that she is/was Sir William Jardine and her Statutory Declaration dated 8 August 2025 declaring that she was the sole partner of the Partnership. She therefore says that there is nothing wrong with her making phone calls, writing letters or visiting the offices as these are reasonable actions of the owner of the JMG business. On 16 March 2026, D submitted an “Addendum (1) for the Defence against Amended Writ HCA 1140/2025” (“Addendum”) essentially to explain why it was necessary for her to write some of the emails and letters set out in Schedule 1 and that the injunction should not be granted because as a partner she should not be enjoined from speaking to her staff and managers. Applicable principles The applicable principles for summary judgment are well-established. In Guanghua SS Holdings Limited v Lim Yew Cheng & Another [2022] HKCFI 1052 at §13, Ng J set out a helpful and succinct summary of the proper approach to such application as follows: The Order 14 machinery works on the basis that if the plaintiff’s application is properly constituted, it is prima facie entitled to judgment unless the defendant shows cause to the contrary; The mere assertion in an affidavit of a given situation by the defendant responding to an application for summary judgment does not, ipso facto, ground leave to defend; The burden is on the defendant to show a real or bona fide defence or some other reason for a trial. The defendant must satisfy the Court that his evidence is capable of being believed and that on the basis of such evidence, there is a fair or reasonable probability of the defendant having a real or bona fide defence; In deciding whether there is a fair or reasonable probability of the defendant having a real or bona fide defence, the Court does not isolate each factual issue and consider whether it is possible that the defendant’s story on that issue is credible. Rather, the Court must look at the whole situation; In assessing the credibility of the defendant’s factual case, while the Court will not embark upon a mini-trial on affidavit evidence, the Court is not obliged to suspend its critical faculties and assume that the defendant’s evidence is accurate; If having regard to inherent plausibility, inconsistency with contemporaneous documents and other compelling evidence, the defence is not credible, the Court must say so; and If the defendant’s evidence is incredible in any material respect, it cannot be said that there is a fair or reasonable probability that the defendant has a real or bona fide defence. As for the common law tort of harassment, the existence of which has most recently been recognized by the Court of Final Appeal in Sir Elly Kadoorie & Sons Limited v Samantha Jane Bradley [2026] HKCFA 2, the ingredients of the tort which were summarized by Chow JA giving the judgment of the Court ([2024] 4 HKLRD 428 at §32) and approved (subject to one point) at §176: “In summary, in the present state of the development of the tort of harassment in Hong Kong, in order to make out a cause of action in this tort, the victim of harassment has to show that: the harasser, directly or through third parties, has, by a course of sufficiently repetitive, unreasonable and oppressive conduct, caused, and which he ought reasonably to know would cause, worry, alarm, emotional distress or annoyance to the victim; the conduct complained of must, objectively, amount to harassment (in the ordinary sense of that word); the harasser either intends to cause harm or injury to the victim by his harassing conduct, or is reckless as to whether the victim would suffer harm or injury as a result of the harassing conduct; and to complete the tort, the victim must have suffered actual damage caused by the harassment. For this purpose, physical harm, including anxiety, distress, (a fortiori) recognised psychiatric illness, and financial loss would suffice.” At §177, Lam PJ and Lord Neuberger held that they would characterize the above as a “good working definition” of the ingredients of the tort of harassment as they did not want to close off the possibility of the courts in the future refining or even altering this definition as a result of experience and that the final component requires a little refinement (namely, that apart from financial loss, the plaintiff must suffer some distress or worse as a result of the defendant’s actions: see §§185-188). It was also accepted that whilst a corporate entity cannot pursue a claim for harassment on its own behalf (see §192), a corporate employer may seek an injunction not only on its own behalf where its employees were subject to harassment in the course of their employment and the harassment is in substance directed at the employer, but also as a representative of its employees so far as the harassment concerns the workplace: see §§64-91 and 117. As for private nuisance, this has been defined in Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort as: “unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in connection with it. It has been said that the tort takes three forms: encroachment on a neighbour’s land; direct physical injury to the land; or interference with the enjoyment of the land.” This definition was applied by Anthony Chan J (as he then was) in Lau Tat Wai v Yip Lai Kuen Joey [2013] 2 HKLRD 1197 at §48. Discussion and Disposition Having carefully considered the ASOC and based on the above authorities, I am of the view that the constituent elements of the torts of harassment and private nuisance have been properly pleaded. I am further satisfied that based on the matters pleaded, which were supported by the uncontradicted evidence filed by Ps in support of the SJ Summons, Ps are entitled to the injunctive relief sought on their own behalf and/or as a representative of their employees. In so far as the claim in harassment is concerned: D’s course of conduct was sufficiently repetitive having made at least 3 physical visits to the Jardine House Office, sent at least 27 letters, 38 emails and made no less than 11 unsolicited phone calls to Ps or their officers and/or employees; D’s course of conduct was also unreasonable and oppressive in that: (a) D’s repeated instructions/demands on Ps’ staff are unreasonable and oppressive when there is no factual/legal basis for her instructions/demands; (b) despite repeated requests by Ps to D that she stop her conduct which is causing nuisance or constitute harassment to Ps, she has persisted in her conduct; (c) D even physically visited the Jardine House Office and Devon House Office on 4 occasions to enforce her instruction/demands and had to be escorted away by security staff; D’s conduct objectively amounts to harassment; D ought reasonably to know that her conduct would cause worry, alarm, emotional distress or annoyance to Ps’ staff and it can be inferred that she intended or is reckless as to whether Ps would suffer harm or injury as a result of her harassing conduct from the continuation of her conduct despite demands for her to cease as her conduct amounted to harassment; and D’s conduct caused worry, alarm, emotional/mental distress and annoyance to Ps’ staff including: (a) JMG’s general counsel and P2’s employee who was tasked to deal with this matter and had to spend no less than 100 hours reviewing the relevant correspondence, alerting the front desk and security personnel in relation to potential visits to JMG’s offices by D, arranging for security personnel to deny D’s access to Jardine House Office and Devon House Office, preparing protocols for handling unsolicited calls and visits by D, coordinate response to D’s activities within JMG companies, preparing and issuing cease-and-desist letters, communicating with D, liaising with Ps’ solicitors and the police etc. These additional tasks over and above his normal business duties caused him and his team much stress, worry, annoyance and distress; and (b) the Chief Financial Officer of Jardine Matheson Holdings Limited and P2’s employee, who explained that he felt annoyed about reading about his purported dismissal and repeated negative comments on his job performance, worrying what action might next be taken by D and having to spend additional working time because of D’s conduct; and Given Ds’ persistence in her conduct despite requests by Ps to cease in her conduct which is causing significant nuisance and harassment to Ps directors and/or employees, unless restrained, D threatens to and will continue to harass Ps’ current officers and employees. As for Ps’ claim in private nuisance, P2 is the lessee of the Jardine House Office and the visits by D without permission on at least 3 occasions requiring her to be escorted away constitute unlawful interference with P2’s enjoyment of the Jardine House Office which are premises for professional and business uses. Accordingly, Ps are prima facie entitled to judgment unless D shows cause to the contrary. In D’s Aff and the Addendum, D clearly accepts that she did make the emails, phonecalls and visits. Her assertion that she is the “reincarnate” of Mr Jardine and the sole remaining partner of the Partnership is a mere assertion unsupported by any evidence apart from her own say-so and is incapable of belief. Besides, the law simply does not recognize the concept of reincarnation. As a matter of fact, the Partnership was dissolved in 1906. Having carefully read D’s Aff and the Addendum, I am satisfied that they do not reveal any real or bona fide defence to Ps’ claims or raise any triable issues. I will therefore grant judgment in terms of §§1-2 of the SJ Summons. I see no reason why costs should not follow the event. I will therefore order that D pays Ps’ costs of this action, including the costs of the SJ Summons and any reserved costs, to be taxed, if not agreed. (Grace Chow) Deputy High Court Judge Mr Alexander Tang and Mr Martin Lau, instructed by Messrs. Slaughter and May, for the 1st to 6th Plaintiffs The Defendant was not represented and did not appear