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HCAL 2481/2020
[2026] HKCFI 630
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 2481 of 2020
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BETWEEN
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Attaurehman |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |
Putative |
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Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-Refoulement Claims) Vincent Lung:
1. Form 86 be amended, naming the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office as the Putative Respondent and the Director of Immigration be named as the Putative Interested Party.
2. Leave to apply for judicial review out of time be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By a Form 86 filed on 22 December 2020 (the “Form 86”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“DOI”) dated 3 December 2018 and the decision of the adjudicator of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “TCAB”) dated 14 December 2020. There was no decision from the TCAB of such date; rather there was one dated 16 July 2020 (the “TCAB Decision”) as exhibited to the Applicant’s affirmation in support, which affirmed the DOI’s decision dated 3 December 2018. I regard the present application as a challenge against the TCAB Decision.
2. This TCAB Decision dismissed the Applicant’s appeal against the decision of the DOI, which refused the Applicant’s application to re-open his non-refoulement claim under section 37ZG(3) of the Immigration Ordinance.
3. I amend the Form 86 on my own motion to name the TCAB as the putative respondent and the DOI as the putative interested party.
4. The Applicant requested for a hearing of this application and he attended the same. When asked if he had anything to add he confirmed that he had not.
Background
5. The Applicant is a national of Pakistan. The underlying facts and procedural history have been comprehensively set out in the TCAB Decision, which can be viewed through a hyperlink[1]. I shall therefore not repeat them.
6. In brief terms, after making his non-refoulement claims, the Applicant was required to file a claim form (“SCF”). The Applicant applied (with the assistance of the Duty Lawyer Service) and was granted an extension of time to complete and return the SCF by 24 October 2018. That was not done, and on the deadline date the Duty Lawyer Service indicated that they had no instructions from the Applicant. The Applicant’s claim was deemed withdrawn [2-3, 7-9].
7. The Applicant wrote to the DOI on 14 November 2018 requesting to re-open his non-refoulement claims. The DOI requested the Applicant to provide sufficient evidence in writing on or before 29 November 2018 to show that he had not been able to return the completed SCF due to circumstances beyond his control. Certain medical documents were then produced by the Applicant to show his medical conditions for not returning the completed the SCF [5]. The DOI was not satisfied that the Applicant had not able to return the completed NCF as required due to circumstances beyond his control, and therefore refused to re-open the Applicant’s claims [10-11].
Discussion
8. The leave application operates as a filtering process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision: Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. It is sufficient to state my observations after considering the TCAB Decision and the materials adduced by the Applicant.
9. I remind myself that in a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of appeal. Though in non-refoulement cases an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the TCAB is required given the seriousness of the issue at hand, this court should not usurp the role of the TCAB, which together with the DOI are the primary decision-makers. A finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the TCAB, and this court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. There must be a reasonably arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for judicial review will be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.
10. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly: Ho Loy v Director of Environmental Protection (unreported, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016) at [142], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit.
11. The Applicant did not point to any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality of the TCAB Decision in the Form 86. In his affirmation in support he merely repeated his health issues.
12. I note that the TCAB properly took into account of the then-in-force section 37ZG of the Immigration Ordinance which sets out the relevant statutory regime in failing to file a completed NCF [12-13]. Properly applying that section, the true question for the TCAB was whether there was sufficient material to exercise a discretion under section 37ZG(3) to allow the claim to be re-opened after section 37ZG(1) is triggered. The TCAB essentially adopted the reasoning of the DOI and held that it was justified to refuse the Applicant’s application to re-open his claim [14-17]. I can detect no error, unfairness or irrationality in the reasoning of the TCAB. It is not for this Court to substitute my own opinion on that question: Re Esmiralde Naguimbing Ruz [2025] HKCA 399 at [21]-[22].
13. This leave application is accordingly without merit and is dismissed. I further note that the present leave application was brought out of time, given that Order 53 rule 4(1) requires the leave application to be taken out within 3 months after the TCAB Decision was made. Given that I consider that the proposed judicial review is not reasonably arguable, I refuse to extend time for the Applicant (in any case no reasons were given for the lateness).
Dated the 20th day of February 2026
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(Gladys Lee)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 20/02/2026
Attaurehman
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 20/02/2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 14886/18/12/243/P2974
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
ImmD RA 7/37/C (formerly RBCZ 2000108/14)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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