HKSAR v. CHEN KEEN (alias JACK CHEN) AND OTHERS

CACC 228 /2023, [2026] HKCA 1519

On Appeal From [2024] HKCFI 327

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 228 OF 2023

(ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 309 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Macrae Acting CJHC (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 7 May 2026, this Court handed down its judgment (“the Conviction Judgment”[2]) allowing the appeals against conviction on Count 1 (which was laid against D1 and D2 only) and Count 2 and Count 4 (which were laid against all appellants), but dismissing, by a majority, the appeals against conviction on Count 3 (which was laid against D1 and D2 only).  On 1 June 2026, this Court allowed the appeals against sentence on Count 3 (of D1 and D2), which resulted in their immediate release, and handed down its reasons for so doing on 5 June 2026 (“the Sentence Judgment”[3]).  We shall continue to refer to them collectively as “appellants”, though individually by their designations at trial.

2.  By their respective Notices of Motion, both dated 13 May 2026, D1 and D2 have applied for a certificate in identical terms that four points of law of great and general public importance are involved in the Conviction Judgment, pursuant to section 32(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  The proposed questions of law are as follows:

“1. In a charge of conspiracy to defraud a listed company and its shareholders where it is alleged in relation to a Very Substantial Acquisition governed by the Listing Rules that the defendants (i) made false representations as to the connection/relationship between them, one being a director of the listed company and the other the vendor; and (ii) concealed or failed to disclose an interest held by the director in the Acquisition, which representations were alleged to have been made for the purpose of causing the listed company and its shareholders to approve the Acquisition and release convertible notes and an option bond for the purpose of paying for it, is the Judge required as a matter of law, to determine and direct the Jury, on the meaning of a ‘connection transaction’ and a ‘connected person’ under the Listing Rules? (Question 1)

2. Where allegedly false representations are made in response to inquiries from the Stock Exchange intended to ensure compliance with the Connected Transaction provisions under the Listing Rules but which were (i) true in the meaning they would convey to a reasonable person reading them in that context; and (ii) true in the meaning in which they were actually understood by the recipients of them, including the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, such that no conspiracy to defraud the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong could be sustained in respect of identically worded ingredient elements to those in the ListCo count, can a conviction in respect of that conspiracy nonetheless be sustained on the alternative more general, non-Listing Rules alleged meaning of the representations, namely that the defendants falsely represented that they were not secretly ‘working together on the same side’ of the Very Substantial Acquisition. (Question 2)

3. Where allegedly false representations are made in response to inquiries from the Stock Exchange intended to ensure compliance with the Connected Transaction provisions under the Listing Rules, is the trial judge entitled to direct the jury that the meaning of the words used was not, as a matter of law, to be defined by the Listing Rules, thereby requiring the jury to determine the truth or falsity of the indicted representations by reference to the meaning ascribed to them by the prosecution? (Question 3)

4.  Can a conviction in relation to an offence of conspiracy to defraud be sustained (assuming dishonest is established), only on the basis of the non-disclosure of an established fact, without proof that the defendant in question was under a legal duty to make disclosure of that fact in the circumstances in which disclosure was not made? (Question 4)”

3.  Further, by three separate letters from the parties’ solicitors filed with the Court on 12 May 2026 (in the case of D2) and 13 May 2026 (in the case of D1 and D3), the appellants have applied for the costs incurred by them in the proceedings below and on appeal.

4.  It will be convenient to deal with the applications for a certificate and costs together.  There is no objection from any of the parties to disposing of these applications on the papers without an oral hearing. 

D1 and D2’s submissions on the certificate application

5.  It is submitted on behalf of D1 and D2 that it is reasonably arguable:

(i)  in respect of Question 1, since particulars (a) and (b) of Count 1 and Count 3 are worded in identical terms, that if Count 1, which is a Listing Rule (“LR”) case, called for the jury to be directed on the meaning of a “connection transaction” and a “connected person”[4], the same direction should equally have been required and given in respect of Count 3;

(ii)  in respect of Question 2, that the prosecution case in respect of particulars (a) and (b) of Count 1 (and Count 3) that D1 and D2 were “working together” manifested a lack of legal certainty or precision;

(iii)  in respect of Question 3, that absent any directions on the meaning of the impugned words in the LR context, the judge erred in allowing the prosecution to decide whether to base its case as an LR case and to ascribe its own chosen meaning to those words; and

(iv)  in respect of Question 4, that the failure to disclose a potential conflict of interest was incapable in law of amounting to dishonest means for the purpose of the offence of conspiracy to defraud.

The respondent’s submissions on the certificate application

6.  Mr Chau DPP, who acts for the respondent in the certificate application only, together with Ms Ng and Mr Li, opposes the certification of any of the proposed questions. 

7.  In respect of Question 1, Mr Chau submits that since, in HKSAR v Mak Kwong Yiu[5], the Court of Final Appeal rejected the proposition that conspiracy to defraud based on concealment necessarily required proof of a breach of the connected transaction rules or proof that the arrangement in question fell within the definition of a connected transaction[6], there is no general principle which requires a judge to direct the jury on the meaning of a “connection transaction” and a “connected person” in every conspiracy case in an LR context[7].  Mr Chau relies on R v Hayes[8] for the proposition that the legal effect of the connected transactions rules is irrelevant to the issue of falsity and, therefore, requires no direction on their meaning[9].

8.  Mr Chau also submits that Question 2 is directed to the factual sufficiency and precision of the prosecution in the particular trial in the present case and does not give rise to any point of law of great and general importance[10].

9.  Mr Chau maintains that Question 3 is a repackaged version of Question 1; whereas Question 4, which attempts to distinguish between actual and potential conflict, does not raise any novel point of law and is academic[11].

Discussion (the certificate application)

10.  Although Question 1(i) is made specific to Count 3, namely, a conspiracy to defraud 462 and its shareholders, it is akin to the question for which Mr Tsoi, SC (at that time led by Mr Grossman, SC) had sought certification from the Court of Appeal (differently constituted) in 2018 in respect of the then two counts of conspiracy to defraud (Count 1 against SEHK; and Count 2 against 462 and its existing shareholders).

11.  The question for certification in 2018 read:

“In the context of charges of conspiracy to defraud the Stock Exchange and shareholders of a listed company, where false representations are said to have been made as to connections between the directors of the listed company and the vendor in a very substantial acquisition governed by the Listing Rules, for the purpose of the direction on falsity, is the Judge required to determine and direct the Jury, as a matter of law, on the meaning of a ‘connected transaction’ and ‘connected persons’ under the Listing Rules?”

12.  The Court of Appeal declined to certify the question, holding that[12]:

“13. … The ultimate question for the jury was whether what the conspirators were doing was a fraud on HKSE (Count 1) and/or 462 (Count 2).  The defence may well for tactical reasons have wished to side-track, and perhaps ensnare, the prosecution in an immaterial debate on whether the transaction was a ‘connected transaction’ under the Listing Rules, but the case put by the prosecution from beginning to end was one of conspiracy to defraud the HKSE and/or 462 by various specified dishonest means.  The term “connected transaction” did not appear anywhere in the particulars of each count, nor was there any reference to the Listing Rules.

14.  It is true that the term ‘connected persons’ did appear in particular (a) of each count, but there was, and could be, no dispute that A1 and 462 were connected persons, since A1 was a director of 462.  However, the question was whether the relationship between A1 and A2 was properly disclosed to 462 and SEHK, the prosecution allegation at all times being that they were ‘working together’, notwithstanding that they were on opposite sides of the Acquisition.  Whether they were ‘connected persons’ under the Listing Rules was not germane to either count of the indictment.”

13.  Later, however, the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal granted leave to appeal on the question of law at [11] supra (Question 1 in 2018)[13], although the appeal was ultimately allowed on a different ground and the Court of Final Appeal found it unnecessary and undesirable to resolve that question[14].

14.  Since it was not specifically engaged or raised as a ground of appeal in Mak Kwong Yiu, judgment in which was handed down by the Court of Final Appeal on 5 November 2025, it seems to us arguable that the question should not be regarded as having been answered or determined, directly or indirectly, by the Court of Final Appeal.

15.  In the Conviction Judgment, this Court considered that the question does not matter in respect of Count 3 because, as held by the majority, the jury could not have thought, from the clear and repeated directions given to them, that the representations were made in the context of the LR[15].  However, the failure to give the jury an appropriate direction on the meaning of ‘connected transaction’ and ‘connected person(s)’ could amount to a misdirection in the context of Count 1[16].

16.  Irrespective of how we approached and resolved the question ourselves in the appeal when it was before us, the role of this Court in the present application is to decide whether the question is of the requisite importance and reasonably arguable.  Absent anything pointing to the contrary, we can only assume that the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal will find the same unresolved question of law, albeit that it was then concerned with both the fraud on SEHK and the fraud on 462 and its shareholders, on which the Appeal Committee granted leave in 2018, reasonably arguable today.

17.  Accordingly, we think the proper course for us is to grant a certificate in terms of Question 1(i) and for the Appeal Committee to determine whether to grant leave in the circumstances which now obtain.

18.  We note that no certificate in terms of Question 1(i) is sought in the context of a conspiracy to defraud SEHK.  The question we certify is therefore in the context of a conspiracy to defraud a listed company and its shareholders only.

19.  We shall state briefly why we refuse the grant of a certificate on the other questions.  Part (ii) of Question 1 does not arise because the interest on the CSA had to do with particular (c) of Counts 1 and 3 and falls outside the ambit of the question on which the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal granted leave.  As rightly pointed out by Mr Chau, Question 2 is directed to the particular way in which the prosecution case was run in the present case and Question 3 adds nothing of substance to Question 1(i).  As to Question 4, as was pointed out in the Conviction Judgment[17], the associated argument was decided in Natural Dairy (NZ) Holdings Limited (in provisional liquidation) v Chen Keen (alia Jack Chen) and 4 others by Deputy Judge Eva Sit, SC[18], whose reasoning was not disturbed on appeal to the Court of Appeal[19].

D1 and D2’s application for costs

20.  Identical written submissions on costs were filed on behalf of D1 and D2, although D1’s submission has been settled by his solicitors, and D2’s by Mr Tsoi and Ms Chiu.  D1 and D2 seek the costs of the following:

(i)  defence costs incurred following their arrests up to the date of committal;

(ii)  the re-trial before Deputy Judge Bruce, SC;

(iii)  the re-trial before Anna Lai J;

(iv)  the application for bail pending appeal to this Court;

(v)  the appeal against conviction to this Court; and

(vi)  the appeal against sentence to this Court.

(For (iii) and (v) above, D1 and D2 only seek costs in relation to Counts 1, 2 and 4.)

21.  It is argued on behalf of D1 and D2 that, by exercising their right of silence in the interviews and electing not to give evidence at the trial or re-trial, they did not bring suspicions on themselves.  It is submitted that the defence case throughout was that they were not part of any alleged conspiracies and the allegations against them were flawed in fact and in law; the bulk of the trial preparation, and the evidence of most prosecution witnesses, were related to Counts 1, 2 and 4; the conduct of Count 3 (vis-à-vis the non-disclosure of the CSA) had nothing to do with that of Count 1 (for the CSA was not a disclosable instrument to SEHK); and the quashing of Counts 2 and 4 involved no point of law.  It is submitted that, whilst D1 and D2’s convictions of Count 3 were affirmed on appeal to this Court, they should nevertheless be granted 90% of their total costs.

D3’s application for costs

22.  Mr Khosa, for D3, seeks costs regarding (i), (ii), (iii) and (v) as stated in [20] supra.  He emphasises the point that D3’s convictions were quashed in full following the appeal to this Court and submits that, as a matter of compensatory principle, D3 should be entitled to costs.  He also submits that D3 is a person of limited means and will have to start afresh after he is repatriated from Hong Kong.

The respondent’s position on costs

23.  Mr Mitchell, with him Ms Ng and Mr Li, for the respondent, does not oppose costs in relation to the appeal to this Court, but opposes costs incurred at the committal since the arrests, and of the two re-trials.

24.  He submits that D1 and D2 had brought suspicion upon themselves in respect of Count 1[20].  He also states that, in light of the evidential overlap between Counts 1 and 3, and D1 and D2’s own assertions that both counts allege the same conduct, no additional costs were incurred by the defence in defending on Count 1 when also dealing with Count 3[21].

25.  Mr Mitchell submits that the appellants’ convictions on Counts 2 and 4 were quashed on a very narrow basis.  The appellants again brought suspicion on themselves in terms of the significant email correspondence between D2 and D3, copied to D1, as well as the nature of the resulting falsified accounts[22].

Discussion (the costs application)

26.  We wish to make it clear that all members of this Court considered that the appellants had plainly brought suspicion on themselves and should be deprived of their costs as a matter of principle, although we are prepared to grant the appellants the costs of the aborted re-trial before Deputy Judge Bruce, SC; and D1 and D2, a portion of their appeal costs.

27.  We shall deal first with the re-trial before Deputy Judge Bruce, SC, which was aborted upon the application of the appellants, as a result of one of the prosecution witnesses giving unsolicited evidence which was found to be prejudicial to the appellants.  Deputy Judge Bruce, SC, awarded costs to the appellants and held “[t]he basis upon which I award costs is solely to compensate the accused for the conduct of the re-trial ordered by the Court of Final Appeal”[23].  We note that such order was subsequently set aside (on the ground of a lack of jurisdiction in making the order) by the Court of Appeal[24], which decision was affirmed by the Court of Final Appeal[25].

28.  It should be noted that, having allowed the appellants’ appeal and ordered a re-trial in 2019, the Court of Final Appeal further awarded costs, including their costs of the first trial, in 2020.  The Court of Final Appeal held[26]:

“7.  As to the costs of the trial, the fact that following their successful appeals to this court resulting in the quashing of their convictions, the appellants were not acquitted as such but were ordered to stand a retrial does not prevent them from asking for the costs of the original trial.  The matter is entirely in the discretion of the court.  To a defendant who has to stand trial a second time, the question of the costs of the original trial is as important a matter to him as it is to a defendant who has been acquitted after trial or after appeal.  Indeed, to the defendant who has to face a second trial, the question of costs affects directly his funding for the second trial. This is particularly so where, as in the present case, the retrial, like the original trial, is going to be a lengthy and costly one.

8.  As for the argument that the appellants have brought suspicion on themselves as evidenced by the guilty verdicts which indicate that they were found by the jury to have been dishonest in the transactions in question, again it is related to the issue of misdirections which we have not dealt with in the appeal.  The onus being on the respondent to satisfy us that there are ‘positive reasons’ to deprive the successful appellants of the costs of the trial, and bearing in mind the presumption of innocence which applies equally to an appellant whose conviction has been quashed on appeal and who is ordered to stand a retrial as it applies to a defendant who has been acquitted after trial, we find there is no or insufficient basis for us to deprive the appellants of their costs of the trial.  The issue on which the appellants succeeded on their appeals, namely, latent duplicity, was not a mere technicality, but was a substantive point going to the basis of the charges against them.  Whether the appellants were dishonest in the transactions concerned is a matter for the retrial.

9.  However, as regards the costs of the proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court (including the costs of the preliminary inquiry which included an evidence gathering exercise in New Zealand), they shall form part of the costs of the retrial and be dealt with accordingly.” 

29.  It seems to us that, when granting the appellants their costs, the Court of Final Appeal bore firmly in mind that they were to “stand trial a second time”, which was anticipated to be as “lengthy and costly” as the original trial.  The award of costs may therefore be regarded a means to compensate them for money expended on their original trial and associated appeals, so that they might be in a position to fund another trial (and subsequent appeal(s), if necessary).  We do not accept the appellants’ submissions that the Court of Final Appeal had rejected the prosecution contention that the appellants brought suspicions on themselves.  Whilst the order of the Court of Final Appeal enabled the appellants to be restored to their financial position at the time of the trial before A Pang J (as she then was), they may well be deprived of their costs (or part of their costs) in respect of the events which followed, if it can be shown that they brought suspicion on themselves.  We are fortified in this view since the Court of Final Appeal purposely directed that the costs of the proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court form part of the costs of the re-trial and be dealt with in any subsequent costs proceedings.

30.  It is common ground that the re-trial before Deputy Judge Bruce, SC, was aborted without fault on the part of the defence; although we have not heard conclusive argument as to why the judge believed the case could not be saved by judicial intervention and direction.  As a result, the appellants have had to stand a lengthy and costly third trial before Anna Lai J.  In those circumstances, we think it appropriate to grant the appellants their costs of the aborted re-trial, if we were to put them back to the original position, which the Court of Final Appeal must have contemplated.  We therefore exercise our discretion and grant the costs of the aborted trial before Deputy Judge Bruce, SC to the appellants (excluding the costs of the proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court), with a certificate of a maximum of 3 counsel engaged by each appellant, to be taxed if not agreed.

31.  We now turn to the costs of the re-trial before Anna Lai J and the appeal proceedings before this Court.

32.  It should be remembered that, with regard to the VSA, D1, D2 and Latitude Asia Limited entered into the CSA on 8 October 2008.  Thereafter, D1 was appointed the joint Chairman and CEO of 462 on 7 May 2009 for the specific purpose of the acquisition.  The suspicion which the appellants brought upon themselves was also manifested in the replies of 462 or themselves in response to SEHK’s enquiries (as set out at [19] of the Conviction Judgment).  The evidence relating to Counts 1 and 3 was inextricably linked and arose out of the same factual matrix.  Most, if not all, of the defence arguments were common to both counts.  Although we allowed the appeal on Count 1, in refusing leave on Ground 6, we were satisfied that the evidence relating to those counts was correctly placed before the jury at trial.  We also found no merit in Ground 4 concerning the admissibility of William Wong’s evidence.

33.  However, insofar as Count 1 is concerned, the position on costs is perhaps less straightforward.  It should be remembered that some issues were decided against the appellants by this Court (differently constituted) in April 2018, but leave on those matters was granted by the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal in late 2018 and not ultimately resolved by the Court of Final Appeal in 2019.  In respect of the repeat arguments relating to those issues put forward at the re-trial, whilst the court and parties below should regard themselves as bound by the previous decision of this Court; in the subsequent appeal from the re-trial, an appellant should not however be deprived of costs for advancing a point of appeal which was declared to be reasonably arguable by the Appeal Committee.  Indeed, leave to appeal on Ground 1, Ground 2 and Ground 7 (in relation to Count 1) was granted by ourselves.

34.  For these reasons, although we are not prepared to grant the appellants any costs of the re-trial before Anna Lai J in relation to Counts 1 and 3, we consider it appropriate to grant D1 and D2 part of the costs on appeal.  We shall grant them 25% of their costs of the appeal against conviction, with a certificate for three counsel in the case of D1, with a certificate for two counsel in the case of D2, to be taxed if not agreed.

35.  As for Counts 2 and 4, it will be relevant to recite the passages in the Conviction Judgment in which Macrae VP observed the appellants’ conduct through their email correspondence, with which M Poon and G Lam JJA agreed:

“80. …Suffice it to point out that, notwithstanding the shift in evidence on the disclosure of the Tab 11 accounts, all other relevant evidence was, at the time of the trial, correctly left to the jury in order for them to consider what to make of the appellants’ acts resulting in the representation in Appendix II of the false gross profit figures, which were entirely different from or inconsistent with those in the Tab 11 accounts, and why.  Accordingly, I would refuse leave to appeal on Ground 3.

81.  Nevertheless, I would make this observation.  There is a superficial attraction to the submission put on behalf of the appellants that it was not possible to lie about the profit if the truth had been told about the loss.  However, in reality, the conduct of the appellants as expressed in their various emails as between themselves and with ShineWing reveal a marked reluctance on their part to give the accountants what they required, which together with the rather curious shift in the evidence of some of the ShineWing witnesses, left the Court highly suspicious of everyone’s conduct in this matter.  To say that the appellants ‘told the truth’ about the loss when they were prepared to put forward what was, on any analysis, an absurd set of figures for gross profit for the year ending 31 May 2009, is a rather generous and benign assessment of what was really going on.  Nevertheless, on that somewhat narrow basis, we would allow the appeals against conviction on Counts 2 and 4.”

36.  We should add that, leave having been refused on Ground 3, which alleged that particular (a) of Counts 2 and 4 could not be sustained; and on Ground 6, which alleged that there should be no case to answer on Counts 2 and 4, at the re-trial before Anna Lai J, the appeal against the convictions of those counts was allowed on a narrow basis as explained at [79] of the Conviction Judgment.  Unlike the position before the Court of Final Appeal in 2020, we did not order any re-trial after allowing the appeal in part.  In relation to Counts 2 and 4, we are therefore not prepared to grant the appellants any costs of the re-trial before Anna Lai J and the appeal to this Court.

37.  As for D1 and D2’s application for bail pending appeal, it was made on the basis of some, not all, of the grounds pleaded in the Perfected Grounds of Appeal, and granted by the Single Judge on a myriad of factors including the identical issues contained in the first question of law on which the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal granted leave to appeal and bail pending appeal.  Adopting a broad brush approach, we are prepared to grant the costs of such application to D1 (with a certificate for three counsel) and D2 (with a certificate for two counsel), to be taxed if not agreed.

38.  As for the appeal against sentence, we adjourned the hearing to 1 June 2026 for further written submissions.  Although the Court was in agreement with the contention of D1 and D2 that their sentences should be substantially reduced, and ultimately allowed the appeal, which resulted in their immediate release, the Court expected, with respect, more assistance from the appellants’ counsel.  As we pointed out in the Sentence Judgment, “none of the parties [having] been able to find any case that is comparable with the procedural history of this case”[27], the Court conducted its own researches before finding that “there were two authorities which the Court drew to the attention of the parties”[28].  Thereafter, the respondent submitted a further authority.  The Court relied substantially upon its own researches in disposing of the appeal.  In the circumstances, we are not prepared to grant D1 and D2 any of the costs of the appeal against sentence.  We might add that although argument was mounted orally at the appeal in relation to the director’s disqualification order, this issue had never been a written ground of appeal.

39.  We should also point out that the Court’s order for a rolled-up application for leave together with the appeal proper led to a separate leave hearing being dispensed with and saved a considerable amount of costs as well as judicial resources.  With regard to the asserted limited means of D3, Mr Khosa does not go as far as to suggest that the non-award of costs will have a crippling effect on D3.  Indeed, Mr Khosa acknowledges that, having now restored his clear record, D3 can re-start his career, or start another career, elsewhere.  We would mention that D3 did not join in applying for bail pending appeal on 8 May 2024, whilst his sentence was fully served by 12 June 2024, and he considered it fit to continue with his appeal against sentence, which was overtaken by events when his convictions were quashed.  Without any disrespect to Mr Khosa, the oral arguments at the appeal were left exclusively to leading counsel for D1 and D2.

Annex I

[1]  See Annex I.

[2]   HKSAR v Chen Keen (alias Jack Chen) and others (Unrep., CACC 228/2023, 7 May 2026).

[3]  HKSAR v Chen Keen (alias Jack Chen) and another (Unrep., CACC 228/2023, 5 June 2026).

[4]  The Conviction Judgment, at [93].

[5]  HKSAR v Mak Kwong Yiu (2025) 28 HKCFAR 385.

[6]  Respondent’s submissions on certificate application, at [13].

[7]  Respondent’s submissions on certificate application, at [19].

[8]  R v Hayes [2025] UKSC 29.

[9]  Respondent’s submissions on certificate application, at [20].

[10]  Respondent’s submissions on certificate application, at [22].

[11]  Respondent’s submissions on certificate application, at [43]-[44].

[12]  HKSAR v Chen Keen (alias Jack Chen) and others (Unrep., CACC 172/2016, 31 July 2018), at [13]-[14].

[13]  HKSAR v Hao May (formerly known as Wang May Yan) (alias May Wang), HKSAR v Yee Wenjye (also known as Yu Wenjie) (alias Eric Yee) and HKSAR v Chen Keen (alias Jack Chen) FAMC Nos 27, 28 & 29 of 2018; [2018] HKCFA 60, at [2].

[14]  HKSAR v Chen Keen (2019) 22 HKCFAR 248, at [93].

[15]  Conviction Judgment, at [103].

[16]  Conviction Judgment, at [93].

[17]  Conviction Judgment, at [71].

[18]  Natural Dairy (NZ) Holdings Limited (in provisional liquidation) v Chen Keen (alias Jack Chen) and 4 others (Unrep., HCA 2218/2017, 7 October 2020).

[19]  Natural Dairy (NZ) Holdings Limited (in provisional liquidation) v Chen Keen (alias Jack Chen) and 4 others (Unrep., CAMP 119/2021, 23 February 2022).

[20]  Respondent’s written submission on costs, at [17].

[21]  Respondent’s written submission on costs, at [17] and [21].

[22]  Respondent’s written submission on costs, at [31].

[23]  HKSAR v Chen Keen (alias Jack Chen), HKSAR v Hao May (formerly known as Wang May Yan) (alias May Wang), HKSAR v Yee Wenjye (also known as Yu Wenjie) (alias Eric Yee) (Unrep., HCCC 309/2019, 6 August 2021) (Ruling – Application for Costs), at [44].

[24]  HKSAR v Chen Keen (alias Jack Chen), HKSAR v Hao May (formerly known as Wang May Yan) (alias May Wang), HKSAR v Yee Wenjye (also known as Yu Wenjie) (alias Eric Yee) [2022] 4 HKLRD 219 (Yuen JA, M Poon JA and Barnes J; M Poon JA writing for the Court).

[25]  HKSAR v Chen Keen (alias Jack Chen), HKSAR v Hao May (formerly known as Wang May Yan) (alias May Wang), HKSAR v Yee Wenjye (also known as Yu Wenjie) (alias Eric Yee) (2023) 26 HKCFAR 157.

[26]  HKSAR v Chen Keen (alias Jack Chen), HKSAR v Hao May (formerly known as Wang May Yan) (alias May Wang), HKSAR v Yee Wenjye (also known as Yu Wenjie) (alias Eric Yee) FAMC Nos 27, 28 & 29 of 2018, 8 January 2020 (Judgment on Costs).

[27]  Sentence Judgment, at [18].

[28]  Sentence Judgment, at [20].