RIADY, TJONDRO STEPHEN v. INSIDER DEALING TRIBUNAL

CACV 310/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 310 OF 2002

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 89 OF 2002)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Rogers VP:

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. It is made under the provisions of section 22(1)(b) of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance. There is no dispute between the parties that what has to be shown is that there is a matter of great general or public importance and that the matter should go to the Court of Final Appeal. The tentative argument is put that the additional ground of "or otherwise", which is contained in that subsection, might also be prayed in aid in this case. In my view, that is a wholly exceptional ground and certainly does not arise in this case.

2. The questions which the appellant wishes to put to the Court of Final Appeal are:

(a) Does the Insider Dealing Tribunal, under the terms of reference in the form issued by the Financial Secretary on 2 November 2000 and within the context of the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance, Cap. 395, have jurisdiction to investigate and identify a person as an "insider dealer" and, as appropriate, to punish him, when he is not identified in the terms of reference as a suspected insider dealer, either by name or by class description? and

(b) Does the Insider Dealing Tribunal, under the terms of reference in the form issued by the Financial Secretary on 2 November 2000 and within the context of the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance, Cap. 395, have jurisdiction to investigate, identify and punish an "insider dealer" for acts of "counselling and procuring", notwithstanding the fact that these acts may have been committed on a day, or days, falling outside the period prescribed in the terms of reference?

3. The background facts to this case are set out in the judgment of Hartmann and Chung JJ in the court below, which was given on 31 May 2000, and in the reasons for judgment of this court, which were handed down on 9 January of this year. There is no need to repeat them here.

4. In my view, it suffices to say two things. In the first place, I am not altogether convinced that any matter of great or general public importance can arise by reason of the way in which part of the argument has been put this morning. It seems to me that part of the argument turns on an interpretation of a particular phraseology used in the terms of reference and that is not a matter of great general or public importance.

5. Nevertheless, taking the questions on the face of the way in which they have been phrased, these have been dealt with both by the court below and by this court. No new arguments have been raised this morning. In my view, both questions have been answered by both the court below and this court in very clear terms and I, for my part, do not see any basis upon which this court could give leave for the matter to be taken to the Court of Final Appeal because I do not consider that the arguments are of sufficient merit to be sent there.

6. I would therefore dismiss this application.

Hon Le Pichon JA:

7. I agree.

Hon Ma JA:

8. I agree.