SULALAH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 629/2023

[2025] HKCFI 4527

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 629 OF 2023

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons dated and filed on 29 July 2025 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for leave to appeal out of time against Deputy High Court Judge Reuden Lai’s order dated 3 April 2025.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As Deputy High Court Judge Reuden Lai’s order was made on 3 April 2025, the last day for the applicant to file an appeal was on 17 April 2025. The time for appealing against the order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons, the applicant explained that she was late in applying due to her lack of knowledge. However, at the hearing of the Summons, the applicant said that she was late because she received the court’s decision late. She was in custody from 5 December 2024 until now. She only received the decision while in custody a week before she made the present application through her friend on 29 July 2025.

8.  Thus, the applicant gave two versions of the reason for filing her appeal late. Both versions are not satisfactory explanations. Ignorance of the court’s procedure cannot be a valid reason for the delay. The court’s decision was sent to Nei Kwu Correctional Institution on 3 April 2025 and the applicant confirmed at the hearing that she was detained there on that day. It is highly unlikely that she would receive the decision late while in custody.

9.  In any event, as aforesaid, the crucial question is whether there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review, but I find no merits of the intended appeal or the intended judicial review at all.

10.  The applicant failed to advance any ground for the intended appeal in the Summons. She did not file any supporting affirmation to give any ground either. At the hearing of the Summons, when I asked the applicant for her grounds of the intended appeal, she merely said that she was sick, as she had breast cancer and itchiness on the left side of her breast, her butt and her feet. She claimed that her health conditions were related to her intended appeal because she only started to have the illness after she was detained in custody and she wanted to stay outside and in Hong Kong to have proper medication.

11.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

12.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Her health conditions cannot be a ground for challenging the court’s decision at all. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

13.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review and I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

14.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.