RE MAHMOOD SAJID

CAMP 369/2022, [2025] HKCA 159

On Appeal From [2024] HKCA 906

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 369 OF 2022

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 350 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 20 November 2024, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal out of time against this court’s judgment of 8 October 2024 (“the Judgment”) ([2024] HKCA 906). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s reapplication for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Deputy Judge”) dated 7 April 2022, by which the Deputy Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2022] HKCFI 998).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  Pursuant to section 24(2) of the HKCFAO, an appellant has 28 days from the date of the Judgment to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  In the present case, the deadline for the applicant to seek leave to appeal against the Judgment fell on 5 November 2024.  Accordingly, the applicant was over two weeks late in taking out his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

5.  As the applicant did not apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal within time, the Court has a discretion to extend time under section 24(5) of the HKCFAO only if good and sufficient grounds are shown by the applicant: see Re Imran Muhammad [2021] HKCA 482 at [9] and the authorities cited therein.  In deciding whether there are such good grounds, the court is entitled to take into account (a) the length of the delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the chances of the appeal succeeding if an extension of time is granted; and (d) the degree of prejudice to the respondent if the application is granted: Begum Jahanara v Ian Candy, Esq & Another [2021] HKCA 83 at [4] and the authorities cited therein.

6.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“I would like to inform the Court of Final Appeal. There are some error in my decision maker. I am disagree with the decision maker authorities. They were totally relied on some web news which officially not recognized. They were also rejected all my evidence as well. I do not think my case determined fairly.” (sic)

7.  The applicant also filed an affirmation on 20 November 2024, merely stating that he sought time extension for his “Notice of Motion against the order dated 8 October 2024” without giving any reason for his delay.

8.  The applicant lodged his written submissions on 4 December 2024.  Those written submissions were defective since they included a statement written by his wife who had no capacity to make any statement in this appeal. Pursuant to the directions of the Registrar of Civil Appeals, Master SP Yip, given on 13 January 2025 (“the Directions”).  The applicant was directed to lodge two sets of proper written submissions on or before 28 January 2025, failing which he would be deemed to have abandoned his right to rely on written submissions.  Contrary to those directions, the applicant failed to lodge any proper written submissions before the deadline.

9.  At the outset, the applicant’s delay of over two weeks is substantial and he fails to provide any reason, let alone good and sufficient reason, in support for his delay.

10.  Further, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  His allegations are mainly directed at the Director and the Board’s Decisions and he fails to identify any specific error in the Judgment.  They do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

11.  In any event, even taking his case at its highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

12.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

13.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit and it will be futile to grant him extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion filed on 20 November 2024 is dismissed.