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HCSA 1/2010
香港特別行政區
高等法院原訟法庭
民事司法管轄權
高院小額錢債審裁處上訴案件2010年第1號
（原小額錢債審裁處申索2006年第2723號）
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| 申索人 |
律政司司長 |
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對 |
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| 被告人 |
張璉、李鳳儀及陳錦華
（代表他們自己及香港華璉藝術發展團的其他成員） |
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主審法官：高等法院原訟法庭法官鍾安德內庭聆訊
聆訊日期：2010年5月11日
最後書面陳述呈交日期：2010年6月7日
判決書日期：2010年6月17日
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判決書
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1. 申請人不服小額錢債審裁處（“審裁處”）在2009年9 月22日作出的裁斷，倚仗香港法例第338章《小額錢債審裁處條例》第28條提出本申請，以該項裁斷在法律論點上有錯為由，要求法庭批予許可以提出上訴。
2. 申請人乃審裁處申索編號SCTC 2723/2006的被告人。申索人追討申請人（及其他被告人）欠交的租用香港文化中心大劇院及額外器材、設備及服務的費用。涉案的費用，是2002年8月13日及14日晚上綵排時，申索人提供的較高費用的排練A服務。申請人反指申索人違約，並向申索人提出反申索。
3. 本申請的申請書的擬提出上訴的理由，列載在長達87 頁的附件中。該附件中標題為“申請上訴理由的簡要題綱”的篇幅，約為14頁。其中：
(a) 約8至9頁指，審裁處錯誤地理解（甚或不理解）與涉案爭議點相關的事實及/或證供，或審裁處被申索人傳召的證人的虛假證供誤導等；
(b) 約兩頁指，審裁處在審訊過程中，作為不當。
4. 導致本上訴的法律程序可簡述如下。申索人前曾向申請人（及其他被告人）追討前第2段所述的款額。該申索由審裁處另一審裁官審理。經審訊後，審裁處在2007年8月判定申索人勝訴。申請人（及其他被告人）不服判決，向原訟法庭提出上訴。原訟法庭在2009年3月13日宣布判決，以審裁處未考慮相關證供、未觀看申請人呈交的視像光碟等理由，撤銷了該判決，並將該申索發還審裁處，由另一審裁官審理。
5. 本申請所針對的裁斷，經在2009年5月4至6日及25 至26日及7月16日進行的審訊後，在2009年9月18日及22 日宣布。審裁處依第338章第18條記錄的書面裁斷，長約34 頁。審裁處在其中就：
(1) 與訟雙方傳召的證人（包括申請人）所作的證供；
(2) 與訟雙方各自呈交的書面重點綱要所提的爭議點，
作出評定及/或考慮。
6. 前第3(a) 段所述的論據，其實性質都屬針對審裁處就證供可信性及/或如何評定及/或衡量涉案事實的裁斷。
7. 在行使普通法的各地法院的上級法庭在多宗案例中說，要成功地令上級法庭對原審法庭這種性質的裁斷作出干預，上訴人（或申請人）需顯示：-
(a) 原審法庭在法律論點上，作出錯誤指示；或
(b) 原審法庭的裁斷，完全沒有相關的證據基礎支持；或
(c) 原審法庭的裁斷，完全違背已呈交的證據所顯示的結論。
8. 英國上議院在Edwards v. Bairston [1956] AC 14一案中說：-
“When the case comes before the court it is its duty to examine the determination having regard to its knowledge of the relevant law. If the case contains anything ex facie which is bad law and which bears upon the determination, it is, obviously, erroneous in point of law. But, without any such misconception appearing ex facie, it may be that the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination under appeal. In those circumstances, too, the court must intervene. … there, too, there has been error in point of law. I do not think that it much matters whether this state of affairs is described as one in which there is no evidence to support the determination or as one in which the evidence is inconsistent with and contradictory of the determination, or as one in which the true and only reasonable conclusion contradicts the determination. Rightly understood, each, phrase propounds the same test. For my part, I prefer the last of the three, … ” (上文獲強調之處，由本席後加) (第36頁)。
9. 英國上議院其後在Griffiths v. J P Harrison (Waterford) Ltd. [1963] AC 1一案中亦說：-
“Harrisons appealed to the High Court seeking to get the decision of the commissioners reversed. Now the powers of the High Court on an appeal are very limited. The judge cannot reverse the commissioners on their findings of fact. He can only reverse their decision if it is “erroneous in point of law.” Now here the primary facts were all found by the commissioners. They were stated in the case. They cannot be disputed. What is disputed is their conclusion from them. And it is now settled, as well as anything can be, that their conclusion cannot be challenged unless it was unreasonable, …. It is not sufficient that the judge would himself have come to a different conclusion. Reasonable people on the same facts may reasonably come to different conclusions, and often do. Juries do. So do judges. And are they not all reasonable men? But there comes a point when a judge can say that no reasonable man could reasonably come to that conclusion. Then, but not till then, he is entitled to interfere. ….” (上文獲強調之處，由本席後加)。
10. 故此，要成功地作出這一類推翻原審裁斷的申請，申請人要顯示的是：-
“ … when the question is asked whether the evidence upon which the commissioner could arrive at their findings, I take it that this means whether (to adapt the words … in Edwards v Bairston) the contrary conclusion is the true and only reasonable one.” (上文獲強調之處，由本席後加) (英國上議院在Griffiths一案中第10至11頁的用詞)。
11. 此外，香港終審法院在Ting Kwok Keung v. Tam Dick Yuen & Others (2002) 5 HKCFAR 336 的判案書中，引用英國上議院上訴委員會在Biogen Inc. v. Medava Plc [1997] PRC 1, 45的判詞中，就上級法庭應如何看待原審法庭的判詞所作的論述：-
“The need for appellate caution in reversing the trial judge’s evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance … of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge’s overall evaluation”。
12. 香港終審法院在Ting Kwok Keung判案書中亦說：-
“Where the judgment turns on an issue of fact, the Court of Appeal must have regard to the nature of that issue of fact. And it must have regard to the advantages enjoyed by a trial judge who received the evidence on such an issue at first-hand, in other words, in whose presence the whole of the evidence unfolded in its living state. Such advantages can be, as Lord Shaw of Dunfermline put it in Clarke v Edinburgh Tramways [1919] SC (HL) 35 at p 36, ‘sometimes broad and sometimes subtle’. The question for the Court of Appeal is whether, even though it does not enjoy the advantages enjoyed by the trial judge who received the evidence at first-hand, it is nevertheless satisfied that his conclusion on the facts is plainly wrong. The Court of Appeal should intervene if so satisfied. But if not so satisfied, the Court of Appeal should defer to the trial judge’s conclusion even if in some doubt as to its correctness” （第42段）。
亦參看Wide Project Construction (HK) Ltd. v. The I.D. of Yen Dack Building, CACV 136/2006 (2007年7月6日，第32及33段; Tam Shair Leung v. Tam Cheung Shiu, CACV 215/2004 (2005年4月20 日)，第35段。
13. 就前第3(a)及6段所述的論據，審裁處在作出不利申請人的裁斷時，已充分考慮與訟雙方所提的證據及論據。因此，該等裁斷全屬審裁處基於已呈堂證據而可作出不利申請人的裁斷的範疇，並不涉及法律論點。
14. 前第3(b)段所述的論據（審裁處的作為不當），涉及以下的指稱：
(1) 審裁官在審訊完結後（但未作出裁斷前），私下與申索人代表及其中一名證人在走廊談論案情;
(2) 審裁官在審訊時，容許申索人代表使用手勢，提示證人如何作供；
(3) 審裁官干擾申請人盤問證人。
15. 本席認為，就上述性質嚴重的指稱，應給予審裁官作出回應的機會。審裁官其後在2010年5月24日以書面回應，並否認前第3(b) 及14段所述的指稱。
16. 本席亦容許申請人對審裁官的書面回應作出進一步陳述。申請人在2010年6月7日呈交了書面陳述。就前第14(1) 段所述的指稱，書面陳述指，發生於2009年5月7日下午約5時40 分，當時審裁處的錄音系統，應仍在運作。錄音紀錄應可顯示，當時審裁官要求申索人傳召的證人，聆訊完結後在法庭外面等她。
17. 但本席聆聽過相關的錄音紀錄，並未察覺任何對話，支持前第14(1)、14(2)及/或14(3)段所述的的不當作為。
18. 因此，本席判定，並沒有：
(a) 香港終審法院在Ting Kwok Keung 的判案書中指，原審法庭在裁斷涉案事實時明顯錯誤；
(b) 審裁處的裁斷在法律論點上有錯；
(d) 充分或合理基礎，顯示審裁處在審訊過程中有不當作為，
的情況。
19. 本席故此駁回本申請。
被告人：無律師代表，自行應訊
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