HUSSAIN MANZAR v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 1353/2020

[2026] HKCFI 165

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1353 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  By a summons issued on 1 December 2025 (“Summons”) supported by an affirmation of the same date (“Affirmation”) the Applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal my order dated 11 November 2025 (“Order”) wherein I had refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) dated 9 June 2020 (“NRCPO Decision”).

2.  In dealing with such I have had regard below to the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospects of the intended appeal, and the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time is granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346; Nupur Mst [2018] HKCA 524; Nguyen Van Quyen [2025] HKCA 510).

3.  In the Summons and the Affirmation, the Applicant says that he has reasonable grounds to bring the proceedings and good reasons for his request to be granted, as follows:

(1)  He says that the reason for the delay is that he “did not receive [his] decision copy in time”;

(2)  He submits that “there are substantive merits to my underlying appeal”; and

(3)  He says that as no hearing date has been fixed for determination of the intended proceedings, there is no impairment or delay if the intended proceedings proceed.

4.  Firstly, as the 14-day period for the Applicant to appeal against the Order expired on 25 November 2025 (RHC O. 53 r. 3(4)), the application is late by some 6 days. While the decision was returned to the court undelivered by reason of “No such address”[1], it was and is his duty to give the court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner, such that the consequence of any delay occasioned by the ineffectiveness of such an address falls on his shoulders (Hasmi Rizwan Imran HKCA 439 at §§14-15; Rai Tika Kumari [2025] HKCA 78). Moreover, he has not explained how and when he learnt of the Order and my decision.

5.  However, as the delay is relatively minor I will focus on the prospects of success in the intended appeal, which is important as the court will not grant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal (Tran Van Anh [2025] HKCA 408).

6.  In that regard, the Applicant’s bare and unparticularised claim that there are “substantive merits to my underlying appeal” fails to identify or amount to a ground of appeal against the decision. Indeed, in the decision I had reviewed the NRCPO Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard, and found no reasonably arguable public law grounds to vitiate such. I do not see that there is any proper ground of appeal with any prospect of success, particularly when the Applicant has not identified any basis (in the nature of an error of law, any failure to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court, or that I was plainly wrong) on which the Court of Appeal would reverse my decision (Nupur Mst, supra).

7.  In the premises, it would be futile to extend time and would clearly needlessly prejudice the respondent for what appears to be a hopeless appeal. I therefore reject the Applicant’s submissions (insofar as they can be understood) that there is no impairment or delay in relation to the administration of justice.

8.  I therefore refuse the application and dismiss the Summons.