RE DHIMAL KAMALA

CACV 196/2018

[2018] HKCA 875

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 196 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 539/2017)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 28 September 2018, this court (Chu and Barma JJA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock (“the judge”) on 24 May 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing her appeal from a decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting her non‑refoulement claim.

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1]  We will not repeat them here.

3.  The applicant subsequently applied, by a notice of motion dated 4 October 2018, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant stated in her notice of motion that she did not receive any legal or language assistance.  She did not understand the process and suffered real prejudice.  She also said that “I have demonstrated how the lack of legal representation had caused prejudice.  The court has twisted the idea of seeking representation from the Duty Lawyer Service as the Duty Lawyer Service was provided to me by a referral from the Director of [Immigration] to the Duty Lawyer Service.  Should there be a change in policy or method of referral, I should have been notified as a self-represented litigant.”

4.  In compliance with the directions of the court, the applicant lodged with the court a written submission dated 16 October 2018 but received on 18 October 2018.  In her written submission, the applicant reiterated the matters raised in the Notice of Motion.  She also repeated her grounds for seeking leave for judicial review.

5.  Having considered the applicant’s notice of motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on paper.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of her notice of motion and written submission.

6.  The matters stated by the applicant in her notice of motion do not constitute grounds for granting leave to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine in accordance with section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters she has raised in her notice of motion and her written submission.  These matters had been adequately addressed at [16] of our judgment.  In our view, these matters are plainly not reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.

7.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

8.  For these reasons, the notice of motion dated 4 October 2018 is dismissed.