|
HCMA 81/2015
香港特別行政區
高等法院原訟法庭
刑事上訴司法管轄權
充公令上訴
案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2015年第81號
(原屯門裁判法院雜項案件2014年第714號)
-------------------------
-------------------------
| 聆訊日期： |
2015年3月12日 |
| 判案日期： |
2015年3月12日 |
| 頒布判案書日期： |
2015年4月13日 |
判案書
1. 上訴人是一間租車公司，去年3月31日，男子黃國勳向上訴人租用輕型貨車(GA 8614)，為期30 天，租金$5,000，按金$4,500[1]。
2. 同年4 月17 日，黃國勳用該車參與走私活動[2]，被海關人員拘捕，他後來認罪，判監6 個月[3]。今年1 月，海關關長根據《進出口條例》向特委裁判官何麗明(「裁判官」)申請充公涉案輕型貨車、車匙和行車証。
3. 裁判官重申黃瀚笙案終審法院定下的原則，又考慮了其他案例[4]，她指出以下幾點：
a 若海關關長證明[5]被檢取的物品須予沒收，除非聲請人能證明[6]法庭應行使酌情權將物品交給他，否則法庭會命令沒收物品[7]。
b 行使酌情權時，法庭必須考慮沒收令會對無辜的物主帶來嚴重後果。同時，也須顧及遏止嚴重不法活動和保障稅收的立法目標。
c 雖然酌情權是沒有限制的，但要公正和合理地行使。[8]
d 裁判官認為黃國勳沒能力賠償不應是行使酌情權的理由。
e 她指出上訴人沒有採取有效步驟阻止出租車輛被誤用。
4. 裁判官考慮了有關文件[9]，裁定該輕型貨車(GA 8614)可被充公，而上訴人未能證明充公令對它會構成嚴苛影響。況且，上訴人可以向黃國勳追討賠償。所以，作出充公令。
上訴理由
5. 上訴人代表廖元聰大律師提出幾項上訴理由，基於答辯人在聆訊前已表示不反對是次上訴，所以本席不必在此討論。
6. 由於上訴人呈交的附加文件[10]，答辯人考慮後認為，若裁判官有機會考慮這些文件，交還涉案輕型貨車應是公正的決定，所以不反對此上訴。
7. 就申請充公令的程序、舉證責任和舉證標準，終審法院已在黃瀚笙[11]案詳細闡述，有關的法律原則已相當清楚。值得留意是常任法官包致金就舉證標準與其餘4 位法官看法不同，本席認為應特別留意。
8. 非常任法官梅師賢爵士的判詞[12]指出以下幾點：
a 根據第28(7)條，法庭可行使酌情權交還涉案物品給聲請人，也可附帶條件，目的是減輕沒收令對無辜物主的影響。同時，也須顧及遏止嚴重不法活動和保障稅收的立法原意。[13]
b 申請充公令時，先由海關關長負責證明涉案物品可被充公，因該物品涉違反《進出口條例》或《進出口規則》，應採用相對可能衡量標準。當支持充公令的表面證據成立，如果沒有證據令法庭行使酌情權，法庭便會充公該物品。[14]
c 到此階段，聲請人必須舉證說服法庭行使酌情權，也是相對可能衡量標準。聲請人可以證明，他沒有故意或疏忽地參與或輔助有關違法行為。[15]
d 梅爵士強調聲請人必須證實支持行使酌情權的論據，海關關長沒有責任舉證去否定該些論據。[16]
e 梅爵士再強調聲請人必然知道自己是否全然無辜，海關關長不會知道。若每案都要求海關關長去證明聲請人曾參與或輔助有關違法行為，責任實非常艱巨。就算海關關長知道這些證據，也不應將聲請人的舉證責任轉給海關關長。[17]
f 最後，梅爵士再指出舉證責任關乎證實案件的整體論據，不是證實個別事實。[18]
9. 梅爵士特別指出，他詮釋和運用第28(7)條的方法跟R v CEC Finance Ltd案[19]有些不同。他不同意該案的部份論述，但沒有詳細講述。[20]
10. 據本席理解，在CEC Finance Ltd案 ，上訴庭包致金法官(當時職位)認為申請充公令時，雙方地位平等，基於相對可能衡量標準，各自負責證實所聲稱的事實，裁判官考慮所有情況後才決定是否行使酌情權。[21]
11. 這講法與梅爵士在黃瀚笙案有些分別，終審法院4 位法官同意海關關長只須基於相對可能衡量標準，證實涉案物品可被充公，不須負責證實其他事情，也沒責任舉證去否定聲請人是無辜的。聲請人負責舉證說服法庭行使酌情權，也是相對可能衡量標準。
12. 同時，在黃瀚笙案常任法官包致金提出「相稱證據」的標準——海關關長對聲請人的指控越嚴重，證據必須相應越強[22]。不過，其餘4 位法官沒有採用這原則。
13. 本席認為處理充公令時，應採用梅爵士在黃瀚笙案闡述的原則。以本案而言，本席同意答辯人的立場，涉案輕型貨車(GA 8614)應交還上訴人，並作以下命令：
a 判上訴人得直，
b 上訴人3天內支付海關關長因本案引致的開支共$10,414,
c 海關關長收款後14天內將輕型貨車(GA 8614)、車匙和行車証交還上訴人。
答辯人：由律政司署理高級檢控官談立豐代表香港特別行政區。
上訴人：由鄧志聰李德祥律師行轉聘廖元聰大律師代表。
[1] 見上訴文件冊48至52 頁。
[2] 涉案貨物包括舊手提電話、電池、電子書和平板電腦等共約值140 萬元。
[3] 詳見上訴文件冊第30至33 頁。
[4] 錢國柱 HCMA 91/2001，R v CEC Finance Ltd. [1993] 1 HKC 127。
[5] 舉證標準是相對可能性。Balance of probabilities。
[6] 舉證標準同樣是相對可能性。Balance of probabilities。
[7] [2009]12HKCFAR 65至68 段。
[8] CEC Finance Ltd. [1993] 1 HKC 127 at 130H—I, per Bokhary JA (as he then was), “Of course even such a discretion must be exercised judicially. And it should be exercised to further the objects of the statute concerned. That object, as the Ordinance’s long title tells us, is to regulate the import of articles into, and the export of articles from Hong Kong. And that involves combating smuggling—in a reasonable manner of course.”。
[9] 包括 (A) 海關通知書，(B) 上訴人覆信，(C) 法庭紀錄和謄本，(D) 案情擇要，(E) 與案有關的費用表，和(F) 租車合約和附帶文件。
[10] 包括一份完整的租車合約，黃國勳的身份證、駕駛執照和住址證明副本，上訴人代表給海關的供詞。
[11] 見註 7。
[12] 其餘3 位常任法官同意。
[13] 見註 7第64 段。
[14] 見註 7第65 段，“On a hearing under s28(7) the Commissioner bears the onus of establishing that the seized article is liable to forfeiture, namely that it is the subject of a contravention of the IEO or the regulations. Once this is established the Commissioner makes out a prima facie case for the order for forfeiture of the article and, in the absence of evidence to support an exercise of the discretion to order delivery of the seized article to the claimant, the court will make an order for forfeiture.” 和74 段。
[15] 見註 7第66 段，“It is therefore for the claimant, in order to avoid this outcome, to make out a case for an exercise of the discretion to order delivery of the article to him. He may do this by proving facts to the satisfaction of the court, according to the balance of probabilities, that show that he did not in any way participate in or facilitate, either by design or negligence, the contravention which has resulted in the article becoming liable to forfeiture.”
[16] 見註 7，第66 段G行，“To say this is to say no more than that a party who seeks to have a judicial discretion exercised in his favour bears the burden of establishing his case. It is not for his opponent to negative the existence of such a case.”
[17] 見註 7第67 段，“What I have just said has additional force in the context of Pt VI of the IEO. Whether the claimant is wholly innocent of any connection with the relevant contravention of the IEO is a matter that lies within his knowledge, not the Commissioner’s knowledge. It would put a heavy burden on the Commissioner if he were compelled in every case to shoulder the burden of showing that the claimant participated in, or facilitated, the relevant contravention. Even if, in some cases, the Commissioner is aware of evidence that indicates that the claimant is complicit in the contravention, that fact is no justification for suggesting that, in some way or other, the legal burden rests on the Commissioner in such cases simply because there is an issue of serious misconduct. The existence of such an issue cannot justify a reversal of the onus of proof which lies on an applicant seeking the exercise of a judicial discretion to make an order in his favour…”
[18] 見註 7第67 段最尾兩行，“...I would add also that the legal burden of proof relates to the making out of a case not to the proof of particular facts.”
[19] 見註 8。
[20] 見註 7第67 段，“I acknowledge that my approach to the meaning and application of s28(7) is in some respects inconsistent with what was said in R v CEC Finance Ltd [1993] 1 HKC 127. While I accept the correctness of the decision in that case, with the greatest respect to Mr Justice Bokhary PJ, it is my view that not everything said in that case should be accepted.”
[21] 見註 8 ，第131 頁D至E行，“The discretion to order forfeiture being unfettered, the question whether or not to so order is to be approached from a neutral starting point, with both parties on a level playing field, so to speak, and each with the onus of proving on a balance of probabilities any fact which he or it asserts if that fact is not admitted by the opposite party. That is how the question is to be approached. And it is to be answered by reference to what is just in all the circumstances as the magistrate finds such circumstances proved or admitted.”
[22]‘commensurate evidence approach’, 見註 7，第29—37 段。
|