有關馬沛東的事宜

HCB 19884/2003

香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

破產案件2003年第19884號

_________________________

判案書

前言

1. 破產管理署署長以受託人身份在2008年4月18日（“受託人”）根據《破產條例》（第6章）第30A條，向法庭提出申請，要求法庭頒令終止計算有關期間（“本申請”）。換句話說，是要求把破產人馬沛東先生（“馬先生”）的破產期延長。

2. 在2003年11月11日，香港律師會以債權人身份，要求法庭頒令馬先生破產。經聆訊後，鍾安德法官在2004年5月17日頒下破產令。同年6月8日，馬先生提出上訴（CACV 168/2004），但其後並沒有跟進有關程序。及至2008年9月，馬先生才修訂上訴通知書。此上訴案尚未審理。

3. 由於馬先生是第一次被頒令破產，根據《破產條例》第30A（1）及（2）條，若非本申請，馬先生的破產令理應在2008年5月17日自動獲得解除。

受託人的理據

4. 本案並沒有太多事實方面的爭議。受託人在他提交的報告中指出，馬先生沒有履行他作為破產人的責任：沒有提交問卷、資產負債狀況說明書和入息及財產的取得的周年報告（“年報”）。基於上述原因，受託人引用《破產條例》第30A（4）（c）、（d）及（h）條，作出本次申請。有關條文節錄如下：

“（4）根據本條對破產人的破產解除提出反對時可基於的理由如下——

（a）……

（b）……

（c）在對破產人產業的管理方面，破產人並不合作；

（d）破產人就破產開始前的期間或就破產開始後的期間的行為操守並不令人感到滿意；

（e）……

（f）……

（g）……

（h）破產人沒有為受託人擬備一份其入息及財產的取得的周年報告。”

5. 受託人曾多次提醒及催促馬先生遞交上述文件，但馬先生置若妄聞。馬先生曾向受託人表示，因為法庭不應頒下破產令，所以他不會遞交有關文件及提交資料。

6. 馬先生因沒有提交年報，在2008年9月18日，於東區裁判法院被判罰款$1,000。就定罪的上訴於2009年4月3日被駁回（HCMA 1109/2008）。

破產人的論點

7. 馬先生反對本申請。他主要的論據是債權人申請債務人破產的有關法例條文違反基本法和《香港人權法案條例》（第383章），應予以廢止。基於此等條文而頒下的破產令（包括馬先生的破產令）亦屬無效。因破產令無效，不再存在凍結破產期的問題。

8. 除了上述論據外，馬先生的書面陳述亦提出下列事項：

(i)      質疑律師會提出破產呈請的合法性及動機；

(ii)     質疑為何破產管理署就律師會所提出的破產呈請不聞不問；

(iii)     本案的破產令非基於公眾利益而頒發及有違馬先生的憲法權和人權；

(iv)     本申請的性質等同刑事控罪，因此受託人的舉證責任要達到毫無合理疑點的標準；和

(v)     由於受託人一方偏袒及包庇律師會，行為不當，因此不向受託人提交上述文件及資料。

9. 其實，馬先生早已在其它訴訟中,提出有關條文是違反基本法及人權法的說法。

10. 在HCMA 1109/2008上訴審訊中，馬先生援引CACV 168/2004中的修訂上訴通知書內容，作為有關條文應被廢止的理據。邵德煒法官在判案書中指：

“  26.   In the course of discussions the appellant confirmed that the main thrust of his grounds of appeal however caste was that:

‘The Bankruptcy Ordinance in its application offends the right to the inherent dignity of a creditor bankrupt and in particular is an infringement of the bankrupt’s inherent dignity and that his right to privacy and free will are also improperly compromised.’

27.   In the end result his submission is that the Bankruptcy Ordinance is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights and should be struck down for that reason.  He said that:

‘… a creditor bankruptcy petition is an affront to the absolute right to human dignity’

……

31.   As part of the appellant’s submissions in this appeal, he has referred me to the Amended Notice of Appeal filed by him in CACV 168/2004 which is his appeal from the decisions of Chung J. Adopting the particulars of those grounds of appeal in this appeal, he submits, inter alia, that the reasons why it is said that the Bankruptcy Ordinance is unconstitutional appear in that document.’

11. 邵法官又指馬先生在HCAL 48/2008一案中，曾要求法院頒令宣布《破產條例》違憲及被廢止，但有關請求已在2008年7月14日，被夏正文法官撤消。馬先生已開展上訴程序，唯案件尚未審理。

12. 邵法官在其判案書中引述夏法官的判詞：

“  42.   It is apparent from the ruling of Hartmann J (HCAL 48/2008) on 14 July 2008 that the issue of the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Ordinance was canvassed extensively before him both in oral and written submissions.  At paragraph 4 of his ruling, he said:

‘At the outset let me stress that in addition to hearing oral submissions this morning, I have had the opportunity to read detailed submissions filed several days ago.’

43.   Of the appellant’s submissions Hartmann J said:

‘5.  Speaking in the broadest of terms, it is, as I understand it, the case of the applicants that Hong Kong’s present bankruptcy laws – as, at least, they apply to actions instituted by creditors – are unlawful.  They are unlawful because, in the context of modern human rights law, they undermine and violate the dignity of the individual.’

and shortly after this:

‘7.  The first remedy sought is a declaration that the Bankruptcy Ordinance itself is unconstitutional as it violates the right to inherent dignity of all Hong Kong residents, that right being guaranteed under the Basic Law and various conventions to which Hong Kong has submitted itself.

8.  In addition, there are a series of six further declarations sought.

9.  Three of those declarations are to the effect that a bankruptcy petition brought by a creditor is not civil but criminal in nature and amounts to a private criminal prosecution.  Arising out of that assertion, a declaration is sought that it is unconstitutional for a public authority to take out a private prosecution under the Bankruptcy Ordinance.  Such a public authority, by way of example, would be the Law Society, one of the respondents.

10.  Expressed in the broadest terms, declarations are sought which would prevent the Law Society and other public authorities from bringing any petition for bankruptcy against any person.’

   44.   Hartmann J when considering the matters relevant to the exercise of the discretion to grant leave for judicial review said that the test he must apply is the ‘arguability test’.  He said in this regard:

‘… A reasonably arguable case is one which enjoys a realistic prospect of success.’

   45.   Of the appellant’s case and the merits of the appellant’s submissions, he said:

‘22.  Certainly, if a person is declared bankrupt, there goes with it, in our society today, an impairment of dignity.  Mr Ma has argued that this is a fault of the legislation itself and it seems to be his submission that this is one of the factors that gives bankruptcy proceedings a criminal nature.  I have difficulties with that submission.  The legislation seeks in a rational way to bring about a determination of matters concerning the financial affairs of an individual bankrupt so that creditors receive as much of their money as the law considers proper in accordance with their rights inter se and the fundamental rights of the debtor are themselves protected.

23.  When a person, by means of a bankruptcy petition, has lost the right for a period of time to manage his own financial affairs, that may have regrettable consequences.  Certain professional bodies may be of the opinion that, if one of their members has been declared bankrupt, that person should not continue to practice the profession.  But that is not a term of the Bankruptcy Ordinance itself.

24.  It is, in my view, inevitable, when a person’s financial estate is to be placed in the hands of a trustee, that the trustee must gather together the estate and must draw up a balance sheet of debits and credits so that the rights of the debtor can be protected together with the rights of creditors.  There is simply no other way of proceeding.’

   46.   Of the application for a declaration that a bankruptcy petition brought by a creditor is not civil but criminal in nature and thus amounted to a private criminal prosecution, Hartmann J said:

’20.  I do not accept that bankruptcy proceedings are criminal in nature.  I will explain further what I mean.

21.  The Bankruptcy Ordinance has been a subject of amendments over the years.  The ground for bringing bankruptcy proceedings by a creditor is a single ground, namely, the inability to pay a debt or a number of debts.  A bankruptcy petition brought by a creditor, if successful, brings about an immediate protection of a debtor’s financial estate.  The estate is placed in the hands of a trustee who has certain obligations to protect the fundamental interests of the debtor and also the interests of creditors.’

and:

‘… Bankruptcy proceedings are not penal, they do not seek to punish anybody.’

and:

’25.  I accept that a trustee in bankruptcy does have an obligation to examine the possibility of any criminal conduct on the part of a bankrupt.  But, with respect, an auditor doing the audit on a publicly listed company also has a responsibility to check that there is no criminal conduct to be found in the financial management of that company.  But I do not see how it can be suggested that the audit requirement is criminal in nature.

26.  Statutes recognize realities.  The Bankruptcy Ordinance does no more than recognize that persons in financial difficulties may, wittingly or unwittingly, commit offences.  Trustees have an obligation to investigate such matters.  But I do not see how that obligation can render bankruptcy proceedings criminal in nature.

27.  In my judgment, it is misconceived to suggest that they are criminal.  Bankruptcy proceedings are not penal, they do not seek to punish anybody.

28.  … The written submissions begin with a citation from the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem as to the nature of evil.  In addition, Mr Ma spoke of The Merchant of Venice, a play by William Shakespeare, in which Shylock seeks his pound of flesh.  More fundamentally, perhaps, was the constant reference to ‘the stigma’ attaching to bankruptcy proceedings which has echoes, said Mr Ma, of Victorian practices.

29.  It is regrettable, although no doubt a fact of life, that persons who are declared bankrupt suffer a loss of reputation.  That loss of reputation arises out of the fact that they have been found to be unable to pay their debts.  But I fail to see how it can be argued that the Ordinance seeks in some way to bring about that loss of reputation or in some way to ‘punish’ persons who are declared bankrupt.’

47.   Hartmann J determined that the application was misconceived.  He was satisfied that the Bankruptcy Ordinance was not arguably unconstitutional.  He was satisfied that the Bankruptcy Ordinance generally pursues legitimate objectives.

13. 邵法官在仔細分析馬先生的陳述後，裁定他的陳述毫無理據，因此駁回上訴。由此可知, 馬先生的違憲論據已先後在兩宗案件中被否定。

14. 馬先生在本案中，只是重覆他在HCAL 48/2008和HCMA 1109/2008的陳述。本席認為上述兩案的裁決，對本庭有約束力，本席理應遵從案例處理本案，拒絕接納馬先生指《破產條例》是違憲的說法。

15. 縱使沒有上述案例，本席也認為馬先生錯誤地把《基本法》、《香港人權案條例》及其他有關的國際公約條文，援引至本案。債權人申請債務人破產的法律條文，旨在規範如何處理無力償債人仕和其財產；保障所有債權人的利益及平衡債權人與債務人之間的利害關係。我們的社會需要妥善處理上述事項。《破產條例》的有關條文正可以適當地解決有關的問題。

16. 雖然破產人會受到一些限制，但本席認為該些限制是適量的。

17. 基於上述理由，本席裁定《破產條例》並沒有違反《基本法》及其他馬先生所指的法律條文和公約。

18. 律師會提出破產呈請的動機、破產管理署署長對呈請人的態度、受託人處理此個案的手法等根本上與本申請毫無關係。

19. 本席不同意本申請等同刑事控罪的說法。破產案是民事案件，本申請是破產案中的一個申請，當屬民事範疇。

20. 至於法庭應否頒下本案的破產令，亦不須在本申請中處理。由於推翻破產令的上訴，尚未審理，而破產令亦沒有因為上訴而被暫緩執行，本案的破產令仍然有效。

結論

21. 明顯地，馬先生並沒有就其產業管理方面，跟受託人合作。其行為操守亦不令人感到滿意。

22. 馬先生除了提起CACV 168/2004的上訴後，他便沒有再跟進上訴的事宜。因此，該上訴案仍未審理。當然，馬先生有權以任何態度處理該上訴，但必須承擔因此而帶來的後果：即破產令仍然有效。馬先生理應明白，除非他在CACV 168/2004勝訴，否則，他必須理行作為破產人的責任。

23. 本席已考慮本申請適用的案例包括Re Li Tat Kong [2003] 3 HKC 360，Re Leung Chin Yeung [2007] 1 HKC 164（及其上訴的裁決，CACV 30, 31 and 32 of 2007）和Re Tong Yuk Kin（HCB 22870/2002, 20 June 2007, Deputy Judge To）等。馬先生是在明知故犯的情況下，蓄意漠視作為破產人的責任。

25.  本席認為必須要把破產期凍結以反應事態的嚴重性。

26.  由於馬先生的不合作，受託人根本沒法去處理馬先生的破產產業。債權人的權益得不到應有的保障。因此，本席裁定終止計算有關期間，為期4年。由2008年5月16日起計算。

訟費

27.  本席亦頒令馬先生須支付受託人的訟費（包括所有保留待決的訟費）。如雙方未能就訟費金額達成共識，須交由法庭評定。