ROBINSON, DUNDAS v. 香港特別行政區政府入境事務處生死登記官郭俊峯先生

HCAL 1431/2024

[2024] HKCFI 2479

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1431 OF 2024

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D E C I S I O N

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A.  Introduction

1.  By Form 86 dated 26 August 2024, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge a certified copy of his birth registration issued by the Registrar of Births and Deaths (“Registrar”), of the Immigration Department (“ImmD”).

B.  No Merit

2.  The Applicant seeks an order of mandamus to cancel the certified copy. But the application has no merit.

3.  First, the Form 86 has no entry where the Applicant ought to have identified the grounds on which relief is sought. This is a breach of the mandatory requirements in Order 53 rule 3 of the Rules of the High Court. It is trite that an applicant for leave to apply for judicial review must identify on the Form 86 the public law grounds which the applicant says are of sufficient merit for the grant of leave. It is not for the Court to try to identify grounds for an applicant. This alone is fatal to the application.

4.  Further, in his supporting affirmation, the Applicant merely states that:

(1)  He applied to the Births and Deaths Registry for a certified copy of his birth registration.

(2)  On the certified copy provided, the name of the institution responsible for acknowledging the course of birth of a child is missed out in the “where born” entry.

(3)  He has written a complaint to the Public Complaints Office of the Legislative Council Secretariat (“PCO”).

(4)  From the PCO’s written reply dated 9 August 2024, the Registrar has given up responsibility for managing public functions or to cancel the doubtful certified copy.

5.  The affirmation also attaches copies of: (1) his birth certificate; (2) his certified copy of his birth registration; (3) his letter to the PCO dated 3 July 2024; and (4) the PCO’s holding reply dated 22 July 2024 and its substantive reply letter dated 9 August 2024.

6.  The certificate identifies the Applicant’s date of birth as “18 OCTOBER 1971” and his place of birth as “45, YIN, HING ST., 1/F”. The certified copy of an entry in a Register of Birth kept in terms of the Births and Deaths Registration Ordinance (“BDRO”) has a box for the entry “When and where born” with precisely the same details completed namely “18 OCTOBER 1971” and “45, YIN, HING ST., 1/F”. There is no discrepancy.

7.  In his letter to the PCO, the Applicant suggested that the name of the approved institution responsible for acknowledging the course of birth of a child is missed out from the box, and that such registered information does not meet the certification requirements. He requested that the Births and Deaths Registry should cancel the certified copy of his birth registration.

8.  In the PCO’s substantive reply, it identified that the ImmD informed it that, based on the record, the Applicant’s father had completed the procedure for his birth registration as a declarant on 19 November 1971, that the certified copy of the entry uses the information recorded in the births register, and was signed to certify it as a true copy pursuant to section 22 of the BDRO. It also informed the Applicant that the Registrar is not empowered to cancel certified copies of entries in the births register.

9.  Nothing in the PCO’s letter identifies any arguable public law wrong committed by the Registrar. Nor does the Applicant properly identify why he would say that anything in that letter identifies any arguable public law wrong committed by the Registrar. As is evident from the documents provided by the Applicant himself, the certified copy of his registration matches the details given by his father at the time of registration.

10.  Any complaint by the Applicant as to the information given by his father at the time of registration is not a matter of any arguable concern for this Court.

C.  Result

11.  The Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds for review with any realistic prospect of success. In those circumstances, the application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed, with no order as to costs.