FA AND OTHERS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD/NON REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 136/2019

[2021] HKCFI 3056

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 136 OF 2019

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J U D G M E N T

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1.  This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”) dated 9 November 2018. Before that, the Director of Immigration (“Director”) had rejected the applicants’ non-refoulement claims on 29 September 2017.

2.  The 1^st applicant (A1) is the mother of the 2^nd applicant (daughter) (A2) and 3^rd applicant (son) (A3).[1] They came to Hong Kong on 8/2/2017.  They were allowed to stay for 3 months.  They overstayed and surrendered to the Immigration Department on 10/5/2017.  They filed the non-refoulement claims on 19/5/2017.  While each of them filed a non-refoulement claim form (“NCF”), A2 and A3 did not raise any independent claim.

3.  The applicants claimed that, if they returned to Egypt, they would be subjected to real risk of harm or death from the ex-husband, his family and extremist Muslim organisations.  The main reason being that the applicants were converted from Islam to Coptic Christianity.  This was regarded as apostasy and punishable by death in the Muslim communities.

BACKGROUND

4.  A1 was born and raised as a Coptic Christian in Egypt.  She faced discrimination since childhood.  Around October 2002, she entered into a customary marriage with Mr. Ayman Abdalsalam (“H”) who was a Muslim.  The marriage was not registered.  Her marriage certificate was torn by H during an argument.

5.  After marriage, she was forced to convert to Islam on 2/10/2004.[2] Based on the conversion certificate, she applied for the re-issue of a birth certificate and an identity card in her Muslim name.  She last contacted her family shortly after the birth of A2.  She lost contact with her family since then.

6.  She however secretly practised Christianity.  This resulted in verbal and physical abuse by H’s family.  She was also physically and sexually abused by H for several years after marriage.

7.  Around 2011, H was arrested for trafficking in a dangerous drug.  She fled from home with A2 and A3.  She started divorce proceedings against H.

8.  Meanwhile, she taught A2 and A3 about Coptic Christianity. She later arranged their baptism on 4/11/2016.  The certificates were issued on a later date in 2017 after she decided to leave Egypt.[3] The priest also wrote 2 letters stating the applicants’ reasons for fleeing Egypt (“Priest letters”).[4]

9.  The Director rejected the applicants’ claim on 29/9/2017 on all grounds.  The TCAB dismissed the appeal on 9/11/2018.

10.  The adjudicator found that A1 was not credible given the material inconsistencies in her evidence.  He also found significant credibility problems with the Baptism Certificates, the Priest letters and A1’s identity card.  He rejected that the applicants were Coptic Christians.  He rejected the factual basis of their claim.  He found that there was no real risk of harm from H, H’s family, Islamic extremists and the Egyptian authorities.[5] The main reasons are summarised as follows:

a.     The COI revealed that the regime under President Sisi gave equality and protection to Coptic Christians.  The government condemned discrimination against Coptic Christians and called for national unity between religions.  The Egyptian authorities had the capacity and were willing to protect Coptic Christians against militant groups.[6]

b.     The COI indicated that Coptic Christians were less vulnerable to societal discrimination and harassment in urban area such as Cairo and Alexandria.[7]

c.     The constitution of Egypt recognised Christianity with equal rights.  Apostasy or proselytization were not criminal offences.  Since the regime under President Sisi, there were substantial decrease in blasphemy charges against Christians.  Those converted to Christianity mainly faced familial and communal violence.[8]

d.     Corruption and fraudulent documents were prevalent.  Some Coptic Christians resorted to using fraudulent identity documents to circumvent the policy against registration of conversion from Islam to Christianity in identity documents. 

e.     According Egyptian Personal Status Law, the father would be considered the guardian of children before the age of 15 but custody remained with the mother.  Beyond that age, a court would award custody according to the preference of the child.  It was a practice that a child would only be issued a passport with the approval of the father.[9]

f.     A1 provided no official documents[10] which bore her Christian name except the Priest letters and the conversion certificate.[11]

g.     On the original identity card produced by A1, the hologram of Pharaoh, which should be a security device, was absent.  It was different from the sample Egyptian identity card on the Edison website.  In addition, it was recorded on A1’s identity card that she had married H.  This was contrary to A1’s evidence that her customary marriage was not registered.[12]

h.     The Baptism Certificates bore the passport numbers of A2 and A3.  However, when A2 and A3 were baptized on 4/11/2016, the passports were not yet issued.  They were issued on a subsequent date—20/12/2016. Further, the signature of the priest on the Baptism Certificate was different from that on the Priest letter.  A1’s evidence before the TCAB in relation to the date of baptism of her children was inconsistent with the NCF.[13]

i.     The Priest letter in English stated that A1 wanted to return to her family and Christianity.  Whereas according to A1’s evidence, she had lost contact with her family after marriage.[14]

j.     A1 was shifty about the police report by H on the removal of A2 and A3 from Egypt.  She initially told the adjudicator that she called the priest from Hong Kong.  The priest told her that H went to the church and informed him.  However, during the screening interview, she told the Director that the Priest learnt from his friend who worked for the police.  When the inconsistency was pointed out to her, she then denied having said the former version.[15]

k.     She asserted that H reported to the police about the removal of her children from Egypt.[16] When the adjudicator explained to her this was not an offence, she changed to say that the report was about her converting the children from Islam to Christianity.[17]

l.     She asserted to the adjudicator that she gave a proxy to the priest to apply the passports for her children.  However, in her NCF, she said she applied the passports herself.  While the adjudicator accepted the possibility of application by proxy, nevertheless, he thought the inconsistency affected her credibility.[18]

GROUNDS OF THE INTENDED JUDICIAL REVIEW

12.  In the re-amended Form 86 dated 13/8/2021, the applicants advanced the following grounds:

(1)     The adjudicator failed to independently assess the claims of A2 and A3;

(2)     The adjudicator erred in law in assessing the credibility of A1; and

(3)     The adjudicator erred in relying on the factual findings from another TCAB appeal.  This gave rise to apparent bias.

DISCUSSION

Ground 1

15.     Ms Souza, counsel for the applicants, complained that the adjudicator decided all claims as if they were a composite claim.  He had not considered the positions of A2 and A3 separately according to the principles in Fabio Arlyn Timogan & Others v Evan Ruth, Esq. Adjudicator & Others [2020] HKCA 971.[19]

16.     In Fabio, the Court of Appeal stressed that non-refoulement claims by children were separate claims Their personal circumstances should be considered.  The children’s claims should not be dismissed solely because of the parent’s claim was dismissed.  Ill-treatment might amount to persecution for a child though not for an adult.  In assessing ill-treatment in persecution for children, one might need to consider up-to-date analysis and knowledge of child specific circumstances in the country of origin.[20]

17.     The 1^st applicant (“mother”) in Fabio came to Hong Kong from the Philippines in 2008.  She overstayed after her contract was terminated in 2010.  She gave birth to the 2^nd and 3^rd applicants (children) in 2011 and 2015 in Hong Kong.  She lodged a non-refoulement claim for herself on 5/1/2015 and for her children on 5/9/2015.  The mother was in fear that if she returned to the Philippines, she and her children would be killed by her Filipino husband.

18.     In the appeal against the refusal to extend time[21], the Court of Appeal found that the adjudicator had given due consideration to the claims of the children. The adjudicator did not reject their claims because she found that the mother’s claim was false.[22]

19.     The Court of Appeal further commented that in assessing the merits of the intended judicial review, it was understandable that the adjudicator concentrated on the case of the mother who was the only one giving evidence before the TCAB.  While the basis of the children’s claims depended greatly on the credibility of the mother, the Court should consider if the children’s claims had been properly assessed.[23]

20.     In the hearing bundle, the Court of Appeal found 2 letters from the children stating that they were stateless.  It would be cruel and inhuman to deport them to the Philippines.  They would suffer discrimination.  The mother did not press this point before the TCAB.  The Court was in doubt if the children’s claims had been fully presented to the TCAB.  The Court ruled that it would be reasonably arguable that the children should have legal representation to satisfy the high standard of fairness.[24] Leave to apply for judicial review was granted to the children.  The mother’s appeal was dismissed[25].

21.     In the present case, A2 and A3 each provided an NCF which did not raise any independent claim but just repeated that of A1.  During the hearing before the TCAB, A1 was represented and gave evidence on behalf of A2 and A3 who did not participate. 

22.     The adjudicator set out the basis of the claim in great detail.  He found that A1 was not credible.  He rejected the assertion that A1 was a Coptic Christian.  He found that all applicants had always been Muslims There was no real risk that they would be mistaken as Coptic Christian.  They would not face any harm from the Egyptian society or anti-Christian groups.[26]

23.     The adjudicator rejected the assertion that A1 had committed an offence for taking A2 and A3 out of Egypt.  He considered relevant COI and found that A1 had custody of A2 and A3 as they were under 15 years of age.  Beyond that age, it would be up to the Egyptian court to consider the custody issue again.  He rejected the assertion that H would definitely be given custody.  There was no suggestion that the Egyptian court operated in a discriminatory way.  The need to apply to the Egyptian court for custody would not amount to any risk of harm warranting non-refoulement protection.  Given that A2 and A3 were all along Muslims, there would not be any harm to them even custody was given to H.[27]

24.     The adjudicator further considered gender based violence.  He accepted that A1 was abused by her ex-husband for several years. He accepted that A1 had divorced H.  However, he also accepted the findings of the COI that the regime under President Sisi had committed to the protection of women.  The authorities were able to provide protection.  There would not be real risk that the applicants would face gender violence or violence due to the lack of a male protector.[28]

25.     The adjudicator had found that the applicants were never Coptic Christians.  There was no motive for H’s family to harm A2 and A3.  In fact, there was no evidence that H had been violent to A2 and A3 before.  As to A1, the adjudicator accepted that she had divorced H.  It further decreased the risk of harm.

26.     The analysis above showed that the adjudicator had considered the claims of the applicants cumulatively and individually.  While he had not dealt with the claims of A2 and A3 in separate sections, he did bear in mind the interest of A2 and A3 in assessing each item of risk.  He had taken into account various COI submitted by both parties.  In my view, he had not treated the claims as a composite one.  His approach is acceptable as there is no independent claim raised by A2 and A3.  In any event, the applicants were represented by Ms Souza in the TCAB hearing.  She had not raised any specific issue for the children to the adjudicator. 

27.     In Re: Jasvir Singh and others [2021] HKCA 53, the Court of Appeal further explained the principles set down in Fabio. The claim in Jasvir Singh was based on the assertion that there was a land dispute leading to repeated attacks on the claimant family by an uncle.  The child’s claim was the same as the parents.  The TCAB rejected the evidence of the parents and the child completely.  It dismissed their appeal. 

28.     The Court of First Instance (“CFI”) refused the leave application.  Later, the CFI also refused to extend time for appeal as there was no merit in the intended judicial review.[29]

29.     In refusing the renewed application for extension of time, the Court of Appeal confirmed the principles set down in Fabio in relation to the position of the child.  The Court of Appeal found that there was no material which gave rise to any concern that there might be non-refoulement grounds related to the child.  There was no concern that such grounds had not been advanced to the Board or considered by it because of the lack of legal representation before the Board.  In the circumstances, it was open for the CFI to conclude that the child’s intended judicial review was without merit.  The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave application treating the lack of legal representation as an irregularity pursuant to Order 80, rule 2.[30]

30.       The situation in the present case is similar to that of Jasvir Singh.  In my judgment, the adjudicator had considered the appeal correctly.  Having rejected the evidence of A1, it was open to him to reject the claim of the children as there was no merit.  There was nothing arising from the children which caused any concern to this court.  This ground failed.

Ground 2

31.     Ms Souza complained that:

a.     There was insufficient evidence for the adjudicator to find that certain supporting documents submitted by A1 were fraudulent; and

b.     It was an error of law to hold that the reliance on those documents justified a finding that A1 was not credible.

32.     Counsel relied on the principle set down in Tanveer Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 439, at§38:

“1. In asylum and human rights cases it is for an individual claimant to show that a document on which he seeks to rely can be relied on.

2. The decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.

3. Only very rarely will there be the need to make an allegation of forgery, or evidence strong enough to support it.  The allegation should not be made without such evidence.  Failure to establish the allegation on the balance of probabilities to the higher civil standard does not show that a document is reliable.  The decision maker still needs to apply principles 1 and 2.”

33.     The Court of Appeal applied this principle in Re: AB [2019] HKCA 834.

34.     In that case, the applicant produced an identity card and 2 temporary travel documents to prove that he was an ethnic Rohingya born in Myanmar.  The TCAB found that those documents were not authentic documents.  It was unable to attach any weight to the documents in relation to the applicant’s identity.  The production of such unauthentic documents had further damaged the applicant’s general credibility.

35.     The Court of Appeal held that the TCAB erred in finding that the very act of submitting those documents undermined the credibility of the applicant.  This would be tantamount to finding that the documents were forgeries to the knowledge of the applicant.  For a finding of forgery, there must be commensurably strong and cogent evidence.  The Court of Appeal concluded that the finding of the TCAB was not justified.[31]

36.     In the present case, counsel pointed out that the adjudicator erred when he found the following which damaged the general credibility of A1:

a.     The identity card was non-credible merely because it did not contain security features of a hologram as shown in a sample ID card in some COI.  There was no expert evidence to prove forgery.  The adjudicator just made his own visual comparison.

b.     The Baptism certificates were non-credible as the passport numbers of the children appeared on the certificates.  However, on the day of baptism, the passports had not been issued.  The adjudicator also found it strange to have the passport numbers on religious documents.

c.     As to the Priest letter in English, the content was inconsistent with the evidence of A1.  She asserted that she had lost contact with her family after her marriage.  Whereas, the priest wrote that A1 wanted to return to her family.

37.     I am prepared to accept that the adjudicator actually meant ‘fraudulent’ by his term ‘non-credible’.  This is especially so when he cited some COI which reported that some Coptic Christians revert to using fraudulent identity documents to circumvent the policy against registration on identity documents any conversion from Islam to Christianity.[32]

38.     What evidence is needed for assessing whether a document is fraudulent in asylum cases? This issue was discussed in Tanveer Ahmed above.  In that case, the authenticity of an arrest warrant and the FIR[33] were in dispute.  The applicant claimed that he was targeted by the Pakistani police.  They alleged that he was involved in a murder which occurred in December 1999.  The adjudicator found that the arrest warrant and the FIR were not likely to be genuine.  It was unlikely that the applicant’s friend would have been able to obtain them so easily or at all.  There was no reason to issue a warrant on 3/1/2001 when the alleged murder occurred in 1999.  The applicant had been arrested and released on bail.  If the FIR was genuine, the applicant would not have been released so easily. 

39.     The UK Immigration Appeal Tribunal (“UKIAT”) commented on the approach of assessing the documents:

“35. In almost all cases it would be an error to concentrate on whether a document is a forgery. In most cases where forgery is alleged it will be of no great importance whether this is or is not made out to the required higher civil standard. In all cases where there is a material document it should be assessed in the same way as any other piece of evidence. A document should not be viewed in isolation. The decision maker should look at the evidence as a whole or in the round (which is the same thing).

36. There is no obligation on the Home Office to make detailed enquiries about documents produced by individual claimants. Doubtless there are cost and logistical difficulties in the light of the number of documents submitted by many asylum claimants. In the absence of a particular reason on the facts of an individual case a decision by the Home Office not to make inquiries, produce in-country evidence relating to a particular document or scientific evidence should not give rise to any presumption in favour of an individual claimant or against the Home Office.

37. ... It is clear that he looked at the documentary and oral evidence in the round. Very properly, he considered the question of whether, even if the documents were false, the Appellant's story could be true. On the evidence the Adjudicator was entitled to reach his conclusions in relation to the documents and the evidence as a whole. This evidence supports the final conclusions that the Appellant has not established either a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason or that his human rights would be infringed.” (emphasis added)

40.     The UKIAT held that it was open to the adjudicator to reach his conclusion on the documents and the evidence by looking at the evidence as a whole.

41.     I entirely agree with the observation of the UKIAT above.  In assessing the authenticity of a document, a decision maker should consider the evidence as a whole.  The fact that there is no specific inquiry or no scientific evidence is neither here nor there.

42.     In the present case, the adjudicator had considered the following evidence in relation to the non-credible documents:

Identity card

a.     The COI revealed that corruption and fraudulent documents were prevalent in Egypt.  Some Coptic Christians revert to using fraudulent identity documents to circumvent the policy against registration on identity documents any conversion from Islam to Christianity.[34]

b.     The adjudicator noticed a sample identity card on the Edison website of the Dutch police.  There was a hologram of pharaoh on the identity card.  There was only one type of identity cards issued between 2000 and June 2016.  It was risky to obtain a fraudulent identity card.[35]

c.     There was no official document in her Christian name except the Priest letters and the Conversion Certificate.  Some COI revealed that the authorities were more ready to issue official documents for persons converted to Islam.[36]

d.     The hologram of pharaoh, which was a security device, was not on A1’s identity card.  There was only a pharaoh mask inked into the substrate of her card.  A1 chose not to adduce further evidence on this.[37]

e.     The identity card recorded that she was married to H, whereas she asserted that hers was a customary marriage and not registered with the authorities.  This was supported by the COI considered by the adjudicator.[38]

Baptism certificate

f.     The Baptism certificates were issued on 4/11/2016.  They each bore the passport numbers of the children.  This seemed implausible as the passports were issued on 20/12/2016 after the Baptism certificates were issued.[39]

g.     There were 2 dates on each Baptism certificate—4/11/2016 and 1/2/2017—in different handwriting. The date—1/2/2017—appeared to be in the same handwriting as the signature of the priest on the Baptism Certificates.[40]

h.     The signatures of the priest on the Baptism Certificates were materially different from the signature of the priest on the Priest letter.[41]

i.     A1’s evidence on the date the children were baptized was inconsistent.  In the NCF[42], A1 said it was February 2016.  She however told the adjudicator it was November 2016.[43]

j.     A1 also said the children were baptized in November 2016 but she did not obtain the certificates until February 2017.  When the contradiction of the passport numbers was pointed out to her, she then said she made a mistake in the NCF.[44]

k.     The adjudicator doubted the need to put the passport number on the Baptism certificates.  Besides, A1 should be able to remember the date of baptism as it was memorable for her.[45]

Priest letters

l.     The priest gave the letters to A1 just prior to her departure from Egypt in February 2017.  The letter stated that A1 wanted to return to her family and her original religion.  Whereas A1 asserted that she had lost contact with her family after her marriage to H.[46]

m.     This cannot be a fluency problem in English on the part of the priest as Ms Souza argued before the TCAB.  In the English translation of the Arabic version of the Priest letter, it stated “…she could not stand it anymore and wanted to return to her family and her original religion.” [47]

43.     The adjudicator also pointed out the inconsistencies of A1’s evidence in relation to (1) how she learned about H’s report; (2) H’s allegation against her to the police and (3) whether she obtained the children’s passports by proxy.[48]

44.     A fair reading of the adjudicator’s decision shows that, in assessing the authenticity of the documents, he had considered the evidence as a whole instead of looking at them in isolation.  Given the evidence above, it is open to the adjudicator to conclude that the identity card, the Baptism certificates and the Priest letters were non-credible.

45.     In the TCAB hearing, Ms Souza argued that even if the adjudicator found that the priest was not credible, it did not follow that the adjudicator should also found A1 not credible.  The adjudicator understood the argument to mean that A1 was an innocent recipient of those non-credible documents.[49]

46.     The adjudicator rejected the argument in these words:

“…I am not persuaded by the submission of the Appellants’ representative my credibility findings against the Priest do not mean I should find against the credibility of the mother (A1) too. If the ID card is a genuine document or not, is something the mother should know. If the Baptism certificates were genuinely issued or not at the correct date again is something the mother should know. In my view, the mother cannot simply say she innocently received the Baptism certificates or the Priest letter…” [50]

47.     According to the evidence of A1, H helped her to apply for the identity card after conversion to Islam.  She arranged A2 and A3 to be baptized by the priest.  She asked the priest to issue the Baptism certificates.  She must have told the Priest the reasons for her departing H and Egypt.  In my view, she must have personal knowledge of the information recorded in those documents.  I agree with the adjudicator, A1 knowingly submitted the non-credible documents.  Her credibility is rightly discounted for submitting them.

48.     I reject ground 2 for the reasons above.

Ground 3

49.     In gist, Ms Souza complained that it was unfair for the adjudicator to rely on the evidence from the ‘Other Appeal’.  Those evidence contributed substantially to the rejection of the factual basis of the appellants’ claim.  In the alternative, the adjudicator appeared to be biased as he must be influenced by the credibility findings against the priest in the ‘Other Appeal’.

50.     In relation to the Priest letters, the adjudicator disclosed to parties during the hearing that he had rejected the evidence of the same priest in another case—‘Other Appeal’—on credibility.  A1 responded that ‘if the priest had made a mistake that is his fault.’[51]

51.     The adjudicator stressed that he had discharged the high standard of fairness by fully disclosing the information about the priest in the ‘Other Appeal’.  However, since parties did not submit that he should not have regard to the information in the ‘Other Appeal’, he would regard it as a reason to doubt the credibility of the priest in the present case.[52]

52.     Taking the above in context, I understand that the adjudicator referred to the priest letters only.  Unfortunately, there is no further elaboration elsewhere in his decision about what exactly he meant by the information in the Other Appeal.

53.     In my view, the adjudicator must consider the evidence in the present case and decide on the credibility of the priest albeit that he had disbelieved the priest in the Other Appeal.  However, whether there would be prejudice depended on the evidence in totality.  It is therefore essential to look at the reasons upon which the adjudicator rejected the factual basis of the applicants’ claim.  I have set them out in paragraph 10 above.  There is no need to repeat here.  The credibility of the Priest letters is only one of the reasons.

54.      In fact, the main reason for rejecting the Priest letters was that its content was inconsistent with A1’s evidence.  The Priest letters stated that she wanted to return to her family whereas she asserted in her NCF that she had lost contact with her family after marriage.  In my view, it is open to the adjudicator to doubt the reliability of the Priest letters given this inconsistency, the credibility of the priest is not pivotal. As to the remaining content of the priest letters, the source must be from A1. It is basically hearsay.  The reliability of which also depended on the credibility of A1.  The credibility of the priest is of little bearing, if at all.

55.     Again in relation to the Baptism certificates, the adjudicator found serious inconsistencies in relation to the date of Baptism, the children’s passport numbers and the signature of the priest.  All these inconsistencies were from A1’s evidence.  I have set them out in paragraphs 42(f)—(k).  Although the adjudicator believed that the priest had played a central role in the appellants coming to Hong Kong, A1’s credibility was decisive.  As the adjudicator aptly put it, she was a knowing participant.[53]

56.     Given the analysis above, I disagree with Ms Souza that the credibility of the priest substantially affected the decision of the adjudicator.

57.     As to apparent bias, the question is whether the circumstances, as identified by this court, would lead to a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the decision maker was biased.  In the sense that he has pre-judged the issue or cannot  consider the issue with an open mind.[54]

58.     Ms Souza was counsel representing the applicants in the present case and the ‘Other Appeal’.  She must be aware of the stance of the adjudicator on the credibility of the priest in the ‘Other Appeal’.  Had there been any worry on the issue of bias, counsel should have raised it before the hearing with the adjudicator and dealt with appropriately. This is not meant to be any criticism, however, it shows that counsel was not caught by surprise when the adjudicator disclosed his observation during the hearing. 

59.     The adjudicator may change or maintain his credibility findings about the priest.  One should not readily presume that he would not.  It is therefore essential to look at the evidence, as the fair-minded and informed observer would do, before coming to any conclusion of apparent bias.  I entirely agree with the comment of the Court of Appeal in Dr Sengupta and another v Holmes and others [2002] EWCA Civ 1104, at §36:

“…It is not only lawyers and judges who in various states of affairs may be invited – they may invite themselves – to change their minds. Absent special circumstances a readiness to change one's mind upon some issue, whether upon new information or simply on further reflection, and to change it from a previously declared position, is a capacity possessed by anyone prepared and able to engage with the issue on a reasonable and intelligent basis. It is surely a commonplace of all the professions, indeed of the experience of all thinking men and women.”

60.     The adjudicator had considered the evidence of A1 and submissions by both legal representatives.  He had analysed the evidence in great detail.  The case mainly turned on the credibility of A1.  There is nothing in the decision which indicated that the adjudicator had pre-judged the claim or had been prejudiced because he disbelieved the priest in the ‘Other Appeal’.

61.     A fair minded and informed observer who knew about the evidence must equally doubt the credibility of A1.  In my view, there was no apparent bias.

62.     I reject this ground.  

Conclusion

63.     For the above reasons, I consider that there is no error of law or procedures.  The decision of the adjudicator is rational.  The intended judicial review is not reasonably arguable.  There is no reasonable prospect of success.  I refuse leave for judicial review.

64.     I order that the applicants’ own costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.