HUMAYUN SK v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5337 · HCAL 9/2021
Court of First Instance
HCAL 9/2021
[2026] HKCFI 5337
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 9 OF 2021
BETWEEN
| |Humayun SK |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by counsel for the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. The time for filing the applicant’s application for leave to apply
for judicial review be extended to 5 January 2021.
2. Leave granted to the applicant to apply for judicial review in
respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 14
November 2019.
3. The applicant is directed to issue an originating summons for the
intended judicial review on or before 7 October 2026 pursuant to
Order 53, rule 5(5) of the Rules of the High Court.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 5 January 2021, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 14 November 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL00
0009_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board’ Decision was in respect of the applicant’s late filing of
his Notice of Appeal/Petition (“NOAP”) against the Further Decision of
the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 16 November 2016,
which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim on the ground of
BOR 2 Risk[1] under the Unified Screening Mechanism.
3. The applicant filed his NOAP to the Board on 4 October 2017. The
Board considered that the NOAP was filed 10 month and 2 days late, and
refused the applicant’s late filing of the NOAP by the Board’s
Decision.
Amendments
4. By way of summons dated 11 September 2026, the applicant applied,
inter alia, for leave to amend his Form 86. This court granted leave
to the applicant at the oral hearing of the Leave Application on 15
September 2026 to amend Form 86 as per the draft submitted at the
hearing. The Amended Form 86 was filed on 16 September 2026.
Late application
5. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
6. However, the applicant filed his Form 86 on 5 January 2021, which was
more than 13 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 14 November
2019). The applicant was hence late for more than 10 months in making
the Leave Application.
7. This court has to consider whether the time for the applicant to make
the Leave Application should be extended taking into account of the
criteria laid down in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393,
which are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
8. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay when he filed the Leave
Application.
9. On 18 November 2025, the Director of Legal Aid issued a Legal Aid
Certificate to the applicant in these proceedings. Since then, the
applicant was legally represented before this court.
10. By way of the said summons dated 11 September 2026, the applicant
applied for an extension of time to file the Leave Application.
11. In paragraphs 9 to 13 of the applicant’s 2nd affirmation dated 11
September 2026, the applicant explained the delay by saying that he
did not receive the Board’s letter containing the Board’s Decision at
his Lucky House Address as he had moved by November 2019 without
informing the Director. The applicant also mentioned that when he
completed the original Form 86, he only had limited ability to read
and understand written English and was acting without legal
assistance. He first learnt of the Board’s Decision in or about
December 2020 or January 2021, when an officer at the Castle Peak Bay
Immigration Centre informed him that his late filing application had
been refused, and he only obtained a copy of the Board’s Decision in
or about January 2021.
12. In essence, the applicant’s excuses for the delay in making the Leave
Application were that he had moved from his reported address and he
had limited understanding of English and court procedures.
13. A delay of more than 10 months is very substantial, and the
explanations given by the applicant are not satisfactory. The
applicant is under a duty to report his new residential address to the
Director whenever there is a change, and lack of language assistance
and ignorance of court procedures are generally not excuses.
14. However, as discussed below, this court is of the view that there are
merits in the Leave Application. In view of the high standards of
fairness required in the handling of non-refoulement claims, this
court will grant an extension of time to the applicant to file the
Leave Application out of time on 5 January 2021.
The applicant’s case
15. It is not necessary for this court to state the details of the
applicant’s case here as the Leave Application is only about the
applicant’s challenge in respect of the Board’s Decision in refusing
his application for late filing of the NOAP.
16. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to India, he would be harmed or killed by politically
connected persons who remained in power and had threatened to kill or
harm his family.
Oral hearing
17. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and his case was heard on 15 September 2026.
18. As aforesaid, the applicant was granted legal aid on 18 November 2025.
He was represented by counsel at the hearing.
19. Counsel for the applicant confirmed at the hearing that the applicant
would rely on one single ground as stated in the Amended Form 86 for
his intended judicial review, namely, the Board’s failure to undertake
the required independent paper assessment of the merits of the
applicant’s case; alternatively, the Board’s reasons do not disclose
such an assessment.
Grounds for judicial review
20. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
21. As aforesaid, counsel for the applicant confirmed that the applicant
relied only on one ground as mentioned above.
Discussion
22. As submitted by counsel for the applicant, the Court of Appeal had
repeatedly held that under the then section 37ZT(2)(b) of the
Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, the Board should have taken account of
the merits of the appeal/petition, because the words “any other
relevant matters of fact within the knowledge of the Board” required
the Board to do so (see Re Khan Kamal Ahmed [2019] HKCA 377 and Re
Qasim Ali [2019] HKCA 430).
23. It is clear from the Board’s Decision that the Board did not consider
the merits of the applicant’s petition, including the merits of the
applicant’s non-refoulement claim itself.
24. The Board only followed the principles as laid down in The Secretary
of State for the Home Department v Begum (2016) ECWA Civ 122 (3 March
2016) to consider whether the applicant’s application for late filing
of the NOAP should be allowed.
25. However, as can be seen from paragraph 18 of the Board’s Decision, in
evaluating all the circumstances of the applicant’s case, the Board
only stated that:-
“The Director in the Notice of Further Decision had reviewed his claim
and found that the evidence in his claim clearly did not engage BOR 2
risk, which applied to death sentence and genocide, and the Director
was satisfied that he had not established a personal and real risk of
being arbitrarily deprived of his life in violation of BOR 2 upon his
return to India. Following the 3rd stage referred to in Begum, I
evaluated all the circumstances in this case and arrived at the
conclusion that it is fair and just to refuse the Petitioner’s
application.”
26. In Re Mohammed Aslam [2025] HKCA 914, the Court of Appeal held that
the Board had not properly considered the merits of the applicant’s
case, despite the words of the Board that it had evaluated all the
circumstances, or that there were no other matters known which might
make it unjust not to allow for late filing. Likewise, what the Board
said in the Board’s Decision could not be regarded as a proper
consideration of the merits of the applicant’s case.
27. In failing to consider the merits of the applicant’s case, the Board
did not take account of other relevant matters of fact within its
knowledge as required by the then section 37ZT(2)(b). The Board had
therefore committed an error of law in the Board’s Decision. This
error of law alone is a sufficient reason for the applicant’s intended
judicial review to be reasonably arguable.
28. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, the court should grant leave to apply for
judicial review when the claim is a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that there are realistic prospects of success for the applicant’s
intended judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision and hence
leave is granted to the applicant to proceed with the intended
judicial review.
29. For the sake of completeness, this court notes that the Director had
plainly committed an error of law in stating that the evidence in the
applicant’s claim clearly did not engage BOR 2 risk, which applied to
“death sentence and genocide”.
30. As held by the Court of Appeal in Kulwinder Kaur v Director of
Immigration and another [2022] HKCA 48, “The authorities establish
that the right to life is also violated by extra-judicial killings by
State agents or by non-State actors, where the State fails to take
steps to avoid a threat to life emanating from non-State actors or
private persons.” Thus, violation of right to life is not confined to
imposition of death penalty or genocide by a State as conceived by the
Director.
31. The Board’s recital of the Director’s conclusion in paragraph 18 of
the Board’s Decision, which was followed by the Board’s statement that
it had evaluated all the circumstances in the applicant’s case and
arrived at the conclusion that it was fair and just to refuse the
Petitioner’s application, could be indicative of the Board’s agreement
of the Director’s interpretation of BOR 2 as aforesaid. Hence, it
could be an error of law on the part of the Board as well.
32. Lastly, this court noticed that the adjudicator, Mr LI Wai Chi, signed
the Board’s Decision as “Adjudicator of the Non-refoulement Claims
Petition Office” instead of “Member of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board”. This is not a correct description of his capacity, as he was
not making the determination on behalf of the Non-refoulement Claims
Petition Office. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just
an office providing administrative and secretariat support to the
members of the Board and does not have the capacity to determine non-
refoulement claims itself.
33. Under the USM, the Chief Executive has delegated his powers under
Article 48(13) of the Basic Law to members of the Board to hear and
determine petitions in relation to claims made on all applicable
grounds other than Torture Risk (see paragraph 3.7 of the Practice and
Procedural Guide of the Administrative Non-refoulement Claims Petition
Scheme). Thus, only the members of the Board have the powers to
determine whether the applicant’s application for late filing of his
NOAP should be allowed.
34. Nevertheless, the wrong description of his capacity does not nullify
the Board’s Decision, as Mr LI was indeed a member of the Board and
did have the power to determine the applicant’s application for the
late filing of his NOAP.
Conclusion
35. For reasons aforesaid, extension of time is granted for the applicant
to file the Leave Application on 5 January 2021, and leave is granted
for the applicant to apply for judicial review in respect of the
Board’s Decision.
36. The applicant is directed to issue an originating summons for the
intended judicial review on or before 7 October 2026 pursuant to Order
53, rule 5(5) of the Rules of the High Court.
Dated the 23rd day of September 2026
| | |
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 23/09/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no: |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted |KM/11387/2025 |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |23/09/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|originating summons | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|within 14 days after | |Claims Petition Office |
|the grant of leave and| |Putative respondent’s |
|serve it in accordance| |ref. no.: |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |BOR 1000/17/10/3/IN259 |
|and | | |
| | |Director of Immigration |
|c) supply to every | |Putative interested |
|other party copies of | |party’s ref. no.: |
|every affidavit which | |RBCZ 9000561/16 (Formerly|
|the Applicant proposes| |RBCZ 1495/07) |
|to use at the hearing,| | |
|including the | |Department of Justice, |
|affidavit in support | |Senior Assistant Law |
|of the application for| |Officer |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |(Civil Law) |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1
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