劉 對 陳及另一人

FCMC 6384/2021

[2026] HKFC 75

香港特別行政區

區域法院

婚姻訴訟編號2021年第6384號

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判 案 書
(初步爭議)

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序言

1.  在2025年5月27日至6月2日，本席接續審理了本案（一）初步爭議（「本審訊」）及（二）附屬濟助申請的審訊。此判案書處理初步爭議的審訊，與附屬濟助申請的判案書同時頒佈。

2.  以下簡稱呈請人為「女方」和第一答辯人為「男方」。第二答辯人是男女方所生的長子，簡稱「長子」。

3.  初步爭議審訊的爭議點在於：在長子名下，位於珠海的一個物業及一個車位（「珠海物業及車位」）和位於香港的一個物業及一個車位（「峻源物業及車位」）的實益權益是否屬於男方。

4.  法庭於2024年7月3日作出命令，免除排解財務糾紛聆訊，並將（一）有關長子名下物業實益權益的初步爭議與（二）附屬濟助的審訊一併進行[1]。

5.  兩個審訊總共用了5天。雙方在初步爭議及附屬濟助申請審訊分別作出開案陳詞，雙方證人（即男方及女方）亦分別兩次作供。審訊中，女方由姚黎李律師行聘用陳大律師及謝大律師代表。男方沒有律師代表。長子在本案所有有關時段均沒有參與及出席聆訊。

背景

6.  男方於1969年出生，審訊時56歲。職業為商人，於婚姻期間成立多家公司，經營護老院及其他業務。

7.  女方於1968出生，審訊時56歲。於男方經營的護老院任職配藥員，月入 HK$46,500。

8.  雙方於1996年結婚，於婚姻期間育有二子：

（a）  長子於1997年出生，審訊時27歲，從2019年在男方公司「YY投資」工作；

（b）  次子於2005年出生，審訊時19歲，於英國留學。

9.  2016年，珠海物業及車位在長子名下購入。

10.  2017年，呈請人與男方分居。根據女方，原因是當時發現男方有婚外情[2]。

11.  2018年5 月28日,雙方簽署一份分居協議書（「分居協議書」）[3]。

12.  女方於2019年6月27日提出離婚呈請，案件編號為FCMC7507/2019[4]。於2019年8月20日，經雙方同意及法庭許可下，女方撤銷該離婚呈請。

13.  2020和2021年之間，峻源物業及車位在長子名下購入。

14.  女方於2021年6月30日提出本案的離婚呈請[5]。2021年11月23日存檔修訂離婚呈請[6]。

15.  2022年6月17日，法庭頒發暫准離婚令。雙方婚姻逾 25 年。

16.  分居後，女方繼續於男方經營的護老院工作。女方亦繼續照顧次子。

17.  審訊時，男方與其新伴侶（「張女士」）育有兩名孩子，分別2 歲 及 5 歲。

雙方案情

女方

18.  女方首要案情是所有長子名下物業都是都是長子在共同意圖構定信託（common intention constructive trust）下為男方代持，該些物業的實益權益屬於男方[7]。

19.  就著珠海物業及車位：

（a）  女方的首要案情是男方、女方及長子三方之間有明示共同意圖（express intention），即長子為男方持有珠海物業及車位。女方的交替案情是，男方和長子二人之間有共同意圖。

（b）  在女方的申索要點中，女方指不利依賴在於「依賴上述的共同意圖，呈請人與長子一同到內地簽署買入珠海物業的文件， 呈請人讓男方和長子利用男方個人及／或其公司的資金買入珠海物業， 而該些資金是呈請人和男方的家庭資產。這在法律上構成對呈請人的不利的改變（ detrimental reliance) 。」[8]

20.  女方的進一步交替案情是依賴歸復信託假定（presumption of resulting trust）[9]。

21.  就峻源物業及車位[10]，

（a）  女方並不主張任何明示共同意圖，但基於男方及長子行為推論雙方有共同意圖（inferred intention）讓長子代男方持有峻源物業;

（b）  女方在申索要點中沒有就「不利依賴」作訴。在女方的開案陳詞中，女方指不利依賴在於「容許長子以其名義買入物業，使用男方個人/公司， 即雙方共同努力所獲得的家庭資產，買入物業。」

22.  女方的交替案情是依賴歸復信託假定[11]。

男方

23.  男方案情是長子名下物業的實益權益都不屬於男方。其中：

（a）  珠海物業及車位是男方向長子的送贈[12]；

（b）  峻源物業是長子向男方和男方妹妹借款支付首期[13]; 峻源車位是長子向男方借款購買[14]。

適用的法律原則

信託

24.  本案中，女方的基本案情是男方和第三方（長子）就著長子名下物業有信託關係，實益權益屬於男方。

25.  香港衡平法下的信託原則應用於處於內地的物業和車位：SL v CPYD [2020] HKFC 105第19-30段。男方並不爭議香港法律的適用性，亦無主張過其他司法管轄權的法律適用。

26.  有關共同意圖構定信託和歸復信託法律原則不具爭議[15]。

27.  TL v ML [2006] 1 FLR 1263指出：

「43. Implied Trusts

i) There are two principal types of implied trust: the resulting trust and the constructive trust.

ii) A resulting trust arises by way of implication in circumstances where the property is purchased in the name of the legal owner with the money of the beneficial owner.

iii) A constructive trust requires (a) a common intention between those concerned, (b) a change of position on the part of the beneficiary and (c) a finding that it would be unconscionable to deny the claim.」

28.  在最近的案例ALDL v FTFC and Anor [2024] HKFC 13中，法庭如此總結有關原則：

「21. There is a presumption that the beneficial interest follows the legal interest, and the onus is on the party alleging that the beneficial interest is different: Leung Hang Lin and Another v Lam Mei Yung [2019] HKCFI 2819, §8(1). In the present case, the onus is on W.

22. The relevant legal principles of trust law are explained in Bhura v Bhura (No. 2) [2015] 1 FLR 153 at §8, Liu Wai Keung v Liu Wai Man [2013] 5 HKLRD 9 at §§46-50, and Primecredit Ltd v Yeung Chun Pang Barry [2017] 4 HKLRD 327 at §§2.3-2.4.

23. In order to prove a common intention constructive trust, W has to establish that (a) there was a common intention of H and R2 that H would be the beneficial owner of the Landed Properties, (b) H had altered his position in detrimental reliance upon the common intention, and (c) it would be unconscionable for R2 being the registered owner to assert full ownership in reliance on her legal title to the Landed Properties: Liu Wai Keung’s case at §46.

24. For the question of common intention, W has to show either (1) an express ‘agreement, arrangement or understanding’ between the parties (ie H and R2) that the non-legal owner (ie H) was to have a beneficial interest or (2) that such an ‘agreement, arrangement or understanding’ is to be inferred from the parties’ conduct: Mo Ying v Brillex (CA), [5. 8]; Primecredit Ltd v Yeung Chun Pang Barry [2017] 4 HKLRD 327 (CA).

…

26. As there is no suggestion from any of the parties that the intention of H and R2 had ever changed, it is the common intention of H and R2 at the respective time of the acquisitions of each of the Landed Properties that is relevant: Liu Wai Keung’s case at §48.

27. Presumptions of resulting trust and presumption of advancement may only be resorted to where the intention is not expressed. In Lui Kam Lau & Others v Leung Ming Fai [1994] 3 HKC 477, the court said that:

“Where a property is purchased in the name of one but with the money of another, the Court must ascertain the true intention of the parties as to whether it is the former or the latter who should have the beneficial interest in the property. Where there is admissible evidence of the actual express intention of the parties, the Court will act on such intention accordingly. But where the intention is not expressed, the Court must ascertain the intention of the parties objectively. In so doing, the Court will resort to two tools: the presumption of resulting trust and the presumption of advancement.”

28. W has the burden of proof of the resulting trust as she alleged. In Re Superyield Holdings Ltd [2000] 2 HKC 90, at 91F, the court held:

“..… (3) The burden of proof of a resulting trust fell upon the party asserting that the equitable right was not consistent with the legal title.”

29. It is also a well-established principle that ownership of an asset vis-à-vis a spouse and a third party should be ascertained by reference to the general law of property. In Prest v Petrodel [2013] 2 AC 415, Lord Sumption JSC said, at §37:

“Courts exercising family jurisdiction do not occupy a desert island in which general legal concepts are suspended or mean something different. If a right of property exists, it exists in every division of the High Court and in every jurisdiction of the county courts. If it does not exist, it does not exist anywhere.」

（強調後加）

狀書

29.  初步爭議審訊與一般民事程序無異，呈請人必須在申索書清楚陳述其申索的元素及有關詳情，見YYT v. CCM and Others [2022] HKFC 230第80-85段，法庭指出：

「80. The importance of pleadings has been repeatedly emphasised in many legal authorities. It bears repeating some of them below.

81. In Sinoearn International Ltd v Hyundai-CCECC Joint Venture (2013) 16 HKCFAR 632, Ribeiro PJ reminded practitioners that:

“34. Pleadings are not mere formalities. They impose a necessary discipline and are fundamental to enabling every procedural facet of the adversarial system to operate fairly."

82. To allow a party to run an unpleaded case would give rise to confusion and a real likelihood of procedural unfairness: Sinoearn International Ltd, supra [27].

83. In Kwok Chin Wing v 21 Holdings Ltd (2013) 16 HKCFAR 663, Ma CJ (as he then was) reiterated that:

“21. It should by now really be quite unnecessary to issue yet another reminder on the rationale behind pleadings. The basic objective is fairly and precisely to inform the other party or parties in the litigation of the stance of the pleading party (in other words, that party’s case) so that proper preparation is made possible, and to ensure that time and effort are not expended unnecessarily on other issues: Wing Hang Bank Ltd v Crystal Jet International Ltd. It is the pleadings that will define the issues in a trial and dictate the course of proceedings both before and at trial. Where witnesses are involved, it will be the pleaded issues that define the scope of the evidence, and not the other way round. In other words, it will not be acceptable for unpleaded issues to be raised out of the evidence which is to be or has been adduced. As the Court of Appeal remarked in Wing Hang Bank Ltd v Crystal Jet International Ltd:

(2) In a trial, particularly where evidence is given by witnesses, it becomes extremely important that each side knows exactly what are the live issues. Where issues are sought to be introduced that have not been adequately or properly pleaded, amendments must be sought unless the consent of the other party or parties has been obtained. It will simply not do for unpleaded issues to be “slipped in” when evidence is being given in the hope that the other side is not sufficiently alert to object.

22. …. one does not sift through the evidence adduced in a trial in the hope that something was said that can conceivably found a cause of action. Issues, I would reiterate, must be properly pleaded unless for some reason the pleadings have assumed a less significant role in the proceedings. …

23. The purpose of pleadings, in clearly and unambiguously setting out the true extent and nature of a dispute not just for the benefit of the parties but also for the Court in managing and trying cases, remains important under our system of civil justice. The retention of the old rules as to pleading as well as the introduction of new provisions over four years ago under the Civil Justice Reform, reinforce this.”

84. The above principles apply equally to the present trial on preliminary issue concerning beneficial ownership of properties held in the name of third parties, where the family court shall approach the issues in the same way as one would expect in the civil court.

85. It is elementary that a party must plead all the elements and particulars required to support a cause of action.」

（強調後加）

證人口供

30.  本案的事實爭議很大部分取決於雙方證供的可信性。

31.  在考慮證人證供方面，本席提醒自己有關證人可信性的原則，包括YYT v. CCM（見上）第40-42段。

32.  此外，就著當事人當時購買物業時的意圖及可呈堂證供，FWY v. TYCY and Another [2022] HKFC 67一案中，法庭指出：

「52. On assessing a witness’ credibility, DHCJ Au (as he then was) made the following observations in Lee Fu Wing v Yau Po Ting Paul [2009] 5 HKLRD 513 at [53]:

“In assessing the credibility of a party's case on a particular issue, I accept the submissions of [counsel] that the Court should take into considerations the following:-

(1) Whether the party's case is inherently plausible or implausible.

(2) Whether the party's case is, in a material way, contradicted by other evidence (documentary or otherwise) which is undisputed or indisputable.

(3) Where it is shown that a witness has been discredited over one or more matters to which he has given evidence using the above tests. This is relevant to the assessment of his overall credibility.

(4) The demeanour of the witnesses."

53. In a more recent case, Yu Man Fung Alice v. Chiau Sing Chi Stephen [2020] HKCFI 2923, Coleman J observed at [61] & [62]:

“61. Evaluation of a witness’s evidence may, depending on the particular circumstances, also include having regard to factors such as: evasive and argumentative answers, tangential speeches avoiding the question, blaming legal advisers for pleadings, disclosure and evidence shortcomings, self-contradiction, internal inconsistency, shifting case, new evidence, and selective disclosure: see Painter v Hutchison [2007] EWHC 758 (Ch) at §3. There may be other factors in any particular case, but this list gives important and helpful guidance. ...

62. An examination of the consistency of conduct and documents and motives will, therefore, likely be helpful. As long as it is recognised that there is also a risk of potential (perhaps unconscious) bias in the identification of them, it is the inherent probabilities and likelihoods which will be of greater assistance in deciding what, on the balance of probabilities, actually happened.”

54. In the present case, there were conducts that are alleged to have happened proximate to the purchases and those which were not. Speaking of admissibly of these conducts as evidence of intention at the time of transfer, Stock NPJ said this in Leung Wing Yi Asther v Kwok Yu Wah (2015) 18 HKCFAR 605,

55. A question canvassed in the course of argument before this Court was whether those earlier and later events were admissible as evidence of intention at the time of transfers. It seems to me that they were and that the issue was one of weight. In the context of a question whether evidence of conduct subsequent to the registration of shares in the names of children was admissible to rebut the presumption of advancement, it was held in Shephard v Cartwright that whereas acts and declarations of the parties before or at the time of the transaction or so immediately after it as to render it a part of that transaction are admissible “either for or against the party who did the act or made the declaration... subsequent declarations are admissible as evidence only against the party who made them, not in his favour.”  The modern approach is less rigid in relation to evidence of subsequent conduct:

“… it does not follow that subsequent conduct is necessarily irrelevant. Where the existence of an equitable interest depends upon a rebuttable presumption or inference of the transferor’s intention, evidence may be given of the subsequent conduct in order to rebut the presumption or inference which would otherwise be drawn.”

56. As a matter of common experience, contemporaneous conduct is inherently more likely to be a reliable indicator of intention, to be given greater weight, than are words and conduct after the event, especially in the case of “self serving statements or conduct of the transferor, who may long after the transaction be regretting earlier generosity.” That rationale is not restricted to evidence in rebuttal of presumptions but embraces any evidence from which an inference of the transferor’s intention may properly be drawn.」

不利推論（adverse inference）

33.  女方邀請本席在本案中向男方案情作出某些不利推斷，並引用了Securities and Futures Commission v DFRF Enterprises LLC [2022] HKCFI 1288第1、4段，及CSY v CPK [2019] HKFLR 172第91-92段（該案引用Ip Man Shan Henry v Ching Hing Construction Co Ltd (No 2) [2003] 1 HKC 256, 307B）。

34.  就着家事法庭什麼時候可以作出不利推斷，ALDL案指出：

「30. Ms Cheng and Mr Kwan for W further relied on a passage of Lord Sumption JSC in Prest’s case (at §45) relating to the drawing of adverse inferences in claims for ancillary financial relief and submitted that this court may also draw adverse inferences against H and R2 in the preliminary issue trial:

“The modification to which I have referred concerns the drawing of adverse inferences in claims for ancillary financial relief in matrimonial proceedings, which have some important distinctive features. There is a public interest in the proper maintenance of the wife by her former husband, especially (but not only) where the interests of the children are engaged. Partly for that reason, the proceedings although in form adversarial have a substantial inquisitorial element. The family finances will commonly have been the responsibility of the husband, so that although technically a claimant, the wife is in reality dependent on the disclosure and evidence of the husband to ascertain the extent of her proper claim. The concept of the burden of proof, which has always been one of the main factors inhibiting the drawing of adverse inferences from the absence of evidence or disclosure, cannot be applied in the same way to proceedings of this kind as it is in ordinary civil litigation. These considerations are not a licence to engage in pure speculation. But judges exercising family jurisdiction are entitled to draw on their experience and to take notice of the inherent probabilities when deciding what an uncommunicative husband is likely to be concealing. I refer to the husband because the husband is usually the economically dominant party, but of course the same applies to the economically dominant spouse whoever it is.” (Emphasis supplied)

31. Mr Marwah and Mr Baker for H pointed out that the UK Supreme Court in Prest’s case was dealing with an ancillary relief claims which have “a substantial inquisitorial element” whereas this court is dealing with a preliminary issue trial, in which R2 was ordered to be joined and ordinary civil procedural rules are used such as filing of formal pleadings and witness statements etc3 .

32. I am of the view that in these preliminary issue proceedings, this court has the task to make finding of the primary facts and is entitled to draw the necessary inferences concerning the common intention of H and R2 at the respective time of the acquisitions of each of the Landed Properties, but not necessarily to draw adverse inference against H and R2 if they fail to furnish credible evidence as to their true intentions. In Jones v Kernott [2012] 1 AC 776, §§34-36 …」

35.  此外，在YWS v SJ [2025] 2 HKLRD 921一案中，法庭在第32-48段亦有作出相關討論，包括：

「38. As discerned from the above authorities, there are at least two matters to be satisfied by the court before an adverse inference is drawn by reason of a party’s failure to call a witness, viz.: (1) there is some evidence that establishes a primary fact on which the witness is expected to give evidence, and the primary fact can logically give rise to the inference; and (2) there is no explanation for the party’s failure to call the witness. With respect to the latter, the party against whom the adverse inference is to be drawn should be given an opportunity to explain why that witness was not called to testify. If there is some credible reason for not calling that witness, the court should refrain from drawing the adverse inference. (See also: South China Securities Ltd v Lam Kwen Yuen [2012] 5 HKLRD 524 at [7]; Jiang Zhong v Up Cheer Ltd & Ors [2017] 6 HKC 339 at [48]–[52]; Cheung Kwong Yuen at [26]–[34], and Wong Chak Wing v Camelo Investment Ltd at [41(e) and (g)].)

39. Ms Lee has no disagreement to the above principles. She argued that the above are general civil cases. Citing [45] of Prest v Petrodel, she said that the court has a wider discretion in matrimonial cases, judges can “draw on their experience and to take notice of the inherent probabilities when deciding what an uncommunicative husband is likely to be concealing”. Hence, she submitted that this Court can draw the adverse inference even though W had not put to H at cross-examination the issue on his failure to call Madam C to give evidence.

40. [45] of Prest v Petrodel should be read together with [44]: …

41. With respect, I disagreed with Ms Lee on this point. Although the cases cited by Ms Chong are not matrimonial cases, I do not see any reason why the principles on drawing adverse inference as expounded in those cases do not apply to matrimonial proceedings.

42. It was elucidated by the Court of Appeal in Tjang Siu Thu that the mere failure of a party to call a witness does not automatically confer an evidential benefit on the opposing party.

43. The authorities (including the two cases cited by Ms Lee) reckoned that the reason for not calling the witness to testify is a relevant consideration on the question of whether an adverse inference should be drawn.

44. The “modification” that Lord Sumption referred to in [45] of Prest v Petrodel, in my view, should not be taken to mean that judges can proceed to draw the adverse inference in matrimonial cases without exploring the reason for not calling the witness. Lord Sumption has warned that consideration of the distinctive features in family disputes is not a licence to engage in pure speculation. There ought to be some basis to substantiate the drawing of an adverse inference.

45. In CH v TTHM v Well Bond Property Management Ltd & Ors (another case cited by Ms Lee), HHJ S Lo said in [37(5)] that it will not be appropriate to draw the adverse inference where there is an explanation for the party’s failure to call the witness.

46. As such, the party should be given an opportunity to provide explanation for not calling the witness before an adverse inference is drawn. In practice, this is often done by putting the issue to the party at cross-examination. If the court received some evidence on the reason for not calling Madam C, the court can assess whether such evidence is credible.

47. Ms Lee had the opportunity to cross-examine H but she had not raised this issue with him. This issue was only raised at the written closing submission. There is no evidence why Madam C was not called to testify. In such circumstances, it is unfair to draw the adverse inference as submitted by Ms Lee.」

狀書及證據

36.  雙方就初步爭議向法庭提交了以下文件[16]：

（a）  女方的申索要點（2023年10月17日存檔）[17]

（b）  男方的抗辯要點（2023年12月11日存檔）[18]

（c）  女方的回覆要點（2024年1月11日存檔）[19]

（d）  男方的誓章（2024年1月12日存檔）[20]

（e）  女方第四份誓章（2024年2月22日存檔）[21]

37.  根據法庭在2023年9月12日作出的命令[22]，雙方就初步爭議存檔的誓章僅限於以上兩份。男方更在2024年3月14日向法庭確認[23]。

分析：珠海物業及車位

38.  雙方同意：

（a）  珠海物業及車位於 2016 年買入，購入價為人民幣10,000,000以上，並且全部由男方支付[24]。

（b）  長子為唯一註冊業主，當時19歲，還是學生，沒有收入，在所有有關時段不在珠海生活。

共同意圖

39.  女方的說法是[25]：

「7. 在本人和第一答辯人分居前，約於2016年前後，第一答辯人提議動用其資產於內地買人一所物業，即珠海物業。而該物業由第一答辯人的個人及／或其公司的資金出資。當時我和第一答辯人表示該物業應用本人及／或第一答辯人的名份買人。但第一答辯人以大陸的某些政策及稅務條例為由，多次說服我讓長子代第一答辯人持有該珠海物業以作投資。起初我非常反對這個做法，因為本人工作多年根本從來未持有任何物業。但第一答辯人不斷說服我，告訴我這只是投資之用，即使在長子名下，物業並不屬於長子而是屬於第一答辯人。他更告訴我如果寫我的名字物業前由始至終在我們買人珠海要交多些稅，寫長子名字就可交少些。第一答辯人從未提及這是對長子的送贈。

8. 最終，經過我和第一答辯人在香港的數次討論，及我們與長子在香港的討論後，長子僅僅是名義上的業主，實際的業主則是第一答辯人。我們最終在香港達成共識以長子的名義買入珠海物業，物業則用作投資用。

9． 按以上共識，當時我亦與長子一同到內地簽署置業的文件。我亦讓第一答辯人和長子利用第一答辯人及／或其公司的資金買入珠海物業，而該些資金是可算是本人與第一答辯人的家庭資產。」

40.  男方並沒有在他的初步爭議誓章中表述其案情，他只存檔了一頁紙的誓章[26]。男方在陳詞中的說法是珠海物業及車位是男方給長子的送贈。他在審訊第一天說他是第一次聽到女方指珠海物業及車位是男方為投資而在長子名下代持。

41.  雙方均沒有任何購買當時就共同意圖的書面紀錄。

42.  考慮所有證據後，在相對可能性的衡量下，本席接納男方、長子和女方（或起碼男方及長子）有共同意圖，透過男方支付購買珠海物業及車位作投資，在長子名下持有。

43.  首先，從環境證據來說，

（a）  2016年，長子年僅 19 歲，尚未完成學業，亦未開始工作，生活開支全是由父母提供，沒有置業的需要。亦沒有證據證明長子表明當時有置業的願望，或向男方請求購買此物業及車位。

（b）  物業及車位遠在珠海，審訊中亦沒有證據指長子在2016年後曾經有意或實際使用過珠海物業及車位。

（c）  在此情況下，男方向男方公司借取人民幣10,000,000購買珠海物業及車位送給長子不符合內在或然率（inherently improbable）。

44.  第二，本席接受女方在審訊時的證供。她的證供與誓詞吻合，而在男方的盤問下並沒有動搖。本席接納：

（a）  珠海物業及車位是作投資用途；

（b）  女方為長子的照顧者，陪同長子一同到內地簽署置業的文件，當時長子只是「去簽名」；

（c）  男方告訴女方男方當時持有深圳物業，如果讓「阿仔簽名」的話可以「交少啲稅」；

（d）  這個理解「你（男方）、我（女方）、大仔知」。

45.  第三，男方由始至終未能解釋贈送該物業的原因及背景。

（a）  男方在作供時不少次與女方大律師爭論及迴避問題，亦不時提出新證據及審訊前從未有過的說法，令本席對他證供的可靠性有所保留。

（b）  男方說送贈珠海物業及車位的原因是「個城市好」，又說他可以就自己的資產自由地作出任何財政決定，包括送贈物業予長子。男方說他並沒有和女方或兒子討論。此說法缺乏說服力。雙方同意購買價超過人民幣一千萬，倘若男方真的是送贈物業給剛剛成年的長子（當時才19歲）, 男方和長子必定會有溝通：例如，就著當時珠海當地環境及發展潛力、珠海物業及車位本身、當時購買的時機等等。此外，倘若男方要作出一個如此重大的送贈給長子時，男方亦必定會和照顧長子的女方進行討論。然而，男方在這方面沒有提供任何證據。

（c）  此外，男方說他在審訊中第一次聽到女方案情是珠海物業及車位為投資不可信。女方早在誓章中提出此說法。男方亦在盤問中承認，珠海物業為男方負責物色，並同意當時港珠澳大橋建成在珠海的物業有升值潛力，值得購買。這也支持女方投資的說法。

46.  第四，男方強調指女方在購買珠海物業及車位之後簽署的分居協議書中確認「雙方確認沒有共同財產」，女方當時也知悉珠海物業是男方贈送予長子的物業而非雙方的共同財產，而男方購買珠海物業贈送予長子早於 2016 年雙方婚姻關係尚未破裂前[27]。

（a）  本席會在附屬濟助申請判案書詳細分析分居協議書。但在初步爭議階段，起碼就珠海物業及車位，本席不認為分居協議書和現在處理的議題有關聯或比重。

（b）  女方的案情是珠海物業及車位的實益權益屬於男方所有，她並沒有主張她本人在珠海物業及車位有任何實益權益。因此，本席考慮到即使女方承認「雙方確認沒有共同財產」，也與本初步審訊沒有直接關係。

47.  第五，男方在結案陳詞中依賴送贈假定(presumption of advancement)，本席不接納。

（a）  首先，男方從未在回覆要點或開案陳詞依賴送贈假定。

（b）  第二，基於以上的分析，本席認為已經有充分的證據推翻任何送贈假定。

應否就長子不作供作出不利推斷？

48.  長子自2023年10月被加入本案後基本上並無任何參與，亦無參與本審訊或存檔任何誓章或證據。男方亦與法庭確認長子知曉本案及本審訊，而選擇不參與。女方邀請法庭因長子的不作為作出不利推斷[28]。

49.  仔細考慮雙方陳詞後，本席不準備就不傳召長子向男方作出不利推斷。

50.  首先，女方邀請法庭作出不利推斷，卻沒有指明法庭應就初步爭議那一個物業及議題（共同意圖、不利依賴、不合情理之事等等）向那一方（男方、長子本人）作出甚麼不利推斷。

51.  第二，女方邀請法庭作出不利推斷的基礎只是「長子沒有參與本次訴訟」[29]。然而，上述法律原則清晰指出一方不傳召一名證人並不自動代表另一方在證據上受惠。女方必須提供會引至不利推斷的基礎事實（primary facts）。

52.  長子被加入為本案第二答辯人是為了裁定長子名下物業的實益權益[30]。他是物業的法定持有人，而法庭就女方信託案情的裁斷有可能對長子的利益有影響。然而，長子是否參與本案訴訟是他的選擇。他的缺席代表他放棄了反駁女方案情及提供正面證據的機會。然而，在本案中，本席不認為應該單單就長子不出現而強化女方案情，或弱化男方/長子的案情。

53.  第三，長子是男方和女方的孩子，也是本案的答辯人，很大程度上是被「拖進」本案。如男方所指，長子不希望捲入父母之間的糾紛，亦情有可原[31]。本席能夠明白長子不參與本審訊的選擇。

54.  最後，本席不認為本案情況與女方引用Securities and Futures Commission v DFRF Enterprises LLC [2022] HKCFI 1288第1及4段相似[32]。在該案中法庭向被控參與龐氏騙局的所有被告人因沒有出席審訊作出需要的不利推斷段，與本案案情不盡相同。

不利依賴

55.  女方在申索要點及開案陳詞指出女方有不利依賴。

56.  然而，在TL v ML 及ALDL 等案例指明，依賴共同意圖而受損的一方是據稱為有實益權益的一方（a change of position on the part of the beneficiary）。在本案中，即是男方，而非女方。無論女方是否共同意圖的其中一方，女方的案情並不是她自己有任何實益權益。因此，本席認為女方的不利依賴並不是證明本案共同意圖構定信託的一個元素。

57.  女方在結案陳詞中陳詞「交替地，若 2016年所發生的討論並不構成女方作為共同意圖的其中一方，而女方只是目擊男方和長子共同意圖的組成，男方亦倚賴共同意圖以出資」。本席同意男方全數出資是雙方不爭的事實。然而，本席在考慮相關證供後，尤其是在女方並未提出或主張此點的情況下，無法找到或推斷男方有任何不利的信賴。

58.  基於以上原因，本席認為「不利依賴」元素未能成立。

59.  因此，本席認為「不合情理」元素未能成立。

歸復信託

60.  雖然女方的共同意圖構定信託未能成立，女方亦交替地依賴歸復信託：YYT v CCM（見上）第107至109段。

61.  本席提醒自己法庭在Re Superyield第106E至108E就歸復信託的法律原則：

“Miss Wong made very helpful and detailed submissions on the law of resulting trust. The propositions I set out hereunder I have drawn heavily on her written and oral submissions:

1. A useful starting point is art 31(1) of Underhill & Hayton, Law of Trusts and Trustees (15th Ed) p 317 as follows:

When real or personal property is conveyed to a purchaser jointly with others, or to one or more persons other than the purchaser, a resulting trust will be presumed in favour of the person who is proved … to have paid the purchase-money in the character of purchaser (as opposed to that of donor or lender).

2. The better view is that this is a rebuttable presumption of law in that:

(a) it applies as soon as the fact of contribution to the purchase price is proved; and

(b) in the absence of other evidence, it is conclusive for the party in whose favour it operates and for the purpose for which it operates.

3. The fact being presumed is that of the intention of the parties (or more precisely, the providers of the purchase-money) in the absence of evidence of their actual intention. That being the case, the presumption can be rebutted by:

(a) the application and non-rebuttal of the presumption of advancement;

(b) evidence of an actual intention on the part of the purchaser to benefit the holder of the legal title.

4. The principle is applicable to different combinations of factual circumstances:

(a) Where one person pays the whole of the purchase price and title is taken in the name of another, it is presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that it was intended that the property be held in trust for him.

…

7. The time to take stock of the respective interest taken by the parties is the time of acquisition.

…

11. The better view is that post-completion unequal contributions to mortgage repayments, whether by prior agreement or otherwise, cannot affect the quantum of interest taken by the respective parties at the date of acquisition under, I emphasise, a resulting trust. Such contributions may, however, have a bearing on the remedies which may be available under what is now usually referred to as a common intention constructive trust or under some form of proprietary estoppel.…”

62.  本席認爲本案女方的歸復信託成立。

63.  首先，雙方不爭議購入價完全由男方支付。本案亦沒有證據證明長子在購買物業後享用過珠海物業及車位。

64.  第二，本席不接納男方送贈的案情。本席亦不認為有任何足以推翻歸復信託的證據。

65.  因此，本席裁定歸復信託成立。

分析：峻源物業及車位

66.  就峻源物業，雙方不爭議：

（a）  2020年5月12日，長子簽訂買賣合約。購買價為HK$22,800,000[33]。長子當時22 歲，在YY投資工作。

（b）  2020 年 10 月 22 日，長子簽訂轉讓契[34]。

（c）  同日，IDL公司向長子提供按掲[35]。根據2020年9月17日的貸款函，男方為長子按揭提供個人擔保[36]。

（d）  2021年5月1日起，YY投資以每月HK$58,000租用峻源物業及峻源車位，租期為5年[37]，用途作男方及其新家庭住用。

（e）  2022 年 10 月 20 日香港匯豐銀行提供按揭[38]。同日，長子與IDL公司按揭解除[39]。

（f）  男方據稱長子有向男方歸還過HK$1,290,000。

67.  就峻源車位，雙方不爭議以下事實：

（a）  2020 年 11 月 12 日，長子簽訂買賣合約[40]。長子當時 23 歲，在YY投資工作。

（b）  2021 年 3 月 2 日，長子簽訂轉讓契[41]。峻源車位的購入價（HK$2,580,000）是一筆過支付。男方在盤問中指，該款項有可能是從他在2021年3月1日向YY投資借款（轉至男方及其父母的三人聯名戶口）的HK$2,800,000而來[42]。

（c）  如上述，2021年5月1日起，YY投資以每月HK$58,000租用峻源物業及峻源車位，租期為5年[43]，用途作男方及其新家庭住用。

（d）  2021 年 5 月 24 日，長子就車位與香港匯豐銀行簽訂按揭[44]。

共同意圖

68.  本席認為基於本案的證據可以推論男方和長子有共同意圖，讓長子代男方持有峻源物業及車位。

69.  第一，長子就借款購買峻源物業及車位的背景和原因沒有提供任何解釋或證據。縱使如此，本席亦考慮到：

（a）  男方及長子沒有就當時購入峻源物業及車位時的討論及意圖提供證據。

（b）  長子當時22-23歲，開始在男方公司工作不久，收入大約HK$55,000，沒有財政能力支付首期或按揭。

（c）  當時長子沒有持有香港物業，而是住在YY投資為他租住的地方。男方案情是長子從父親（即男方）透過YY投資借款支付首期後，又將物業及車位租給YY投資，讓男方住用。

（d）  男方名下的唯一物業，即匯璽物業亦只是峻源物業的大約一半價值（約HK$13,800,000）。

（e）  基於以上因素，長子自己希望購入一個價值HK$22,800,000的物業和HK$2,580,000的車位作投資的說法令人好奇。

70.  第二，本席不接納男方的案情及證供。

（a）  男方就峻源物業及車位對女方整個盤問單單圍繞著分居協議書的效力。本席重申，本席會在附屬爭議判案書仔細分析分居協議書，初步爭議的重心是男方是否在峻源物業及車位有實益權益，這與分居協議書無關。

（b）  在初步爭議第一天審訊中，男方被盤問時據稱借款HK$3,420,000給長子以支付峻源物業首期，至今沒有償還過。男方又借款給長子約HK$2,600,000購買峻源車位的資金。男方稱長子在2024年就峻源車位向男方歸還了HK$1,290,000，與峻源物業首期的借款無關。他亦同意，總共借款予長子大約HK$6,000,000。

（c）  然而，在審訊第二天，男方被盤問時卻說長子一共只欠男方HK$3,420,000，而且已經歸還了HK$1,290,000。

（d）  本席觀察，認為男方多次與女方大律師爭論、迴避問題、提出新證據及說法前後不一，令人難以信服。因此，本席認為男方兩個說法均不可信。

（e）  無論如何，男方確認此借款沒有文件紀錄，沒有還款期，如長子沒有還錢能力，男方就不會要求長子還錢給男方，亦不會收回峻源物業。本席對這樣的「借款」安排有所保留。

（f）  此外，男方聲稱長子有償還HK$1,290,000給男方,唯一的證據似乎是男方匯豐銀行2021年6月月結單顯示2021年6月7日有一項「轉帳收入」存款HK$1,290,000[45]。這是在長子就峻源車位簽訂按揭後月兩星期。

（g）  然而，這與男方在審訊所指在2024年收到此筆款項並不相符。這筆款項的支付人不詳，就算是長子，亦不知道是為何用途。本席認為男方和長子之間有多重財政關係，即使長子有曾經轉款HK$1,290,000給男方，亦不一定是向男方就峻源物業及/或車位的「還款」。

71.  第三，本席不接納男方據稱男方妹妹借款給長子HK$4,900,000，支付購買峻源物業的首期。

（a）  首先，女方在申索要點中指男方曾在本案2023年7月27日聆訊中承認首期源自YY投資所提供的資金，屬男方所有，與其妹無關[46]。男方在其抗辯要點反對，指他透過YY投資借予長子 HK$3,420,000，其妹借予長子HK$4,900,000[47]。

（b）  證據上，男方提供了（i）一張男方妹妹寫給長子日期為2022年10月9日的支票副本；和（ii）男方妹妹2022年10月月結單證明[48]。

（c）  月結單顯示男方妹妹的港元往來帳戶有在2022年10月11日有一項HK$4,900,000的支票支出，但不能確認此支票支出是否長子兌現了男方妹妹寫給長子的支票。但儘管如此，這亦不能證明長子用了該款項支付峻源物業的首期。

（d）  更重要的是，在月結單同頁支票支出的下方，可以看到在2022年10月10日（i）男方妹妹從自己的港元儲蓄將HK$900,000轉到自己的港元往來帳戶，及（ii）男方妹妹收到從外來HK$4,000,000的轉款，恰巧等於她寫給長子支票的款項。

（e）  因此，男方妹妹在支票支出前收到了HK$4,000,000存入她提供的月結單戶口，她從該戶口只支付了HK$900,000。男方的案情是HK$4,900,000全部由男方妹妹借予男方，卻沒有解釋過該HK$4,000,000從何而來。

（f）  在相對可能性的衡量下，本席認為男方妹妹寫給長子的HK$4,900,000支票並不是她向長子為購買峻源物業的借款。長子亦不「欠」男方妹妹HK$4,900,000。

（g）  本席也考慮到男方妹妹沒有出庭作證人支持男方的說法。

72.  第四，綜觀所有證據，本席認為：

（a）  峻源物業的首期由男方支付，

（b）  峻源物業在有關時段由男方使用，並由男方策劃每月支付HK$58,000「租金」予長子，租金與長子的每月按揭還款相約之安排。

（c）  IDL的按揭由男方做擔保人，雖然後來該按揭在2022年解除，但屆時男方已經入住峻源物業，由YY投資每月向長子「交租」支付按揭。

（d）  峻源物業除了在長子名下，基本上完全是男方獨自在財政上支持並享用。

73.  第五，本席同意男方單方面有合理原因希望長子代持。

（a）  首先，男方自己持有匯璽物業，本席接納女方的說法，即假如當時（2020年）再在男方名下購買物業會承擔額外印花稅，讓長子代持可以省下稅項。

（b）  第二，當時雙方已經分居，男方亦已經有自己的新家庭，女方亦已經撤銷第一次離婚呈請。男方絕對有可能希望透過長子代持而減低婚姻資產，從而減低須支付女方的附屬濟助。

（c）  男方指出根據分居協議書，雙方的權債已有明確的協定，長子買入峻源物業為雙方簽定分居協議書之後。因此，男方透過公司借首期款予長子購買相關物業及車位根本不可能是為了削弱女方的附屬濟助[49]。本席不認同。男方在盤問中承認分居協議書的內容有欠清晰。再者，女方的確在2019年提出過離婚，有見及此，本席接納男方有可能希望在簽署分居協議書之後再透過轉移資產到他人名下「防範於未然」[50]。

74.  第六，峻源車位在2021年3月簽轉讓契購買，YY投資在2021年5月和長子簽訂5年租約。本席認為車位是讓男方享用。

75.  最後，雙方爭議男方給予長子支付峻源物業首期的「借款」是否從男方在2020年8月26日售賣的深圳物業的出售價（HK$27,888,888）而來。本席認為這與男方及長子的共同意圖關聯不大。重要的本席認為購入價是男方安排他公司支付，長子並沒有經濟能力支付，也沒有權力促使安排支付首期或按揭。

應否就長子及男方妹妹不作供作出不利推斷？

76.  如上述，本席並不準備就長子不作供向男方作出不利推斷。

77.  女方亦邀請法庭因男方沒有傳召男方妹妹作出不利推斷。本席認為，男方依賴男方妹妹的證供的目的是支持男方的說法，即男方妹妹向長子作出借款。本席已在上文第71（g）段作出相關考慮。本席認爲再額外因為男方妹妹的不作供向男方作出不利推斷不合適。

不利依賴

78.  女方並未有在申索要點作訴「不利依賴」。女方在開案陳詞亦只是指「不利依賴 – 容許長子以其名義買入物業，使用男方個人／公司， 即雙方共同努力所獲得的家庭資產，買入物業。」[51]，並沒有指明是誰在依賴共同意圖下受損。女方的結案陳詞亦無進一步陳詞。

79.  因此，本席認為「不利依賴」元素未能成立。

歸復信託

80.  本席認爲女方的歸復信託交替案情成立。

81.  首先，本席認為峻源物業的首期及按揭還款完全由男方或男方安排支付及擔保。本席亦認為男方及長子有共識，是支付購買資金的一方（即男方）擁有峻源物業及車位的實益權益。

82.  第二，本席不接納男方借款的案情。本席亦不認為有任何足以推翻歸復信託的證據。

83.  因此，本席裁定歸復信託成立。

84.  至於男方在結案陳詞交替地依賴的送贈假定，鑑於本席以上對證據的分析，本席認為已經有充分的證據推翻任何送贈假定。

命令

85.  綜上原因，本席裁定珠海物業及車位和峻源物業及車位的實益權益屬於男方。

86.  因此，本席命令如下：

（a）  宣布長子在信託下為男方持有珠海物業及車位，男方是珠海物業及車位的唯一實益權益持有人。

（b）  宣布長子在信託下為男方持有峻源物業，男方是峻源物業的唯一實益權益持有人。

（c）  宣布長子在信託下為男方持有峻源車位，男方是峻源車位的唯一實益權益持有人。

訟費

87.  本席接納女方案情。然而，女方的共同意圖構定信託未能成立，該議題在本審訊中使用了不少時間。另一方面，男方在支持其案情方面缺乏證據，同樣不令人滿意。而長子在初步爭議的訴訟程序中從沒有參與，也未提交任何狀書或證據，本席將不會對長子作出訟費命令。考慮各方面因素後，本席初步認爲男方支付女方初步爭議審訊的50%訟費（包括所有保留訟費），包括一位大律師證書，是最合適的。以上的訟費命令是一個暫准命令，如雙方在本命令頒布後14天內沒有任何申請，有關的暫准命令將轉為絕對命令。

88.  本席感謝陳大律師、謝大律師及雙方提供的協助。