SOLIKATUN JANURI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 296/2020

[2025] HKCFI 6339

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 296 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 3 November 2025 (“the  Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of  time to appeal against my order made on 2 July 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 23 January 2020.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 2 July 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 16 July 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons and her supporting affirmation dated 3 November 2025, the applicant did not give any reason for her delay in lodging the intended appeal.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 10 December 2025, the applicant confirmed that she received this court’s decision shortly after 2 July 2025. She explained her delay in lodging the appeal by saying that she was at first advised by a friend to send a letter to the High Court at Counter 344 to give the reasons why she did not want to go back to Indonesia, which she did on 16 July 2025. Later on, another friend advised her that she should appeal to the High Court, but by then she was late and hence she had to make the present application for extension of time.

9.  This court did receive the applicant’s letter dated 16 July 2025 and replied to her on 23 July 2025. Thus, it seems that the applicant’s explanation for her delay could be true. However, ignorance of the court procedure is not an excuse. I am not satisfied that the applicant has a reasonable excuse for the delay.

10.  When I asked the applicant for her grounds of the intended appeal at the hearing, the applicant did not give any ground at all. She merely said that when her case at the High Court was completed, every time when she reported to the Immigration Department, the immigration officer would ask her whether she wanted to go back or not.

11.  Nevertheless, the applicant did provide a ground for her intended appeal in the Summons and her supporting affirmation, in both of which she mentioned that she thought there was procedural error as the Board had disregarded her dangerous situation.

12.  First of all, the Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA 578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244, “general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to the facts of his case”.

13.  The applicant’s allegation that there was procedural error as the Board had disregarded her dangerous situation is just a general allegation without any particulars. Thus, it cannot amount to a valid ground for the intended judicial review.

14.  In fact, the Board had already dealt with the applicant’s alleged dangerous situation in its decision dated 23 January 2020. The applicant’s allegation that the Board had disregarded her dangerous situation is simply untrue.

15.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

16.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

17.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review and I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

18.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.