SZG v. WCK

HCCT 78/2026
HCCT 79/2026
(heard together)

[2026] HKCFI 4546

HCCT 78/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

NO 78 OF 2026

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AND

HCCT 79/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

NO 79 OF 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  This Court held in KB v S HCCT 13/2015, 15 September 2015, that for an application to set aside an order granting leave to enforce an arbitral award, it is an abuse of process, and contrary to the principles of respecting and giving effect to the finality of arbitral awards and facilitating speedy resolution of disputes under the Arbitration Ordinance (“Ordinance”), for a summons to be issued under Order 73 rule 10(6A) RHC, without stating the grounds of the opposition to enforcement of an award.

2.  These proceedings relate to two awards in two arbitrations between the same parties relating to agreements governing loan transactions between the parties. The same issues arose for determination in the two arbitrations and identical issues are raised in relation to each of the Respondent’s present application to set aside the orders granting leave (“Enforcement Orders”) to enforce the two awards made by the Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (“Award”). The application to set aside was made by the Respondent’s summons issued on 14 April 2026 (“Summons”) in each of the Originating Summonses. No grounds were stated in the Summons. Each Summons was supported by the Respondent’s affirmation filed on the same day as the Summons. In that affirmation, it was stated that the Respondent was unable to present his case in the arbitration, because his former legal representatives had failed to properly present to the Tribunal the original form of the agreements relied upon by the Respondent, which led to the Award made against him. Thus, the only ground relied upon and the only facts affirmed to in support by the Respondent to set aside the Enforcement Orders made by this Court on 23 March 2026 was that he was unable to present his case in the arbitration, under section 95(2)(c)(ii) of the Ordinance.

3.  It was only in the skeleton submissions filed by the Respondent’s Counsel that it was contended, for the first time, that the Tribunal had failed to explain adequately or at all the reasons for the rejection of the Respondent’s case, and that there was a failure “to give sufficient analysis, explanation, and reasons” for the Award, which allegedly affected the structural integrity of the arbitral process and undermined due process.

4.  This ground and the facts relied upon under this ground were never raised in either the Summons, or in the Respondent’s affirmation filed with the Summons in each of the two proceedings in question. As in a case in which pleadings are required to be filed, the ground was never pleaded, and the Applicant was never put on notice of the case which it had to meet. I agree with Counsel for the Applicant, that this ground should not be, and will not be, entertained.

5.  On the facts set out in the Respondent’s affirmation, there is simply no case to set aside the Enforcement Order.

6.  On the inability to present case ground, the Respondent accepted that it was the decision of his legal representatives not to present the original agreements in the Arbitration. The Respondent’s claim that the evidence before the Tribunal was incomplete, and his inability to present his case as a result, was entirely due to his own choice made under legal advice that it would not be necessary to produce the original agreements. As a result, the Tribunal did not regard the Respondent’s case on the “Extension Agreement” as credible and expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the purported Extension Agreements, but this was not because the Respondent had been deprived of the opportunity to present his case. He and his legal advisers had been given the reasonable opportunity to present his defence and make submissions on the Respondent’s case on the loan agreements, and the Applicant’s claim for repayment thereunder. There was no denial of due process as a result of any egregious error made by the Tribunal. As Counsel for the Applicant pointed out, the Respondent’s redress, if any, is against his own former legal advisers, but the matter of which the Respondent complains does not affect the integrity of the arbitral process, the Tribunal’s conduct of the Arbitration, or the Award.

7.  As Counsel for the Applicant further contended, the production of the original Extension Agreements would not have had any impact on the Award, and would not have changed the outcome of the Arbitration. The Tribunal found in the Award that there were internal inconsistencies in, and suspicious features of, the terms of the purported Extension Agreements. These inconsistencies include the fact that the purported Extension Agreements referred to a loan agreement signed in July 2021 for RMB 900,000 which was purportedly extended, but the relevant loan agreement was not signed in July 2021.

8.  In her skeleton submissions, Counsel for the Respondent argued that there were inconsistencies in the Tribunal’s rejection of the original Extension Agreement, and the Tribunal’s acceptance that an agreement existed for an interest-free renewal of the relevant loan agreements.

9.  There is no such inconsistency. What the Tribunal accepted was that there was a renewal agreement, but considered that the Respondent was not able to prove the terms thereof and in particular the time for repayment under the extended term. It was on that basis that the Tribunal found that by operation of the relevant provision of the Civil Code applicable under Mainland law, the loan was repayable on demand within a reasonable time.

10.  The attempts to criticize the Award, such as the claim that the findings of the Tribunal were unreasonable or not supported by the evidence, and that the commencement of the Arbitration should not constitute a demand for payment, all amount simply to an attack on the correctness of the findings of law and fact made in the Award, and on the Tribunal’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence adduced - which is solely for determination by the Tribunal, and is not reviewable by the enforcement court. Any errors of law, or of fact, made in the Award are not grounds to set aside either the Award or the Enforcement Order. It is significant that the Respondent’s application made to the Mainland supervisory court to set aside the Awards, on the ground that the Tribunal had not properly analyzed the relevant transactions, has been dismissed on the ground that the claims were only made against the merits of the Awards. On the authorities, such a decision by the supervisory court is one to which this court of enforcement should give due weight (Gao Hai Yan v Keeneye Holdings Ltd [2012] 1 HKC 335).

11.  Needless to say, the Respondent’s claim as to his old age and limited knowledge of the law affords no ground to set aside the Enforcement Order.

12.  Even if I should consider the claim of the lack of reasoning in the Awards, I would add that such a claim likewise has no merits. The reasons for the Tribunal’s findings were clear to the parties, and were made under the applicable Mainland law (summarized at paragraph 9 above). As Counsel for the Applicant submitted, the conclusion made by the Tribunal was a matter of factual assessment. It cannot be claimed that the Respondent and his legal advisers had not been given the opportunity to present their arguments as to the application of the relevant Mainland law. If they made the choice not to make their arguments, they only have themselves to blame.

13.  For all the above reasons, each of the Respondent’s Summonses is dismissed, with costs on indemnity basis, to be summarily assessed. The Applicant should file a consolidated statement of costs for the Summonses within 14 days, and the Respondent be at liberty to file a consolidated statement of objection within 14 days thereafter, for assessment to be made on the papers.