HALDER LILY v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 1364/2021

[2021] HKCFI 3145

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1364 of 2021

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

	consideration of documents only;     or
	consideration of documents and Applicant being present in open court;

1.      Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.      A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.  This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 14 September 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 550 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.  The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

The procedural history

3.  The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Bangladesh.  She raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written representation received on 2 September 2014 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention and subsequently BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance

4.  Her claim was rejected by the Director by Notice of Decision dated 10 June 2015 and Notice of Further Decision dated 7 December 2016.

5.  She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 9 March 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed her appeal.

6.  She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 24 December 2018 (the “Court’s Order”).

7.  She appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and her application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 10 May 2019.

8.  Her Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 30 August 2019.

9.  Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 2 March 2021.

10.  She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter of 9 March 2021.

11.  By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application.

The subsequent claim application

12.  The factual basis of her claim is that if she is refouled, she will be harmed or killed by Azizul and his group of the Awami League (“AL”), who are Muslims as she is a Hindu and a supporter of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party.

13.  The Director found that her claim was not substantiated. He found that the level of risk of her being harmed or killed by her enemies if she returned to Bangladesh was assessed to be low; that reasonable state protection was available to her and that internal relocation was an option open to her.

14.  The Board affirmed the Director’s Decisions. The Board also found that it was purely a private personal dispute between the applicant and Azizul; that the cause did not fall within the definition of torture under the Ordinance; that there was no evidence to show a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violation of human rights existed in Bangladesh and that there was no evidence to show that the Bangladeshi government would not provide protection to her.

15.  Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

16.  She relies upon the following facts for her subsequent claim:

a.  she is afraid that she will be murdered by the AL or framed up of murder charge by the AL people;

b.  she fears that she will be tortured, harmed or killed by member of Hefazat-e-Islam because of her Hindu religion, her legal representative having submitted the country of origin information in support of her claim;

c.  she does not believe that the Bangladeshi government, ruled by the AL, will provide her with protection and the government has also failed to curb the activities of Hefazat-e-Islam.

17.  The Director, for the reasons that follow, does not accept that there is significant change of circumstances.  Such information, coupled with the original claim, would not give her subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

a.  Her first ground had been considered in her original claim.  The dispute is a private dispute between herself and Azizul.  Even if there is pressure on her family in Bangladesh, it does not amount to any significant change of circumstances in support of her subsequent claim.

b.  She did not raise the second ground in her original claim though this organization existed before her original claim.  The Director has considered objective country of origin information, which shows that reforms on Bangladesh police are on-going and there have been objective indications of positive results in recent years.  The information shows that the police in Bangladesh will discharge its duties impartially and reasonable state protection will be available to the applicant.

c.  The immigration officer assesses that religious freedom and state protection for minority Hindus were available to her in Bangladesh.  Whilst it is accepted that violence and attacks in relation to religious difference remains a problem in Bangladesh, there is no cogent evidence to show that the conflicts have been significantly intensified recently amounting to a significant change in the country condition. Hefazat-e-Islam against Hindus is a general condition in her country and there is no indication that her claim is personalized on her.  See paragraph 12 of the Director’s Decision.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review

18.  The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of her application. She raised the following: -    

1.  Procedural impropriety;

2.  Irrationality;

3.  Error/ misdirection in law.

They are her opinions or comments without any evidence or specifics in support of them.

19.  The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision.  The Court will not usurp his fact finding power.  See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, CA. §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

20.  The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.  Before me, the applicant agreed that the Director was correct in his decision.

21.  The Director is entitled to reach his conclusion after considering her evidence as he did in this case. The applicant has raised no valid challenge to the Director’s Decision or finding of the facts.

22.  It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating her original claim in her subsequent claim application. 

23.  The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

The RPO

24.  The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process.  The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her.  See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

25.  RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

26.  In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process.  The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

27.  For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her.  The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Before me, the applicant had nothing to say.

28.  I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts of the original claim for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only.  I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the Court of First Instance, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless this Court or the designated Judge should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to this Court or the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of this Court or the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(11)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

29.  The applicant’s application is dismissed.

30.  RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1