SAM v. LCC

FCMC 16302 / 2018

[2021] HKFC 212

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 16302 OF 2018

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J U D G M E N T
(Maintenance Pending Suit)

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Introduction

1.  This is an application by the Respondent Wife (“W”) seeking maintenance pending suit against the Petitioner Husband (“H”) for the sum of HK$100,000 a month. There was included in the Summons that H should renew the licence and insurance of a vehicle which W used to drive; or alternatively, cause and procure the company which owned the vehicle to renew the same.

2.  Prior to W issuing the present Summons, her lawyers put forward by correspondence on 12 April 2019 to H’s lawyers an open offer of HK$50,000 a month which was met with no response.

3.  W filed 3 Affirmations whereas H filed 2 Affirmations. There had been exchange of Financial Statements (Form Es) followed by questionnaires and answers.

4.  W was represented by Mr. Robert Pang, S.C., leading Miss Noel Chan for this hearing. H was represented by Mr. Eugene Yim.

Background

5.  Parties were married in February 2013. At trial, H was aged 63 and W aged 46. There was no child born out of their marriage.

6.  That said, H and W have had their earlier marriage dissolved and coincidentally, each has a grown up daughter and both of them were named as the children of the family in the Petition filed by H. For convenience sake, H’s daughter by the name “J”, aged 25. W’s daughter by the name “N” aged 24.

7.  Parties separated in November 2017. H and J moved out from the former matrimonial home (“FMH”) in December 2017 leaving behind W and N. The FMH was jointly owned by the parties which is a 3-storey house of 2,100 square feet in size and with a garden of around 1,500 square feet.

8.  It is common ground that during the marriage and prior to H moving out from the FMH, apart from the parties and the daughters, there were 2 domestic helpers and 1 driver, and also several pets including 4 dogs, 2 cats and 23 Cyprinus Carpio fish (錦鯉魚) at the FMH. There were 5 cars within the family. Suffice is to say that the standard of living of the parties are above average if not more.

9.  There was a document typed in Chinese named “離婚協議書” (hereinafter called “DA”)[1] signed by the parties dated 3 November 2017 which contained 12 clauses. It is H’s case that he was being coerced by W to sign the DA which W strenuously denied.

10.  H filed the Petition for divorce upon “One Year Separation and Consent” in December 2018. Decree Nisi was granted in April 2019. The Court also granted the declaration under Section 18 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192, on the same day.

11.  On 18 June 2019, an application for the decree nisi to be made absolute was filed by H’s solicitors. This was met with requisitions from the Family Court which, surprisingly, had not been attended to as at this trial. Meanwhile, W’s solicitors filed a Notice of application under Rule 56B (Form B) on 2 September 2019 intended to apply for the Court to consider her financial position under Section 17A of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Cap.179 thus caused the making of the decree absolute in abeyance.

12.  There is not much dispute between the parties on the law and the well settled applicable principles for maintenance pending suit applications. For the sake of completeness but at the expense of repetition, I would briefly set out the leading cases and applicable principles as follows.

The applicable principles

13.  Section 3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192 (“MPPO”) provides the Court the discretionary power to make interim orders requiring one party to the marriage to make to the other periodical payments for his or her maintenance as the court thinks reasonable having considered all the circumstances of the case (see HJFG v. KCY [1012] 1 HKLRD 95). The overriding principle is one of ‘reasonableness’.

14.  It is useful to recite those paragraphs of Hartmann JA (as he then was) in the HJFG case :-

“33. Jurisdiction to award maintenance pending suit to a spouse is statutory, being governed by the provisions of s.3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192. By that section the court is given a discretion to make an order requiring either party to the marriage to make to the other such periodical payments for his or her ‘maintenance’ as the court thinks ‘reasonable’, subject to the condition that the duration of any such order is limited to the period of what may broadly be called the divorce litigation.

34. By definition, therefore, maintenance pending suit is restricted to payments which constitute ‘maintenance’, which are reasonable in the circumstances and which will endure for no longer than it takes to determine the divorce litigation. ‘Maintenance’ is a broad concept. I do not seek to define its exact meaning but it seems to me that it must be restricted to those payments necessary to meet the recurring costs of living at whatever standard of living is appropriate. That being the case, no matter how great the wealth of the parties and how unevenly distributed that wealth may be at the time an application for interim maintenance is made, the court has no jurisdiction to make orders which for all practical purposes result in a form of pre-trial capital re-balancing. In the present case, the judge recognised the long-established approach of looking to the “immediate and reasonable needs” of the wife and son.

35. As to the amount of maintenance pending suit that may be paid, the Ordinance provides only that it must be ‘reasonable’, that is having regard to the circumstances of the case, that it must be fair.

36. An important factor in determining fairness is a consideration of the marital standard of living. In this regard, each case must be considered according to its own circumstances. It is not simply to be assumed that great wealth equates to great extravagance. Some married couples who enjoy great wealth spend with comparative modesty and with a discipline born of discretion, others enjoy consumption on a grand scale.

37. The principles that have emerged over time to guide judges in matters of interim maintenance have been fashioned in the main to ensure fairness. This is well illustrated in the judgment of Nicholas Mostyn, QC, sitting then as a deputy High Court judge, in TL v. ML and Others (Ancillary Relief : Claim against Assets of Extended Family) [2006] 1 FLR 1263, at 1289, in which, having looked at earlier authorities, he derived the following principles that speak specifically to fairness or are based on the need to ensure it.

For present purposes, it is sufficient to cite the relevant principles without citing the judge’s reference to the source of those principles :

i. The sole criterion to be applied in determining the application is ‘reasonableness’, which is synonymous with ‘fairness’.

ii. A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living. This is not to say that the exercise is merely to replicate that standard.

iii. In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long-term expenditure, more aptly to be considered on a final hearing. That budget should be examined critically in every case to exclude forensic exaggeration.

iv. Where the affidavit or form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay. The court is now confirmed to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources. In such a situation, the court should err in favour of the payee.

38. Finally, it is to be noted that in applications for interim maintenance, when the amount to be paid is for a limited period only and not all of the evidence is necessarily before the court, it is not appropriate, nor indeed in most cases possible, for the court to conduct a detailed investigation into the finances of the parties. While, in order to determine what is or is not reasonable, some analysis is always required, that analysis can be conducted on a ‘broad brush’ basis.”

15.  In the commonly cited case of C v F [2006] 1 HKFLR 41 where His Honour Judge Bruno Chan said :

“12. ……the only statutory guidance as to the award of maintenance pending suit, means that the Court has a discretion in the matter, and subject to the result being ‘reasonable’ , the discretion is not fettered in any way.

(See Waller v Waller [1956] P 300, [1956] 2 All ER 234, 236, CA, and Griffith v Griffith [1957] 1 All ER 494, 495).”

16.  Further, at paragraph 14 of the Judgment, the learned Judge said :

“14. Although the sole statutory guideline in considering maintenance pending suit is that the award shall be “reasonable”, the Court will nevertheless bear in mind all the factors drawn to its attention relating to the marriage and the parties to it, and perhaps the 2 most outstanding matters in every case, as in this one, are the standard of living of the parties, and the ability of the husband to pay,”

The Wife’s case

17.  Throughout the marriage until the signing of the DA in November 2017, H had been paying regular sums monthly to W first at the rate of HK$30,000 and later increased to HK$50,000 a month through bank transfer. In addition, and from time to time, H would also give to W substantial sums in cash (emphasis added). In 2014, W had received cash no less than HK$1,060,000. In 2015, she received cash no less than HK$2,156,000. In 2016, she received a total sum of HK$5,020,000.[2] All these cash payments was not disputed by H.

18.  It is W’s case that H had not fully and frankly disclosed all his other properties and assets in his Form E; in particular, the source and origin of those cash payments given to her over the years. Besides, H had also failed to disclose the substantial profits which she believed to be over HK$55 million that H had made in 2017 upon the sale of a plot of land in Lantau Island. The land was bought for HK$17.2 million only but sold at around HK$72 million.

19.  There are 2 companies incorporated after their marriage, namely ATS and AMS, which provided consultancy services. According to W, these 2 companies had generated an average monthly profit of around HK$415,882 in 2018 to H.[3]

20.  W in her supporting affirmation, repeated her monthly expenses set forth in her Form E, as follows :-

“  General

Item	Amount (HK$)
Rent	N/A
Mortgage Instalments	$7,721.00
Utilities (electricity, gas, rates, telephone & water)	$11,800.00
Management fees	$ 2,600.00
Food	$10,000.00
Household expenses	$18,000.00
Car expenses	$ 8,000.00
Insurance premia	$ 2,500.00
Domestic helper (s)	$ 9,040.00
Others (specify)     1.  Household maintenance and repair     2.  Food and medical for dogs	$10,000.00
Total monthly household expenses	HK$79,661.00

  Personal

Item	Amount (HK$)
Meals out of home	$15,000.00
Transport	$ 8,000.00
Clothing/shoes	$ 5,000.00
Personal grooming (including haircut and cosmetics)	$ 3,000.00
Entertainment/presents	$ 5,000.00
Holiday	$ 5,000.00
Medical/dental	$ 2,500.00
Tax	$ 926.00
Insurance premia	$ 1,140.00
Interim maintenance	$
Contribution to parents	$ 5,000.00
Dependent family members	$
Others (specify)	$
Total monthly personal expenses	HK$50,566.00

  Children

Item	Amount (HK$)
School fees	$11,000.00
Extra tuition fees	$
School books and stationery	$ 1,000.00
Transport to school (including school bus)	$ 1,000.00
Medical/Dental	$ 1,500.00
Extra Curricular Activities	$ 500.00
Entertainment /presents	$ 200.00
Holidays	$ 2,000.00
Clothing/Shoes	$ 3,000.00
Insurance premia	$ 1,000.00
Lunches and pocket money	$ 5,000.00
Other Transport	$
Child-minding fees	$
Uniform	$
Others (specify)	$
Total monthly personal expenses	HK$26,200.00

Total Monthly Expenses :

$ 156,427.00”

21.  W was once employed as a District Board Councillor receiving an honorarium of HK$32,150 per month from the Government of the HKSAR. Such honorarium was chargeable for salary tax by the Inland Revenue Department.[4] However, she had not been successful at the district board election in November 2019 and thus she was no longer receiving the honorarium as at the time of this trial.

22.  There was a company by the name CHL of which W holds 51% shareholding with the remaining 49% held by H. According to W, this was a dormant company during the marriage and the only purpose of CHL was to serve as a vehicle for settling family expenses for tax saving.

23.  W in her Form E explained the sudden surge of balance in CHL’s bank account within a month from HK$325,766.03 in October 2017 to HK$3,450,747.89 in November 2017. It was due to her withdrawal of around HK$3.18 million from the bank accounts of the 2 companies ATS and AMS after she discovered that H had unilaterally withdrawn sums around HK$5.98 million from the bank accounts of ATS and AMS without her knowledge.[5]

24.  However, the CHL’s account balance came down to only HK$29,923 as per the bank statement dated 30 October 2020[6] whilst it was HK$1,321,025 as per the bank statement dated 30 May 2019. W accounted for the drop of HK$1,291,102 (that is, HK$1,321,025 – HK$29,923) was because of (i) her payment of the balance of the purchase price of her Porsche car at HK$793,121.50; (ii) payment for her Full membership of the HKJC at HK$664,000; (iii) repair costs for the water leakage problem at the FMH at HK$376,577; and (iv) payment of legal fees of HK$317,958.50. Whenever there was insufficient cash flow in the CHL’s account to defray expenses, she would transfer money from her personal bank accounts to CHL’s account.[7]

25.  Admittedly, W used to have had personal bank savings with HSBC and Bank of China around HK$2,294,050 at the time of her Form E in March 2019.[8] It dropped to HK$1,202,790 some 20 months later in October 2020[9]. W accounted for the drop of HK$1,091,260 (that is, HK$2,294,050 – HK$1,202,790) in the last 20 months was because she had not received any maintenance from H but she would have to pay for all the family expenses solely.

26.  W has had stocks and the value of which had dropped from HK$1,102,573 (as per her Form E) down to HK$807,200 (as per her 3^rd Affirmation).[10]

27.  W denied that she had received any cash payment from the Community Section of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government or any salary for working as personal assistant to the Chairman Mr. Wong of a listed company. Admittedly, Mr. Wong was the nominated elder brother of W.

The Husband’s case

28.  H has retired from the Hong Kong Police Force in 2012 after more than 30 years of service. During his career with the Hong Kong Police Force, he made various private investments including trading in stocks, catering and antique business. All his investments were reported and that he had made quite a handsome fortune before retirement. Upon his retirement, he took around HK$6 million as his lump sum pension.

29.  Admittedly, the 2 companies ATS and AMS were incorporated after he married W but at all material times these 2 companies were run by H alone. It was only upon W’s requests that she became a director of AMS in May 2015 and a shareholder of ATS in August 2017. According to H, this was done out of his love and affection to W.

30.  H produced 2 Chinese Agreements signed between ATS and CHL dated 28 September 2013 and 1 April 2015[11]. It can be seen from these Agreements that ATS would be paying monthly consultation fees of HK$30,000 (under 1^st Agreement from 1/10/2013 to 30/9/2015 for 24 months) and HK$50,000 (under 2^nd Agreement from 1/4/2015 to 31/3/2016 for 12 months) to CHL.

31.  H in his Affirmation filed in October 2019 confirmed his financial position remained more or less the same as per his Form E filed in February 2019. He had around HK$3.84 million of net liquid cash. His monthly expenses was around HK$145,958 a month as follows :-

“  General

Item	Amount (HK$)
Rent	40,000
Mortgage Instalments	0
Utilities (electricity, gas, rates, telephone & water)	7,000.00
Management fees	2,600.00
Food	4,000.00
Household expenses	4,000.00
Car expenses	3,000.00
Insurance premia	1,896.00
Domestic helper (s)	5,000.00
Others (specify)	0
Total monthly household expenses	67,496.00

  Personal

Item	Amount (HK$)
Meals out of home	4,500.00
Transport	1,500.00
Clothing/shoes	1,500.00
Personal grooming (including haircut and cosmetics)	1,500.00
Entertainment/presents	3,000.00
Holiday	0
Medical/dental	0
Tax	6,162.00
Insurance premia	400.00
Interim maintenance	0
Contribution to parents	0
Dependent family members	0
Others (specify)	0
Total monthly personal expenses	18,562.00

  Children

Item	Amount (HK$)
School fees	30,000.00
Extra tuition fees	0
School books and stationery	700.00
Transport to school (including school bus)	1,200.00
Medical/Dental	1,700.00
Extra Curricular Activities	500.00
Entertainment /presents	500.00
Holidays	0
Clothing/Shoes	0
Insurance premia	0
Lunches and pocket money	5,000.00
Other Transport	1,300.00
Child-minding fees	0
Uniform	19,000.00
Others (specify)	0
Total monthly personal expenses	59,900.00

Total Monthly Expenses :

$ 145,958.00”

32.  In his latest Affirmation[12] on updating his financial position, H confirmed the termination of directorship with the listed company “AI” by the end of August 2020. As a result of such termination, he lost an annual income of HK$180,000.

33.  The withdrawal of HK$3.18 million by W from the bank accounts of ATS and AMS had caused him to have to pay HK$928,046 from his own pocket for settling the companies’ tax liabilities[13].

34.  The latest balance in his personal bank accounts with HSBC and Bank of China have been reduced from HK$3,251,725 as at the date of his Form E in February 2019 down to HK$2,988,167 in November 2020. H had also sold 2 of his watches at around HK$700,000 to his friends for supporting his daily expenses.

35.  To countenance W’s allegation of substantial profits of HK$55 million having been made, H produced (i) A Project Management Consultancy Engagement Agreement signed between ATS and XX Management Consultant Limited; and (ii) A Risk Assessment Consultancy Engagement Agreement signed between AMS and the same XX Management Consultant Limited. The respective Directors and Financial Statements for the 2 companies had also been produced as exhibits to his Form E which showed no such profits having been made so alleged by W.

36.  For the withdrawal of HK$5.98 million from the bank accounts of ATS and AMS, H’s case was that the withdrawal of HK$2 million from ATS was well documented and recorded as “Loan to Director”. The other withdrawal of HK$2 million was made for investing beauty products projected by CHL which sum was, however, later transferred by W to her personal bank account.

37.  As for the balance sum of HK$1.97 million, it was borrowed by W (as the then director of AMS) to purchase a property in Mainland China under the joint names of W and the daughter N. Such withdrawal was also recorded as “Loan to Director” in the audited report of AMS.

38.  For the reported monthly income of H at HK$99,898, it consists of monthly pension of HK$34,898; monthly payment from “I” averaged at HK$20,000; monthly payment from “AI” averaged at HK$15,000 and his contractual monthly salary from “KLF” at HK$30,000[14].

39.  H in his Affirmation in opposition[15] set out his estimated monthly reasonable amount of W’s general expenses to be HK$35,341; personal expenses to be HK$20,566 and children expenses to be HK$26,200. The total reasonable amount should be HK$82,107. Thus, H’s case is that W had exaggerated her general and personal expenses but he agreed to the children’s expenses of HK$26,200.

Discussion

40.  On the evidence available, I am satisfied that both parties have sufficient liquid cash and savings on hand or equities readily available that could be used for their respective monthly expenses. As a matter of fact, this was one of H’s contention, apart from his other contention of W having exaggerated her monthly expenses, that there was no immediate need or urgency for W to seek maintenance pending suit at this stage.

41.  That said, the real question to be considered is that, on all the circumstances of the case, would it be fair and reasonable (emphasis added) to order H to pay maintenance pending suit ? If the answer is “yes”, what level of maintenance should H be paying to W ?

42.  To start with, the regular monthly payments of HK$30,000 which was later increased to HK$50,000 could hardly be said to be W’s maintenance. At this stage without having the benefit of the parties’ evidence tested through trial and purely upon perusal on paper, I am prepared to accept H’s case that those were consultancy fees on the strength of the 2 Chinese Agreements signed between 2 legal entities, namely, ATS (by H) and CHL (by W).

43.  W as the only controlling shareholder of CHL, it is her sole decision as to how the consultancy fees received from ATS are to be attributed, be it for settling family expenses or otherwise. The purpose of the payments received should not be dictated by W’s preference or usage of them but should be considered in accordance with the designated purpose stated under the available evidence, namely, the 2 Chinese Agreements. Hence, for the purpose of this trial on maintenance pending suit, there is no question of H having paid regular sums of monthly maintenance to W, be it HK$30,000 or HK$50,000 a month.

44.  Further, parties’ evidence as to the purpose of the other substantial sums given in cash by H to W from time to time are at odds. H’s case was that it was aimed at paying off the mortgage and settling family expenses whereas W’s case was somehow unclear. W even commented that H had failed to disclose the source and origin of those sums in case that she had received from H during the marriage.

45.  Given the amount varies from HK$70,000 (in May 2015) to HK$1,000,000 (both in May and August 2016)[16], and also considering the frequencies of payment and duration between each payment, I am not convinced that they could be taken as payments given to defray monthly family expenses. On a broad brush basis and without further investigation, I am only prepared to say that those were scattered payments between spouses without any specific aim or purpose.

46.  In the unreported case of CWK v YCHS & Ors, FCMC No.6082/2014, this Court awarded maintenance pending suit to the wife upon an established pattern of payment by the husband which he had ceased upon the wife filing the petition for divorce. The wife in that case was a full time housewife since 1996 and that she was financially dependent upon the husband prior to the divorce. By the way, I noticed that Senior Counsel Mr. Pang leading Mr. Eugene Yim represented the husband in that case.

47.  At paragraphs 51 to 60 of the Judgment where this Court said :-

“51. Parties disputed heatedly as to the nature and purpose of the HK$70,000 given by the Husband to the Wife. The Husband’s case is that all along his salary was aimed for investment and savings for their retirement purposes rather than maintenance for the Wife. He expected the Wife to manage the moneys. The Wife’s case is that she was entrusted by the Husband to use the moneys without restraint for her maintenance and also for defraying family expenses.

52. …….[cases cited]

53. …….[cases cited]

54. ….…[cases cited]

55. Mr. Pang, S.C. submitted the above cases are not related to maintenance pending suit applications but rather for permanent financial orders.

56. In my view, to ascertain the common intention and conduct of the parties in the present case are more important than to apply the ordinary literal meaning of the word ‘maintenance’, though I am bound to take note of those cases and authorities where the term ‘maintenance’ had been defined.

57. As earlier mentioned, there has been an established pattern of payment by the Husband of his entire salary to the Wife. Given the fact that the Wife at all times since 1996 was a full time housewife financially dependent upon the Husband, I find it more probable than not that it would be in the Husband’s knowledge and contemplation that part of his salary would be used for defraying the monthly family expenses. As Miss Yip S.C., rightly submitted, if those deposits were aimed for safe keeping and investments, then, how could the Wife who was unemployed to defray those day to day family expenses ?

58. …….

59. Considering objectively all the circumstances, I am inclined to find in favour of the Wife that the moneys given to her by the Husband as per the established pattern of payment was more likely than not for her personal use with no restrictions, including for her to defray all necessary day to day family expenses. Whatever sums left over after defrayment of expenses would be for the purpose of her maintenance.

60. It is the established pattern of payment, with the Husband’s knowledge and concurrence of those recurring expenses for family living (although not knowing the exact amount) were to be defrayed out of it by the Wife, satisfied the notion of ‘meeting the recurring costs of living at whatever standard of living is appropriate’ propounded by His Lordship Hartmann JA in HJKG.”

48.  Although both W and the wife in the CWK case had their own bank savings and resources to look upon for settling their monthly expenses, which is no doubt a stumbling block for W to overcome on the paramount issue of ‘immediate financial needs’ for maintenance pending suit applications, there are other salient facts which call for different consideration when determining W’s maintenance pending suit.

49.  First, the cash payments made by H to W fall short of any “established pattern” as in the CWK case, both in terms of their continuity and the amount of each payment during the course of the marriage.

50.  Secondly, the cash payments in this case ceased around January 2017[17] which was long before the parties’ separation in November 2017 and filing of the Petition for divorce in December 2018. In the CWK case, the fixed amount of payment of HK$70,000 ceased around the time when the husband suddenly moved out from the matrimonial home and the wife’s filing of her Petition for divorce[18].

51.  Thirdly, the husband in the CWK case engaged in a “tri-partes’ relationship for some 13 odd years and had spent substantive amount of the family assets over his ‘partner’ and their 4 children. There are no resembling facts in this case.

52.  Fourthly, W’s spending of over 1.5 million in total, or to be precise, it was HK$1,457,121 (HK$793,121[19] + HK$664,000[20]) for the purchase of the brand new Porsche vehicle and upgrading her membership to Full Member at the Hong Kong Jockey Club speak for itself which need no elaboration. It was noted that the sum of HK$793,121 was just the balance of the purchase price without counting the deposit that had already been paid. The total purchase price was HK$893,121[21].

53.  And lastly, the earning capacity of W and the wife in the CWK case varies.

54.  Considering W’s case on a broad-brush basis, I am not convinced that W was in need of maintenance pending suit nor that it would be fair and reasonable to order H to make any such payment at this stage.

55.  Given my decision against W on her need for maintenance pending suit, I would not have to consider or go into any detail as to H’s means and ability to make such payment.

56.  I decided that W fails in paragraph 1 of her Summons for maintenance pending suit.

57.  For paragraph 2 of her Summons for renewal of licence and insurance of W’s vehicle, I agree with H’s Counsel Mr. Yim that this must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. There was a similar item of claim for reinstatement of an AE Centurion supplementary card by the wife in the CWK case which was dismissed for the same reason. As said, Mr. Pang S.C. who appeared for the husband in the CWK case had successfully resisted such item, I expected that W’s lawyers should have been properly advised by Senior Counsel not to include such similar item in the Summons.

58.  I decided that W fails in paragraph 2 of her Summons.

The Divorce Agreement (“DA”)

59.  At paragraph 20 of W’s Skeleton Submissions, it was submitted :

“20. The DA is a nuptial agreement. It is relevant to the question of MPS for it shows the manner in which H and W mutually agreed and intended to settle their rights and obligations left over from the marriage. W submits that H has exercised his rights but reneged on his obligations, and this is unfair.”

60.  As said in paragraph 11 of this Judgment, Decree Absolute has yet to be granted.

61.  Thus, it is legally wrong or at least premature to say the parties’ marital relationship had ended (emphasis added) at the time of this maintenance pending suit trial. In my view, the terms of the DA were to regulate parties’ finances after (emphasis added) their marital relationship had ended by the divorce, or to be more precise, the granting of the Decree Absolute. This had yet to happen. That said, and with respect to Senior Counsel Mr. Pang, the Court does not have to take into account the contents of the DA at this stage and in the present application. Any submission as to the Court’s decision should be as close to the terms of the DA as practicable falls apart completely.

62.  Thus, those reference to the clauses of the DA by Senior Counsel Mr. Pang at paragraph 21 of his Skeleton Submissions bears little weight and that they would not be considered.

63.  All in all, the Court is only required to consider maintenance pending suit in a ‘broad brush’ manner. Should there be any over-provision or under-provision, it can always be adjusted at the ancillary relief trial proper at a later stage.

Conclusion

64.  For all the above reasons, I decided that W’s Summons for maintenance pending suit should be dismissed.

Costs

65.  On the question of costs, there was no reason or any basis for departure from the normal rule that costs to follow the event.

66.  And I will so order.

67.  I will also grant Certificate for Counsel.

68.  This is a costs order nisi which would become absolute if no application to vary the same is made within 14 days from the date of this Judgment.

Orders

69.  I now grant the following Orders :-

(a)  The Respondent’s (Wife’s) Summons dated 6 June 2019 be dismissed;

(b)  The Respondent (Wife) do pay to the Petitioner (Husband) costs of this application, including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed; and

(c)  There be Certificate for Counsel.

70.  Last but not least, I wish to thank Senior Counsel and Counsel for their valuable assistance to this Court.