LANDING ENTERTAINMENT KOREA CO LTD v. CHAU MEI YING

DCCJ 1045/2024

[2025] HKDC 114

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 1045 OF 2024

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DECISION

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I.  INTRODUCTION

1.  This is the defendant’s summons (the “defendant’s summons”)  filed on 3 April 2024 pursuant to Order 12 rule 8 of the Rules of the District Court (Cap 336H)  for a permanent stay of the proceedings on the ground that the Court should not exercise jurisdiction over the defendant in respect of the subject matter of the present proceedings in favour of the Ordinary Courts of the Republic of Korea (commonly known as South Korea).

II.  PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM

2.  The plaintiff issued the writ of summons in the present proceedings on 23 February 2024 indorsed specifically with a statement of claim.  According to it:-

(1)  The plaintiff is the proprietor of a casino known as “Landing Casino” in Jeju Island, South Korea;

(2)  At all material times, the defendant has been the holder of Hong Kong ID Card;

(3)  By the following three written pro forma applications for credit (the “Applications”)  signed by the defendant, the defendant applies for, and the plaintiff approved, three credit facilities (the “Credit Facilities”):-

(a)  First Credit Facility dated 16 June 2018 for unlimited credit;

(b)  Second Credit Facility dated 17 / 18 June 2018 for KRW100,000,000; and

(c)  Third Credit Facility dated 19 June 2018 for KRW300,000,000.

(4)  Accordingly, the plaintiff advanced various loans to the defendant.  As at the date of the writ, an amount of KRW360,000,000, with interest, was, and still is, due and owing to the plaintiff; and

(5)  Despite the plaintiff’s repeated requests and demands, the defendant has refused and failed to repay the plaintiff.

III.  DEFENDANT’S CASE

3.  The defendant of course has not filed any defence, but set out her case in her affirmation in support of her summons.  In gist, she had already fully settled the account with the plaintiff.  In summary:-

(1)  She has been “a businessperson residing in Hong Kong”: see §6 of her affirmation;

(2)  She is an alumni of Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business (“CKGSB”)  in Beijing, and has since 2016 been a member of the CKGSB Alumni Association;

(3)  In June 2018, she joined an alumni reunion trip to Jeju Island, organised by the CKGSB Alumni Association, with one Mr Hao as a lead organiser.  The trip was scheduled to take place from 15 to 19 June 2018 in a resort (the “Resort”).  The trip would include meetings for networking among the alumni;

(4)  On 16 June 2018, after the meeting that day followed by a dinner banquet, upon Mr Hao’s suggestion, the defendant and some others visited and gambled at the casino (the “Casino”)  in the Resort;

(5)  There, Mr Hao took them to a VIP room where Mr Hao introduced a Ms Chan (“Ms Chan”)  to them as a representative of the Resort and assistant to the Chairman of the Resort.  Ms Chan then showed them around the Casino, appearing to the defendant that Ms Chan was a high-ranking official properly authorised to represent the Casino and the Resort;

(6)  Mr Hao arranged with Ms Chan for obtaining a large lot of casino chips on behalf of the group.  Mr Hao then provided each of them with casino chips, and Ms Chan requested them to sign a marker sheet for the allotment of the casino chips.  However, the defendant was not provided a copy of the marker sheet.  The defendant made some gain that day;

(7)  The defendant and Mr Hao as well as some others gambled at the Casino again on 18 and 19 June 2018. However, the defendant as well as some others suffered loss;

(8)  On various occasions on 18 and 19 June 2018, to make sure that they would be able to continue to gamble despite the loss, Mr Hao asked the defendant to transfer some of the defendant’s casino chips to him, either for Mr Hao’s personal use or for use by other members of the group.  The defendant acceded to the request, and transferred to Mr Hao casino chips amounting to KRW200,000,000;

(9)  In the hope of recovering her loss, the defendant extended her stay to 20 June 2018 so that she could (and did)  gamble, though Mr Hao left on 19 June 2018;

(10)  At the conclusion on 20 June 2018, the defendant contacted Ms Chan, returned the casino chips in her hands, and settled the accounts with the Casino; 

(11)  Ms Chan informed the defendant that the defendant was allotted chips worth of KRW500,000,000, but the chips she returned to her amounted only to KRW140,000,000.  Thus, Ms Chan asked the defendant for paying the Casino KRW360,000,000;

(12)  The defendant immediately responded to Ms Chan that she had transferred chips worth of KRW200,000,000 to Mr Hao, and thus, the defendant had to pay the Casino only KRW160,000,000.  Ms Chan acknowledged that “KRW200,000,000 would be ‘assigned’ to Mr Hao” and “only KRW160,000,000 would be payable by [the defendant]”;

(13)  On or around 26 July 2018, on WeChat (the details of which I shall return below), Ms Chan asked the defendant to pay the Casino KRW360,000,000, and the defendant replied that it should be KRW160,000,000 only.  Ms Chan did not contest this, and upon the defendant’s request, gave a bank account number under the name of a Mr Chung for the defendant’s transfer;

(14)  Accordingly, on 7 August 2018, the defendant did transfer RMB957,500 (worth of KRW160,000,000)  to the said bank account under the name of Mr Chung.  The defendant sent the screenshot of the payment to Ms Chan via WeChat, and Ms Chan acknowledged the receipt;

(15)  Subsequently, via a collection agent and solicitors’ letters, the plaintiff still demanded the defendant to pay KRW360,000,000 with interest; and

(16)  The defendant then made enquiry with Ms Chan via WeChat, who asked her to contact the bookkeeper of the Casino named Xiuhui (秀慧)  (the “Bookkeeper”)  for a fuller record of the transactions.

4.  As regards the three Applications for Credit dated 16, 17/18 and 19 June 2018, the defendant’s said at §16 of her affirmation, being her only response to the Applications, that:-

“(a)  I have no recollection of signing the Alleged Applications during my visit to the Casino.

(b)  Without prejudice to the above, when the Plaintiff’s lawyers first issued a letter to me dated 8 December 2023 (“Pre-Action Letter”), the Plaintiff’s lawyers only referred to two (as opposed to three)  “Applications for Credit” respectively dated 18 and 19 June 2018.

(c)  It was only upon my lawyers’ request for copies of the “Applications for Credit” that the Plaintiff’s lawyers provided three copies of the purported “Applications” respectively dated 16, 18 and 19 June 2018.  I can only confirm that the signatures on these purported copies broadly resemble my usual signatures”.

5.  Further, I note that at least at this stage, there is no challenge to the authenticity of the Applications, and the defendant has not taken the trouble to request for inspection of the originals of the Applications.

IV.  JURISDICTIONAL CLAUSE IN THE APPLICATIONS

6.  All the three Applications contain a jurisdiction clause (being clause 13), which provides that:-

“You hereby unconditionally and irrevocably:

(i)  agree that the facility, if being drawn down at any casino operated by Landing Entertainment Korea Co Ltd shall be governed by and construed in accordance with Korean Law;

(ii)  agree that the Korean courts shall have non-exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any disputes whatsoever which may arise out of or in connection with the facility or any cheque accepted by us in connection with the facility;

(iii)  agree that we may also bring any action or proceeding against you in any court in any country or territory in which you or any of your assets are then situated or in any other court of competent jurisdiction selected by us;

(iv)  waive any objection which you may now or later have to any action or proceeding being brought by us and any of the courts referred to above;

(v)  submit to the jurisdiction of the courts referred to above; and

(vi)  waive the right to challenge the enforceability of a judgment issued by the Court”.

7.  It is a non-exclusive jurisdictional clause.  For convenience, I shall refer to this clause as the “NEJC”.

V.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES

8.  The plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant “as of right”, given that the defendant, as she herself deposes, is a resident in Hong Kong.  “Where a plaintiff institutes proceedings in Hong Kong as of right, the defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts to hear the claim in the sense that it may be argued that there is an alternative forum which ought, in preference to Hong Kong, to deal with the claim” on the ground of a foreign jurisdiction clause or on the ground of forum non conveniens: see Noble Power Investments Ltd v Nissei Stomach Tokyo Co Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 631 at §22(1)  per Ma CJHC (as he then was).

9.  As mentioned above, there is a jurisdiction clause here, namely the NEJC.  Before I set out the legal principles in relation to how the Court should approach the NEJC, I note that although the NEJC here is governed by the Korean law, the parties do not dispute the plain meaning as one can read from its English text and how the Court here in Hong Kong should treat such a clause.  The only dispute raised under the Korean law is one raised by the defendant on the validity of the NEJC on the ground that it is “significantly unreasonable and unfair” under the Korean law, a matter I shall return later in an appropriate juncture.

10.  As regards a jurisdiction clause:-

(1)  The questions of jurisdiction and forum are ultimately for the courts to consider where the interests of justice lie: see Noble Power Investments Ltd v Nissei Stomach Tokyo Co Ltd, supra at §27;

(2)  The starting point is that the courts will hold the parties to their contractual bargain, though in exceptional cases, a court may ignore the contractual bargain: see Noble Power Investments Ltd v Nissei Stomach Tokyo Co Ltd, supra at §27;

(3)  Where proceedings are instituted in the forum which is the named forum under a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, the party seeking a stay or contesting the jurisdiction or appropriateness of that forum carries a very heavy burden to discharge, “since that party has by definition agreed contractually to submit to the jurisdiction”: see Noble Power Investments Ltd v Nissei Stomach Tokyo Co Ltd, supra at §31;

(4)  It makes little difference where proceedings are instituted in a forum other than the identified one, if that other forum is one to which the parties have also agreed to submit in the event of their being sued: see Noble Power Investments Ltd v Nissei Stomach Tokyo Co Ltd, supra at §32; and

(5)  Where that other forum is merely one in which proceedings can be instituted without any obligation on the party sued actually to submit to that forum, the party seeking a stay or contesting the jurisdiction or appropriateness of that forum is in a better situation to do so because he would not be seeking to avoid a forum to which he has contractually agreed to submit: see Noble Power Investments Ltd v Nissei Stomach Tokyo Co Ltd, supra at §32.

11.  As regards the legal principle in relation to forum non conveniens:-

(1)  “The single question to be decided is whether there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of an action, i.e. in which the action may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice”;

(2)  In “Stage I” inquiry, the party seeking a stay or contesting jurisdiction has to establish that:-

(a)  first, Hong Kong is not the natural or appropriate forum in the sense that the forum has the most real and substantial connection with the action; and

(b)  second, there is another available forum which is clearly and distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong.

(3)  If the party passed the Stage I inquiry, then in the Stage II inquiry, the plaintiff will have to show that he will be deprived of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage if the action is tried in a forum other than Hong Kong; and

(4)  If the plaintiff passes the Stage II inquiry, then in the Stage III inquiry the Court will have to balance the advantages of the alternative forum with the disadvantages that the plaintiff may suffer.

VI.  NEJC

A.  Defendant’s contractual agreement to NEJC

12.  As can be seen from the defendant’s own affirmation quoted in §4 above, although the defendant does not admit that she signed the Applications for Credit, she has no positive evidence to deny it.  Further, she does not dispute the authenticity of the Applications for Credit and does not in any way raise any allegation (let alone evidence)  that fraud is involved in relation to the Applications for Credit.  Thus, at least for the present purpose, I accept that the defendant did sign the Applications for Credit and is thus taken to have contractually agreed to them.

B.  Defendant’s allegation of “grounds to believe” that NEJC “may not” be valid and enforceable

13.  Although the defendant on her own refers to the NEJC in her supporting affirmation, it is only in §18 of her reply affirmation that the defendant has for the first time raised a very vague assertion that “there are (at minimum)  grounds to believe that Clause 13 may not constitute a valid and enforceable jurisdictional agreement under Korean Law”.  In support, the defendant exhibits a “preliminary” Korean legal opinion.  That opinion refers to article 12(1)  of the Act on Private International Law and a decision of the Supreme Court of Korea (96Da200093)  and opines that a jurisdiction clause may be invalid if it is “significantly unreasonable and unfair”.  The opinion then opines at §6 that:-

“While the list of significantly unreasonable and unfair’ features is not closed, there are certain factors which may suggest the Clause 13 is ‘significantly unreasonable and unfair’, including but not limited to (a)  the fact that standard[s] [sic] forms appears to be used, such that one party was deprived of any meaningful opportunity to negotiate the terms of the jurisdictional agreement, (b)  the jurisdictional agreement is asymmetrical in that it allows one party an apparently unfettered choice of jurisdiction while the other party is not afforded any opportunity to challenge, (c)  Korean law applies to the contract, but one party may force another to accept a foreign court’s determination of Korean law issues, and (d)  choice of forum may be used as a means to circumvent some provisions that may be decided in favour of opposing party”.

14.  I find that this preliminary opinion does not help the defendant to discharge her burden of proof here because:-

(1)  The decision of the Supreme Court of Korea is not attached.  The Court is not to accept expert’s opinion as a given but should exercise its independent faculty to examine the opinion, and can certainly disagree with any plainly illogical part of the opinion: see Shenzhen Development Bank Company Ltd v New Century International (Holdings)  Ltd, HCA 2976/2001, unreported, 31 July 2002 at §§25-27 per DHCJ Lam (as Lam PJ then was).  Without the decision, I am simply not in any position to exercise my independent faculty to examine the opinion;

(2)  According to (a)  of the opinion quoted above, it is not that the use of the standard form is a problem, but the use of the standard form such that the defendant was “deprived of any meaningful opportunity to negotiate” would be a problem.  However, there is no allegation from the defendant that she actually wanted to negotiate the terms of the Applications for Credit.  As mentioned above, she simply cannot remember signing the Applications for Credit.  I would have thought that if she had wanted to negotiate, she would have at least some recollection of these Applications for Credit.  But she has not;

(3)  As regards (b), I cannot see any explanation in the opinion why the parties having contractually agreed to submit to foreign jurisdiction absent any allegation of undue influence or duress or the like, the so-called asymmetry would be regarded as unfair and/or unreasonable.  Where necessary, I also rely on the characterisation of such a clause as “common” by the learned editors in §12-075 of Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (16^th Ed);

(4)  As regards (c), I cannot see any explanation in the opinion why the party, having contractually agreed to submit to foreign jurisdiction absent any allegation of undue influence or duress or the like, would be regarded as “forced” to accept a foreign court’s determination of the Korean law issues;

(5)  As regards (d), the allegation that the choice of forum may be used “as a means to circumvent some provisions that may be decided in favour of opposing party” is a general allegation without any particulars at all as to what provisions were or were intended to be circumvented.  At the hearing, the defendant submitted that it was the limitation defence available under the Korean law that is being circumvented, but I cannot accept it as it is not what the legal opinion says; and

(6)  Equally fundamentally, the opinion does not explain the basis (for example, textbooks or decided cases)  for opining that these are considerations for determining whether the NEJC is “significantly unreasonable and unfair”. 

15.  In my view, the defendant has failed her burden to convince me even provisionally that the NEJC is invalid and/or unenforceable under the Korean law.  Thus, I shall take the NEJC as valid and enforceable under the Korean law.

C.  Submissions to courts by NEJC

16.  In the NEJC, while the Korean courts are named form under (ii), courts in “any country or territory in which [the defendant] or any of [the defendant’s] assets are then situated or in any other court of competent jurisdiction” are also named under (iii).  More importantly, by virtue of (v), the parties agreed to “submit to the jurisdiction of the courts referred to above”.  In the same vein, by (iv), the defendant has waived any objection to the action or proceedings brought by the plaintiff in the “courts referred to above”.

17.  The plaintiff has since 18 March 2015 been the sole registered owner of a landed property in Tai Po acquired at HK$20,000,000, the address of which is her residential address in her affirmations.  In the circumstances, it is clear that by the NEJC, the defendant submits to the Courts of Hong Kong as well.

D.  No reasons for releasing defendant from contractual bargain in NEJC

18.  The defendant submits that I should release her from the contractual bargain in the NEJC in favour of Korean Courts by reason of the following factors:-

(1)  The plaintiff carries on business in Jeju;

(2)  The material events happened in South Korea;

(3)  It would be costly and difficult to get the following persons to testify in Hong Kong Courts:-

(a)  Ms Chan, being a representative of the Resort or the Casino, is likely stationed in South Korea;

(b)  The Bookkeeper managing and keeping all records for the accounts of the Casino is likely to be a resident in South Korea;

(c)  Chloe, an employee of the Casino handling the logistics of the visit to the Casino and thus able to speak to the circumstances leading to and surrounding the trip to the Casino, is likely to be found in South Korea;

(d)  The staff members of the plaintiff involved in the organisation of the trip are likely to be found in South Korea; and

(e)  Other staff members who can testify to the Casino’s usual operation and credit arrangement are likely to be found in South Korea.

(4)  The governing law of the Applications for Credit is Korean law; and

(5)  Under the Korean law, the plaintiff’s action would have been time-barred.

19.  For convenience, I shall refer to them as “Factor (1)”, “Factor (2)” and so on.

20.  Factors (1)  and (2)  have little weight in my view.  They by themselves do not have any or any significant impact on the costs and time of how the litigation would be conducted in Hong Kong.  Insofar as that the defendant would say that Factor (1)  would mean that the defendant would have difficulty in enforcing costs order against the plaintiff, the defendant, if she thinks fit, may apply for an order for security for costs.

21.  For Factor (3), in my view:-

(1)  The most important witness is Mr Hao (besides the defendant herself).  The defendant has not adduced any evidence at all as to any difficulty in locating Mr Hao and having him testify in Hong Kong Courts;  

(2)  As regards Ms Chan:-

(a)  On 28 February 2024, the defendant texted Ms Chan after the commencement of the present action, asking Ms Chan that she may have to testify in Court to assist her defence.  First, this shows that the defendant still had contact with Ms Chan.  Second, there is no evidence that Ms Chan would resist coming to Hong Kong Courts to testify. Third, given the recent contacts, however, there is no evidence from the plaintiff as to the whereabouts of Ms Chan, save and except the defendant’s opinion that because Ms Chan is a representative of the Resort or the Casino, it is “likely” that she is stationed in South Korea.  Considering all these, in my view, the defendant even cannot convince me that she would encounter difficulty in having Ms Chan to testify in Hong Kong Courts;

(b)  In any event, even on the version of the defendant’s evidence:-

(i)   Ms Chan simply relied upon on what the defendant told her at the time about what Mr Hao did.  Thus, even if Ms Chan did acknowledge what the defendant told her about Mr Hao, I do not see how such acknowledgement would amount to any valid legal defence like estoppel in respect of the KRW200,000,000;

(ii)  Further, if the defendant actually did not transfer the KRW200,000,000 to Mr Hao (which evidence would come from first-hand evidence of the defendant and Mr Hao), I do not see how the defendant could realistically rely on Ms Chan’s representation (as now alleged by the defendant on affirmation)  that the KRW200,000,000 was assigned to Mr Hao;

(iii)  If the defendant actually did transfer the KRW200,000,000 to Mr Hao, I also do not see how the dealing between the defendant and Mr Hao would assist the defendant’s defence to the plaintiff’s claim;

(iv)  If the defendant actually did transfer the KRW200,000,000 to Mr Hao and the defendant would rely on Ms Chan’s representation to raise the defence that in detrimental reliance (being payment of KRW160,000,000 to Mr Chung)  on Ms Chan’s representation, the plaintiff has been estopped from claiming the KRW200,000,000 or KRW160,000,000, in my view, this would not help the defendant even assuming that Ms Chan did  say in the Casino (as mentioned in §3(12)  above)  that the KRW200,000,000 would be assigned to Mr Hao and only KRW160,000,000 would be payable by the defendant.  This is because in the WeChat conversation (which is self-explanatory)  between Ms Chan and the defendant, it is clear to me that before the defendant’s payment of the KRW160,000,000 to Mr Chung, there was no clear and unequivocal representation from Ms Chan (even considered against the alleged representation made by Ms Chan in June 2018 in the Casino)  that the payment of KRW160,000,000 would settle all the debts once and for all due and owing by the defendant to the plaintiff.  Instead:-

“Ms Chan: 美英姐 [that is, the defendant]，美英姐您看一下那個我們發給您的這個，還有沒有任何，還有沒有別的疑問，如果有的話啊，您看我這邊能怎麼能夠解釋的，因爲查了系統各個方面最後底。卻是下的是3.6個億…

Ms Chan: 美英姐，美英姐，嗯，信息收到了那個就說關於是316 [this clearly refers to KRW360,000,000]，肯定這個不會錯，因爲我自己當時也進去系統也查了，我也給那個賬房的經理也有查了，也有。對過，所以這個316肯定100%不會有那個有錯誤，然後關於您要後面的一部分要慢慢還給我們的時候呢，可能需要我得去給財務那邊說，然後我也給那個啊。我也給那個郝總那邊也看看，我也給他發個信息，看一下怎麼能夠怎麼弄，因爲財務那邊錢那個到了的時候啊，就說賬期到了的時候呢，他就會找找的，所以我也不想。造成有任何不開心的事情，所以我先給財務那邊說一下看看，看看他那邊是怎麼說，就說您這邊等您就說一部分，慢慢還可能一可能要寫。

[the defendant]: 哦，你可能誤會我的意思了，不是慢慢給你，你搞錯了… 我只匯1.6亿[億]給你

Ms Chan: 美雲姐，我這就把賬戶發給你，你稍等，如果今天晚上不發給你的話，我明天發給你，因爲不是我懂你，意思就是我想我要現在確定的是要我要給財務說 一下，就關於你這個1.6億，如果就是等到你股票出了之後再還給我們，我要給那個財務那邊說一下，給他們商量一下那個時間，因爲那個就是這個賬期已經到了，那我要要給財務那邊說，美雲姐不用着急，我明天會把那個銀行信息就發給您的。

[the defendant]: 因爲之前一直是以一個億來算的，所以突然現在又變成就是說是1.6個億，所以，這個我自己也是有點預，就是失了預算，所以很多就放在那個股票市場裏邊，再再加上最近這些天都在跌，所以，我就這個禮拜是可以出出來的，沒問題的，那我就下個禮拜就會給你搞了。”

This, to me, is clear that before the defendant’s payment of the KRW160,000,000, Ms Chan made no clear and unequivocal representation that upon the payment of the KRW160,000,000, all the debts would be discharged.  On the contrary, Ms Chan made it clear that according to the plaintiff’s account, the defendant was still indebted to the plaintiff KRW360,000,000;

(3)  As regards the Bookkeeper, I think the more important evidence is not the Bookkeeper herself but the book, which is document that should be discovered during the proceedings, and there is no evidence that the discovery would be made difficult by Hong Kong Courts being the forum;

(4)  In relation to Chloe, I do not see any material relevance of the circumstances leading to and surrounding the trip, to which the defendant thinks this potential witness could speak, absent any suggestion that the organisation of the trip to the Casino was somehow a premeditated scheme to defraud the defendant; and

(5)  As regards the other staff, I do not understand the significance of their evidence.  Their evidence as to the operation of the Resort and Casino would not help the defendant’s defence that she paid certain amount of the chips to Mr Hao.

22.  Finally, for Factors (4)  and (5), if there is any dispute over the Korean law, a single joint expert could be appointed to save time and costs.

23.  Having considered the above, I think I should hold the parties to their contractual bargain, specifically, the defendant’s contractual agreement to submit to other jurisdictions including the Hong Kong Courts.

24.  This is sufficient for me to dismiss the defendant’s summons.

VII.  FORUM NON CONVENIENS

25.  For the sake of completeness, I shall also consider the defendant’s application on forum non conveniens.

26.  The factors upon which the defendant rely for her contention that the matter has close and substantial connection with South Korea are the same as those set out in §18 above.  For the same reason, I do not think that the matter has sufficiently close and substantial connection with South Korea.  In any event, given the defendant’s agreement by the NEJC to submit to other jurisdictions and on the waiver of objection to other jurisdictions, I do not see how the defendant can convince me in Stage I of the inquiry that South Korea is a forum “which is clearly and distinctly more appropriate” than Hong Kong.  By the NEJC, at most, the defendant can only argue that South Korea is an available forum, however, short of any more “clear” and “distinct” appropriateness.

27.  Therefore, I would hold that the defendant cannot even pass Stage I inquiry, and would also dismiss the defendant’s summons on the ground of forum non conveniens.

VIII.  CONCLUSION

28.  In conclusion, I dismiss the defendant’s summons with costs payable to the plaintiff forthwith, summarily assessed at HK$147,000, with certificate for one counsel.