SUMAHAT ENDANG YULIANTI v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5751 · HCAL 1145/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1145/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5751
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1145 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Sumahat Endang Yulianti |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| | | |
| |Application for Leave to Apply for | |
| |Judicial Review | |
| |NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord | |
| |53 r 3) | |
Following:
|( |consideration of documents only; or |
| | |
|( |consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open |
| |court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Keith Lam:
1. Form 86 be amended, naming the Director of Immigration as the putative
Respondent.
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 filed on 10 July 2023 (“Form 86”), the Applicant seeks
leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of
Immigration dated 31 May 2023 (respectively “DOI” and “DOI Decision”).
By that decision the DOI refused to allow the Applicant to make a
subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection.
2. The Applicant’s previous claim had been rejected by the DOI on all
applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (USM) on 21
January 2022. The Applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal
Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“TCAB”), but upon her
own indication (both in writing and at the hearing before the TCAB)
that she wished to withdraw her appeal, her appeal was directed by the
TCAB to be withdrawn on 25 October 2022, and the DOI’s decision (of 21
January 2022) was confirmed.
3. Subsequently, the Applicant raised her request to make a subsequent
claim for non-refoulement protection on 29 March 2023 and 19 April
2023.
4. The Form 86 incorrectly named the Immigration Department as the
putative respondent and the DOI as the putative interested party. I
therefore amend the Form 86 on my own motion to name the DOI as the
putative respondent.
5. The Applicant requested for a hearing of this application and attended
the same which was held on 14 September 2026. When asked if she had
anything to add, she mentioned that she has health problems and can
only rely on medication in Hong Kong. The day following the oral
hearing, the Applicant also filed an affidavit attaching various
medical records, and a record of appointment with the Kwong Wah
Hospital on 11 January 2028.
Background
6. The Applicant is a national of Indonesia. In gist, she claims that
she could not return to Indonesia because she feared that her ex-
husband would kill or seriously harm her upon her return.
7. The Applicant’s personal background, the basis of her application for
non-refoulement and relevant procedural history were set out in detail
in the DOI Decision. I will not repeat them here.
Discussion
8. A decision by the DOI in refusing to allow an applicant to make a
subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance Cap
115 is not appealable to the TCAB: see section 37ZR of Cap 115; Gopal
v Director of Immigration [2025] HKCA 34 at §5; Re Mandeep Singh
[2024] HKCA 718 at §10.
9. Judicial review does not operate as a further avenue of appeal. The
leave application operates as a “filtering” process and there is no
requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision:
Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23. I therefore set out below brief
reasons for my decision, which I have reached upon considering all the
materials before me.
10. An applicant is required to clearly and succinctly identify the
grounds of judicial review relied upon in the Form 86 and in the
supporting affirmation: Ho Loy v Director of Environment Protection,
HCAL 21/2015 (unrep.) 22.12.2016 at §142. He or she is also under a
duty to make full and frank disclosure of material facts: Kan Hung
Cheung v The Director of Immigration [2008] HKC 323 at §§14-17.
11. The Applicant’s Form 86 and affirmation in support are virtually
devoid of substance, save for a bare assertion in the Form 86 that
“The immigration department just ignored the important evidence which
I have present to them”. However, it is clear from the DOI Decision
that the DOI did consider in detail and did not ignore the various
matters raised by the Applicant. Other than that, the Applicant has
not identified any error of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the DOI Decision to demonstrate a reasonably arguable
case.
12. In view of the seriousness of the matter involved, I have reminded
myself of the enhanced standard required by law. Despite the fact
that the Applicant did not advance any valid ground for the intended
judicial review, I have scrutinised the DOI Decision for any errors of
law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.
13. Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, there are constraints on an
applicant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a
subsequent claim:-
“(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously
made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.
(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides
sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that
–
(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since
the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and
(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously
submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the
subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.
(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim
under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any
finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the
Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the
person…”
14. As can be seen in the DOI Decision, the DOI duly considered the
circumstances provided by the Applicant in her letters dated 29 March
2023, 19 April 2023 and 17 May 2023 respectively. The Director did
not accept that there has been any significant change of circumstances
since her previous claim was determined, or that those changes when
taken together with the material previously submitted in support of
her previous claim would give her subsequent claim any realistic
prospect of success (§23). In particular:
1) The DOI found that the nature of the Applicant’s fear remained the
same, and her love dispute with her ex-husband had been considered
thoroughly in her previous claim and was not accepted as
substantiated, and this did not amount to a significant change of
circumstances (§12).
2) Regarding the alleged incident of a threat made by a stranger to
the Applicant’s son (which took place after the withdrawal of her
first appeal to the TCAB), the DOI considered that this was a one-
sided allegation of the Applicant’s son, and it was mere
speculation that the threat was related to the Applicant’s ex-
husband. Although a document from the police was produced, it was
merely a record of the son’s report to the police and not concrete
evidence of a threat from the ex-husband (§14).
3) The Applicant did not adduce credible evidence that the Indonesian
police was corrupt and could not help protect the Applicant, and
this was a point that was raised and considered in the previous
claim (§16). Further, there is nothing to indicate that the
government as a whole would refuse to do anything, and it had been
considered in the first claim that there were existing available
channels for the Applicant to pursue her grievance. Thus, it
cannot be inferred that the Indonesian police are unwilling to or
incapable of offering protection to the Applicant (§§17-18).
4) Further and in any event, there was no new and substantial
evidence to refute the previous assessment that the threat from
the ex-husband was localised, and internal relocation alternatives
were open to the Applicant. There was nothing substantial to
suggest that the Applicant’s ex-husband was a powerful and
influential person in Indonesia, or that he would have the means
to track down the Applicant everywhere in Indonesia (other than to
approach the Applicant’s family for details). The Applicant,
being an able-bodied person with formal education and 12 years of
working experience, it was not unduly harsh for her to relocate to
other areas in Indonesia to earn a living and find a shelter.
See: DOI Decision §§20-22.
15. I have also considered the oral submissions of the Applicant, and the
additional materials submitted. The Applicant’s claimed health
problems and need for medication in Hong Kong were not matters raised
with the DOI, and cannot be a ground for judicial review of the DOI
Decision. They are not relevant to the present application.
16. Therefore, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality on the part of the DOI in the consideration and
assessment of the Applicant’s request to make a subsequent claim.
Conclusion
17. I conclude that the Applicant’s intended challenge against the DOI
Decision is not reasonably arguable, and accordingly the application
for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.
Dated the 23rd day of October 2026
| |(Joyce Ooi) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 23/10/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |Sumahat Endang |Putative Interested |
|granting leave and any |Yulianti |Parties as may be |
|directions given within| |directed by the Court / |
|14 days after the leave|Applicant’s ref. no:|the Putative Interested |
|was granted (Order 53, |Nil. |Parties’ solicitors on |
|rule 4A); | |23/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | |Director of Immigration |
|originating summons | |Putative Respondent’s |
|within 14 days after | |ref. no.: L/M (27368) in|
|the grant of leave and | |ImmD RA 7/37/C (Formerly|
|serve it in accordance | |RBCZ/364/21) |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | | |
|and | |Department of Justice, |
| | |Senior Assistant Law |
|c) supply to every | |Officer |
|other party copies of | |(Civil Law) |
|every affidavit which | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
|the Applicant proposes | |2) |
|to use at the hearing, | | |
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | | |
|application for leave | | |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | | |
Form CALL-1