WSN v. BOM

FCMC 3210/2023

[2024] HKFC 191

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO.3210 OF 2023

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DECISION
(Jurisdiction)

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1.  This is the Respondent’s application for the following:

1)  to have the Petition stayed for forum non conveniens; and

2)  to have the Petition dismissed upon the Dublin Circuit Court of Ireland granting a decree of divorce.

2.  Both parties are Irish nationals and are currently 60 years’ old. They have three children, all of whom are now over 18 years old (“collectively referred to as “the Adult Children”). The Petitioner and the Adult Children all currently reside in Ireland. The youngest son is studying in university in Ireland.

3.  The parties were married in Ireland on 1 January 1996. At the time of marriage, the Petitioner (“the Husband”) had already been living in Hong Kong for 3 months due to his employment and the Respondent (“the Wife”) was living in Ireland.

4.  I set out the following salient background facts which are not disputed between the parties:

Date	Event
October 1995	The Husband commenced work in Hong Kong
1 January 1996	Parties were married in Ireland
29 September 1996	The parties bought a property in Ireland that was used as their matrimonial home (“1st Ireland Property”).
December 1996	The Wife moved to Hong Kong to join the Husband
1 December 1996 to June 2007	Parties resided in Hong Kong
March 2002	The parties purchased a property in Hong Kong (“Hong Kong Property”)
June 2007	The Wife and the Adult Children relocated back to Ireland and resided in the 1st Ireland Property. To this day, the Respondent and the Adult Children continue to live in Ireland.
October 2007	1) The Husband moved back to Ireland. 2) The Hong Kong Property was sold.
21 August 2008	The parties bought another property in Ireland (“the 2nd Ireland Property”) using the sale proceeds of the Hong Kong Property.
November 2011	The Husband moved to Saudi Arabia for employment purposes.
November 2013	The Husband moved to Oman for employment purposes.
August 2014	The Husband moved to Abu Dhabi for employment purposes.
August 2015	The Husband moved to Qatar for employment purposes.
October 2016	The Husband moved to Hong Kong for employment purposes.
28 December 2018	The Parties separated.
3 January 2019	The Husband acquired a property in Ireland from his father by way of inheritance (“the Inherited Ireland Property”)
19 June 2019	The Husband purchased 2 properties in Thailand with his current partner (collectively “the Thailand Properties”)
24 March 2023	The Husband filed for divorce in Hong Kong.
12 April 2023	The Hong Kong divorce petition was served on the Wife.
25 May 2023	Parties agreed, by way of consent summons, on a moratorium to stay the Hong Kong divorce proceedings until 14 July 2023 pending negotiations.
18 July 2023	The Wife filed for divorce in Ireland.
19 July 2023	The Husband was served with the Ireland divorce papers by way of email and post. The Husband claims he was not aware of the Ireland Proceedings until the present application.

5.  For the purposes of these proceedings, the parties appointed a Single Joint Expert (“SJE”) to give her opinion on Irish matrimonial law. The SJE filed her opinion by way of an affirmation on 24 January 2024 (“the SJE Opinion”). By reason of the parties’ supplemental questions, the SJE gave a supplemental opinion by way of a letter dated 25 January 2024 (“the Supplemental SJE Opinion”).

THE LAW

6.  I shall set out the relevant legal principles relating to the jurisdiction of this court and forum non conveniens.

7.  Section 3 of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (Cap 179) (“MCO”) states the following:

“3. Jurisdiction in divorce

The court shall have jurisdiction in proceedings for divorce under this Ordinance if—

(a) either of the parties to the marriage was domiciled in Hong Kong at the date of the petition or application; (Replaced 29 of 1995 s. 3)

(b) either of the parties to the marriage was habitually resident in Hong Kong throughout the period of 3 years immediately preceding the date of the petition or application; or (Replaced 29 of 1995 s. 3)

(c) either of the parties to the marriage had a substantial connexion with Hong Kong at the date of the petition or application. (Added 68 of 1970 s. 26. Amended 29 of 1995 s. 3)”

8.  The principles of forum non conveniens, in the context of matrimonial proceedings, are set out in the Court of Final Appeal’s decision in SPH v SA [2014] 3 HKLRD 497 as follows:

“VI Forum non conveniens: principles

50. It is now well established in Hong Kong that the general principles of forum non conveniens apply to the stay of matrimonial proceedings: Johnston, Conflict of Laws in Hong Kong (2^nd ed 2012), para 7.104.

51. We adopt the re-statement of the principles in matrimonial proceedings by the Court of Appeal (Cheung JA and Tang JA (as he then was)) in DGC v SLC (née C) [2005] 3 HKC 293, 297-298, applying Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex Limited [1987] 1 AC 460, 477 and Louvet v. Louvet [1990] 1 HKLR 670, 674-675:

“1. The single question to be decided is whether there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of an action i.e. in which the action may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice?

2. In order to answer this question, the applicant for the stay has to establish that first, Hong Kong is not the natural or appropriate forum (‘appropriate’ in this context means the forum has the most real and substantial connection with the action) and second, there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong. Failure by the applicant to establish these two matters at this stage is fatal.

3. If the applicant is able to establish both of these two matters, then the plaintiff in the Hong Kong proceedings has to show that he will be deprived of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage if the action is tried in a forum other than Hong Kong.

4. If the plaintiff is able to establish this, the court will have to balance the advantages of the alternative forum with the disadvantages that the plaintiff may suffer. Deprivation of one or more personal advantages will not necessarily be fatal to the applicant for the stay if he is able to establish to the court's satisfaction that substantial justice will be done in the available appropriate forum.”

52. The Court of Appeal in that case (as in the present case) emphasised that the husband was entitled to sue in Hong Kong as of right. Where jurisdiction is founded in the Hong Kong court as of right (as in divorce proceedings like the present case), the party seeking the stay has to establish that there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the Hong Kong forum. This derives from what Lord Goff said in Spiliada (at 477), which has been regularly applied in Hong Kong: e.g. The Kapitan Shvetsov [1997] HKLRD 374 at 377; The Peng Yan [2009] 1 HKLRD 144, at [22].”

9.  The Wife does not dispute Hong Kong courts have jurisdiction over the current divorce proceedings initiated in Hong Kong. The Wife’s main argument is whether Ireland is clearly and/or distinctly the more appropriate forum to litigate the present divorce proceedings.

Summary of Parties’ submissions

10.  I shall not repeat each and every submission made by the parties’ respective counsel. Suffice to say, I have considered submissions of counsel. I shall summarize the salient arguments made by both sides below.

11.  In summary, the Wife argues Ireland is clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum for the following reasons:

1)  The Wife and the youngest son reside in Ireland and therefore their reasonable financial needs will be assessed based on the standard of living in Ireland. The Irish courts, as opposed to the Hong Kong courts, are in a better position to assess the Wife and the youngest son’s needs as they live in a small county in Ireland.

2)  The majority of matrimonial assets are in Ireland.

3)  Given the disparity in the parties’ financial means, litigating in Hong Kong will cause financial hardship to the Wife. Costs of litigation in Hong Kong is expensive compared to Ireland, especially if the parties will be required to instruct experts on various matters like property valuations. Moreover, the Wife will incur costs of travelling back and forth Ireland to attend proceedings in Hong Kong.

4)  There will be multiple proceedings because before a Hong Kong ancillary relief order can be enforceable in Ireland, the Irish courts must recognize the Hong Kong order. Hence, proceedings in Ireland must be taken out for the purposes for applying for recognition of the Hong Kong order.

5)  One of the prerequisite requirements for a foreign judgment to be recognized in Ireland is that either of the spouses must be domiciled in the foreign state. The Wife argues there is uncertainty on whether an order made by the Hong Kong courts will be enforceable in Ireland as it is uncertain whether the Irish Courts will recognize the Husband as being domiciled in Hong Kong.

6)  There are tax implications that will reduce the total value of assets, which are subject to division between the parties. Transfer of assets between spouses are subject to tax unless the transfer is made pursuant to an order recognized by the Irish courts.

12.  The Husband contests the Wife’s application. I summarize his salient arguments below:

1)  The Wife has not been able to show Ireland is clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum. The Single Joint Expert opinion does not support the Wife’s arguments on the potential unenforceability of an order made by the Hong Kong courts.

2)  There is no provision for “clean break” under Irish divorce law. If proceedings are litigated in Ireland, the Husband will suffer a personal and jurisdictional disadvantage.

3)  Halting all proceedings in Hong Kong and starting afresh in Ireland will cause delay as well as a wastage of costs.

13.  I shall now proceed to deal with the salient arguments raised by the parties.

Location of assets and the ability of the courts to deal with the assets.

14.  One of the major arguments made by the Wife in favour of staying the Hong Kong proceedings is that the majority of the matrimonial assets are in Ireland. The Wife argues almost 80% of the matrimonial assets are located in Ireland, including two properties and possible inheritance properties of the Husband. The parties do not own any real estate in Hong Kong. The only assets the Husband has in Hong Kong are cash in his bank accounts, stocks, some personal chattels (including cars etc.), and his pension with his Hong Kong employer.

15.  Though the counsel for the Husband, Ms Allison, takes issue with the figure of 80%, she concedes that the majority of the matrimonial assets are located in Ireland.

16.  I am of the view the location of majority of the assets in itself is not factor which is determinative of which forum is the more appropriate forum. As reiterated by the Court of Appeal in DGC v SLC (née C), Hong Kong family courts frequently deal with and make provision for the division of assets located internationally.

17.  Having read the SJE Opinion, there is nothing precluding the Hong Kong courts from making orders against the 1^st and 2^nd Ireland Properties. I therefore do not accept the location of the matrimonial assets in itself to be a factor that would sway the balance in the Wife’s favour.

18.  Counsel for the Wife, Ms. Booth, argues that the Wife intends to seek a pension adjustment order against the Husband’s pension in Ireland and such orders can only be made by the Irish courts. Firstly, I note that according to the Husband’s Form E, his non-Hong Kong pensions only comprise of 19% of his total pension value (total of HKD286,746 - assuming realized in 2029 - and monthly UK state pension of GBP873.64). The remaining 81% of his pension (HKD$1,246,298) is his Hong Kong pension with his current employer. Given the significant value of the Husband’s Hong Kong pension, any relief the Wife seeks against the Husband’s pensions would inevitably include seeking an order against the Hong Kong pension. The enforcement of a foreign court order against the Husband’s respective pensions would be unavoidable in such circumstances. Hence, if the divorce proceedings were to be litigated in Ireland, the Wife would face the same problems or uncertainty regarding the enforceability and/or availability of foreign court order against the Husband’s Hong Kong pension as she would if the proceedings were litigated here in Hong Kong and she had to enforce against the Irish pensions.

19.  Secondly, I am of the view the ability of the Irish courts to make a pension adjustment order against the Irish pensions is to be weighed against the fact that the Hong Kong courts are able to make ancillary relief orders that could factor in the value of the Husband’s pensions in Ireland without actually making orders against the pensions. Although the Hong Kong courts may not be able to make orders against the Husband’s pensions in Ireland, the Hong Kong courts are able to consider the value of the pensions when deciding how the matrimonial assets should be divided, and in what proportion, when making the ultimate ancillary relief order. In the court’s process of equalization of the parties’ assets, it is open to the Hong Kong courts to make ancillary relief orders without a need to make any pension adjustment orders.

20.  Furthermore, if the Wife finds it necessary to seek a pension adjustment order after the Hong Kong courts make an ancillary relief order, it seems the Wife is not automatically precluded from seeking such relief from the Irish courts. According to the SJE Opinion at paragraph 9(iii), the Wife merely needs to obtain special leave from the Irish courts before bringing the application. The relevant passage from paragraph 9(iii) of the SJE Opinion reads as follows:

“Part III of the 1995 Family Act provides for applications for financial relief orders after a foreign decree of divorce. These orders are limited in scope than ancillary orders available to an applicant for domestic divorce. The applicant must obtain special leave from the court before bringing an application.

In determining an application for relief, the court must consider several factors, including:

• The connection the spouse may have with Ireland,

• Existing financial arrangements.

• The possibility of seeking relief in the original state.

. . .”

21.  By reason of the above, I do not accept the availability of a pension adjustment order in the Irish Courts to be a factor that makes the Irish Courts clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum. Moreover, I do not accept the availability of pension adjustment orders in the Irish courts to be a significant juridical advantage to the Wife such that this is a factor that weighs in favour of Ireland being the more appropriate forum.

Enforceability of a Hong Kong order in Ireland.

22.  Ms Booth submits that if the Hong Kong proceedings were allowed to continue, the inevitable result is that the Wife would have to bring another set of proceedings in Ireland to enforce the Hong Kong order. Her submissions can be paraphrased as follows:

1)  The Irish courts will not enforce a foreign divorce decree automatically. According to the SJE Opinion at paragraph 9(ii)(b), the Irish courts would only recognize the divorce decree of a foreign state if the courts were satisfied that either of the spouses were domiciled in the foreign state. The basis of jurisdiction relied on by the Husband in the Hong Kong divorce petition is his habitual residence in Hong Kong and not on his domicile. Ms Booth submits this is indicative of the fact that the Husband does not view himself as being domiciled in Hong Kong. Hence there is no certainty the Irish courts will recognize the Hong Kong divorce decree.

2)  Even if the Hong Kong divorce decree is recognised by the Irish courts, there is no certainty in the enforcement of any ancillary relief order made by the Hong Kong courts. According to the SJE Opinion at paragraph 9(iv)(a), an application has to be made to the Irish courts to recognise and declare the Hong Kong order to be enforceable. This not only creates uncertainty but also results in multiple proceedings as well as escalating costs.

23.  In so far as Ms Booth argues the Husband’s domicile creates uncertainty in the recognition of a Hong Kong divorce decree under Irish law, I do not accept her submissions. In short, there is no evidence to rebut the Husband’s evidence that he is now domiciled in Hong Kong. Although Ms Booth tries to argue the Husband has constantly relocated to different countries in the past due to his employment obligations, there is no evidence to suggest the Husband will relocate out of Hong Kong in the near future. According to his affirmation, the Husband deposes the following:

1)  He currently lives in Hong Kong and has a Hong Kong permanent ID card.

2)  He intends to stay in Hong Kong permanently.

3)  There is also no evidence to suggest his employment here in Hong Kong is merely temporary. On the contrary, the Husband has been under employment with the same company in Hong Kong since 2016. Despite previous concerns about possibly being laid off, his current employer has now assigned him new tasks and the Husband continues to be under employment with the same employer.

These are all factors indicating the Husband’s choice of domicile as being Hong Kong.

24.  By the Supplemental SJE Opinion, the SJE opined the following:

“With respect to the query raised I would confirm that it is my opinion that a Hong Kong Divorce Decree would be recognised in Ireland in circumstances and in the context of the parties’ case.”

25.  Ms Booth’s submits the conclusion given in Supplemental SJE Opinion on whether the Husband’s claim of domicile should be considered cautiously and should not be accepted because the opinion lacks reasoning. Although I do accept I should consider the Supplemental SJE Opinion cautiously, for reasons given above and given the evidence currently before me, I do not accept the Husband’s claim of domicile in Hong Kong to be untenable or unsustainable. For reasons given previously, the Husband has already provided evidence of matters that, prima facie, indicate his domicile of choice is Hong Kong.

26.  As for the enforcement of a Hong Kong order involving multiple proceedings, it is trite to say that any divorce proceedings involving spouses living in different countries/jurisdictions will inevitably involve multi-jurisdiction proceedings for the purposes of enforcement. The converse is true if the present divorce were to proceed in Ireland. Hence, the need to bring an application before the Irish courts for recognition and enforcement of a Hong Kong order is no more disadvantageous or uncertain than bringing an application before a Hong Kong court for the recognition of an Irish court order.

27.  In so far as to whether the Irish courts would enforce a Hong Kong order, the relevant excerpts of paragraph 9(iv)(a) of the SJE Opinion reads as follows:

“An application may be made to have the order recognised and declared enforceable in Ireland at common law. The court has a wide discretion as to whether to recognise and declare an order enforceable, however the starting point will always be to give effect to a valid and final order from a foreign court of competent jurisdiction. . . .

For judgments under common law, the position is not quite as straightforward, as it is the court’s discretion on whether to recognise a foreign judgment. However, as a general principle, and on the basis of respect and comity between international courts, the approach of the Irish court to proceedings seeking recognition and enforcement is generally positive, provided the judgment is for a definite sum, is final and conclusive, and has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

28.  Having considered the SJE Opinion, I am of the view the considerations of an Irish court in deciding whether to order enforcement of a foreign order is similar to the considerations taken by the Hong Kong courts if asked to make a mirror order.

29.  Hence, the parties’ position are similar whether the proceedings are conducted in Hong Kong or Ireland. Both parties would have to apply to enforce a foreign court order in the relevant jurisdiction and it would be the discretion of the local court to decide whether the foreign judgment would be recognised. The considerations to be had by both the Hong Kong courts and the Irish courts are similar when deciding whether to enforce a foreign order. Furthermore, both jurisdictions are similar in that Hong Kong courts and Irish courts will endeavour to give effect to a “valid and final order from a foreign court.”

30.  I therefore do not accept the Wife’s argument that enforcement of a Hong Kong order in the Irish courts is so uncertain such that the divorce proceedings should more properly be litigated in Ireland.

Litigation costs, financial needs assessment, tax implications

31.  I shall deal with the remaining arguments made by the Wife.

32.  Ms Booth argues that the Wife would suffer significant financial hardship if the proceedings were to be litigated in Hong Kong due to the high litigation costs. I do not think one can deny that litigation, wherever it may be conducted, can be expensive. However, as stated previously, given the international element of this case, multi-jurisdiction proceedings are inevitable and costs incurred for recognition and/or enforcement of foreign orders are equally unavoidable. Assuming the divorce proceedings were to continue in the Hong Kong courts, it is open to the parties to apply for interim financial relief under section 3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap 192) and Rule 78 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules (Cap 179A). Such interim relief not only includes maintenance pending suit but also litigation costs funding. I therefore do not see litigation costs as being an obstacle or even a reason to bar proceedings from continuing in Hong Kong.

33.  In so far as Ms Booth submits the Irish courts would have a better idea of assessing the Wife’s financial needs, I do not accept these submissions. Firstly, references to a certain standard of living in a particular country or city can be dealt with by way of evidence. Secondly, using the same logic, the converse could be argued by the Husband in that the Hong Kong courts are better at assessing the Husband’s financial needs by a Hong Kong living standard.

34.  Regarding Ms Booth’s submissions about extra litigation costs to be incurred by reason of having to call for expert opinion on various matters including reasonable living standards and valuation of Irish properties, I do not accept these costs would be avoided if the divorce were litigated in Ireland. I am of the view that even if the ancillary relief proceedings were litigated in Ireland, the Irish courts would most likely require expert evidence of the Hong Kong living standard to assess the reasonableness of the Husband expenses. Furthermore, if the parties are unable to agree on the value of the 1^st and 2^nd Ireland Properties, expert valuation evidence would also be unavoidable.

35.  As for Ms Booth’s submissions on the tax implications of transfer of property, I take a different view. Firstly, the SJE is clear in that since the Husband is no longer resident in Ireland, any sale of the Irish property will be subject to tax. Hence, my understanding of the SJE Opinion is that, regardless of whether the proceedings are started in Ireland, the mere fact the Husband is a non-resident means the sale of any Irish property has tax implications.

36.  Secondly, in so far as there may be transfer of Irish property, the SJE Opinion states at paragraph 9(ix):

“. . . Transfer of assets between spouses who are separated are exempted from Capital Gains Tax if they are made under a Separation Agreement or a court order. Transfer of assets between spouses following a court order in a decree of divorce are also exempted from CGT. Transfers after the granting of a decree are not exempt, if they are not ordered by the court.”

37.  If a Hong Kong order has been recognised and declared enforceable by the Irish courts by way of a mirror order, it seems this would fall under the exemption as set out by the SJE because any transfer ordered by the Hong Kong court endorsed by the Irish courts would be part of an Irish court order.

38.  Having read the SJE Opinion and considered the circumstances of the case, I do not accept that Ireland is clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum.

Personal and/or jurisdictional advantage

39.  For sake of completeness, I shall also consider last limb of the test set out in the case of DGC v SLC (née C).

40.  Ms Allison argues one major determining factor in this present application is absence of the “clean break” principle in the matrimonial law of Ireland. She submits this is a significant loss of personal and jurisdictional advantage to the Husband if the proceedings were to be litigated in Ireland.

41.  Paragraph 9(viii) of the SJE Opinion reads as follows:

“. . .

Factors

There is no provision for a “clean break” under Irish law, in the context of divorce. . . . In essence, the court’s obligation is to ensure that “proper provision” is made for the spouses and any dependent children. . . .

There are no specific rules governing the assessment of proper provisions. The seminal case on this issue is T v T [2002] 3 IR 335, which referred to a benchmark of fairness for the dependent spouse as between one-third and one-half of the net assets. . . . The courts exercise their judicial discretion widely in these matters and are often heavily influenced by the specific circumstances of the case…

The approach of the Irish courts in ancillary relief applications was summarised in the High Court decision of MB v VB (Birmingham J, 19 October 2007 (unreported)). When considering the concept of proper provision, the court held that the “Supreme Court [in T v T] eschewed any adherence to any particular mathematical formula, making it clear that there was no automatic principle of assets being distributed on the basis of equality and that equally, on the other side of the coin, the claiming spouse was not confined to the share of the assets that would be required to meet their reasonable needs.”

42.  In my view, the lack of the “clean break” principle in the Irish matrimonial law is a significant deprivation of the Husband’s personal and juridical advantage.

43.  Since the case of LKW v DD [2010] 6 HKC 528, the Court of Final Appeal has clearly stated that in considering distribution of matrimonial assets, Hong Kong courts would adopt a “yardstick of equal division” or “equal sharing principle” where appropriate. If there were good reasons for departure from equal division, the court would make an order accordingly.

44.  The importance of and the rationale for the clean break principle in Hong Kong matrimonial law is succinctly summarized in the case of Mimi Kar Kee Wong Hung v Raymond Kin Sang Hung (No 2) (2015) 18 HKCFAR 210, where Ma CJ stated the following at paragraph 36 of the judgment:

“Nevertheless, in accepting the above, one must as far as possible try to achieve a clean break between parties who, following the dissolution of a marriage, can often be severely at odds with one another. The desirability of a clean break should be at the top of a judge’s mind when considering issues of ancillary relief. While there is no statutory backing for this approach, it is a common law principle of long standing. In LKW, reference was made to the clean break principle. In Miller v Miller, to which reference was made in LKW, the desirability of a clean break was emphasised in a number of passages. In one, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead referred to a familiar passage in the speech of Lord Scarman in Minton v Minton : ‘An object of the modern law is to encourage [the parties] to put the past behind them and to begin a new life which is not overshadowed by the relationship which has broken down.’ I would also echo the sentiments of Stock JA in L v C :

‘…That policy consideration is one that itself recognizes the considerable trauma that attends prolonged and costly matrimonial disputes, and the obvious advantage in settlement rather than in the litigious cauldron that stirs bitterness, prolongs uncertainty, and is the enemy of the clean break that enures to the advantage of husband, wife and children.’”

45.  In the present case, two of the Adult Children are no longer financially dependent on the parties. The youngest Adult Child is in his last year of university. There is no reason why the parties should not strive for a clean break in their ancillary relief order.

46.  Although Ms Booth submits a clean break may not be possible in the present circumstance and, in any event, could be practically achieved by the Irish court, this is no answer to the fact that there is no such principle entrenched in Irish matrimonial law.

47.  If the Wife manages to prove a clean break is not proper in the present case and there are good reasons for departure, the Hong Kong courts would not heed slavishly to the clean break principle but instead make an order to ensure her financial needs are provided for. This would be similar to the Irish court approach of considering the proper provision to be provided to the parties.

48.  In other words, the Hong Kong approach encompasses the Irish approach of providing proper provision to spouses, but the Irish approach does not encompass the Hong Kong approach of adopting the “clean break” principle as the starting point.

49.  By reason of the above, even if I am wrong in that the Ireland is clearly and distinctly a more appropriate forum to litigate the present divorce proceedings, I would nevertheless refuse the Wife’s application for the reason the Husband would suffer a significant personal and juridical disadvantage if proceedings continued in Ireland.

50.  I therefore refuse the Wife’s application and dismiss paragraph 1 – 3 of her summons.

51.  I see no reason why costs should not follow the event. I therefore make a costs order nisi as follows:

1)  Costs of the Respondent’s summons dated 11 August 2023 be to the Petitioner, to be summarily assessed, with certificate for counsel.

2)  Unless any party applies to vary the above costs order nisi within 14 days hereof, the costs order shall become an order absolute.

3)  The summary assessment of costs of the Respondent’s application shall be dealt with by way of paper disposal.

4)  The parties shall propose directions on the paper disposal of the summary assessment of costs no later than 28 days from the date of this Decision.

5)  The First Appointment hearing be adjourned to a date to be fixed in consultation with counsel’s diaries if necessary. Parties shall approach the Registry no later than 30 days from the date of this Decision for the purposes of fixing the next First Appointment hearing date.