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1995 No. A2787
IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG
HIGH COURT
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BETWEEN
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JIN
HAI AN CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING LIMITED
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Plaintiff
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and
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GOLDEN
ROCK BEACH INC.
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1st
Defendant
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NG
CHUN WAH trading as WAI WAH COMPANY
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2nd
Defendant
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Coram: The Hon. Mr.
Justice Leonard in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 26th
October 1995
Date of Delivery of
Judgment: 26th October 1995
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JUDGMENT
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1. The Plaintiff,
a company registered in Hong Kong, applies under Order 14 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court for summary judgment against the 2nd Defendant, Mr. Ng
Chun Wah trading as Wai Wah company. Mr. Ng, a Hong Kong resident who is
described as trading as Wai Wah Company, according to the Plaintiff, is liable
under a guarantee for a debt due from the 1st Defendant, which is a
company incorporated in the United States of America. It being inconvenient to
proceed against the 1st Defendant which is out of the jurisdiction,
the Plaintiff seeks to enforce the guarantee against the 2nd Defendant.
2. On the 31st
December 1987, the Plaintiff entered into an agreement with the 1st
Defendant whereby the Plaintiff would in March 1988 remit to the 1st
Defendant through the 2nd Defendant’s bank account, a sum of
US$500,000.00 for use in a building project in the United States of America.
Within 22 months thereafter, the 1st Defendant was to repay to the
Plaintiff the sum advanced, that is to say US$500,000.00, plus what was
described as “a profit after tax” of US$150,000.00. In the event of delay in
payment, interest was to accrue at 15% per annum.
3. Clause 4 of
the agreement reads as follows:
“4.
Repayment guarantee: both Party A (the 1st Defendant) and Party B
(the Plaintiff) agreed to invite Wai Wah company to be the credit guarantee of
repayment, guarantee is that Party A shall perform the agreement, if Party A
cannot repay on time guarantor shall be responsible for repayment. Guarantor
fee is 5%, that is US$32,500.00. Party A is responsible to pay it.”
The Plaintiff, it is
common ground, has received payments from the 2nd Defendant as
follows:
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25th October
1990
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US$100,000.00
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29th January
1991
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51,282.00
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8th April
1993
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32,051.00
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Total:
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US$183,333.00
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For the purpose of the
action, the Plaintiff has treated the payments as payments of principal so that
its claim for interest is less than it might otherwise have been. Thus the sum
of principal now claimed is:
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US$650,000.00
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-
183,323.00
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US$466,667.00
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A claim for interest up
to 8th March 1995 at 15% per annum was particularised in the
Statement of Claim and the sum is quantified as US$385,106.43. There is a
further claim for interest at 15% per annum from 9th March 1995
until judgment or earlier payment.
4. The 2nd
Defendant, in resisting the application for judgment , says that there have
been substantial variations in the agreement between the Plaintiff and the 1st
Defendant and that he is, as a result, no longer liable as guarantor.
5. The first
alleged variation is that whereas according to the agreement the Plaintiff was
to remit $500,000 in March, it only remitted that sum on the 22nd
April 1988. The second alleged variation is that the Plaintiff agreed to an
extension of time for payment. In connection with the question of the effect of
a variation of a contract upon the liability of the guarantor my attention has
been drawn to the passage at paragraph 42-039 of Chitty on Contracts 27th
ed. Vol. II.
6. The money,
according to the agreement, was to be paid into the 2nd Defendant’s
bank account and it was in due course paid into the 2nd Defendant’s
bank account. It is not suggested on behalf of the 2nd Defendant
that he was unaware of the lateness of the payment. Moreover, on 19th
April 1988 the 2nd Defendant made a statutory declaration,
identifying himself as being the signatory as guarantor of the agreement and I
note that it was very shortly after that, on the 22nd that the money
was advanced to the 1st Defendant. It is difficult to see any
purpose in making that statutory declaration other than to give comfort to the
Plaintiff in order that the Plaintiff would advance the money.
7. Taking into
account the circumstances, I hold that the 2nd Defendant fails on
this point. I am satisfied that as a matter of law the delay in the advance was
not a variation of the contract such as to relieve the 2nd Defendant
of his liability as guarantor. Moreover, since the payment was made he has
repeatedly over the years described himself as guarantor and the suggestion
that this alleged variation has released him from liability comes very late
indeed.
8. The evidence
that there was an agreement to postpone payment by the 1st Defendant
is shadowy and the 2nd Defendant has not suggested that if there was
such an agreement, it was without his knowledge and consent. The letter he
relies on, written by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiff submitting
a suggested fresh repayment schedule for approval, indicates, on the face of
it, that the 2nd Defendant was a party to discussions leading to the
writing of the letter and that a copy of the letter was sent to him. There is
no evidence that the suggested schedule was agreed to and there is ample
evidence in the correspondence that the Plaintiff was pressing for payment.
9. A point has
been taken as to the significance of the phrase “ cannot repay on time” in the
translation of clause 4 of the agreement. It is common ground that the Chinese
term can also be translated as “is unable to repay on time” but there does not
seem to be any significance in the difference between the two possible
translations. It is submitted on behalf of the 2nd Defendant that
the Plaintiff must show not only that the 1st Defendant has failed
to pay but also that the 1st Defendant is unable to pay before the 2nd
Defendant can become liable as guarantor to pay the sum claimed.
10. This is a
matter of construction. I hold that the words used were clearly intended to
deal with a failure to pay whether or not the 1st Defendant was able
to pay. As a matter of business common sense, one can say that nobody in the
Plaintiff’s position could have intended the guarantee to be limited in the
manner suggested by the 2nd Defendant. Moreover, the Defendant
himself is on record as telling the Plaintiff in correspondence that the 1st
Defendant is unable to pay as a result of business difficulties.
11. It is
submitted on behalf of the 2nd Defendant that there is a triable
issue as to the exact sum due and my attention has been drawn to certain
letters written by the Plaintiff’s solicitors setting out certain claims. But
the fact is that the sum claimed is clearly stated in the Statement of Claim
and it is upon the Statement of Claim that the Plaintiff is proceeding. There
has been no suggestion that there is any inaccuracy in the calculation of the
sum allegedly due.
12. It is
submitted on behalf of the 2nd Defendant that there ought to be a
trial on the basis that the proper law governing the agreement is Chinese law,
the reasons put forward for this proposition are as follows:
“(a)
The agreement was made in Mainland China.
(b)
It was in the Chinese language.
(c)
The signing parties made a special trip to China to sign the agreement.
(d)
The Plaintiff was a mere subsidiary of a Mainland Chinese Company which owns
99.9% of its shares.
(e)
The Plaintiff’s director who signed the agreement is a Chinese national
residing in Guangxi.
13. Assuming for
the purpose of argument that all the signing parties made a special trip to
China to sign the agreement (and the 2nd Defendant's affidavit in this regard is somewhat
ambiguous), I find that no good ground has been made out here for giving leave
to defend.
14. The fact is
that the parties arranged for the money to be advanced by a Hong Kong company,
by payment in Hong Kong into the Hong Kong bank account of a Hong Kong resident
so that he presumably would transmit the money to the 1st Defendant
in the United States of America. So far as the guarantee was concerned, clearly
the parties all realised that not only was the money to be advanced in Hong
Kong but also that the guarantor was going to be in Hong Kong and the Plaintiff
would be able to take action against him to enforce the guarantee in Hong Kong.
The business activity for the purpose of which the money was advanced was to
take place in United States of America. It seems to me that there is no ground
for supposing that the people responsible for this arrangement had any
intention other than that the agreement should be regarded as being most
closely connected with Hong Kong, so that Hong Kong Law, in the absence of any
specific provision in the agreement, will apply.
15. It is asserted
by the 2nd Defendant that before the agreement was signed, he was
told by the Plaintiff that he was only to be a guarantor for the principal sum.
It is submitted on his behalf that there was a collateral agreement and that
when the two agreements are read together, he should not be held to be a
guarantor of the interest or at least that there is an arguable case that that
is his position. So far as the material before me is concerned, this assertion
was made by the 2nd Defendant for the first time in an affidavit made
on the 13th June 1995. It is inconsistent with the wording of the
written agreement; it is inconsistent with the correspondence which has taken
place between the 2nd Defendant and the Plaintiff over the years up
to now, and I am satisfied that this late assertion is a late invention and
wholly incredible. One cannot imagine why if there had been such an agreement
the Defendant would have put his name to the written agreement or proceeded
over the years on the basis that he was a guarantor simpliciter without ever
mentioning that he only regarded himself as liable to guarantee the repayment
of principal.
16. In Bhagwandas
Kewaleram Murjani and Others v. Bank of India [1990] HKLR, 586, the Court
of Appeal held that:
“The
mere assertion of a fact in an affidavit does not necessarily give leave to
defend, Order14, r.3 puts an onus upon a Defendant. It might be described as a
threshold onus to show that there is a triable issue in the case. That onus can
only be satisfied on the balance of probabilities. The Court will test the
credibility of an affidavit asserting a triable issue against the conduct of
the Defendant and contemporary documents.”
17. The Defendant
here has failed to discharge that threshold onus: He has failed to show that
there is a triable issue in the case. I find that there is no fair or
reasonable probability of the Defendant having a real and bona fide defence.
Apart from what appears to be the late invention of allegations of fact, the
points taken are clearly an attempt to delay recovery by the Plaintiff of money
due to it under the guarantee. Having regard to the great patience displayed by
the Plaintiff before bringing proceeding, it seems to me that it is time for
the delay to end. There will be judgment for the Plaintiff for the sums claimed.
There will be an order that the Plaintiff’s costs of and occasioned by this
application be taxed if not agreed and paid by the 2nd Defendant.
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(D.J. Leonard)
Judge of the High Court
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Mr. Au-Yeung Kwan
instructed by M/s. Gary Mak & Co. for the Plaintiff.
Mr. Albert Tsang
instructed by M/s. Y.C. Lee & Pang for the 2nd Defendant.
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