RE LACANLALE TERESITA CRUZ

CAMP 215/2023, [2025] HKCA 1113

On intended appeal from [2021] HKCFI 2587

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 215 OF 2023

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 6 of 2019)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Chu VP giving the Judgment of the Court:

1.  On 15 August 2025, this Court handed down our judgment ([2025] HKCA 746) refusing to extend the time for the applicant to appeal the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 2 September 2021 which refused to give her leave to apply for judicial review.

2.  On 18 August 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.  She has also put in a written submission to support the application.

3.  Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case.

4.  The background to this case and the applicant’s claim has been set out in our judgment.  We will not repeat them.

5.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.  The notice of motion stated that (i) there has been a failure to consider that the applicant still faces real risk from her enemies; (ii) the applicant was late in her appeal because she did not receive the decision; and (iii) there has been a failure to consider the applicant’s claim under the BOR 2 risk and BOR 3 risk grounds.    

7.  In her written submission, the applicant made the following additional points:

(1)     The Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) considered the risk of harm was too low.  The fact is she still faces danger in her country, her fear continues and she is seeking protection.    

(2)     The Director of Immigration (“the Director”) and the Board failed to consider and/or give proper weight to relevant considerations and materials, namely (a) they did not follow the high standard of fairness and failed to enquire into her fear and the continuing threat from her enemies, and the country of origin information showed that the authority could not or had no intention to protect her; (b) her claim was based on a true story of her life, and maybe the risk arose from private or personal dispute but it is too risky for her to return to her country.

(3)     The decision makers did not properly consider her fear.  The Court also did not focus on her fear and just confirm the decisions of the Director and the Board.  The Court should consider that it is out of fear that she seeks protection in Hong Kong, and it will be hard for her to survive in her country.

8.  The matters set out in the Notice of Motion and written submission do not afford any basis for granting leave to appeal.   Importantly, they all concern the applicant’s claim and personal circumstances, and do not show that the intended appeal involves any question of great general or public importance. 

9.  Further, for the reasons that we have given in [16] to [18] of our judgment, the matters raised are unarguable.  It is evident from the decisions of the Director and the Board that they had given consideration to the applicant’s evidence and claim.  For the reasons given in its decision, the Board had rejected the applicant’s evidence and found there was no real risk that she would face any of the prescribed form of fear if she returns to the Philippines.  The applicant has provided no grounds or particulars to challenge the Board’s findings.  She has also not been able to establish that the Judge has erred in his decision or reasoning.  In these circumstances, the applicant simply has no evidential or factual basis for asserting that she will face risks of harm if she returns to her home country. 

10.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

11.  As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, we dismiss the Notice of Motion.