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CACV 474/2024, [2025] HKCA 412
On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 213
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 474 OF 2024
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 1470 OF 2019)
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| RE: |
SHRESTHA SHYAM KUMAR |
Applicant |
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| Before : |
Hon Cheung JA and H. Au-Yeung J in Court |
| Date of Judgment : |
9 May 2025 |
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JUDGMENT
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Hon H. Au-Yeung J (giving the Judgment of the Court) :
A. BACKGROUND
1. On 5 March 2025, this Court (Cheung JA and H. Au-Yeung J) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 7 November 2024 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non‑refoulement claim.
B. THE PRESENT APPLICATION
2. By a Notice of Motion filed on 17 March 2025, the applicant applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. As far as his grounds of appeal are concerned, he contends that:
(1) This Court has made an error in law;
(2) The Court has ignored overwhelming evidence which is in his favour;
(3) The Court is biased;
(4) The Court’s decision is unfair.
3. In his written submissions dated 17 March 2025, he repeated his argument that the Board’s decision was unreasonable or irrational, and that the Board had failed to give sufficient reason for dismissing his appeal. He further alleged that the Board had erred in law and acted unfairly.
C. DISCUSSION
4. Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484, Laws of Hong Kong) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal, from any judgment of the Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter, whether final or interlocutory, if, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal, as the case may be, the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.
5. In the present application, the applicant has simply failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine. Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised.
6. Further, neither the Notice of Motion nor the written submissions identify any supposed error in our Judgment. His argument that this Court has erred in law is a bare assertion which is not particularised.
7. We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).
D. DISPOSITION
8. To conclude, the matters advanced by the applicant do not constitute valid grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The Notice of Motion filed on 17 March 2025 is therefore dismissed.
(Peter Cheung)
Justice of Appeal
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(H. Au-Yeung)
Judge of the
Court of First Instance
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The Applicant was unrepresented
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