DOAN XUAN KY v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5264 · HCAL 1036/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1036/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5264
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1036 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Doan Xuan Ky |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of
Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 27 June 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 3 April 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1036_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant had failed to substantiate his
claim for non-refoulement protection on all the applicable grounds
under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board
dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the
Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 27 August 2021 (“the
Director’s Decision”) and confirmed the same, which rejected the
applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection.
Amendments
3. The applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
and the Director as the putative respondents and did not name any
putative interested party in Form 86.
4. In fact, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the
Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.
6. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and to add
“Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party.
The applicant’s case
7. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
8. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Vietnam, he would be harmed or killed by his creditor
and the creditor’s followers due to his inability to repay a loan of
450 million Vietnamese Dong.
Oral hearing
9. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and his case was heard on 10 September 2026.
10. When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on the grounds of his
intended judicial review, which were stated in a document annexed to
his Form 86 with the title “Grounds on which relief is sought”, he
just confirmed that he would rely on the grounds stated therein, and
added that someone was still chasing after him to beat him in his
country and he could not go back for the time being.
Grounds for judicial review
11. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
12. The contents of the said document with the title “Grounds on which
relief is sought” were all very general and were in fact used by many
applicants in similar applications as their grounds for applying leave
to judicially review the Board’s decisions. It is like a template for
such applicants and they just used the grounds stated therein without
any regard to their own situations. Nevertheless, as the applicant is
relying on the said grounds to make the Leave Application, this court
will still deal with the grounds as discussed below.
13. As aforesaid, the applicant did not elaborate on any of the grounds
stated in the said document at the oral hearing. He only mentioned
that someone was still chasing after him to beat him in his country
and he could not go back for the time being.
Discussion
14. First of all, the applicant’s danger in his country had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If he intends to challenge the
Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for
judicial review.
15. As mentioned, all the grounds contained in the document with the title
“Grounds on which relief is sought” are very general. Some of the
grounds therein were directed at the Director. As the Director’s
Decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision, it is no longer
susceptible to judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549).
This court will therefore consider only those grounds directed at the
Board in respect of the Board’s Decision.
16. There are a total of 6 paragraphs under the heading “Grounds” in the
applicant’s said document. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the applicant’s
grounds were directed at the Director. Hence, they could not be used
to challenge the Board’s Decision and can be simply ignored. Thus,
only paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 6 of the grounds are relevant to the Leave
Application.
17. In paragraph 1 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator of the Board reached the Board’s Decision wrongly and it
was not reasonable and fair as required by the Wednesbury test.
However, the applicant did not state how or why the Board’s Decision
was wrong, unfair and unreasonable.
18. It does not help the applicant to establish any ground by just
mentioning the right to life in paragraph 1 either. In any event, the
Board did assess the applicant’s risk of right to life and concluded
that the applicant faced no BOR 2 Risk[1] if refouled, as his case was
not related to death penalty or genocide (see paragraph 39 of the
Board’s Decision).
19. This court notes that the Board may have committed an error of law in
stating that BOR 2 Risk was not established because the applicant’s
case was not related to death penalty or genocide. As held by the
Court of Appeal in Kulwinder Kaur v Director of Immigration and
another [2022] HKCA 48, “The authorities establish that the right to
life is also violated by extra-judicial killings by State agents or by
non-State actors, where the State fails to take steps to avoid a
threat to life emanating from non-State actors or private persons.”
Thus, violation of right to life is not confined to imposition of
death penalty or genocide by a State as suggested by the Board.
20. Nevertheless, as the Board found that the applicant’s appeal/petition
failed under BOR 3 Risk[2], there was no arguable ground for any BOR 2
Risk (see Kulwinder Kaur v Director of Immigration and another, supra,
at paragraph 59). The Court of Appeal acknowledged there was some
force in the argument that issues under the BOR 2 Risk are not
separable from those under the BOR 3 Risk, and this essentially meant
that upon determining that there is no BOR 3 Risk, there is no
arguable ground for any BOR 2 Risk (see Re Doyaoen Josephine Biba
[2025] HKCA 482, at paragraph 27).
21. The applicant did not specifically challenge the Board’s findings on
the BOR 3 Risk on any basis other than the general grounds as
mentioned in the said document. This court also finds no flaw in the
Board’s findings in this regard. Thus, there is no reasonably
arguable ground in the factual context of the applicant’s case, and
the aforesaid error of law, taken on its own, would not vitiate the
Board’s Decision (see Kulwinder Kaur v Director of Immigration and
another, supra, at paragraph 60).
22. In paragraph 3 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by placing
too much reliance on country of origin information (“COI”) but failed
to take his personal background and experience into account. However,
the applicant did not state which aspects of his personal background
and experience had not been taken into account by the Board.
23. In paragraph 4 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing
whether to accept or not to accept explanations provided by him, and
unreasonably required him to respond to questions.
24. This accusation is clearly unfounded. The Board did not hold any oral
hearing in its assessment of the applicant’s case. Thus, the Board
never posed any questions on the applicant and did not require him to
answer any of its questions.
25. In paragraph 6 of the grounds, the applicant simply alleged that the
adjudicator ought to allow the appeal/petition and the Board’s
Decision was irrational. There was no particulars or reasons given to
say how or why the Board’s Decision was irrational.
26. The Board had in fact provided a detailed analysis of the applicant’s
claim and the reasons why the Board concluded that the applicant
failed on all applicable grounds under the USM to claim non-
refoulement protection. The Board’s rejection of his non-refoulement
claim was a decision made after due consideration of the law (save for
the error of law as aforesaid) and the evidence placed before it.
27. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
28. Thus, none of the grounds that were contained in the applicant’s said
document could establish any valid ground to challenge the Board’s
Decision when they are so vague and general without any requisite
particulars related to the applicant’s case, or are completely
unfounded.
29. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
30. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review. However, the error of law as identified
above has already been discussed and it is not necessary for this
court to discuss it again in the ensuing paragraphs.
31. As aforesaid, this court notes that the Board assessed the applicant’s
appeal/petition without an oral hearing. The Board had given detailed
reasons for not having an oral hearing in paragraphs 16 to 21 of the
Board’s Decision. In gist, the Board was satisfied that it was
reasonably clear that the applicant had provided everything he wished
the Board to consider and that there was nothing either explicitly or
implicitly lacking in the information before the Board. More
importantly, the Board assessed the applicant’s claim based on the
facts as presented by the applicant. Thus, the Board was satisfied
that the applicant’s appeal/petition could be justly determined
without a hearing.
32. There is no absolute right to an oral hearing. The question of
whether an oral hearing should be afforded must be decided by the
adjudicator at the appeal/petition stage after considering all
relevant circumstances. Ultimately, what is in issue is the question
of fairness, and in the present context, high standards of fairness
are involved (see St v Betty Kwan and the Director of Immigration,
CACV 115/2013).
33. Thus, it was not a must for the applicant to have an oral hearing
before the Board. This court agrees with the Board that an oral
hearing was not necessary. There was no procedural unfairness to the
applicant when the Board accepted the factual basis of the applicant’s
claims and did not challenge his credibility. Thus, the high
standards of fairness required for the determination of the
applicant’s appeal/petition was not compromised by not having an oral
hearing.
34. As aforesaid, in assessing the applicant’s appeal/petition, the Board
accepted the applicant’s claims, namely that he borrowed money from a
creditor, he was asked for repayment many times and he was assaulted
once when the creditor brought her followers to chase him for
repayment.
35. The Board laid out its assessment of the applicant’s claims against
all the applicable grounds under the USM in paragraphs 23 to 43 of the
Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
36. In gist, the Board found that the applicant’s fear only arose from his
inability to repay a loan, which was a private matter. The injuries
the applicant sustained from the only assault by the creditor and her
followers were not so serious as to amount to torture or attain a
level of minimum severity. The creditor was not a state actor, and
there was no element of state acquiescence in the alleged ill-
treatment of the applicant. His fear of ill-treatment did not fall
within any of the Convention categories.
37. Moreover, the Board found from COI that although there were materials
that indicated that inefficiency was common in the Vietnamese police
force and authorities, the Vietnamese government had taken actions to
combat corruption and there was legislation in place to protect the
applicant from being assaulted by the creditor. In fact, the
applicant had never sought assistance from the police or the
authorities in respect of the creditor when he was in Vietnam.
38. Furthermore, the Board had given full reasons in paragraphs 44 to 46
of the Board’s Decision for its finding that it would not be difficult
for the applicant to relocate and find employment in Vietnam in order
to avoid his creditor.
39. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant had failed to establish a
case for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the
applicable grounds under the USM.
40. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board. The Board was
entitled to make its own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or
unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion (save for the
error of law as aforesaid).
41. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM (save for the error of law as aforesaid), the
burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly
identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness.
This court could detect no errors of law (save for the error of law as
aforesaid), procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s
Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury
test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board
to reach its decision.
42. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
43. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or the applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors on: |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |16/09/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given |Applicant’s ref. no: |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Nil |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted | |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |16/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 18710 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the applicant proposes| |QA T/C 1033/21(formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 11041/21) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
| | | |
| | | |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] Risk of violation of right
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h1wPJ\?aJo([pic]h1wPJ\?aJmH sH h1wPJaJmH sH h1w5?PJaJmH sH
!h1w5?PJaJmH nHsH tHh1wPJaJmH o([pic]sH h™5¹h™5¹PJaJnHtH
h™to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights
Ordinance, Cap 383.
[2] Risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap
383.