香港特別行政區 訴 楊華裕及另三人

HCMA880/2007

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

刑事上訴司法管轄權

判罪上訴

案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2007年第880號

(原九龍城裁判法院案件2007年第2154號)

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判案書

1. 本案四名上訴人共同被控一項「企圖輸出未列艙單貨物」修訂控罪罪名成立，違反香港法例第 60 章《進出口條例》第 18(1)(b) 條及香港法例第 200 章《刑事罪行條例》第 159G 條。聆訊後被裁定罪名成立，四人各被判監禁12 個月。他們現不服定罪，提出上訴。

2. 案發當日巡邏船上的關員對載著四名上訴人的漁船進行監視，發出截停警號後，漁船仍然不斷前進，並無減慢速度。而巡邏船在三次的嘗試下，才成功靠泊該漁船。關員發現船上的管道蓋扭開後，可望到下面的管道，而下層的機房位置共有五個油缸。關員從其中之一的管道蓋內，抽出了63,980 公升柴油，及後又在另一管道蓋內抽出了770 公升柴油，關員再發現漁船上另有一暗格油缸，再從一個被懷疑是暗格油缸處抽出805 公升柴油。他指該漁船除載滿了柴油外，並無載有其他貨物，亦没有捕漁工具，漁船內的出口貨物並無被列入艙單內。

3. 本案的專家證人發現漁船的機房內共有六個油缸。他指船上其中一些油缸裝有以電源連接潛水泵，用作將油缸內的柴油以每分鐘1,667 公升及3,333 公升抽離油缸。他從漁船所使用的兩部引擎的馬力推算，如在24 小時內全力運作，不需用超過2,816 公升柴油。

4. 當時第一上訴人向關員表示他是漁船的船長；他不知道該漁船可以載到多少柴油，漁船除左右兩邊各有兩個油缸外，還有一個日用缸；他打算將漁船駛去惠州澳頭港。警誡下，他聲稱當日早上到港，在油躉船入了13 萬港幣油，會將油運返大陸等候船主指示。

5. 第二上訴人在警誡下指他在漁船機房內工作，來香港的目的是入油，入了約20 至30 噸柴油。第三上訴人指他在漁船負責做飯，他從船長處得知，漁船當日注入了30 噸柴油，他並不知道柴油會注入哪個油缸。第四上訴人在漁船上做雜工和做飯，來香港的目的是入油。他並不清楚關於柴油的事項。

6. 在聆訊中，所有上訴人均選擇不作供及不傳召證人。

上訴理由

7. 上訴理由現綜合概述如下：

(1)	裁判官所作出四名上訴人肯定知道漁船上所儲存的柴油是用作輸出用途的唯一合理推論，所基於的三項事實，均為未能確定並有證據反駁的事實；
(2)	裁判官錯誤忽略考慮辯方所指，漁船上的油缸互通乃將缸內的柴油駁去漁船上的引擎自用，以供運作一點，並錯誤認定此乃掩人耳目的說法。
(3)	裁判官在第一及第三上訴人對關員的說話內容與獲控辯雙方承認的事實有所抵觸下，錯誤認定控方已在毫無合理疑點下證實控罪。
(4)	裁判官在考慮賦予第一上訴人陳述證供比重時，沒有考慮第一證人和第一上訴人溝通上有困難，第 一證人證供前後矛盾之處正正反映他對第一上訴人心存偏見；
(5)	裁判官拒納第一上訴人混雜陳述辯白部分，特別是須等候船主指示部分時，沒有充分考慮授權書正是由該船主發出一點。

答辯人回應

8. 答辯人大律師指，裁判官有權從她席前的整體證供作出唯一合理的推論，該些整體證供當中除了她所列出的三個基本事實外，亦包括了四名上訴人的混雜陳述中的招認部分。裁判官已考慮辯方在陳詞所指，本案整體證供並不能排除船上的柴油是自用的說法，但她接納了專家證人的證供，從而裁定船上的柴油並非自用的。

9. 答辯人大律師續指，上訴人大律師對上述三個基本事實所提出的駁斥，全屬一廂情願以及在沒有實質證供支持下的空談而已。裁判官裁定船上裝置了三個泵速率高的潛水泵與柴油是自用的說法不符的情況下，正確認定辯方所稱，船上油缸可互通等同柴油全供自用的論調，是掩人耳目的說法。

10. 答辯人大律師又指，裁判官有權在考慮第一和第三上訴人的混雜陳述中的辯白部分和獲控辯雙方承認的事實出現不能磨合的分歧下，不賦予該些辯白部分任何的比重。所有上訴人均選擇了不作供，本案並沒有其他證供與裁判官所作出的唯一合理推論相悖或抵觸。定罪並沒有任何不安穩、不能令人滿意、或不公之處，或潛在的疑慮。

裁決

11. 本席首先處理上訴理由(1)。

12. 裁判官在裁斷陳述書中説：

「	從(1)關員在漁船M65562A上沒有發現任何捕魚工具，(2)該漁船連續兩日駛到香港的油躉船注入如此大量的柴油，與及(3)在該漁船上有三個油缸內均裝有泵速率高的潛水泵，本席認為本案唯一合理的推論為四名上訴人肯定知道漁船上所儲存的柴油是作輸出用途，絕非自用，亦超越該漁船所必須的燃料。」

13. 基本上，上訴人大律師對上述三項裁判官賴以為據作出推論的事實，逐一作出駁斥，以示該三項事實，每項單獨來說均可作無罪的推論，故不屬可供裁判官作出唯一合理推論的基本事實，情況一如他所援引的McGreevy v. DPP [1973] 1 AER 504一案中，上訴人的大律師所指：

“

… that there was failure to demonstrate or to discuss ways in which evidence which was consistent with the Crown case was also consistent with the innocence of the appellant …

… It was submitted that the summing up was defective if the learned judge did not in connection with the various parts of the evidence (a) point to any explanations that were consistent with innocence on the part of the appellant and … (c) warn the jury in terms that they must not convict unless they could exclude every reasonable explanation of the facts proved other than the guilt of the appellant …”

14. 法庭在Kwan Ping-bong v. R. [1979] 1 HKLR 1案中指出：

“

The requirement of proof beyond all reasonable doubt does not prevent a jury from inferring, from the facts that have been the subject of direct evidence before them, the existence of some further fact, such as the knowledge or intent of the accused, which constitutes an essential element of the offence; but the inference must be compelling …”

15. 一如本案，在HKSAR v. Lo Hung Kwong, [2000] 3 HKC 474 一案中，針對該案的上訴人的所有證據都是環境證據。該案的原審法官認定了一些「事實」，並根據這些事實作出無可抗拒以及對該案的上訴人不利的推論。上訴人一方上訴時稱，原審法官所依據的某些「事實」根本並非事實，而法庭只可以根據已在毫無合理疑點的情況下獲得證實的基本事實作出推論。

16. 上訴法庭法官祈彥輝這樣說：

“	A number of cases can be cited as authority for that proposition, the most famous of which is the decision of the High Court of Australia in the dingo killing case, Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 157 CLR 521.  At 536, Gibbs CJ and Mason J (as he then was) said :
	‘	… the jury cannot view a fact as a basis for an inference of guilt unless at the end of the day they are satisfied of the existence of that fact beyond reasonable doubt… It seems to us an inescapable consequence that in a criminal case the circumstances from which the inference should be drawn must be established beyond reasonable doubt.  We agree with the statement in R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR at p. 379 that it is ‘an obvious proposition in logic, that you cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the truth of an inference drawn from the facts about the existence of which you are in doubt.’
	However, the law has moved on since then as is demonstrated by the discussion on the topic in Bruce & McCoy, ‘Criminal Evidence in Hong Kong’, Division III, paras 152-153.  They refer to the case of R v Sorby (1986) 21 A Crim R 64, in which the Court of Criminal Appeal in Victoria sought to reconcile the approach of Chamberlain with a line of authority hitherto followed in Victoria, whereby it had been held that as long as the facts in issue are proved beyond reasonable doubt, it is not necessary for the facts from which inferences are drawn to be themselves proved beyond reasonable doubt …
	The court accepted that when proof of an element essential to guilt is left to be inferred, the primary facts from which the inference is to be drawn must be established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt, but the court went on to hold that what that means is that the circumstances relied upon for the inference must exclude any hypothesis consistent with innocence.  It does not mean, however, that every piece of evidence which does not by itself establish a fact beyond reasonable doubt must be disregarded.  The court must consider what weight to be given to the united force of all the circumstances together: one piece of evidence might resolve a doubt as to another.
	Indeed, in R v Shepherd (No 5) (1990) 51 A Crim R 181, the High Court of Australia appears to have resulted from what it held in Chamberlain.  In Shepherd (No 5), the majority held that it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove each fact upon which an inference of guilt is based beyond reasonable doubt.  This requirement is limited to those facts which were indispensable links in the chain of reasoning towards such an inference.  Where the evidence is analogous to strands in a cable rather than to links in a chain, it will not be appropriate to give a direction that all the facts which constitute those strands must themselves be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

17. Pollock CB在R. v. Exall (1866) 4F & F 922一案中使用「一綹綹的繩子」一詞。判案書這樣說：

“

It has been said that circumstantial evidence is to be considered as a chain, and each piece of evidence as a link in a chain, but that is not so, for then, if any one link break, the chain would fall. It is more like the case of a rope comprised of several cords.  One strand of the cord might be insufficient to sustain the weight, but three strands together may be quite of sufficient strength.  Thus it may be in circumstantial evidence — there may be a combination of circumstances, no one of which would raise a reasonable conviction or more than a mere suspicion; but the three taken together may create a conclusion of guilt with as much certainty as human affairs can require or admit of.”

18. 這亦是上訴人大律師所倚賴DPP v. Kilbourne [1973] AC 729一案中所指以「幾何級數累積以摒棄其他可能性」的意思：

“	Circumstantial evidence is evidence of facts from which, taken with all the other evidence, a reasonable inference is a fact directly in issue.  It works by cumulatively, in geometrical progression, eliminating other possibilities…”

19. 加拿大最高法院在R. v. Morin (1988) 66 CR (3d) 1一案中持類似的看法。法庭接納，如果證明被告人是否有罪是依據一連串的元素，而每一項元素又與不同的證據有關的話，那麽陪審團便必須在毫無合理疑點的情況下信納所需的元素已獲得證實。可是，這並非意味著如果一些未獲充份證實的事實並不是該罪行的主要元素的話，法庭就不能根據這些事實作出推論。現在的主流看法是採取了Deane J的看法，雖然這個看法並不被Chamberlain v. R. (No. 2)一案中大多數的法官所接納：

“

There is certainly no requirement of the law that the members of the jury must examine separately each item of evidence adduced by the prosecution and reject it unless they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it is correct.  Nor is it the law that a jury is in all circumstances precluded from drawing an inference from a primary fact unless that fact is proved beyond reasonable doubt.”

20. 就上述Kilbourne一案中，法庭清楚指出：

“

…the basic necessity before guilt of a criminal charge can be pronounced is that the jury are satisfied of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. This is a conception that a jury can readily understand that from one piece of evidence which they accept various inferences might be drawn.  It requires no more than ordinary common sense for a jury to understand that if one suggested inference from an accepted piece of evidence leads to a conclusion of guilt and another suggested inference to a conclusion of innocence a jury could not on that piece of evidence alone be satisfied of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt unless they wholly rejected and excluded the latter suggestion.”

21. 本席認為，該三項裁判官列出，她賴以為據作出推論的事實，只屬是「一條索中個別的綹子」，而不是因果關係連鎖的串連。故此，如上所述，即使每項單獨來說可作無罪推論，三項事實，以幾何級數累積起來，足以令裁判官摒棄其他可能性而作出有關的推論。上訴人大律師所指，裁判官錯誤理解她席前的證供，錯誤裁定漁船一連兩天均在「同一油躉船」入大量的油，並不影響她從上述累積事項作出唯一合理的推論。

22. 本案所有上訴人均選擇不作供，根據Li Defan & another v. HKSAR [2002] 1 HKLRD 527一案，控方的案情及針對上訴人帶罪的推論可得以强化。

23. 而根據R. v. Tan Siew Gim [1995] 1 HKLR 299，上訴庭指出：

“	Where the inference of guilt is available to the tribunal of facts and no explanation is given, it is not open to complain on appeal that another inference was available to be drawn, particularly when the facts cry out for an explanation.”
“	There are circumstances in which a court may more readily draw an inference adverse to the accused from evidence in the absence of testimony from the accused.”

24. 在R. v. Cunningham, HCMA341/1992一案中，Fuad VP說：

“	An accused person should not be surprised if an inference which can legitimately be drawn is more readily drawn when the accused elects not to give evidence.”

25. 本案控方所提出的證據實是顯示有解釋的必要。裁判官有權作出有關推論。上訴理由(1)不成立。

26. 本席現把上訴理由(3)和(5)一併處理。在一名被告不作供的情況下，裁判官有權賦予他向警方或海關所作的混雜陳述中招認部分絕對的比重及不賦予辯白部分任何比重。裁判官在分析四人對關員之陳述後說：

「	經過小心考慮各上訴人向關員所說的話後，本席不會就各上訴人所說的脫罪供詞給予任何比重，而有關他們的招認供詞，本席則給予絕對比重。本席肯定各上訴人心知他們所入的柴油並不是自用，並意在將漁船上的柴油輸出香港。」

27. 裁判官所指，第一及第三上訴人對關員所作之陳述部分內容與獲控辯雙方承認的事實不符一點，旨在闡釋她不賦予有關的辯白部分任何比重之理由。與控方案情自相矛盾、存有疑點根本是截然不同的兩碼子事，不宜混為一談。

28. 至於上訴人大律師所指出的上訴理由(2)，是指裁判官錯誤在缺乏證供支持的情況下裁定辯方所指，漁船上的油缸可互通一點是顯示缸內的柴油是駁到引擎以供自用的最佳證明，乃掩人耳目的說法。

29. 查裁斷陳述書是這樣說的：

「	本席認為本案唯一合理的推論為四名上訴人肯定知道漁船上所儲存的柴油是作輸出用途，絕非自用，亦超越該漁船所必須的燃料。本案中所涉及的64,785公升之工業用柴油根本是貨物，符合了《進出口條例》的“貨物”定義。本席認為辯方所指在漁船上的油缸可互通這一點，根本是掩人耳目的說法。」

30. 辯方大律師向控方證人所指出辯方的說法，在控方證人否認有關的指稱的情況下，該些指稱本身，並不成為本案的證供。事實上，本案並無證供顯示漁船上的油缸可互通一點和缸中的柴油是否全供漁船自用有著直接關係，而裁判官以上的說法，除在道明她並不接納辯方這樣的說法外，別無他意，上訴人大律師不宜斷章取義。

31. 上訴人大律師在上訴理由(4)所指第一證人和第一上訴人溝通上有困難這點，辯方大律師在聆訊時已向第一證人指出時，第一證人斷然否認，並表明雖然第一上訴人有少許鄉音，但並無礙二人之溝通(上訴宗卷第 181 頁 R)，故此，同一道理，溝通障礙這點亦純屬缺乏證供支持的指稱而已。事實上，辯方大律師其後所向第一證人指出之辯方案情，根本是圍繞着二人之對話，亦是建基於二人溝通並無障礙之基礎。上訴理由(4)完全缺乏實際理據。

32. 本席在HKSAR v. Chan Hung Kwan, HCMA667/2006一案中亦清楚指出，上訴人選擇不作供，此舉表示被告沒有提供證據來削弱、反駁或者解釋控方所提出的證供。法庭無須憑空替他想像各式各樣之答辯理由或可能性。

33. 定罪並無不安穩之處，上訴理據不足，駁回，維持原判。