|
HCAL 1674/2025
[2026] HKCFI 2868
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1674 of 2025
|
BETWEEN
|
| |
Kuntadi Wasis |
Applicant |
| |
and |
|
| |
Torture Claims Appeal Board / |
Putative |
| |
Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Respondent |
| |
and |
|
| |
Director of Immigration |
Putative |
| |
|
Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 24 July 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 9 July 2025 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 9 November 2023 (“Director’s Decision”) rejecting the applicant's non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL001674_2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Indonesia, he would be harmed or killed by the loan shark for an unpaid loan. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
3. At the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application, this court scheduled a hearing on 24 March 2026. The applicant attended the hearing in person. After having heard from him, this court informed him that the decision would be reserved, and be sent to his updated address.
Discussion
4. A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.
5. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The supporting affirmation contained no grounds. In the Form 86, the applicant made a number of averments. Broadly, it was averred that the Board’s Decision was tainted with procedural unfairness for having failed to properly consider the applicant’s circumstances (the lack of legal knowledge and limited education) and the impact it had on the applicant.
6. At the hearing, the applicant said he had nothing further to elaborate on the written grounds.
7. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the applicant was late for almost 20 months when he filed the NOA. Pursuant to s.37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance[5], the Board determined, as a preliminary decision, whether to allow the applicant’s late filing of the NOA. After it had considered the applicant’s explanation for the delay that he was unaware of the time limit rules and that he was uneducated and required assistance, the Board did not accept that the applicant had exercised all due diligence to file the NOA within the specified period and that he had failed to do so because of circumstances beyond his control. The Board refused the late filing of the appeal against the Director’s Decision. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors.
Repealed provisions under the previous s.37ZT
8. Before 1 August 2021, the previous provisions under s.37ZT (2)(b) mandated the Board to take account of “any other relevant matters of acts within the knowledge of the Board”.
9. Additionally, s.37ZT (3) provided that the Board “may allow the late filing of the notice of appeal” if it is satisfied that “by reason of special circumstances, it would be unjust not to allow the late filing of the notice of appeal”.
10. However, s.37ZT (2)(b) was repealed. Section 37ZT (3) was replaced by the new 37ZT (3) as follows:
“The Appeal Board may allow the late filing of the notice of appeal if the person filing the notice provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy the Board that the person-
(a) had exercised all due diligence to file the notice within the period specified … but
(b) failed to file the notice within the period because of circumstances beyond the person’s control”
11. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law under s.37ZT and observed a high standard of fairness. The grounds provided in the applicant’s Form 86 were either irrelevant or general. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[6].
Order
12. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Dated the 29th day of May 2026
| |
( Alfred CHAN )
for Registrar, High Court
|
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
|
|
|
|
|
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
|
|
Sent to the Applicant
on 29/5/2026
Kuntadi Wasis
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
|
Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 29/5/2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 26509
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 1071/23 (formerly RBCZ/5001059/23)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142].
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Unless otherwise specified, all references to the statutory provisions in this decision are references to the prevailing Immigration Ordinance.
[6] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676
|