VIRGILIO VALEROSO B v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6160 · HCAL 1941/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1941/2023
[2026] HKCFI 6160
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1941 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Virgilio Valeroso B |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and the applicant being absent in open |
| |court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 27 October 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 11 October 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1941_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s claims for non-refoulement
protection were not made out on any of the applicable grounds under the
Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Accordingly, the Board
confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”)
dated 29 December 2021, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement
claim.
The applicant’s case
3. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision,
which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
4. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if
refouled to the Philippines, his life would be in danger from his
former wife’s relatives, in particular her brothers who were gangsters,
as he had a baby with another woman and abandoned his wife and their
child. The applicant also feared that he would face discrimination in
accessing medical treatment for his medical condition, or otherwise
differentially denied such treatment in the Philippines.
Oral hearing
5. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application.
However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 29 October 2026.
6. As held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091, an application for leave to
bring judicial review should not be dismissed for want of prosecution
merely because the applicant failed to attend the oral hearing of the
leave application. The correct approach is to treat the applicant as
having withdrawn the request for a hearing by reason of the absence at
the hearing, and to proceed to determine the leave application on its
merits.
7. Thus, this court will proceed to consider the merits of the Leave
Application based on the written materials before this court.
Grounds for judicial review
8. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
9. The applicant did not advance any grounds for judicial review in Form
86. In his supporting affirmation dated 27 October 2023, the applicant
stated that he did not agree with the Board.
10. In the document with the title “GROUNDS” that was annexed to his
supporting affirmation, the applicant mentioned a few matters, which
are summarised as follows:-
1) The Board did not truly consider his claim;
2) He was given a lawyer at the screening interview, but the lawyer
did not help him at all. The applicant only talked to the
interpreter, and when the interpreter was writing down his
statement, his lawyer was sleeping;
3) The Board dismissed his claim but showed some bad arguments. The
Board was prepared to dismiss his claim before the oral hearing;
and
4) The adjudicator should be one kind of a judge, but the adjudicator
assessing his case was not neutral, so he did not find any reason
to grant leave to the applicant.
11. As aforesaid, the applicant was absent at the oral hearing before this
court. Thus, no elaboration on the aforesaid grounds could be obtained
from the applicant at the scheduled hearing.
Discussion
12. First of all, the applicant’s comment in his supporting affirmation
that he did not agree with the Board’s Decision cannot help him. He
did not say why he did not agree with the Board’s Decision, how the
Board’s Decision was wrong or how the Board erred in its assessment of
his non-refoulement claim and/or his appeal/petition.
13. In Ground (1) of the applicant’s document as summarised above, the
applicant complained that the Board did not truly consider his claim.
However, this ground was advanced without any particulars. The
applicant did not state how the Board had failed to truly consider his
claim, or how his claim ought to be considered.
14. Contrary to the applicant’s assertion, this court notes that the Board
had discussed thoroughly with the applicant at the Board’s hearing and
carefully considered all aspects of his claim, including his fear of
harm from his wife’s family due to his having a child with another
woman, and his fear of discrimination in accessing medical treatment
for his medical condition.
15. The applicant complained in Ground (2) about the lawyer assigned to
assist him at the screening interview. However, there was nothing
before this court to support the applicant’s allegation in this
respect. In any event, if he found that the lawyer was not assisting
him at all or was even sleeping when his statement was being recorded,
he should have raised this complaint to the interviewing officer, who
should be present at the material time. He could and should also have
complained against the lawyer to the Duty Lawyer Service.
16. More importantly, the applicant failed to indicate how he had been
prejudiced as a result of the attitude of the lawyer. Thus, Ground (2)
has no substance.
17. In Ground (3), the applicant asserted that the Board had showed some
bad arguments when dismissing his claim, and was prepared to dismiss
his claim even before the Board’s hearing. Again, this ground was
advanced without any specificity. The applicant did not state what
“bad arguments” the Board had given, or why he believed that the Board
was prepared to dismiss his claim even before the Board’s hearing.
18. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, there is simply no reason to
believe that the Board was prepared to dismiss the applicant’s claim
even before the Board’s hearing. The Board had asked extensive
questions of the applicant at the Board’s hearing to try to understand
all aspects of his claim, and discussed with him the availability of
medical treatment in the Philippines due to his worries about his own
medical condition.
19. Finally, in Ground (4), the applicant complained that the adjudicator
assessing his case was not neutral, and he did not find any reason to
grant leave to the applicant. The applicant did not specify what the
adjudicator had done to show that he was not neutral. The mere fact
that the Board found the applicant’s appeal/petition failed on all the
applicable grounds under the USM cannot in itself be interpreted as the
Board not being neutral in its assessment of the applicant’s case.
20. Thus, this court finds that none of the matters asserted by the
applicant in his affirmation and the document with the title “GROUNDS”
constitutes a valid ground to challenge the Board’s Decision.
21. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of
judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
22. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite the
lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
23. In assessing the applicant’s appeal/petition, the Board held an oral
hearing on 13 January 2023 and the applicant was present. Thus, the
applicant was given the opportunity to present his case to the Board in
person.
24. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had duly considered
all aspects of the applicant’s claims. The Board’s findings on the
credibility of the applicant’s claim, its assessment of both limbs of
the applicant’s claim and the future risk that the applicant faced,
were laid out in paragraphs 65 to 76 of the Board’s Decision.
25. In gist, the Board found that the applicant was candid at the Board’s
hearing. The Board’s concerns as to the seriousness of the applicant’s
claimed threats and whether any risk arising from those threats were
ongoing had essentially been overtaken by the applicant’s admission
that it was essentially safe for him to go home, and he just wanted to
remain in Hong Kong in order to have surgery.
26. In respect of the applicant’s claim of risk from his wife’s relatives
in the Philippines, the Board accepted that his wife and her brothers
were angry about his having a child with another woman in Hong Kong and
that he had brought the child back to the Philippines to be taken care
of by his mother. The Board was also prepared to accept that his
wife’s brothers were unemployed men who associated with neighbourhood
gangs and drunkenly bullied the applicant when they were growing up and
living in the same neighbourhood, and that on learning of the
applicant’s infidelity they might have made threats against the
applicant’s life. However, in light of the fact that the applicant did
not suffer any serious harm at the hands of his wife’s brothers, and
that none of his family members, including his daughter with another
woman whom he brought back to the Philippines to live with his own
mother, were assaulted or even threatened by them, the Board was not
satisfied that the threats to kill the applicant were as serious as he
claimed.
27. Moreover, given the length of time since the applicant’s infidelity,
the lack of information to suggest that the threats were ongoing, and
the applicant’s own admission that he believed that he might have been
forgiven, that it was now safe for him to return to the Philippines,
and that he intended to do so when he had had surgery, the Board found
on balance that his wife’s brothers no longer pose any appreciable
threat to the applicant, and that as a consequence the applicant faced
only a remote chance of being subjected to serious harm at their hands
for the reasons claimed.
28. As to the applicant’s claimed medical condition, the Board accepted
that he had chronic arthritis and required a knee replacement.
However, the Board found that the applicant had provided no evidence to
support the proposition that he would face discrimination in accessing
medical treatment or otherwise differentially denied such treatment in
the Philippines any more than any other person subject to hospital
waiting lists in the country. Contrary to the applicant’s assertion,
country of origin information (“COI”) showed that a universal health
care system operated in the Philippines. The Board was therefore not
satisfied that the applicant would suffer any serious or significant
harm on this basis, including for the purposes of any of the applicable
grounds under the USM.
29. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s claim for non-
refoulement protection were not made out on any of the applicable
grounds under the USM.
30. Although the Board did not consider state protection and internal
relocation, it was unnecessary to make findings on the availability of
state protection as the Board found the applicant was not at a real
risk of harm.
31. As to internal relocation, it is a well-recognised principle that the
decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the
applicant has established that he qualifies as a refugee pursuant to
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor
[1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997). In other words, internal
relocation only arises if the applicant has established a real risk of
persecution in his home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).
32. As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of
harm upon his return to the Philippines, it is not necessary for the
Board to consider internal relocation.
33. The finding of facts in relation to the applicant’s case, including the
assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm, was primarily within the
realm of the Board. The Board was entitled to come to its own
conclusion. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way
the Board reached its conclusion.
34. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high
standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
35. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave
must be refused.
Conclusion
36. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 4th day of November 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 04/11/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any |Applicant’s ref. no: |interested parties as |
|directions given within|Nil |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave| |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, | |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |04/11/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and | |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance | |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 19697 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes | |QA T/C 1954/21 (formerly|
|to use at the hearing, | |RBCZ 10871/21) |
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | |Department of Justice, |
|application for leave | |Senior Assistant Law |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1