楊曉虹 v. BALLANI, BIPIN KISHINCHAND

LDPD 181/2026

[2026] HKLdT 16

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

APPLICATION NO. LDPD 181 OF 2026

_________________

_________________

_________________

DECISION ON REVIEW

_________________

1.  I delivered my judgment orally on 11 March 2026 (“the Judgment”) in which I made an order as follows:

(1)  The Respondent do deliver vacant possession of the suit premises known as “Flat A, 14/F, Star Mansion, No 3 Minden Row, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong” to the Applicant;

(2)  The Respondent do pay the Applicant arrears of rent/mesne profits at the rate of $12,000 per month from 9 October 2025 until delivery up of vacant possession; and

(3)  The Respondent do pay the Applicant the costs of this Application which is summarily assessed at $365.

2.  The Respondent then on 13 March 2026 applied for a review of the Judgment pursuant to section 11A of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance (“the Review Application”). The grounds in support of the Application for Review are summarised as follows:

(a)  The Notice of Application dated 10 February 2026 was defective because of the mistake in name of the Respondent;

(b)  There is an ongoing hearing in the Small Claims Tribunal No 5796/2025;

(c)  The Applicant trespassed the suit premises on 26 October 2025;

(d)  The Applicant stole money at the suit premises when the Respondent was not present; and

(e)  The Applicant had not yet returned the 2-month rental deposit paid.

Background

3.  By a tenancy agreement dated 8 January 2024, most of the contents of which were pre-printed both in English and Chinese (“the Tenancy Agreement”), the Applicant as Landlord let the suit premises to the Respondent as Tenant for a term of 2 years from 9 January 2024 to 8 January 2026 (“the Term”) for residential purpose only.

4.  By virtue of Schedule I to the Tenancy Agreement, the monthly rental reserved from 9 January 2024 to 8 January 2025 was $11,000 while that from 9 January 2025 to 8 January 2026 was $12,000. A security deposit in the sum of $11,000 was paid.

5.  However, there was a remark scribbled in Chinese as follows:

「乙方在租賃期間的人身和財產安全由乙方自行負責，在租賃期間，乙是該房的負責人，房內發生的所有安全事故都由乙方承擔，與甲方無關; 包括但不限於高空擲物、水淹，摔倒，給與人及同住人造成的人身傷害，甲方都不承擔任何責任。」

In gist, the Applicant declined liability whatsoever that may arise from the occupation of the suit premises during the term of the tenancy.

Notice of Application

6.  The Applicant commenced the Application for recovery of possession in Lands Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 10 February 2026 on the ground that the Respondent had failed to pay rent from 9 October 2025 and that the term of the Tenancy Agreement had expired. In the Notice of Application, however, the Applicant addressed the Respondent as “Ballami Bipin KISHINGAAD” instead of “Ballani Bipin Kishinchand” which was scribbled hardly legible in the Tenancy Agreement.

7.  In fact, the Applicant also provided to the Tribunal on the same day a “Formal Notice: Termination of Tenancy & Demand for Outstanding Arrears” dated 18 December 2025 addressing again to “Ballami Bipin KISHINGAAD” but with a Hong Kong Identity Card No: Rxxxxxx[1] written beside it. This Hong Kong Identity Card Number is the same as that stated under the signature of the Respondent in the Tenancy Agreement.

Notice of Opposition

8.  On 23 February 2026, the Respondent filed a Notice of Opposition stating only that the grounds and particulars “will be submitted at time of hearing”

9.  Then on 11 March 2026, the Respondent sent a letter to the Tribunal stating the following:

“REG – DEFECTIVE DOCUMENT

As the name in Application for Possession of FLAT 14A STAR MANSION, 3 Minden Row TST KLN is not correct it appears BALLAMI BIPIN KISHINGAAD is not the correct name.

Correct name is – BALLANI BIPIN KISHINCHAND[2]

HKID Rxxxxxx

So a document with wrong name is considered as defective potentially Notice of Application of Possession becomes invalid

So a new Notice of Application of Possession be issued & matter to be adjourned till next hearing with correct name.”

Hearing on 11 March 2026

10.  At the beginning of the hearing on 11 March 2026, while the Tribunal was aware of the mistake on the name of the Respondent, I granted leave to the Applicant to make the correction. This was not an unusual occasion where the court would grant such a leave.

11.  Under Order 20 of the Rules of the High Court, the following amendments are allowed:

“1. Amendment of writ without leave (O. 20, r. 1)

(1) Subject to paragraph (3), the plaintiff may, without the leave of the Court, amend the writ once at any time before the pleadings in the action begun by the writ are deemed to be closed.

(2) …

(3) …

2. Amendment of acknowledgment of service (O. 20, r. 2)

(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a party may not amend his acknowledgment of service without leave of the Court.

(2) A party whose acknowledgment of service contains a statement to the effect that—

(a) he does, or

(b) he does not

intend to contest the proceedings to which the acknowledgement relates may, without the leave of the Court, amend the acknowledgment by substituting for that statement a statement to the opposite effect, provided that in a case falling under sub-paragraph (b) the amendment is made before judgment has been obtained in the proceedings.

(3) Where an acknowledgment of service is authorized to be amended under this rule, a fresh acknowledgment, amended as so authorized, must be handed in at or sent by post to the Registry, and Order 12, rule 4, shall apply.

3. Amendment of pleadings without leave (O. 20, r. 3)

(1) A party may, without the leave of the Court, amend any pleading of his once at any time before the pleadings are deemed to be closed and, where he does so, he must serve the amended pleading on the opposite party.

(2) Where an amended statement of claim is served on a defendant—

(a) the defendant, if he has already served a defence on the plaintiff, may amend his defence, and

(b) the period for service of his defence or amended defence, as the case may be, shall be either the period fixed by or under these rules for service of his defence or a period of 14 days after the amended statement of claim is served on him, whichever expires later.

(3) Where an amended defence is served on the plaintiff by a defendant—

(a) the plaintiff, if he has already served a reply on that defendant, may amend his reply, and

(b)   the period for service of his reply or amended reply, as the case may be, shall be 14 days after the amended defence is served on him.”

12.  Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026 Vol 1 at §20/8/19 explains further as follows:

“Correcting name of party (r5(2) and (3) – An amendment to correct the name of a party may be allowed, even if made after the expiry of any relevant period of limitation and even if it is alleged that the effect of the amendment will be to substitute a new party, provided the court is satisfied that the mistake sought to be corrected was a genuine mistake and was not misleading, or such as to cause any reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person intending to sue or to be sued (O20 r5(2) and 5(3) …)

In the rare case where O20 r5(3) is inapplicable, the court still retains a power to correct misnomers…”

13.  During the hearing, I had explained to the Respondent that the purpose of serving the Notice of Application to him was to alert him of the Application so that he would be given the opportunity to reply to that or file his Notice of Opposition. The Respondent had indeed filed his Notice of Opposition on 23 February 2026, sent a letter to the Tribunal on 11 March 2026 bringing the misnomer of his name to the attention of the Tribunal and even attended the hearing. I was satisfied that the Respondent was not prejudiced.

14.  Furthermore, in Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749, notices were served in order to exercise an option to terminate the two leases under a break clause by reference to a milestone date, being 13 January 1995. The notices stated however ‘12 January 1995’ instead of ‘13 January 1995’. The House of Lords held that a reasonable recipient with knowledge of the terms of the lease and of the milestone date would have been left in no doubt that the tenant wished to determine the lease on the milestone date but had wrongly described it as 12 January 1995. Lord Steyn said at page 768 :

“It is important not to lose sight of the purpose of a notice under the break clause. It serves one purpose only: to inform the landlord that the tenant has decided to determine the lease in accordance with the right reserved. That purpose must be relevant to the construction and validity of the notice. Prima facie one would expect that if a notice unambiguously conveys a decision to determine a court may nowadays ignore immaterial errors which would not have misled a reasonable recipient."

15.  This principle in Mannai v Eagle was distilled in Pease v Carter [2020] 1 WLR 1459 where Arnold LJ affirmed at §39 that such an approach to interpretation applied equally to provision of statutory requirements.

16.  Thus, in the present case, whereas the Respondent was unable to spell out any other defences to the Applicant, I delivered the Judgment.

Discussion on the Review Application

17.  Thus to the extent when the Respondent suggested that the  Notice of Application dated 10 February 2026 was defective, he was repeating his argument in the hearing on 11 March 2026. I had explained that he was wrong. There is no point for having a review.

18.  On his second ground for review, the Respondent suggested there might be another proceedings in the Small Claims Tribunal. This would be neither here nor there so long as the Small Claims Tribunal had not formulated its judgment on the same issue or otherwise.

19.  In Chan Yin Kwan v Wong Kam Hoi, CACV 223/2007 (unreported, dated 21 December 2007), the tenant who had the rental fallen into arrears had all along been residing in or occupying the property in question. Despite the tenant had instigated his counterclaim in the District Court, the Court of Appeal ruled at §40 that “the Lands Tribunal only had to deal with the Applicant’s application for the recovery of rent in arrears and repossession of the Property. In considering the Applicant’s application, the Tribunal was not bound to consider and should not have considered the question of deducting part of the rent in arrears.”

20.  As regards the third and fourth grounds alleging trespass or criminal liability respectively, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction under section 8 of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, Cap 17.

21.  On the other hand, I note section 119V of the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance has the following provision:

“(2) Subject to subsection (3), any person who, in relation to any premises—

(a) either—

(i) does any act calculated to interfere with the peace or comfort of the tenant or sub-tenant or members of his household; or

(ii) persistently withdraws or withholds services reasonably required for occupation of the premises as a dwelling; and

(b) knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, that that conduct is likely to cause the tenant or sub-tenant—

(i) to give up occupation of the premises; or

(ii) to refrain from exercising any right or pursuing any remedy in respect of the premises,

commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment by the court …”

22.  Even if the Respondent was in fact referring to the above section concerning harassment, the “court” as referred to in the section means the District Court rather than the Tribunal.

23.  In regard of the Respondent’s fifth ground complaining that the Applicant had not yet returned the 2-month rental deposit paid, I query on what basis the Respondent could make out the complaint when he had failed to pay rents for the period since 9 October 2025.

24.  By clause 7 of the Tenancy Agreement:-

“The Tenant shall pay to the Landlord the Security Deposit set out in Schedule I for the due observance and performance of the terms and conditions herein contained and on his part to be observed and performed. Provided that there is no antecedent breach of any of the terms and conditions herein contained, the Landlord shall refund the Security Deposit to the Tenant without interest within 7 days from the date of delivery of vacant possession of the Premises to the Landlord or settlement of any outstanding payment owed by the Tenant to the Landlord, whichever is later. If the Rent and/or any charges payable by the Tenant hereunder or any part therof shall be unpaid for seven (7) days after the time shall become payable (whether legally demanded or not) or if the Tenant shall commit a breach of any of the terms and conditions herein contained, it shall be lawful for the Landlord at any time thereafter to re-enter the Premises whereupon this Agreement shall absolutely determine and the Landlord may deduct any loss or damage suffered by the Landlord as a result of the Tenant’s breach from the Security Deposit without prejudice to any other right of action or any remedy of the Landlord in respect of such breach of the Tenant.” (underline added)”

25.  Similarly, in Well Century Holdings Limited v Leung Kam Yu [2003] 2 HKLRD 882, a tenancy agreement provided that if the rent shall be unpaid for 15 days after becoming due, or if the tenant thereof failed to observe or perform any term or condition as reserved, the landlord would be entitled to re-enter upon the subject of the tenancy agreement whereupon the tenancy would be absolutely determined, but without prejudice to the right of the landlord in that case in respect of any breach by the tenant of any terms, conditions or stipulation contained in the tenancy agreement. The Court of Appeal referred to the above as “the forfeiture remedy” and upheld the decision of the Court of First Instance that the landlord in that case could pursue both the forfeiture remedy and the common law remedy in respect of the mesne profits and other charges until the property in that case was re-let and the difference (if any) between the rent and other charges under the tenancy agreement and those under the re-letting till the original date of expiry of the tenancy agreement.

26.  In the present case, the Respondent has not yet delivered vacant possession of the suit premises to the Applicant. Also, the Tenancy Agreement only specifies that only one month’s rental in the sum of $11,000 was received. The Respondent must have his memory faded when he is suggesting that 2-month rental deposit was paid.

Conclusion

27.  In view of the above, I dismiss the Application for Review by the Respondent.

Costs

28.  As these decisions are made on papers without a hearing pursuant to the Practice Directions issued by the President of the Tribunal: Review No 1/2009, I make no order as to costs.