RE YADAV SHESH NATH

CACV 209/2025, [2026] HKCA 907

On appeal from [2025] HKCFI 1322

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 209 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 3752 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon K Yeung J (giving the judgment of the Court):

1.  On 13 November 2025, this Court (Chu VP and K Yeung J) handed down our judgment ([2025] HKCA 1012) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Philips Wong dated 11 April 2025 refusing leave to him to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non‑refoulement claim.

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, have been set out in our judgment. We will not repeat them here.

3.  On 27 November 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant stated therein:

“1. The decision was procedurally unfair.

2. The decision-maker failed to take into account relevant matters.

3. The decision-maker took into account irrelevant matters.

4. The decision was unreasonable and/or irrational and involved an error of law.

5. The decision-maker misunderstood or wrongly relied on the Applicant’s statements, including any alleged admission that he was no longer at risk.

6. The decision-maker failed to consider the Applicant’s evidence and submissions regarding political threats, lack of state protection, and risk of harm.

7. The decision-maker failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim.”

4.  On the same day, the Registrar, pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, directed the applicant to lodge written submissions on or before 11 December 2025. The applicant did not comply with that direction nor explained his lateness, and lodged written submissions five days late, on 16 December 2025. We have, nevertheless, considered those submissions.

5.  In those written submissions, the applicant stated, other than general principles:-

“…

5. It is submitted that the Adjudicator acted procedurally unfairly by failing to carry out a proper and balanced assessment of the Applicant’s credibility. Given that credibility is central to evaluating torture claims, any flawed approach in this regard undermines the integrity of the Decision.

6. In addition, there appears to have been a failure to meaningfully engage with the Applicant’s evidence. A mere recitation of submissions does not suffice; the decision-maker must demonstrate a genuine and reasoned engagement with the material before them. Failure to do so compromises both procedural fairness and the Applicant’s substantive rights.

…

10. For the foregoing reasons, the Applicant respectfully seeks an order granting leave. The serious human rights issues at stake, coupled with the procedural and substantive deficiencies identified, render judicial intervention not only appropriate but necessary to prevent potential injustice.”

5.  After considering the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see it fit to follow the usual practice and decide this application on the papers. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed.

6.  We are of the view that the applicant’s case lacks merits. Nowhere in the Notice of Motion and the written submissions has the applicant engaged our reasons for dismissing his appeal (see [12]-[13] of our judgment), nor identified any error therein. The applicant merely repeated his complaints against the decisions below. An appeal to the Court of Final Appeal is not an occasion to reopen issues that have already been carefully considered and determined.

7.  The applicant has in any event not been able to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, pursuant to section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484. We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under the said section.

8.  For the above reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 27 November 2025 is dismissed.