AHMED HAMZA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 954/2020

[2025] HKCFI 5274

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 954 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 9 September 2025 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 27 May 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 6 May 2020.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 27 May 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 10 June 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons, the applicant alleged that he did not receive the court’s letter and his life was still in danger in his home country. In his supporting affirmation dated 9 September 2025, the applicant alleged that the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”), the Board and this court were unlawful and his life was in danger in his home country.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 22 October 2025, the applicant claimed that he did not receive the court’s letter, but the Immigration officer informed him about the court’s decision 4 weeks ago. He also claimed that he had moved his address from Yaumati to Tuen Mun about two years ago, but he did not inform the Immigration Department about this because he was not aware that he had to inform the Immigration Department about his change of address. When I asked the applicant for his grounds of the intended appeal, the applicant simply said that he would be in danger if he goes back.

9.  The applicant’s claim that he was not aware of the requirement of reporting his change of address to the Immigration Department is simply not credible. Under section 37ZA(2) of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, the applicant is under a duty to notify the Director and the Board (on appeal) in writing of any change of his address as soon as practicable after the change. It is inconceivable that the Immigration Department would not have informed the applicant about this requirement. According to the applicant, he had to report to the Immigration Department every two weeks. There is no reason why the Immigration Department would not have asked the applicant to provide his updated address during the past two years when the applicant went there for regular reporting. Thus, I cannot accept the applicant’s explanation in this regard.

10.  Even assuming that the applicant did receive this court’s decision late, it was caused by the applicant’s own fault in not reporting his change of address to the Director or the Board. This cannot be an excuse for seeking an extension of time to appeal.

11.  In any event, the applicant failed to advance any ground for the intended appeal in the Summons, his supporting affirmation and at the hearing on 22 October 2025. His allegation that the decisions of the Director, the Board and this court were unlawful was just a general accusation without any particulars. It cannot amount to any valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review at all.

12.  The applicant’s allegation that his life would be in danger if he returns to his home country cannot be a ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review either. The Board had already assessed the applicant’s alleged danger and found the applicant’s claim not credible. It is not permissible for the applicant to challenge the Board’s finding of facts in an application for judicial review. The applicant has also failed to state any ground or to show why my decision was wrong apart from the general allegation that it was unlawful.

13.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

14.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

15.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review and I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

16.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.