THE HALLA LIBERTY (South Korean flag)

HCAJ400/1997

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ADMIRALTY ACTION NO.400 OF 1997

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J U D G M E N T

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1. I have before me an argument on the costs of the action in the dispute between the Plaintiff and the Intervener. As this is a matter exclusively of an exercise of discretion, I intend to say as little as possible in an attempt to perhaps limit the already substantial costs which have been incurred in the hope that no further costs will be incurred as a result of this determination on costs.

2. The Intervener has come into this Action since February 2000 basically preventing the Plaintiff from obtaining a judgment from the court in terms of what it has claimed as being due in relation to this slot charter dispute against the Defendant. The dispute between the Plaintiff and the Intervener involves what Mr Coleman has said three distinct points. The first two points are now agreed in favour of the Plaintiff. The third of the distinct points being the question of interest.

3. It seems to me clear, both from my case management which had been ongoing for some time (as recently as 15 May 2001 there was a pre-trial review) as well as from reading the correspondence, that the concession that had been made by the Intervener starting from the letter dated 25 May 2001 eventually resulting in the agreement letter of Holman's to Sinclair's dated 14 June 2001 came too late. The terms of the settlement gives to the Plaintiff a judgment which can be regarded as reasonable. It is of course true that the concession of the Invervener has resulted in an interest rate determination of 12% as opposed to 25% claimed by the Plaintiff. The 12% has always been a contractual rate of interest which it is open to the Intervener to concede but it has not done so. I think there had been persistent resistance by the Intervener in this Action. The question I have to ask myself is whether the total behaviour of the Plaintiff has been such that it is reasonable for it to have pushed the matter until today or whether there have some elements, for example, in relation to the question of rate of interest which had not been reasonable and therefore a discount on full costs should be given or that the court should order costs to the Plaintiff on a proportionate basis and not on a full basis.

4. Looking at the case broadly and in the exercise of my discretion, it seems to me that the Plaintiff ought to have against the Intervener all the costs of the Action from the 10 February 2000 until today. Costs of the Plaintiff before 10 February 2000 should be against the Defendant.