GLOBAL ENTERPRISES CORPORATION LTD v. TOMY INDUSTRIAL CO LTD AND ANOTHER

HCA 2076/2023

[2026] HKCFI 2280

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2076 OF 2023

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DECISION

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Nature of appeal

1.  This is the decision relating to the substantive hearing of the Plaintiff’s appeal against Master Elizabeth Cheung’s decision on costs dated 7 October 2024.

2.  By way of background, on 22 November 2024, the Plaintiff (“P”) filed a Notice of Appeal seeking to set aside the entire order made by the Master dated 7 October 2024, pursuant to an application by the 1^st Defendant (“D1”) by its summons filed on 21 June 2024 to set aside a default judgment (“the Judgment”) of 14 June 2024 (“the Setting Aside Application”).  The Master’s order (“the Order”) comprised (1) the setting aside of the Default Judgment and (2) that costs of and occasioned by the Setting Aside Application be in the cause, save that the costs of the hearing on 7 October 2024 be paid by P to D1 (the “Costs Order”).

3.  As the Defendants (“Ds”) explained in their skeleton arguments and at the hearing before me, it appeared despite P in its Notice of Appeal having stated that its application was to set aside the entirety of the Master’s Order, by the time of the filing of its skeleton, P confined its appeal to the Costs Order made by the Master.

4.  P notes that there are factual disputes to be resolved at trial, but states that as the learned Master proceeded on the basis that the parties had agreed to settle the Set Aside Application, P therefore sought to seek this Court’s intervention solely in relation to the Costs Order.  P submitted at the hearing that no prejudice is caused to Ds as a result of this narrowing of scope, since had the same legal team in place, unless they can show that they were working on the full appeal.

5.  P’s appeal is premised upon two bases:

 (i)     That the Master erred in making the Costs Order on the mistaken basis that the parties had reached a settlement agreement; and

 (ii)     That the Master erred in law by failing to apply the established principle that, in the case of a regular default judgment, P should be awarded its costs up to the date when Ds disclosed the merits of their defence.

6.  P also makes a Ladd v Marshall application that comprises seeking leave to adduce a fresh affirmation together with seven exhibits, which P says is fresh evidence for the purpose of this re-hearing.

7.  P thus invites this Court to:

 (i)     granted leave to adduce the fresh evidence;

 (ii)     set aside the Costs Order;

 (iii)     award P its costs of the action and occasioned by the Setting Aside Application up to 23 September 2024, the date when Ds disclosed the merits of their defence by the 2^nd Affirmation of Yu Hiu Ting (including costs of perusal of the said affirmation) payable forthwith (which the Ds refer to as the “Stage 1 Costs” and which I shall adopt); and

 (iv)     thereafter, to order that costs of and occasioned by the Setting Aside Application be in the cause (i.e. to be determined at the conclusion of the trial) (which the Ds refer to as the “Stage 2 Costs” and which I shall adopt).

8.  Ds submit that this appeal should be dismissed as:

 (i)     P’s suggestion that there was no binding settlement agreement reached between the parties prior to the hearing before the Master is unsustainable both as a matter of fact and law, and thus there is no basis to disturb the Master’s costs order that costs of and occasioned by Ds’ Summons be in the cause.

 (ii)     Regardless of whether a settlement was reached, the Master was plainly correct in ordering P to pay “costs of the hearing”, as P had not at any point conceded that D1 showed a meritorious defence, which the Master accepted after hearing substantive arguments.  Rather, P continued to argue to restore the Judgment, even after the hearing, in its Notice of Appeal.

9.  Ds therefore ask this Court to dismiss P’s appeal with costs.  As to the narrowing of scope of P’s present application to the Costs Order, Ds’ position is that P took a belated change in position, which led the Ds to incur time and costs.

Ladd v Marshall Application

10.  Furthermore, as I introduced above, in support of this appeal, P also sought leave to adduce fresh evidence by way of its Ladd v Marshall Application, comprising Wong Tong Po’s 9^th Affirmation (which P refers to as “P’s 9^th”).  I will address and analyse that application before returning to the Costs Order.

11.  As a starting point on this application, Order 58 rule 1(5) RHC make clear that no further evidence may be received on the hearing of an appeal under this rule, except on ‘special grounds’, and that the test for such special grounds requires satisfaction of the conditions in the test laid down in Ladd v Marshall.

12.  The legal test for P’s Ladd v Marshall Application was not substantively addressed before me at the hearing, nor do Ds contest the applicable principles as set out in P’s skeleton (and summarized in Chung Pui Tong v Chung Sau Miu and Ors[2023] HKCA 660 at §14), which are reproduced to a similar effect in Annex A do Ds’ skeleton, being that:

 (i)     such evidence could not have been obtainable at the hearing below with reasonable diligence;

 (ii)     such evidence would be such that, if believed, it would or might have an important influence on the result; and

 (iii)     such evidence must be apparently credible.

13.  The exhibits enclosed with P’s 9^th, as listed out in paragraph 3 of P’s 9^th, comprise the ‘Unsigned Consent Summons’, which I refer to in the paragraph on operative correspondence below, correspondence dated 2 October 2024 relating to the Unsigned Consent Summons, and also further correspondence from January and March 2025, a document index from this Court dated 5 March 2025, certain without prejudice correspondence during September 2024, a letter from P’s lawyers to the Court dated 2 October 2024 indicating ceasing to act, and an email and various further correspondence from the parties’ solicitors from January 2025 and March 2025.  These exhibits are listed in P’s skeleton, and Annex A of Ds’ skeleton provides Ds’ specific objections to each such exhibit.

14.  Of relevance here is Ds’ position that although they consider that P’s Summons so far as the Ladd v Marshall Application is concerned should be rejected, they do not object to the Court referring to such fresh evidence in this application on a de bene esse basis.

15.  It appears to me that given Ds did not ultimately contest the admission the evidence which was the subject of P’s Ladd v Marshall Application, I need not dedicate significant ink to the question of whether the elements of the application for adducing such fresh evidence have been satisfied.  However, I do wish to say something of this application for completeness and given its relevance to my decision on costs below.

16.  To start with, the evidence in question appears to be credible, in satisfaction of the third ground.   As to the first ground, of course, some of the documents comprising the seven exhibits were dated before the date of the hearing before the Master, such that they could in theory have been obtainable at that hearing with reasonable diligence.  P states that this was not the case as P’s lawyers were acting without authority, such that P only became aware of the Unsigned Consent Summons, by way of important example, after the hearing before the Master.  Other documents, however, were only created after the hearing, such that the opposite conclusion applies as to their obtainability at that hearing (and in fact P says that to the extent of these documents they need not meet the Ladd v Marshall criteria to be admitted but instead follow the test under Order 59, rule 10(2) RHC, of which one of the criteria is similar to that of the second ground which I address below). 

17.  Overall, it appears to me that given there is sufficient doubt cast as to whether at least some of these documents could have been obtainable at the hearing before the Master, the first ground was satisfied in respect of at least some of these documents, albeit in the light of my decision on the second ground, which I will come to next, I need not decide which documents satisfy this ground and which do not.

18.  This brings me to the question that remains which is the second ground, i.e., whether such evidence would have an important influence on the result.  Suffice it for me to say that having considered each item of evidence in question, and both parties’ positions in respect of such evidence, I am not persuaded that every such item of correspondence would have an important influence on the result, albeit some of the correspondence comprises helpful background and thus has some degree of influence on the result, even if to dispose of any doubt as to the gaps in the parties’ positions at the hearing before the Master.  Furthermore, I note P’s position that Ds indicated their intention to rely on some of this fresh evidence, and did so rely on such evidence and address me on it at the hearing, and thus such documents were included in the hearing bundle by agreement.

19.  Taking all the above factors together, including Ds’ position as agreed with P and conveyed in its skeleton and at the hearing, I am content to grant the application as a matter of formality and completeness, such that the only matter that remains of its relevance is that relating to costs.  I have addressed this aspect in my decision on costs below.

Background facts to settlement of Setting Aside Application

20.  Moving back to the grounds of the appeal to the Costs Order, and by way of background, I set out a high-level summary of the facts relevant to the purported settlement of the Setting Aside Application.

21.  It appears the parties’ solicitors engaged in negotiations for a potential settlement of the Setting Aside Application during the period 24 to 28 September 2024, which was shortly before the hearing before the Master on 7 October 2024.

22.  The operative correspondence appears to be several letters:

24 September 2024	“YTT Offer Letter”: Letter from Ds’ solicitors, Yip, Tse & Tang (“YTT”) setting out terms of proposed settlement to amicably settle Ds’ Summons.
28 September 2024	“JNK Acceptance Letter”: Letter from P’s solicitors, Jal N Karbhari & Co (“JNK”) replying to accepted YTT’s proposed terms.
28 / 30 September 2024	Unsigned Consent Summons: YTT wrote to JNK enclosing a draft consent summons embodying the parties’ agreed settlement terms.
2 October 2024	YTT Letter to Court: YTT wrote to the Court stating that the “parties have reached an agreement…as communicated by Plaintiff’s letter dated 28th September 2024” (i.e. the JNK Acceptance Letter).
2-3 October 2024	YTT reminders to JNK to return signed Consent Summons
2-3 October 2024	2 October 2024 JNK letter to Court, received by YTT on 3 October 2024, where JNK reported “with regret…that we still have not reached any constructive agreement with the solicitors for the Defendants due to our client’s instructions.  We are now during the process of cease to act.”
7 October 2024	Hearing before the Master.

23.  The Master at the hearing heard substantive arguments on the settlement ground, and D1’s substantive defence.   From an extract of the transcript of such hearing, it is clear and express that the Master made a determination that “there was a concluded agreement to settle the matter”.

24.  She further went on to say:

“Further or alternatively, if I am wrong on that and there was no agreement to settle, I will now consider whether the defendants should get an order on their summons.”

“Having considered the defendant’s submissions and the evidence, I am of the view that based on the materials before the court it cannot be said that the defence is not potentially credible or carrying some degree of conviction, and based on what has been submitted to me were some sound legal basis, matters which I cannot dismiss summarily at this stage.”

25.  The Master, after hearing submissions on costs, then made the Costs Order, and subsequently on 27 October 2024, summarily assessed Ds’ costs of the hearing in the amount of HKD150,000.

26.  Importantly, the language of the Costs Order is as follows:

“Costs of and occasioned by the Defendants’ Summons be in the cause, save that the costs of the hearing on 7 October 2024 be paid by the Plaintiff to the 1^st Defendant forthwith with certificate for one counsel and to be summarily assessed on paper”

Applicable legal principles for appeal from Costs Order

27.  It is well-established that a judge in chambers will only allow an appeal from a master’s costs order if it is unreasonable or if the master erred in law, i.e., if the master either failed to take into account proper matters or took into account matters that should not have been taken into account (Paul Y-ITC Construction Ltd v Kin Shing Co Ltd [1999] 1 HKC 511(CFI) at 515A-C and HKCP(2026) Vol 1 p.1254 §58/1/6).  This is not disputed.

28.  Ds submit that it is trite that a party making an appeal only as to costs has a high hurdle to meet, and that while this is a hearing of the original application, I am entitled to give the weight it deserves to the master’s decision and entitled to adopt the master’s reasoning as that of my own if I think fit (HKCP(2026) Vol 1 p.1253 §58/1/2).  Indeed, P accepted at the hearing that it faces a high hurdle.

Grounds for setting aside Costs Order

29.  As I noted above, P says that the Master erred in finding that the parties had reached a settlement agreement. P submits that the Costs Order was made on a mistaken basis by way of reference to the purported settlement agreement reflected in the Unsigned Consent Summons, and made without the benefit of the full factual picture as some relevant documents only came to light after the hearing on 7 October 2024. 

30.  P also notes that the hearing transcript does not record any submissions by the parties on costs, nor does it address the Master’s reasoning behind the Costs Order, such that P states that “it appears that the Costs Order was made by reference to the purported agreement reflected in the Unsigned Consent Summons, rather than on a decision as to the terms of the Setting Aside Application itself”. 

31.  As to the above, it is clear from a plain read of the extract of the transcript of the hearing before the Master that both the settlement agreement, which she found had been concluded, and the Setting Aside Application, were considered.  Nonetheless, it is important to analyse each of the grounds replied upon by P in this appeal, and I now do so.

32.  P relies on the following arguments (and I have adopted the label given to each such argument as suggested by Ds):

 (i)     That it never authorized its then solicitors, Jal N. Karbhari & Co (“JNK”), to agree to settle the Setting Aside Application with Ds’ solicitors; nor did P itself ever agree to such a settlement (“Authority Argument”).  P argued before me that also a representative of JNK was present at the hearing before the Master, this was not the same as P being “legally represented” at that hearing;

 (ii)     That the purported settlement agreement was evidenced solely by the 28 September 2024 letter on JNK letterhead (“the JNK Acceptance Letter”), and the validity of such JNK Acceptance Letter is questionable (“Validity Argument”);

 (iii)     That the Master ought not to have used the Calderbank letters (i.e., without-prejudice-save-as-to-costs letters) to find the existence of a binding agreement to set aside the Default Judgment, as they are inadmissible for such purpose and cannot be used in proceedings before this Court save for the question of costs only (“Admissibility Argument”), a proposition for which P relies on the Court’s approach to “without prejudice save as to costs” correspondence as articulated by Hon Ma J (as he then was) in National Commercial Bank Ltd v Kanishi (Far East) Ltd & Anor, Po Ding Co Ltd (Claimant)[2005] 2 HKC 81;

 (iv)     Even if the parties’ solicitors reached an agreement to settle Ds’ Summons, it was still subject to the execution of a ‘Consent Summons’, and that the Master’s conclusion that “no term in the correspondence that agreement was subject to a written contract” was incorrect, since the correspondence must be construed as a whole to determine if a binding agreement was intended (“Subject-to-Contract Argument”).

P relies here on the principles as summarized by Recorder Linda Chan SC (as she then was) in Banco Del Austro, SA v Regal Prosper Trading Ltd & Ors,  HCA 477/2015 (14 March 2016, 1 April 2016, unreported) at §§20-26.

P says that in the present case, the parties’ intention to reduce the agreed terms into a written agreement in the form of a Consent Summons, and their failure to conclude the settlement agreement, is clear from the correspondence exchanged between them.

33.  Ds’ respective responses to the above arguments are, in summary and in the same order, as follows:

 (i)     That the Authority Argument fails in limine and should be rejected, since actual authority is irrelevant because a party’s legal representative in an action has implied or ostensible authority to compromise the suit without reference to his client (Waugh v HB Clifford & Sons [1982] Ch 374 (EWCA) at pp.387A-388B; cited with approval in Demy Engineering Ltd v Sau San Tong Management Ltd [2022] HKDC 31 at §70(2)(ii));

 (ii)     That the Validity Argument should be rejected because, contrary to what is said in P’s skeleton, JNK has not in fact confirmed that it did not send the JNK Acceptance Letter  (which was timestamped one minute after JNK’s alleged office hours so likely issued within JNK office hours), and if indeed the validity of the JNK Acceptance Letter was questionable, JNK could have but has not produced any such statement or documentation to this effect.  Further, and importantly from my perspective, a representative of JNK attended the hearing before the Master, where Ds heavily relied on the JNK Acceptance Letter, and no complaint was raised by such representative at the hearing before the Master;

 (iii)     That the Admissibility Argument is wrong in law because it is trite that despite the without prejudice rule, where the issue is whether such without prejudice communications have resulted in a concluded compromise agreement, such communications are admissible (Lai Tai Miu, Rovana v Everest Timothy Wodehouse [2021] HKCFI 206).  Ds say that this was precisely the issue in question here, i.e., whether or not the parties reached a settlement agreement by exchange of the YTT Offer Letter and JNK Acceptance Letter, and thus such correspondence was admissible.  Again importantly, the JNK representative present at the hearing before the Master did not suggest otherwise;

 (iv)     In respect of P’s Subject-to-Contract Argument, Ds make various arguments, in reliance on various authorities, which can be summarized into the following key arguments:

 (1)     that the Court has an interest in upholding agreements to compromise disputes (In Colchester Borough Council v Smith[1992] Ch 421 at 435 D-E), and once a compromise was reached the antecedent dispute cannot be relitigated (Master Weaving Ltd v Hanbo Enterprises Ltd (unreported; HCA 676/2012; 21.7.2014) at §89); 

 (2)     that the YTT Offer Letter and the JNK Acceptance Letter resulted in an immediately binding settlement agreement, despite a Consent Summons not being signed, placing reliance on the principles relating to the formation of a settlement agreement as set out in Re MSB International Ltd [2023] 1 HKLRD 386 at §41, which in turn refers to the Banco del Austro authority relied upon by P);

 (3)     that the parties were legally represented, and the exchange of correspondence (by way of the YTT Offer Letter and JNK Acceptance Letter) whereby the six terms offered and accepted comprised the material components of Ds’ Summons, which suggests indisputably that the parties intended to agree and did agree on a settlement, that the settlement terms were clear and unequivocal and covered all material terms required to settle Ds’ Summons, and that those terms involved consideration on each side;

 (4)     that objectively, the parties’ contemplation of the signing of a consent summons was no more than a formality and did not prevent the agreement from being immediately binding;

 (5)     that although the hearing being fixed before the Master meant that it was necessary for a consent summons to be signed to vacate the hearing and memoralise the parties’ agreed terms into the form of a Court order, this necessary formal step does not undermine the binding effect of the parties’ concluded settlement, and that even P’s counsel accept that the JNK Acceptable Letter was only “intended to reduce the agreed terms into a written contract in the form of a consent summons” (emphasis added by Ds); and

 (6)     the law implies a term that the parties will cooperate such that each would be protected from the consequences of an attempted withdrawal from the agreement by the other party, and thus the Court is able to make a consent order giving effect to that concluded compromise despite the refusal by a party to sign the consent summons (Lam Fung Ying v Ho Tung Sing [1993] 2 HKLR 187 at p.190 (lines 5-10) and Asia-Pac Infrastructure Development Ltd v Ing Yim Leung, Alexander & Ors (unreported; HSMP 196/2011; 26.5.2011, at §47)).

Ds say in the alternative that even if there was no binding settlement between the parties, at the very least, P is estopped from departing from its clear and unequivocal agreement for the Default Judgment to be set aside, on which Ds have self-evidently relied in their conduct of this application.  Ds say this is also a procedural election which P is not permitted to go back on, see Keane, Estoppel by Conduct and Election AT §15-022, which states: “A litigant may be faced with a choice between inconsistent steps in the litigation.If he represents to his opponent that he has adopted one and the latter changes his position and would be prejudiced if the election was reversed the representor may be estopped from doing this.”.

Apportionment of Stage 1 Costs and Stage 2 Costs

34.  On the allocation of what I refer to above, adopting Ds’ terminology, as ‘Stage 1 Costs’ and ‘Stage 2 Costs’, P’s position, as stated in its skeleton, is that it is well-established where a regular judgment is set aside due to the defendant’s fault, the usual order is for the plaintiff to be awarded its costs in any event.  P states that this practice, however, is not appropriate where neither party is at fault, and in such cases, costs should be in the cause.   P submits further that once the basis of the defendant’s defence has been disclosed, the costs for resisting the set aside application ought to follow the event, i.e., the costs from that point onwards should be borne by the party unsuccessful in resisting or pursuing such application. (See Welson International Ltd v Jebson Investments Ltd (HCA 2620/2008, 29 June 2010, unreported), §§14, 16, 23, 26, and as endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Harbour Hero Enterprises Ltd v Chau Nung Tai  at §27).

35.  P states that as it is not disputed that the Default Judgment is a regular judgment, and as Ds only disclosed the merits of their defence on 23 September 2024, P is entitled to costs up to 23 September 2024, including the costs of perusal of Ds’ affirmation of Yu Hiu Tung (which disclosed such merits of Ds’ defence).

36.  As to Stage 2 Costs, P states that as the 7 October 2024 hearing did not dispose of the Setting Aside Application on its merits, the costs of and occasioned by the Setting Aside Application after 23 September 2024 should be in the cause, including the costs of the 7 October 2024 hearing itself.

37.  Ds say of P’s position that it is factually wrong, in that the Master expressly held in favour of Ds both on the settlement agreement ground and D1’s substantive defence.

38.  Ds further say that P continued to resist D1’s Setting Aside Application until the very end, as confirmed by P’s Notice of Appeal filed by JNK shortly after the hearing seeking to restore the Default Judgment.

39.  Thus, having contested and failed to concede the merits of the setting aside, the Master was correct in awarding Ds the costs of the hearing, and P’s argument on Stage 2 Costs should therefore be rejected.

Analysis

40.  So far as the appeal in respect of the Costs Order is concerned, I now proceed to address each basis advanced by P.

41.  As to whether the Master erred in making the Costs Order on the mistaken basis that the parties had reached a settlement agreement, I am not persuaded that the Master did so err.  I find that the Master’s conclusion, that the parties did conclude a settlement, was correct as a matter of law and also reasonable in the circumstances and took into account such matters that should have been taken into account.  It is necessary to repeat here that I do not consider that the evidence applied to be adduced by way of P’s Ladd v Marshall Application are such that the outcome would have been influenced in any meaningful way.  Rather, it seems to me that the Master had the relevant facts and evidence before, and the benefit of submissions by way of an oral hearing, at which it appears a representative of JNK was present, but by whom the objections advanced by P’s now counsel before me were not advanced by her.

42.  As to P’s objections before me on this first ground of whether a settlement agreement had been reached, I agree with the answers given by Ds to each of P’s objections.  In particular:

 (i)     I am not persuaded by the Authority Argument, and agree with the position of the Ds, that actual authority is irrelevant where there is implied or ostensible authority, which in my view there clearly was here.

 (ii)     I am likewise not persuaded by the Validity Argument, and although the facts around the correspondence are nuanced, and I note P’s counsel sought to advance new arguments on the basis of such correspondence (which Ds’ counsel objected to as impermissible), there is not enough in my view to refute the position that the settlement was validly concluded.

 (iii)     I am also not persuaded that the Admissibility Argument is wrong in law.  I agree with Ds’ articulation of the law on this aspect, being that without prejudice communications are admissible where they have resulted in a concluded compromise agreement, and as such, the Master was right to consider such without-prejudice-save-as-to-costs correspondence, and I note again that it was not suggested otherwise to her at the hearing before her which was attended by a representative of JNK.

 (iv)     Finally, P’s Subject-to-Contract Argument also does not stand.  I say this in the light of the position at law that a court has an interest in upholding agreements to compromise disputes, and in this case, an immediately binding settlement was, in my view, concluded.  Even if such concluded agreement had to be presented in the form of a Consent Summons for the purposes of the hearing before the Master, placing reliance on the need for that Consent Summons to legally conclude an already concluded agreement would be placing an argument of form over one of substance, which I do not consider can stand. Although I do not need to decide the alternative argument advanced by Ds’ counsel premised upon estoppel, I state for completeness that I agree that P was estopped from reneging on the election it made to conclude a settlement with Ds.

43.  Thus, in my view, the Master made no error in making the Costs Order on the basis of the parties having reached a settlement.

44.  The Master went on to consider, in the alternative where she was wrong on the agreement to settle, as to whether Ds should get an order on their summons.  This shows the contrary of what P asserts, and it is clear to me as I said above that the Master proceeded, when making the Costs Order, on the basis of both the settlement agreement and also the substance of the Setting Aside Application.

45.  This leads me to the analysis for the second basis for P’s appeal, that the Master erred in law by failing to apply the established principle that, in the case of a regular default judgment, P should be awarded its costs up to the date when Ds disclosed the merits of their defence.  As mentioned above, the Master did consider the Setting Aside Application on its merits.  I agree with Ds’ submission that the facts demonstrate that P continued to resist the Setting Aside Application until the very end, and thus P has little basis to suggest that it should be awarded the costs of the hearing before the Master.

46.  The Master, as is clear from perusing the transcript, considered the submissions and evidence, and took the view that it could not be said that the defence was “not potentially credible or carrying some degree of conviction, and based on what has been submitted to [the Master] were some sound legal basis, matters which [the Master] cannot dismiss summarily at this stage”.   She then proceeded to conclude, considering all matters in the round, that the Default Judgment be set aside.

47.  Taking into account the legal principles relevant to such appeal before me, and in particular that I am entitled to give what weight I think the Master’s decision deserves and to adopt her reasoning as that of my own, I proceed to do so and decide that there is no basis to disturb her finding as to both the Stage 1 Costs and the Stage 2 Costs.

Costs

48.  Turning to the costs of this re-hearing, counsel made submissions before me at the hearing as to their respective positions on the costs of this appeal. 

49.  I note there appeared to be certain facts as to the timing of exchange of submissions by the parties that are contested.  Further, although Ds submitted their Statement of Costs to the Court with a copy to P, it appears that P’s Statement of Costs was submitted only to the Court without a copy to Ds, which unilateral communication Ds’ counsel submitted was procedurally impermissible.

50.  Ultimately however, the parties appear to be in broad agreement as to the principles that apply for me to consider against the facts that were presented to me.

51.  Having heard both parties’ submissions, taking a broad brush approach and bearing in mind the general rule that costs follow the event (and thus taking into account my decision on the Costs Order and also the Ladd v Marshall Application and the circumstances in which I grant it, as well as the narrowing of P’s appeal at a late stage), I summarily assess that of the costs sought by Ds, an amount of HK$220,000 is reasonable and proportionate, and thus fully recoverable and payable to the Defendants forthwith.

Conclusion

52.  For the above reasons, I dismiss this appeal and leave the Costs Order of the Master undisturbed.

53.  For the reasons set out above relating to the Ladd v Marshall Application, I grant such application in the light of the circumstances in question.

54.  I also award costs to the Defendants in the amount of HK$220,000 payable by the Plaintiff forthwith.

55.  It remains for this court to express its gratitude to the counsel who have ably assisted the court by way of their written skeletons, oral arguments and accompany evidence.