NEQUINTO, RUDMAE AMAQUIN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5412 · HCAL 1002/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1002/2024
[2026] HKCFI 5412
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1002 OF 2024
BETWEEN
| |Nequinto, Rudmae Amaquin |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
|Π|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant or |
| |counsel in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of
Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 26 June 2024, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 20 April 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL00
1002_2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board rejected the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection in Hong Kong as not substantiated on all the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”).
Accordingly, the Board confirmed the decision of the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 25 April 2022, which rejected the
applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. In Form 86, the applicant named the Board as the putative respondent
but spelt the Board’s name wrong, and did not name any putative
interested party.
4. In fact, the Director should be named as the putative interested
party.
5. This court therefore makes an order on its own motion to amend the
name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and
to add “Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party.
Late application
6. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
7. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 26 June 2024, which was more
than 14 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 20 April 2023).
The applicant was hence late for more than 11 months in making the
Leave Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any
good reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application.
8. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
9. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay when she filed the Leave
Application.
10. A delay of more than 11 months is very substantial, and there is
simply no reason for this court to extend the time for the applicant
to make the Leave Application when no explanation was given for the
delay at all. More importantly, there is no merit in the Leave
Application whatsoever as discussed below.
11. Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to
grant any extension of time to the applicant to file the Leave
Application. The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the
ground of being made out of time alone.
12. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still deal with
the Leave Application as discussed below.
The applicant’s case
13. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
14. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to the Philippines, she would be harmed or killed by her
husband, who had physically abused her in the past, as she had stopped
sending money to him.
Disposal on paper
15. The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave
Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application
can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court.
Hence, the Leave Application is dealt with on paper.
Grounds for judicial review
16. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
17. The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial
review in Form 86. In her supporting affidavit dated 26 June 2024,
the applicant mentioned that she was not satisfied with the Board’s
Decision because internal relocation was not possible for her, as she
was still not safe and her husband still threatened her. The
applicant also mentioned that she was worried about her own safety and
the safety of her kids, her memory was not strong enough and that was
why “some” [sic] she also forgot.
Discussion
18. First of all, the applicant’s danger from her husband in her country
had been duly assessed but rejected by the Board. If she intends to
challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an
application for judicial review.
19. With regards to the applicant’s claim in her affidavit that internal
relocation was not possible for her, this court notes that the Board
actually rejected her claim for non-refoulement protection for reason
that it did not consider that the applicant faced a real risk of the
proscribed harm from her husband if she was refouled to the
Philippines. The Board only considered the viability of internal
relocation for the applicant for the sake of completeness, and had
given its reasons in paragraphs 56 and 57 of the Board’s Decision for
its view.
20. This court finds no fault or unreasonableness in the Board’s said
finding.
21. As to the applicant’s assertion that her memory was “not strong” and
hence sometimes she forgot, the Board discussed this issue in
paragraph 41 of the Board’s Decision, and explicitly stated that it
did not consider the applicant’s inability to remember dates affected
her credibility but it caused the Board difficulty in following her
claim. In fact, as aforesaid, the Board rejected the applicant’s
claim as it found that the applicant did not face a real risk of the
proscribed harm from her husband if she was refouled to the
Philippines. Her claim was not rejected on adverse finding on her
credibility due to her inability to recall details as to the dates of
the events she described.
22. This court also notes that the Board had addressed the applicant’s
worries about her sons in paragraph 48 of the Board’s Decision. In
fact, the applicant’s elder son is an adult now, and the Board was
plainly aware of the fact that her sons were taken care of by the
applicant’s parents, and all of them were not disturbed by the
applicant’s husband.
23. Thus, all the matters raised by the applicant in her affidavit could
not amount to any valid ground to challenge the Board’s Decision.
24. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
25. Thus, despite the fact that the applicant failed to advance any valid
ground for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize
the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality as aforesaid.
26. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 12 December 2022. The applicant was present and was
thus given the chance to present her case to the Board in person.
27. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board gave full and
detailed reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claims. Its findings
and assessment of the applicant’s claim were laid out in paragraphs 41
to 58 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the
same here.
28. In gist, the Board found that the applicant had only made bare
assertions and she presented no objective proof to support them. The
applicant claimed that she had never seen her husband since 2017, and
the alleged death threat from her husband was only a hearsay from the
applicant’s sister, who told her about the threat in November 2021.
As to the assault by the applicant’s husband which was the subject of
the applicant’s complaint to the local district office, the applicant
needed no medical treatment and withdrew the complaint herself.
29. Further, the Board found that given the unemployment status of the
applicant’s husband and his drinking and drug taking problems, it was
unlikely that the Alpha Kappa Rho International Fraternity and
Sorority, which was involved in humanitarian projects and services to
others, would assist the applicant’s husband to trace the applicant.
30. Moreover, the Board considered that the applicant had strong family
support, and in view of the applicant’s years of education and work
experience, the Board found it unbelievable that the applicant did not
accept that the authorities in the Philippines would treat any threats
made against her and any further assaults upon her as unworthy of
criminal investigation and prosecution if there was sufficient
evidence to support such a course of action.
31. Thus, the Board did not find that the applicant faced a real risk of
any of the proscribed forms of harm from her husband and concluded
that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection failed on
all the applicable grounds under the USM.
32. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including
the assessment of evidence and risk of harm, was solely within the
ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s appeal/petition.
This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board
reached its decision.
33. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
34. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
35. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed for being
made out of time and devoid of merits.
Dated the 23rd day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 23/09/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after | |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted | |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); |Applicant’s ref. no: |23/09/2026 |
| |Nil | |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | | |
|within 14 days after | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|the grant of leave and| |Board/Non-refoulement |
|serve it in accordance| |Claims Petition Office |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |Putative respondent’s |
|and | |ref. no.: |
| | |USM 20253 |
|c) supply to every | | |
|other party copies of | |Director of Immigration |
|every affidavit which | |Putative interested |
|the Applicant proposes| |party’s ref. no.: |
|to use at the hearing,| |QA T/C 57/22 (formerly |
|including the | |RBCZ 5000480/21) |
|affidavit in support | | |
|of the application for| |Department of Justice, |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Senior Assistant Law |
|6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1