KAJEM MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH AL v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 3557/2019

[2026] HKCFI 97

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 3557 OF 2019

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  This is the Applicant’s application, by summons (“the Summons”) filed on 1 September 2025, seeking leave to appeal this Court’s decision dated 19 May 2025 (“the Decision”), which dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Petition Office dated 21 November 2019. That decision confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 25 May 2018, rejecting his non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds other than torture risk.

2.  Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order. The Applicant is therefore late in taking out the Summons by over 3 months. In determining whether to extend time for appealing a refusal of leave, the court will consider: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh and Torture Claims Appeal Board/non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office CAMP 64/2020 [2020] HKCA 844 at §10).

3.  Given the 14-day appeal period, the delay in this matter is substantive. In his affirmation, the Applicant merely asserts that he is unrepresented and lacks the means to instruct a private lawyer. I am not satisfied that these assertions constitute a sufficient or satisfactory explanation for the delay. No undue emphasis can be placed on the fact that the Applicant is a litigant in person. It was, and remains, incumbent upon him to comply with the procedural time frame in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Court (see AXA China Region Insurance Co Ltd v Leong Fong Cheng, CACV 113/2016, 28 October 2016, §47, Lam VP (as he then was)). While the absence of legal representation may warrant certain allowances in case management and the conduct of hearings, it will generally not justify a lower standard of compliance with the Court rules or orders (see Success Lane Development Limited v Fergurson Hong Kong Limited trading as New World Millenium Hong Kong Hotel [2024] HKCA 839, §26 (G Lam JA)).

4.  Turning to the most important consideration, namely, the merits of the proposed appeal, I note that the Applicant has not advanced any valid or arguable grounds of appeal against the Decision (see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017).

5.  In the Decision, I refused leave as I was not remotely satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision was reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. Given the seriousness of the issues under consideration, an enhanced standard was applied. After considering the Applicant’s evidence as a whole, the Board had serious doubts about his case and concluded that there were numerous significant discrepancies and deficiencies undermining his claim to be an active supporter, member or the Union level president of the BNP. The Board also refused the contention that it would be unduly harsh for him to relocate. It is well-established that the assessment and evaluation of the evidence, COI materials, risks of harm, state protection, and the viability of internal relocation fell squarely within the Board’s province. The Applicant was unable to show any error of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality in the Board’s Decision, which concluded that (i) there was no real risk that he would be arbitrarily deprived of his life, imposed death penalty, or otherwise have his rights under BOR 2 infringed; (ii) there were no substantial grounds for believing that he faced a real risk of being subjected to torture or CIDTP if returned such as to constitute a breach of BOR 3; and (iii) he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.

6.  To allow the Applicant to proceed with a challenge that is plainly without merit would only serve to prolong the proceedings unnecessarily, thereby prejudicing the proper administration of the refoulement process and undermining the interests of the proposed respondent.

7.  Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave to the Applicant to appeal out of time and dismiss the Summons.