TKW v. CYKJ AND OTHERS

CAMP 216/2025, [2026] HKCA 96

On Appeal from [2025] HKCFI 4565

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 216 OF 2025

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCMP No. 319 OF 2025)

________________________

________________________

________________________

J U D G M E N T

________________________

G Lam JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  The plaintiff, father of 2 children, issued an originating summons (“OS”)  on 27 February 2025 seeking an order for the return of the 2 children to Hong Kong and to make them wards of the Hong Kong court.  He named as the 1^st defendant his wife the mother of the 2 children, and as the 2^nd and 3^rd defendants his wife’s parents.  We shall refer to the persons involved as “Father”, “Mother”, “Children” (being a “Daughter” born in June 2008 and a “Son” born in July 2012)  and “Grandparents” respectively.

2.  By her judgment of 29 September 2025 (“Judgment”)  ([2025] HKCFI 4565), Au-Yeung J imposed a temporary stay of the OS pending the determination of certain Australian proceedings which we shall describe below.  By a further decision on 31 October 2025 (“Decision”)  ([2025] HKCFI 5184), Au-Yeung J permanently stayed all further proceedings in the OS, refused to grant leave to appeal against the Judgment, and made a costs order nisi against the Father.

3.  The Father now applies to this court by summons dated 12 November 2025 for leave to appeal against both the Judgment and the Decision.  Pursuant to Order 59 rule 2A(5)  of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), we consider it appropriate to determine the application based on the written materials without an oral hearing.  This is our judgment on the application.

Background

4.  The factual background may be briefly stated. The Father was born in 1972 and the Mother in 1979.  They were married in Hong Kong in December 2007 and appear to have drifted apart during the COVID-19 pandemic, though they were not yet divorced.  The Children were born to them in 2008 and 2012 respectively.  All 4 of them were born and raised in Hong Kong, except that the Mother had moved with her family to live in Australia when she was 6 to 11 years old, before returning to Hong Kong.

5.  The Father used to run a small tutorial centre in Hong Kong and the Mother was a solicitor.  In 2015, the Mother set up her own law firm as the sole proprietor, with the Father as the legal clerk.  At some point during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Mother and the Children moved to the Grandparents’ home, while the Father had lived alone.

6.  It is not in dispute that the couple had discussed the subject of moving to Australia with the Children, which was the Mother’s wish.  Apparently the Father did not rule out emigration to Australia but hesitated to do so before everything was in order including accommodation, schooling and work opportunities.

7.  On 6 April 2023, the Mother and the Grandparents moved the Children to Brisbane without saying farewell to the Father.  The Mother also closed down the law firm, which ceased trading on 31 July 2023.  The Mother said the Father had consented to the move to Australia but the Father disputes this, and it seems to be the case that the trip was kept from him who was only notified when they were in Australia.  The Father’s perception that the Children had been “abducted” by the Mother had generated much acrimony which has unfortunately pervaded all subsequent proceedings.

8.  Four sets of legal proceedings have since arisen as follows:

(1)  Shortly following the Children’s removal to Brisbane, in April 2023, the Father made an application under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”)  seeking the return of the Children from Queensland to Hong Kong.  The application was transmitted by the Central Authority of Hong Kong to the Central Authority of Australia.  In September 2023, upon all requisite information being provided by the Father, the Queensland Central Authority (“QCA”)  instituted proceedings under the Hague Convention in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (“FCFCOA”)  against the Mother on 4 September 2023 (BRC 11845/2023)  (“Convention Proceedings”).

(2)  On 12 May 2023, the Mother commenced proceedings in the FCFCOA (BRC 5963/2023)  (“AFC Proceedings”), seeking parenting orders in respect of the Children.

(3)  On the same date of 12 May 2023, the Father commenced proceedings in the Family Court in Hong Kong (FCMP 69/2023)  (“HKFC Proceedings”)  for the return of the Children and joint custody.

(4)  On 27 February 2025, the Father commenced wardship proceedings by the OS (HCMP 319/2025)  in the Court of First Instance of Hong Kong (“OS Proceedings”), seeking an order that the Children be made wards of court and for their return to Hong Kong.  He later made clear that his application was confined to the Son.

9.  Although the subject matter of the present application for leave to appeal is the OS Proceedings, it is necessary to describe what has happened in the other 3 sets of proceedings.

The Convention Proceedings

10.  The Convention Proceedings, initiated by the Father and instituted by the QCA as applicant, were opposed by the Mother on the ground that the Father had consented to removal, that the Children had reached an age of maturity where their wishes should be considered, and that any return order would expose to Children to grave psychological harm or place them in an intolerable situation.  The application was originally fixed for hearing in Australia in November 2023, but was later adjourned a few times, eventually to 17 July 2024, upon the Mother’s requests for time for assessing the Son’s mental health.  A report made by a court child expert dated 31 October 2023 on the welfare and wishes of the Children, intituled “Regulation 26 Hague Report”, was, broadly speaking, unfavourable to the Father’s position. The Independent Children’s Lawyer of Legal Aid Queensland for the Children also took the position that a return order should not been made.  Eventually, on around 7 June 2024, the Father was informed that the QCA intended to withdraw from the Convention Proceedings and was asked if he wished to be substituted into the proceedings.  It is unclear why the QCA wished to withdraw except that it was not upon the request of the Central Authority of Hong Kong.  Although the Father objected and indicated he had no ability to be substituted, on 14 June 2024 the QCA filed a notice of withdrawal.  As the QCA had withdrawn and the Father was not substituted, on 20 June 2024, Williams J of the FCFCOA made an order recording that all outstanding applications in those proceedings were dismissed.  (On 23 June 2024, the Daughter turned 16 and the Hague Convention ceased to apply with regard to her.)  The Father filed an application in October 2024 to appeal out of time but it was dismissed by a Registrar in November 2024.  His further application for review of the dismissal was rejected by Austin J in December 2024.

The HKFC Proceedings

11.  On 12 May 2023, the Father filed an originating summons in the Family Court against the Mother seeking, inter alia, an order for the immediate return of the Children, an order restraining the Mother from removing them from Hong Kong, and joint custody.  On the same day he also filed an ex parte summons, on which an ex parte order was made by a Deputy District Judge on 15 May 2023 requiring the Mother immediately to return the Children to Hong Kong.  The Mother did not return the Children to Hong Kong but filed a summons on 4 July 2023 to vary the order.  The matter was initially adjourned to 20 March 2024 for substantive argument, but on 5 March 2024, these proceedings were ordered to be stayed pending the determination of the Convention Proceedings in Australia. On 2 October 2024, the Father applied by summons for the proceedings to be restored.  The Mother opposed the lifting of the stay, on the ground that the AFC Proceedings were on foot and that Australia was the appropriate forum for considering the circumstances and interests of the Children.  On 27 December 2024, the Father issued a summons to expedite the determination of his application to restore the proceedings, but this was unsuccessful.  On 27 January 2025, the Father issued a summons for the proceedings to be transferred to the Court of First Instance, but this was dismissed on 24 February 2025.  On 18 March 2025, HH Judge G Own adjourned the Father’s application to restore the proceedings to 11 September 2025 for substantive hearing.  The Mother subsequently filed an affidavit dated 27 May 2025 to update the Family Court on the development in the AFC Proceedings and the OS Proceedings in the Court of First Instance.  On 11 September 2025, upon hearing the Father in person and the Mother through video link, Judge Own ordered that the Father’s summons of 2 October 2024 be adjourned sine die with liberty to restore by either party only with leave of the court and upon final determination of the OS Proceedings and the AFC Proceedings.

The AFC Proceedings

12.  The AFC Proceedings brought by the Mother were initially stayed in light of the Convention Proceedings, but with the latter having come to an end, the stay was lifted on 2 July 2024.  On 23 July 2024, a Senior Judicial Registrar of the FCFCOA granted an interim order giving the Mother parental responsibility for the Children and sole decision-making authority in respect of all major long-term issues affecting the Children.  The matter was listed for further hearing on 30 August 2024.  It was noted in the order that in the event the Father failed to attend court on the next occasion, the matter might be heard on an undefended interim or final basis in his absence.  The Father did not file any evidence or appear at the hearing on 30 August 2024.  The court gave directions for the filing of an amended initiating application setting out the final order sought and the filing of evidence.  Subsequently, a “Specific Issues Report” dated 16 April 2025 was issued by a court child expert, expressing the view that if the Children were relocated to Hong Kong, their developmental needs and school lives would be severely disrupted.  The final hearing was fixed on 1 September 2025. 

13.  The Father had not filed any evidence in those proceedings, but he did put in a document close to the hearing setting out his position and he did take part by video link in the final hearing.  At the beginning of the hearing, the presiding judge, Baumann J, refused the Father’s request for an adjournment, and decided to proceed with the matter on an undefended basis, though that did not mean he could not hear from the Father and, as shown by the transcript, the Father continued to participate with the assistance of an interpreter, including cross-examining the Mother and the court child expert. At the end of the hearing the judge directed that the Father file and serve any written submissions by 29 September 2025. 

14.  Baumann J gave his judgment on 7 October 2025 (“Australian Judgment”).  His Honour stated that the question for him was: what is in the best interests of the Children.  He accepted that the Children had happy memories of life earlier in Hong Kong.  He also accepted that the Mother did not fully disclose to the Father her intention to leave Hong Kong with the Children in April 2023.  He found that the Children had a strong relationship with the Mother who had been their primary carer, but their relationship with the Father had a large degree been estranged to the extent it had deteriorated since they left Hong Kong.  He gave weight to the Children’s wishes which were strongly against returning to Hong Kong with the Father.  He found the Children to be happy and stable in Australia.  At the end, he made orders, which, inter alia, granted the Mother the sole decision-making responsibility for major long-term issues of the Children with reasonable access to the Father, and ordered that the Children shall live with the Mother and that neither parent may remove the Son from Australia for a period of 3 years.

The OS Proceedings

15.  The OS was issued on 27 February 2025, shortly after the Father’s summons for the HKFC Proceedings to be transferred to the Court of First Instance was dismissed on 24 February 2025.  With the OS the Father filed an affirmation in support.  At the call-over hearing on 16 April 2025, Au-Yeung J gave directions for the Mother to file evidence and for the Department of Justice to attend and adjourned the OS to 7 May 2025.

16.  On 29 April 2025, the Mother filed her affidavit in opposition to the OS, which, inter alia, set out the developments in the Convention Proceedings and the AFC Proceedings.

17.  At the call-over hearing on 7 May 2025, Au-Yeung J directed the Department of Justice to provide an affirmation to explain the discontinuance of the Convention Proceedings.  An affirmation of a Senior Government Counsel was accordingly filed on 26 May 2025.  The judge also directed the Father to show cause by affirmation or written submissions, within 28 days after the Department of Justice’s affirmation, as to why the OS should not be dismissed for (i)  abuse of court proceedings, and (ii) want of jurisdiction.  The reason for that direction, as explained in [54]-[55] of the Judgment, was that there were prima facie reasons to show that the OS Proceedings were an abuse of process since there had been prior return proceedings under the Hague Convention which had been dismissed, and there were extant proceedings both in Australia and in Hong Kong concerning custody, care and control of the Children, in particular, the Son.  The Father duly provided his written submissions on 23 June 2025.  He made clear that his claim in the OS was limited to the return of the Son: see [66] of the Judgment.

18.  Upon inquiry from the court for further information about the AFC Proceedings, by letter of 15 August 2025, the Mother’s solicitors informed the judge that those proceedings were set down for final hearing on 1 September 2025.  In his response dated 25 August 2025, the Father said that as far as he understood, the nature of the hearing on 1 September 2025 was “the same as the interim order”.

19.  On 29 September 2025, Au-Yeung J gave her Judgment.

The Judgment

20.  In the Judgment, the judge first set out certain general principles.  In wardship proceedings, the court acts in a parental, administrative and inquisitorial manner and in a way that is best suited to serve the true interests of the ward, in order to protect the property and/or person of the ward, asking whether there is “a real need for wardship in the interest of the child” concerned: [56]-[58].  The court’s inherent jurisdiction on wardship is based on whether a child has been habitually resident in Hong Kong or is a Hong Kong permanent resident: [59].  Where a foreign court also has jurisdiction over the child, the court has to determine whether Hong Kong is the forum conveniens: [60]-[61].  The court has power to prevent its wardship jurisdiction from being abused, but the principles governing striking out should be applied with special care in child or family proceedings: [62]-[64].

21.  On the facts of the present case, the judge held that the filing of the wardship proceedings by way of the OS was not, in itself, duplicitous of the Convention Proceedings: [68]-[76].  The judge also accepted that the court has jurisdiction for wardship proceedings in respect of the Son who was habitually resident in Hong Kong before he moved to Australia in 2023: [77].

22.  However, the judge noted that in the AFC Proceedings, interim orders had been made granting parental responsibility for the Children and sole decision-making authority to the Mother and prohibiting the Son from leaving Australia.  Also, the AFC Proceedings had progressed to the final stage with a hearing on 1 September 2025 (though the outcome was not yet known at the time when the Judgment was issued).  The Father had notice of those proceedings although he had largely declined to engage in them.  The Judge held that given the developments, the wardship proceedings were duplicitous of the AFC Proceedings.  Her Ladyship concluded: “For reasons of judicial comity, the CFI should not conduct parallel proceedings on parental responsibility, custody, care and control, to burden the parties with yet another piece of litigation and run the risk of an inconsistent decision.”  See [79]-[85].

23.  Au-Yeung J also considered that, as the Hong Kong Family Court could deal with the Son’s return, custody, care and control in the HKFC Proceedings which the Father had sought to restore, and could also deal with the forum non conveniens issue raised by the Father against the Australian courts, the wardship proceedings were duplicitous of the HKFC Proceedings.  In any event Her Ladyship ruled that “the clearly and distinctly most appropriate forum” for determining the Son’s return, custody, care and control was Australia rather than Hong Kong. Although the Son was born and raised here, he had settled into a home, a school, and social life and extra-curricular activities in Australia for over 2 years.  He had been receiving education and medical treatment there.  Any investigation as to his mental state and other aspects of life would have to be undertaken there.  All the relevant witnesses, including the Mother and Grandparents, teachers and friends were in Australia.  See: [86]-[96].

24.  The judge considered that there was no emergency or real need for the court to exercise its wardship jurisdiction in relation to any matter that could not be dealt with in the AFC Proceedings (and the Father had not identified any), and that the Mother and Grandparents would be unnecessarily vexed if the OS Proceedings were taken further.  The judge concluded that whilst the initial filing of the OS was not an abuse of process, “the development of various pieces of litigation makes it entirely inappropriate to continue it”.  Accordingly, instead of striking it out for abuse or want of jurisdiction, the judge stayed the OS in favour of the AFC Proceedings.  She made an order nisi that there be no order as to costs.  See: [97]-[101].

The Decision

25.  On 7 October 2025, as mentioned above, Baumann J issued his reasoned judgment in the AFC Proceedings, making orders on a final basis that the Mother shall have sole decision-making responsibility for major long-term issues for the Children and that the Children shall live with the Mother, and other orders concerning time with the Father, exchange of information and overseas travel. 

26.  By summons dated 13 October 2025, the Father applied in Hong Kong for the restoration of the OS Proceedings, alternatively for leave to appeal against the Judgment.  He filed a supporting affirmation exhibiting the transcript of the hearing of the AFC Proceedings on 1 September 2025 and the Son’s school report for 2025.

27.  Au-Yeung J heard the parties on 28 October 2025 and handed down her Decision 3 days later.  Her Ladyship noted that the FCFCOA was aware of the Father’s repeated emphases that the Son’s habitual residence was in Hong Kong but had been unlawfully removed by the Mother in 2023.  Nevertheless, the FCFCOA had fully considered the question of custody, care and control of the Son in the light of what was in his best interests and came to a final judgment.  There were therefore no other aspects concerning the Son that the Hong Kong court needs to deal with in wardship proceedings.  The judge said that the Father’s complaint of gross injustice in the AFC Proceedings was “very, very far from the truth”. Accordingly, she dismissed the application to restore the wardship proceedings and made permanent the stay of the OS: [3]-[11].  The judge also refused leave to appeal against the Judgment: [12]-[19].  She made an order nisi that the costs of the summons be to the Mother: [20].

Application for leave to appeal

28.  By summons dated 12 November 2025, the Father applies to this court for leave to appeal against the Judgment and the Decision, filing together a document setting out 5 draft grounds of appeal and a statement as to why leave to appeal should be granted.  His contentions can be summarized as follows:

(1)  Ground 1. The judge erred in her findings on the question of forum non conveniens.

(2)  Ground 2. The judge erred in her findings on the OS being duplicitous of the Australian Proceedings.

(3)  Ground 3. The judge erred in staying the OS in favour of the AFC Proceedings.

(4)  Ground 4. The judge erred in certain factual findings in the Judgment.

(5)  Ground 5. The judge erred in making the costs order in the Decision.

29.  The Father applied for legal aid and an automatic stay of his summons came into effect on 18 November 2025, but this was lifted by directions of 2 December 2025 at the Father’s own request.

30.  As provided by section 14AA(4)  of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4), leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

Discussion

31.  First, we note that the order in the Judgment is in the nature of an interim stay, staying the OS in favour of and effectively pending the AFC Proceedings.  The question of an interim stay is now academic, given that the AFC Proceedings have come to a conclusion with the Australian Judgment handed down on 7 October 2025, and given that Au-Yeung J has subsequently imposed a permanent stay by her Decision.  There is no point for the Father to appeal against the interim stay ordered in the Judgment.  Leave to appeal should for this reason alone be refused.

32.  As for the order in the Decision imposing a permanent stay on the OS, it seems to us that, as the Father accepts, leave to appeal is required, since it is an interlocutory order even though its effect was to put an end to the OS Proceedings and it does not fall within any of the exceptions specified in Order 59 rule 21 of the Rules of the High Court: Bright Shipping Ltd v Changhong Group (HK)  Ltd [2019] 2 HKLRD 220.  (Likewise, if the Father wishes to appeal against the judge’s costs order on a stand-alone basis, leave is required: s 14(3)(e)  of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4).)   An application for leave to appeal may only be made to the court below in the first instance within the specified time limit: RHC Order 59, rule 2B(1)(b).  By seeking leave from this court by way of the summons dated 12 November 2025 without first applying to the judge for leave to appeal, the Father has failed to follow the proper procedure.  There are important functions served by a first-tier application for leave to appeal in the lower court, and the power under Order 59 rule 2B(4)  to permit an application to be made direct to this court is confined to exceptional cases: Singh Arjun v Secretary for Justice [2014] 2 HKLRD 678, at [5]-[7].  There is no exceptional circumstance here to justify this course.  As Lam VP said in Singh Arjun at [12]: “Unjustified attempts to sidestep the first-tier stage will not be entertained and this Court will dismiss an application which should be brought in the first instance to the court below.”  Accordingly, the Father’s application for leave to appeal against the Decision is to be dismissed for this reason alone.

33.  Whilst strictly unnecessary, we have in the particular circumstances of this case thoroughly considered the proposed grounds of appeal, and will discuss them briefly below, if only to let the Father know that his application has not failed on purely procedural grounds.

34.  Ground 1 (forum non conveniens): It is trite that the scope for challenging a decision on stay on forum non conveniens grounds is limited.  The relevant principles have been set out in Bright Shipping Ltd v Changhong Group (HK)  Ltd (No 2) [2019] 5 HKLRD 30 at [4]-[11].

35.  As a preliminary point, the Father complains that the parties were deprived of their rights to address the issue of stay.  We do not agree.  It is the Father who raised the issue of forum non conveniens in his submissions: see [89] of the Judgment.  Further, the issue of duplicity of proceedings, on which the judge had specifically called for submissions, very substantially overlapped with the issue of forum non conveniens.

36.  In any event, the main reason for Au-Yeung J to grant the interim stay in the Judgment is the duplicity of pending proceedings: [85], [97]-[99].  There was a lis alibi pendens in Australia which had progressed to a very advanced stage, and the OS Proceedings would simply duplicate litigation with all the undesirable attendant consequences.  The judge cannot be faulted for giving weight to avoiding burdening the parties with another piece of litigation and avoiding the risk of inconsistent court decisions.  Nor can we see any significant material error in her assessment of the evidence and evaluation of the factors leading to her conclusion that the clearly and distinctly more appropriate forum is Australia rather than Hong Kong: [91]-[92] of the Judgment.  Although the Father has raised various disputes over the judge’s findings, it seems to us that he has failed to establish any palpable error in the judge’s assessment.  The fact that the Father did not take much part or that he had found it difficult to participate fully in the AFC Proceedings does not mean that the Australian court (the FCFCOA)  was not a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of the matter it had adjudicated upon; nor does it provide any reason for the Hong Kong court not to recognise the AFC Proceedings and the eventual judgment in those proceedings.

37.  Ground 2 (duplicity of proceedings): The Father maintains that the OS Proceedings were not duplicitous of the AFC Proceedings, as he sought the return of the Son.  We disagree.  Whether the Son should be returned to Hong Kong depends on what lies in his best interests, and this very much overlaps with the question concerning the custody, care and control of the Son, and indeed with similar questions relating to the Daughter, for the potential separation of the siblings is also a matter to be taken into account.  As to the Father’s complaint that it is the Mother who caused the duplication of proceedings, we note that the OS Proceedings were commenced by the Father later in time, and the HKFC Proceedings and the AFC Proceedings were commenced on the same date.  The Convention Proceedings initiated by the Father earlier were abandoned by the QCA and the Father chose not to be substituted into those proceedings. 

38.  The Father was no doubt hurt by the way in which the Mother left for Australia with the Children.  One can also detect that he continues to feel aggrieved that not only did the Convention Proceedings not result in a prompt order for the Children’s return, but the lapse of time had “rewarded” the Mother in that the Children’s settling down into life in Australia has been taken “against him”.  These feelings are understandable but will not advance his position in these or similar proceedings in which the paramount consideration for the court is the interests of the Children.  It is to be hoped that the Father can find a way in seeing beyond “winning” or “losing” legal fights and in repairing and maintaining a relationship with his Children.

39.  Ground 3 (decision to stay): The Father repeats that he has never engaged in the AFC Proceedings.  The judge did consider the Father’s failure to participate, but did not think it was a sufficient factor not to stay the OS Proceedings: [81]-[84] of the Judgment.  The exercise of the broad discretionary jurisdiction in wardship requires the judge to assess whether there is a “real need” to make a wardship order in the interest of the child: [58] of the Judgment.  The judge was entitled to take into account the absence of emergency in her discretion whether to exercise that jurisdiction.  As to the judge’s finding on the absence of emergency, the judge took into account the Son’s problem in August 2023 ([18] of the Judgment), but she was also entitled to take into account evidence of more recent developments albeit disputed by the Father, as she did in [48]-[49] and [91] of the Judgment.

40.  Ground 4 (factual findings): The Father complains that the judge erred in her factual statements relating to the termination of the Convention Proceedings ([4(2)] and [6] of the Judgment), the parties’ separation ([7] of the Judgment), and when the Children ceased to live with the Father ([13] of the Judgment).  The Father has not developed this ground in his written statement.  We do not see how the judge can be said to have been plainly wrong in those respects.  In any event, it appears to us that the facts concerned were not crucial to the judge’s determination in the Judgment or the Decision.

41.  Ground 5 (costs order): The Father attacks the costs order in the Decision on the ground that the judge failed to give him an opportunity to argue costs and that it has departed from the usual order of no order on costs in proceedings involving children.  The Father has not developed this ground in his written statement.  It seems to us to be misconceived.  The judge ordered costs in favour of the Mother expressly “on a nisi basis”: Decision, [20(4)].  The whole point of an order nisi is to afford the parties an opportunity to ask the court to vary it.  There is no basis for the Father to appeal against the order nisi without first having applied to the judge for variation.  We also note that the judge did make no order as to costs in the Judgment, and that the costs order nisi in the Decision was made against the Father because he failed in his attempt to impugn the Judgment.

Disposition and costs

42.  For the reasons given above, we do not think the proposed grounds of appeal have any reasonable prospect of success.  There is no other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.  Accordingly, the Father’s summons is dismissed.

43.  We make an order pursuant to RHC Order 59 rule 2A(8)  that no party may request for this determination to be reconsidered at an oral hearing inter partes.

44.  We make an order that the Father has to pay the Mother’s costs of his summons in this court.  If the Mother does seek costs, she is to file and serve a statement of costs within 14 days hereof.  The Father may lodge and serve a statement of objections to specific items and their quantum within 14 days thereafter.  The court will summarily assess the costs payable on paper.