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CACV 317/2006
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 317 OF 2006
(ON APPEAL FROM DCCJ NO. 55 of 2005)
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BETWEEN
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THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF |
Plaintiff/ |
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CHAMPION COURT |
Respondent |
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and
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PANG PING FAN PETER |
1st Defendant/
1st Appellant |
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MAN YUK YING VIVIAN |
2nd Defendant/
2nd Appellant |
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Before: Hon Au J in Chamber
Date of Hearing: 16 November 2011
Date of Decision: 16 November 2011
Date of Reasons for Decision: 17 November 2011
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REASONS FOR DECISION
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A. Introduction
1. This is the Defendants’ appeal against Master Lai’s Order dated 26 August 2011 in granting a Charging Order Absolute in favour of the Plaintiff (“the IO”). The Charging Order is based on an allocatur (“the Allocatur”) dated 23 June 2011 in relation to the IO’s costs under CACV 317/2006.
2. After hearing the 2nd Defendant (who also represented the 1st Defendant at this hearing), I dismissed the appeal with reasons to follow.
3. I now give my reasons.
B. Brief background
4. In 2005, the IO sued the Defendants as owners of a flat (“the Flat”) at Champion Court for breach of the terms of the Deed of Mutual Covenant relating to certain illegal structures. The action was DCCJ 55/2005. After trial, District Judge W Wong held in favour of the IO and ordered the Defendants to remove the illegal structures and further ordered costs against them[1].
5. The Defendants appealed the learned District Judge’s judgment to the Court of Appeal under CACV 317/2006. The appeal was eventually dismissed by the Court of Appeal with costs (“the Appeal Costs”) against the Defendants[2].
6. The taxation of the Appeal Costs went before Master Levy. The Defendants raised preliminary objections to the taxation, on the basis that there had been a breach of what they called the “indemnity principle” by the IO. It was also part of the Defendants’ complaints that there existed a contingency fee arrangement between the IO and the IO’s solicitors and also that there were procedural irregularities in the IO’s authorization to instruct the solicitors to bring the litigations.
7. In May 2009, Master Levy decided against the Defendants (“Master Levy’s Decision”) on the preliminary objections. They appealed Master Levy’s Decision to the Court of First Instance (“CFI”). The appeal was heard by Deputy High Court Judge Mayo in January 2010.
8. By a judgment (“Judge Mayo’s Judgment”) dated 5 January 2010, Deputy High Court Judge Mayo dismissed the Defendants’ said appeal and ordered costs against the Defendants.
9. The Defendants’ applications for leave to appeal against Judge Mayo’s Judgment to the Court of Appeal were refused firstly by Rogers VP[3], and later by Tang VP with Le Pichon JA[4]. In both judgments refusing leave, the learned judges were of the clear view that Judge Mayo’s Judgment was correct and there was no reasonable prospect of success in the Defendants’ intended appeal[5]. In the judgment of Tang VP and Le Pichon JA, the Court of Appeal was even of the view that the application for leave to appeal was so devoid of merit that they further ordered[6] that the Defendants might not request that determination to be reconsidered at an inter partes oral hearing.
10. The taxation of the Appeal Costs thus proceeded. As mentioned above, the Allocatur was granted by Master Ng on 15 June 2011 allowing the sum of HK$199,608.50.
11. As the Defendants did not pay this sum, on 23 June 2011, the IO proceeded to apply for a charging order against the Flat based on this sum under the Allocatur. On 30 June 2011, Master Hui granted a charging order nisi and required the Defendants to appear before Master Lai on 26 August 2011 to show cause why the order should not be made absolute.
12. After hearing the 2nd Defendant on 26 August 2011, Master Lai made the Charging Order Absolute.
C. This Appeal
13. In this appeal, the Defendants raise two grounds of appeal:
(1) First, the 2nd Defendant said she was not given sufficient time to present the Defendants’ case (i.e., the 2nd ground below) in detail before Master Lai.
(2) Secondly, under s. 14(1) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) (“HCO”), the Defendants should have as of right to appeal against Judge Mayo’s Judgment to the Court of Appeal. Their earlier unsuccessful applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal were made under a mistaken impression that they had to obtain leave. As such, they should still be entitled to appeal to the Court of Appeal against Judge Mayo’s Judgment, and if successful (which they believe it would as there were clearly the breach of the indemnity principle and the contingency fee arrangement by the IO), the Allocatur would then be set aside. As a result, the Charging Order Absolute should not be made now.
14. There are no merits in these appeal grounds.
15. In relation to the first one, whether or not the 2nd Defendant had been given sufficient time at the hearing before the learned Master to present her case is irrelevant to this appeal, as I am hearing this de novo, and I have clarified with the 2nd Defendant about her case as to why the Charging Order should not be made. In any event, other than a bare allegation, I have not seen any concrete evidence (such as a transcript of the hearing) to show that the 2nd Defendant had not been given sufficient time to make her submissions before the learned Master.
16. In relation to the 2nd ground, I also reject it for the following reasons.
17. First, s. 14 of the HCO provides that an appeal shall lie as of right to the Court of Appeal from every judgment or order of the CFI in any civil matter. But this section is provided to be subject to, inter alia, s. 14AA of the HCO.
18. S. 14AA of the HCO provides that no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from an interlocutory judgment or order of the CFI unless leave to appeal has been granted by the CFI or the Court of Appeal.
19. Judge Mayo’s Judgment was one dealing with an appeal from Master Levy’s Decision. The said judgment and decision related to the ruling of the Defendants’ preliminary objections raised in the taxation of the Appeal Costs. These are interlocutory matters and thus Judge Mayo’s Judgment is an interlocutory judgment or order of the CFI. As such, leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is required under s. 14AA of the HCO. The Defendants therefore do not have a right to appeal to the Court of Appeal as submitted.
20. Secondly, and in any event, as mentioned above, the Court of Appeal (in refusing leave) had expressed the clear view that the Defendants’ case on the breach of indemnity principle and contingency fee clearly had no merits, and Judge Mayo’s Judgment was correct. In the circumstances, even if (which I do not agree for the above reasons) the Defendants were allowed to appeal against Judge Mayo’s Judgment again, there is no reasonable chance that it would be successful. I therefore see no merits in the Defendants’ allegation that they would succeed in appealing against Judge Mayo’s Judgment and be able to set aside the Allocatur.
D. Conclusion
21. For all these reasons, I dismiss the Defendants’ appeal with costs to the IO, to be taxed if not agreed.
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(Thomas Au)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court |
Mr Alvin TSANG, instructed by Messrs Dundons, for the Plaintiff/ Respondent.
The 2nd Defendant/ Appellant, appearing in person, also representing the 1st Defendant/ Appellant.
[1] Judgment dated 6 July 2006.
[2] See Judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 23 May 2008. The Court of Appeal also later refused the 2nd Defendant’s application for leave to appeal to the CFA.
[3] See Judgment dated 5 March 2010 under HCMP 172/2010.
[4] See Judgment dated 22 April 2010 also under HCMP 172/2010.
[5] See Rogers VP’s judgment at paras 2-5; the judgment of Tang VP and Le Pichon JA at paras 5 and 7.
[6] Under O. 59 r. 2A(8).
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