HKSAR v. BRAR HARVIR SINGH AND ANOTHER

DCCC 160/2024

[2025] HKDC 392

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NO 160 OF 2024

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REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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1.  The 3^rd Defendant (“D3”)  indicated that he will plead guilty to Charges 1 to 6 at the first hearing before the District Court. By letter dated 2^nd July 2024, i.e. after the trial had been fixed, the 1^st Defendant (“D1”)  and D3 indicated their guilty pleas to Charge 7.

2.  The charges are as follows:-

(a)  Charge 1: Dangerous driving, section 37(1)  of the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap 374;

(b)  Charge 2: Driving whilst disqualified, section 44(1)(b)  of the Road Traffic Ordinance;

(c)  Charge 3: Driving an unlicensed vehicle, section 52(1)(a)  and (10)(a)  of the Road Traffic Ordinance;

(d)  Charge 4: Using a motor vehicle without third party insurance, section 4(1)  and (2)(a)  of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks)  Ordinance, Cap 272;

(e)  Charge 5: Failing to stop after accident whereby damage was caused to other thing, section 56(1)(b)  and (5)  of the Road Traffic Ordinance;

(f)  Charge 6: Failing to report an accident involving damage, section 56(2A)  and (6)  of the Road Traffic Ordinance; and

(g)  Charge 7: Doing an act or a series of acts tending and intended to pervert the course of public justice, Common Law and punishable under section 101I(5)  of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221.

Facts of the Case

3.  D3 was the registered owner of the private car in question (hereinafter referred to as the “Vehicle”).  The vehicle licence was valid from 14^th July 2022 to 13^th July 2023.  The Third Party Insurance covers 24^th October 2022 to 23^rd October 2023, but was only valid if, amongst other things, the person driving was not disqualified from holding a driving licence.

4.  D3 was convicted of dangerous driving on 11^th May 2023, and was disqualified from holding a driving licence for 6 months with immediate effect. 

5.  On 28^th July 2023, at around 5:15 am, D2  drove the Vehicle, with D3 and an Indian male (hereinafter referred to as “X”)  onboard to Central.  They then went to a restaurant in Central.  At around 6:50 am, they left the restaurant and boarded the Vehicle, with D3 as the driver. 

6.  At around 7 am, the Vehicle was travelling downhill and making a right turn on Lower Albert Road.  The weather was fine and the road surface was dry.  The Vehicle suddenly swerved to its left onto the pedestrian pavement on Lower Albert Road near West Wing, Justice Place (hereinafter referred to as “West Wing”), and crashed into a security kiosk at West Wing where a security guard was stationed inside. 

7.  After the accident, D2, D3 and X immediately alighted, and fled together towards the direction of Wyndham Street, and boarded a taxi at Queen’s Road Central at around 7:05 am.

8.  A report was immediately made to the police, and no brake marks were found at the scene by the police who had arrived at the scene shortly after the report. CCTV camera captured the events.

9.  D2, D3 and X alighted the taxi outside a carpark at Ka Wai Chuen in Hung Hom at around 7:16 am.  D2 and X waited at the carpark whereas D3 returned to his residence nearby at around 7:19 am. 

10.  At about 7:27 am, D3 and his younger brother D1 left their residence.  D1 was wearing the T-shirt, trousers and shoes worn by D3 at the time of the accident.  D1 and D3 then met with D2 and X at the said carpark at around 7:28 am.  At around 7:29 am, D1, D2, D3 and X left the carpark together. 

11.  At around 7:30 am, D1 and D2 boarded a taxi and asked to be taken to Central.  When the taxi reached Cotton Tree Drive, the taxi driver was instructed to go to Lan Kwai Fong.  What transpired was that before the taxi actually reached any particular destination, the taxi driver was  instructed to go to various places both in Central and elsewhere, including further up Cotton Tree Drive, to make a u-turn and go downhill on Garden Road, then to Hung Hom, and then Lan Kwai Fong. 

12.  When the taxi reached Cotton Tree Drive, a male voice from a video call using the mobile phone gave instructions to the taxi driver.  As a result the taxi went to Upper Albert Road, Glenealy, Wyndham Street, Wellington Street, Lyndhurst Terrace, Hollywood Road and Lower Albert Road. 

13.  When the taxi reached Ice House Street near the Hong Kong Diamond Exchange Building at about 8:05 am, D1 and D2 alighted the taxi, and walked towards Lower Albert Road, with D1 walking ahead of D2. D2 was holding a mobile phone next to his ear.  At about 8:06 am, D2 made a U-turn towards Queen’s Road Central.

14.  At about 8:07 am, D1 approached the police on Lower Albert Road near the accident scene.  D1 represented to the police that he was the driver of the Vehicle from Hung Hom to Lan Kwai Fong in the early hours of 28^th July 2023, he had parked the Vehicle at Lan Kwai Fong, and that he was the driver of the Vehicle at the time of the accident. He stated that he was afraid and therefore fled the scene, but had returned to face the consequences.  The police arrested D1 for the offences of dangerous driving and criminal damage.  

15.  D3 surrendered to the police on 31^st July 2023.  No report of the accident was made by D3 to the police before the surrender.  D3 was arrested for various charges, including driving related offences and conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice.

16.  Motor vehicle examination of the Vehicle on 31^st July 2023 found its steering and functions operative, and there was no mechanical defect.  There were, however, some damage to the Vehicle caused by the collision, including the deployment of driver’s airbag and passengers seatbelts.  D3’s DNA was found on the surface of the airbag at the driver’s seat.

D1’s Antecedent Statement, Background Report and Mitigation

17.  D1 is 25 years old and has a clear record. He obtained an Associate Degree in Mobile Information Technology in 2019 and a Bachelor of Science in Information Management in 2021.  He worked as a software developer.  He is also a part-time instructor teaching STEM coding. 

18.  Defence submits that the present offence is out of character, and he had been a role model to young people in the ethnic minority community, evidenced by the press articles on his studies and career path, as well as the projects and platforms he had participated in, assisting Hong Kong’s ethnic minority community and low-income students.   Defence submits that he was woken up by his elder brother D3 at the time, and had committed the offence instinctively in an attempt to help D3.  It is urged upon the Court to consider his deep remorse. 

19.  The background report refers to D1 leading a stable life and had planned a move with his girlfriend to Canada in September 2023 to further his career in information technology.  The plan was cancelled and the relationship with his girlfriend ended due to his arrest for the present case.

D3’s Antecedent Statement, Background Report and Mitigation

20.  D3 is 27 years old and has one previous conviction of dangerous driving, whereby he was disqualified from holding a driver’s licence, the breach of which being the subject matter of this case. He works in food delivery, after having sustained injuries at a traffic accident which rendered it difficult for him to resume his previous construction work.  

21.  It is submitted that D3 had obtained his driving licence at 18 years of age, and his first traffic conviction was in 2023.  The Defence urges the Court to consider his deep remorse for the offence and having caused trouble to D1 and his family, and of the almost 8 months’ remand.

Sentencing Considerations

22.  For all charges against D1 and D3, the Court has considered the guilty pleas, all mitigation and mitigation documents, the authorities submitted by both parties, D1’s clear record and D3’s criminal conviction record, their willingness to compensate, and D3’s surrender to the police. 

Charge 1: Dangerous Driving

23.  The Defence cited HKSAR v Kwan Wan Ki [2020] 5 HKLRD 433.  Although that case is a dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm case, certain basic sentencing principles relevant to dangerous driving charges in general emerge therefrom.

24.  The Court of Appeal in Kwan Wan Ki stated that as a matter of principle for offences involving dangerous driving, it is an aggravating factor where the defendant has a criminal record, especially of multiple similar convictions.  The main concern of the Court is the culpability of the defendant’s dangerous driving and the seriousness of the consequences.

25.  Defence cited this case to show that the Court of Appeal has stated that for a case which did not involve any particular aggravating factor, except that the appellant drove through the pedestrian crossing without paying regard to the traffic sign and traffic signal, causing grievous bodily harm which the victim had fully recovered, a sentence of not less than 10 months’ immediate imprisonment is appropriate as the starting point. 

26.  The sentence in Kwan Wan Ki is however of limited assistance to the present case, as it was a dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm case, and there were no particular aggravating factors as in the present case of a previous same conviction just over 2 months before the present offence. 

27.  In the present case, the degree of danger in D3’s manner of driving was much more serious than the momentary lapse of attention of missing the traffic signal in Kwan Wan Ki.  D3 had completely lost control of the Vehicle with absolutely no explanation and swerved in a very sudden manner with high speed right into the entrance of Justice Place, tore down a sign post, damaged stone walls, and dived head on at the security kiosk.  The photos of the aftermath and the CCTV video showed the full horror of the incident.  It was most fortunate that the security kiosk was built with much sturdier materials than ordinary ones, and therefore no injuries to the security personnel stationed inside were caused.  It was also sheer luck that no one was at  the entrance of Justice Place within the route of the Vehicle as it crashed in, but the potential damage remains grave.

28.  Bearing in mind D3’s willingness to make full compensation, I shall adopt a starting point of 9 months’ imprisonment for Charge 1.  Due to D3’s indicated guilty plea before trial date was fixed, I shall apply 1/3 discount to the sentence.  For Charge 1, D3 is sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment, disqualification order of 2 years and the requirement for completion of a driving improvement course within the time limit set by the law.  As this is the second conviction of dangerous driving for D3 within 5 years, the disqualification order shall not commence until D3 has completed serving all other imprisonment terms for this present case.

29.  I shall also make a compensation order for $3,685, to be deducted from D3’s bail. 

Charge 2: Driving Whilst Disqualified

30.  It is trite law that driving whilst disqualified would normally result in an immediate custodial sentence, as the offence involves a disobedience of Court order. 

31.  In the present case, there is no explanation offered by the Defence as to why D3 had to drive the Vehicle upon leaving the restaurant in Central.  D2 was the person who drove the Vehicle there.  They could have flagged down a taxi easily at around 6:50 a.m. in Central when they left the restaurant.  They could have arranged someone to drive away the Vehicle at a fee if they so desired.  There could not have been any acceptable explanation for D3 taking over the driving of the Vehicle when he had only been disqualified around 2.5 months earlier. 

32.  Defence prays for a lenient sentence for this charge with the case of HKSAR v Liu Yim Hung HCMA 267/1998.  It is true that the appellant in that case was disqualified not long prior to the offence (in the Liu Yim Hung case being 1 month), has only 1 previous conviction record for which he was disqualified, and that there was no good reason for driving, which are all similar to the present case which involved D3 driving 2.5 months after being disqualified for 6 months. 

33.  The said case, however, differs from the present case in that there was no particular aggravation in the manner of driving, involving only a simple speeding offence, and no other evidence of bad driving.  The present case involves dangerous driving which caused an accident, the circumstances of which must have caused fear for the life of the security staff stationed at the security kiosk, and damage to property. 

34.  I am therefore satisfied that the appropriate starting point for this charge should be 6 months’ imprisonment, and allowing 1/3 discount for the guilty plea, D3 shall be sentenced to 4 months’ imprisonment for Charge 2, with a disqualification order of 12 months, to commence after completion of the disqualification order of Charge 1.

Charge 3: Driving an Unlicensed Vehicle

35.  V’s vehicle licence was valid from 14^th July 2022 to 13^th July 2023.  The licence had expired for 15 days when the accident occurred.  I shall order that D3 be fined $2,000 for this Charge.

Charge 4: Using a Motor Vehicle Without Third Party Insurance

36.  Concerning Charge 4, the Court does not agree that the fact that the insurance coverage was paid for a period covering the date of the offence is any mitigation.  D3 knew that he had been disqualified and that the 3^rd party insurance coverage could not protect 3^rd parties involved in any accident caused by his driving during the disqualification period.  The purpose of the insurance was the protection of 3^rd parties, and therefore the effective period of insurance coverage had the disqualification order not been imposed has no relevance to sentencing.

37.  In the present case, an accident occurred, and although there were no personal injuries caused, property damage was occasioned, the costs of repairs being $3,685, for which D3 was willing to make full compensation.  I shall adopt a starting point of 3 months’ imprisonment, and allow 1/3 discount for his guilty plea.  D3 shall be sentenced to 2 months’ imprisonment for Charge 4, with a disqualification order of 12 months.

Charges 5: Failing to Stop After Accident & Charge 6: Failing to Report an Accident

38.  The Court considers that there were no injuries to anyone due to the accident, but property damage was caused, and the repair costs amounted to $3,685.  I will impose a fine of $2,000 each for Charges 5 and 6.

Charge 7: Doing an Act or a Series of Acts Tending and Intended to Pervert the Course of Public Justice

39.  I have considered both authorities submitted by the Prosecution and the Defence. 

40.  The basic principles in sentencing this type of offence is stated in AG v Yeung Kwong-chi [1989] 1 HKLR 266.  It was held that the normal sentence for an attempt to pervert the course of justice was one of immediate imprisonment.  In order to justify any non immediate custodial sentence, abnormal circumstances must be present.  Although clear record, good family background, a single fall from grace, the likelihood of leading a blameless life in future were all proper matters for consideration, they are by no means abnormal when put in the context of a crime of this nature so as to justify a suspended sentence.

41.  Amongst the several cases submitted by the Defence, HKSAR v Tse Nicholas[2004] 1 HKC 39 is an appeal against conviction, and therefore the sentence at first instance is of very limited assistance, if any, to this Court.  Further the facts did not indicate whether the substitution had the purpose of allowing the driver to avoid penalty for matters outside the manner of driving and the crash itself.

42.  The case of HKSAR v Yuen Sun Wing [2010] 3 HKLRD 145, concerns a ‘syndicate type’ arrangement with substitution of an appellant in place of the many taxi drivers who had contravened traffic regulations.  The background is very different from the present case.  Further, the case of Yuen Sun Wing involves traffic contraventions that were minor, i.e. speeding or disregarding traffic signals, which would involve accumulation of driving points leading eventually to disqualification under the driving points system.  That cannot be compared with the much more serious matters of dangerous driving and driving whilst disqualified, for which imprisonment terms are likely.  I am therefore of the view that the case of Yuen Sun Wing offers little assistance. 

43.  The case of HKSAR v Lo Hing Kit HCMA 147/2006 which the Defence submitted, relates to the appeal of an appellant who was convicted after trial.  The facts indicate that the appellant arrived at the scene of an accident where the foreigner driver was the appellant’s friend.  The appellant was sentenced to CSO upon appeal, based on his relative youth of 26 years, previous clear record, positive good character and favourable CSO report, the fact that he had nothing to gain through the offence, his misguided sense of loyalty to his friend, the effect of imprisonment on his insurance and financial planning career, and his family circumstances.

44.  First of all, the judgment of Lo Hing Kit mentioned the “appellant’s background has many aspects of it which are deserving of sympathy, perhaps more for his parents than for himself.”   Secondly, it was also clearly stated that “This sentence is by no means intended to be a precedent for sentences in cases of perverting the course of justice and should not be taken as such.  In such cases, an immediate custodial sentence should still be the norm.”

45.  I have also noticed that in Lo Hing Kit, there is nothing indicating that the appellant’s act of misrepresentation had the tendency to allow the driver to escape from the responsibility concerning anything other than the crash itself.  In the present case, however, D1 and D3’s agreement had the result of not only allowing D3 to escape from his responsibility concerning Charges 1, 3, 5 and 6, but also to escape from the liability for Charges 2 and 4, with Charge 2 leading to an almost inevitable immediate custodial sentence.  This was the reason for which they had engaged in the offence involving Charge 7.  This is a much more serious situation than that in Lo Hing Kit.

46.  For the case of香港特別行政區訴何浩峰 HCMA 443/2010, the appellant was convicted after trial and had appealed against the sentence of 3 months’ imprisonment.  He was the passenger of a car driven by his friend, after the 2 of them went to a bar to drink, and his friend was drunk while driving the car, resulting in an accident.  The appellant claimed to the police that he was the driver at the time of the accident, yet another person present contradicted this statement.  The appellant changed his stance 20 minutes later.  At appeal the appellant’s counsel stated that the appellant pleaded not guilty as he thought he had a defence of intoxication.

47.  It was stated by the Court during appeal in the case of 何浩峰 that the appellant came from a decent family, and had changed his occupation from assistant engineer to transportation worker due to issues with income.  The Court in 何浩峰case considered the appellant’s positive CSO report concerning his fair work attitude and personal qualities, and ordered the original imprisonment term to be substituted by a CSO of 180 hours. 

48.  The appellant’s actions in 何浩峰case would obviously allow his friend to escape the consequences of a drink driving and careless driving or dangerous driving conviction.  Depending on the level of intoxication and the seriousness of the accident and its aftermath (which were entirely unknown upon reading the judgment), one cannot say that immediate imprisonment is a highly likely or normal sentence for the appellant’s friend if he had been caught as the driver. 

49.  It also appears from the facts of 何浩峰case that the premeditation of the appellant, if it existed, would be minimal as there would not be a lot of time before the police arrived.  His actions were also limited although admittedly crucial, i.e. waiting at the scene and telling the police that he was the driver.

50.  The present case tells a much different story. As stated, D3 had breached a Court imposed disqualification order just 2.5 months after the order had been imposed, and will therefore highly likely be sentenced to immediate imprisonment.  D3 had changed his clothes with D1, so as to create the impression that D1 was the driver when the police started investigating the case and viewing the CCTV videos.  D1 and D3 left home and engaged in a discussion with others nearby.  D1 then took a taxi to the vicinity of the accident, and alighted some distance away from the accident location, obviously in order to avoid being detected with D2 who had escaped the scene with D3 and X, and had travelled with D1 back to the area.  D1 then gave the police a story about where he had parked the car prior to the journey which ended with the accident, and brought the police to various locations covered by the route as claimed by him. 

51.  The above shows that the misrepresentation was a carefully thought out and detailed plan, agreed upon by at least D1 and D3.  Although there is no indication as to the amount of police manpower wasted on this misguided investigation direction concerning the accident, it is to be expected that heavy input was made into investigating an accident involving an unexplained car crash at Justice Place.  This necessarily brings the case outside the simple scenario of a car accident with the passenger or someone else not present being called upon to attend the scene and claim as driver.

52.  The Prosecution submitted the case of Secretary for Justice v Lee Ying Tung [2023] 3 HKLRD 667, which was a review of the sentence filed by the Secretary for Justice.  The respondent’s husband was intercepted by the police while leaving their apartment, and alerted the respondent that there were police approaching, and not to open the door. Several minutes later, a bag of dangerous drugs was thrown out of the window from the apartment.  The respondent was charged with perverting the course of public justice, and was sentenced to 84 days’ imprisonment after a guilty plea.  It was stated that the general starting point for providing false account to the police investigating a serious offence is between 2 and 3 years; and for concealment of evidence, the same bracket of 2 to 3 years’ starting point applies.  Upon review, the starting point of 3 years was adopted.

53.  I am of the view that, despite the present case having the element of providing a false account to the investigating police, although the offence involved crashing into Justice Place, it was not intended as a provocation to the authorities.  It was no more than D3 losing control of the Vehicle and thereby committing the act of dangerous driving.  As such, although it cannot be seen as a minor case, it is not very high in the spectrum of seriousness for the offence.  Therefore I do not think a starting point as high as 2 to 3 years for this Charge is warranted. 

54.  Defence in the supplemental mitigation bundle submitted more cases on suspended sentence for Charge 7.  HKSAR v Wong Shing Yim [2003] 3 HKLRD 1046 was an appeal against conviction only and therefore of no assistance.

55.  For Yuen Man Chiu v R CACC 399/1980, it involves a barrister inciting others to pervert the course of public justice by making false statements to the police about an assault, by preparing a statement for those involved in the assault containing false account of the events to present it at the police station.  On appeal, the sentence was suspended, with ‘mitigating factors of substantial weight’ including the fact that other persons involved were given immunity, a recent medical report showing a serious deterioration in both the appellant’s mental and physical condition, the likelihood that his career at the Bar would be finished, and that he had been in custody for 6 months.

56.  The Court observes that Yuen Man Chiu has a rather different factual background from the present case, and therefore its sentence is of little assistance.  Secondly, amongst the ‘mitigating factors of substantial weight’, the only similarity with the present case is the previous detention.  Although D1’s dreams of pursuing his career overseas had probably been dashed, he could still pursue the same area of work in Hong Kong, unlike the appellant in Yuen Man Chiu.  There is also no disparate treatment of D1 and D3 from other persons alleged to be involved in the present case, and no humanitarian ground of deteriorating health for either of them.  I am therefore of the view that the sentence of Yuen Man Chiu lies very much with its own facts and circumstances of the appellant.

57.  HKSAR v Yeung Wai Birney DCCC 1090/2007 is a District Court case and therefore has no binding effect on this Court.  But even so, the facts of that case is different from the present case, in that the defendant was a solicitor who was not the mastermind.  He had merely signed the letters to the witness of a trial trying to dissuade her from testifying.  The letters were in fact drafted by a counsel.  The defendant’s career as a solicitor would be over because of this case, and he had assisted the Prosecution in providing witness statements and testifying in Court against the counsel concerned.  I am therefore of the view that the suspended sentence in that case is not of assistance here.

58.  Of the culpability between D1 and D3, I find that D3 was the mastermind of the plan.  He was the person who had every benefit from the plan, in order to avoid imprisonment for his driving whilst disqualified.  He was also the person who approached D1 while D1 was asleep early in the morning, and abused D1’s brotherly love. Panic is not a mitigating factor for this kind of offence.  The root of the panic was D3’s irresponsible conduct and disregard of the order of the Court.  I am therefore of the view that D3 bears a much greater blame for the events than D1. 

59.  Bearing in mind all the relevant considerations for CSO and suspended sentence and the factors discussed above, I am of the view that immediate imprisonment term for D3 is inevitable, even considering his surrender to the police.  CSO and suspended sentences, even considering D3’s earlier detention before bail, are not sufficiently deterrent sentences against both D3 and others who are minded to commit similar offences.

60.  But that is not to say that D1 should be dealt with by sentences other than immediate custodial sentence.  I accept that he has nothing to gain from the offence.  Yet despite his good record and background, he is an educated man and should know the seriousness, if not the penalty, of tampering with the course of justice.  Even though he had been woken up from his sleep in order to assist D3, the actions involved in the charge were not just transitory representations, and instead involve multiple steps of changing clothes, discussions concerning the plan, taking taxi to the vicinity, alighting well ahead and away from the location, approaching the police and making the false representation, telling a detailed story of what happened prior to the accident and making good that story by bringing the police to different locations. 

61.  Even though D1 may not be the mastermind, and that he has nothing to gain from the offence, D1’s actions involved a good deal of premeditation and planning, and cannot be acts of impulse or the result of lack of consequential thinking.  I am of the view that there are no abnormal or exceptional circumstances justifying imposing anything other than an immediate custodial sentence.  CSO and suspended sentence are therefore not suitable options.

62.  I shall therefore adopt starting points for Charge 7 of 16 months and 20 months for D1 and D3 respectively.  Both of them had entered pleas of not guilty to Charge 7 on 27^th February 2024. A trial date commencing on 10^th February 2025 was therefore fixed on that day.  On 2^nd July 2024, i.e. 4 odd months after the fixing of trial date and 7 months before the trial, D1 and D3 indicated that they would wish to plead guilty to Charge 7.

63.  The Defence accepts that according to HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam[2016] 5 HKLRD 1, an indication of plea of guilty after the fixing of trial date but before the first day of trial would normally attract a discount between 25% and 20%.  Defence submits that as the guideline remains subject to the overriding discretion of the judge in sentencing, in rare cases the discount can be above the said range.  Defence urges the Court to consider that as D1 and D3 had indicated their guilty pleas around 7 months prior to the commencement of trial, that allowed the prosecution to dispose of the case in an efficient and orderly manner, therefore the discount in sentence should be at 30%.

64.  I do not agree. The normal discount for guilty pleas before the trial date is fixed would be 1/3, i.e. 33.33%.  To grant a discount of 30% in this case, which is very close to 33.33%, would blur the division between pleading guilty before and after trial date had been fixed.  Any indication of plea of guilty before the trial date would have the effect of more efficient disposal, and that is already subsumed in the range of 25% to 20%.  The range was designed to allow differing degrees of discount within that range, after taking into account various matters including the timing of the indication.

65.  I am not satisfied that either D1 or D3’s case come within the overriding discretion of the Court, or that this is a rare case.  Considering the plea was indicated about 7 months ahead of the trial, I shall allow a discount of 25% for both D1 and D3 concerning Charge 7.  D1 shall be sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, whereas D3 shall be sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment.

Totality and Further Deductions

D1

66.  Considering D1’s lost opportunities to move to Canada with his girlfriend and pursue his career there, and his impeccable behavior in the past and having served as a role model to young people of ethnic minorities and low income groups, the Court will further discount D1’s sentence for Charge 7 by 2 months.  He is therefore sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment.

D3

67.  As Charges 1, 2 and 4 arise from the same event, I shall order that the sentences of Charges 2 and 4 to run concurrently with that of Charge 1.

68.  As Charge 7 has a different basis of culpability from Charges 1, 2 and 4, I shall order that 12 months of the sentence of Charge 7 be served consecutively to the sentences of Charges 1, 2 and 4.

69.  The total imprisonment term for D3 shall be 18 months’ imprisonment.  The total fine shall be $6,000.

Sentence

D1:

Charge 7 10 months’ imprisonment

D3:

Charge 1 6 months’ imprisonment, disqualification order of 2 years to commence after completion of all imprisonment terms in this case (in accordance with s69A(2)  Road Traffic Ordinance), Driving Improvement Course & compensation order of $3,685

Charge 2 4 months’ imprisonment concurrent with Charge 1, and disqualification order of 12 months, to commence after completion of the disqualification order of Charge 1 (in accordance with s44(3)  Road Traffic Ordinance)

Charge 3 $2,000 fine

Charge 4 2 months’ imprisonment concurrent with Charge 1, and disqualification order of 12 months

Charge 5 $2,000 fine

Charge 6 $2,000 fine

Charge 7 15 months’ imprisonment, with 12 months consecutive to Charges 1, 2 and 4.

Total sentence: 18 months’ imprisonment.

Total fine: $6,000 (to be deducted from D3’s bail)

Compensation order : $3,685 (to be deducted from D3’s bail)