RE ILEAGU JOY EZINNE

CAMP 262/2022, [2026] HKCA 706

On appeal from [2021] HKCFI 1110

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 262 OF 2022

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 850/ 2018)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 8 March 2023, this court (Kwan VP and Barma JA)  handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ Bruno Chan dated 23 April 2021 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dismissing the appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

2.  The facts and issues in the applicant’s application, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1]  We will not repeat them here.

3.  The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion filed out of time on 14 June 2024, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  In the Notice of Motion, the applicant merely stated that she wanted “to go to the Court of Final Appeal”.

4.  In breach of the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals, the applicant failed to lodge any written submissions.  Accordingly, she is deemed to have abandoned the right to rely on written submissions in the present application.

5.  Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed.

6.  The applicant has proffered no explanation for the inordinate delay in filing her Notice of Motion.  The delay of around 1 year and 2 months is substantial, and thus the Notice of Motion is liable to be dismissed on this basis alone.  We have however nonetheless proceeded to consider the merits of the application.

7.  The matters stated by the applicant do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters she has raised.  

8.  The Notice of Motion failed to provide any particulars in the supposed errors in our judgment and it raises no ground that is reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.  

9.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).  

10.  For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 14 June 2024 is dismissed.