MAHAL HARPREET SINGH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD
[2026] HKCA 2064 · CACV 517/2026
Court of Appeal
CACV 517/2026, [2026] HKCA 2064
On Appeal From [2026] HKCFI 2792
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 517 OF 2026
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 3 OF 2021)
BETWEEN
| | | |
| |MAHAL HARPREET SINGH |Applicant |
| |and | |
| |TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| |DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION |Putative |
| | |Interested Party |
_____________________
Before: Hon Chow JA and Winnie Tsui J in Court
Date of Written Submissions: 18 August 2026
Date of Judgment: 13 November 2026
JUDGMENT
Hon Chow JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. On 19 May 2026, Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan made an order
refusing to grant to the Applicant leave to apply for judicial review.
The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 9
October 2020, whereby the Board dismissed the Applicant’s appeal
against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 10 September
2018 rejecting his non-refoulement claim.
2. On 30 July 2026, this Court gave its judgment (“the CA Judgment”)
dismissing the Applicant’s appeal against the order of the Judge. The
basic facts of this case and the Court’s reasons for dismissing the
Applicant’s appeal have been set out in the CA Judgment and will not
be repeated here.
3. By a Notice of Motion filed on 17 August 2026, the Applicant applies
for leave to appeal the CA Judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. In
the Notice of Motion, the Applicant repeats the factual background of
his case, and sets out 6 questions said to be questions of great
general or public importance:
1) Question 1 raises the question of whether the Hong Kong
Government owes a legal and/or constitutional duty to take
reasonable steps to protect a person who has given evidence as a
prosecution witness in a Hong Kong criminal trial from
retaliation if returned to his country of origin;
2) Question 2 raises the question of whether, in assessing state
involvement for the purpose of BOR 2 and BOR 3 risks, the Court
of Appeal erred in law in characterising the risk as a “personal
dispute” without state involvement despite evidence of (i) a
false FIR having been filed against a non-refoulement claimant,
(ii) alleged police “watchlisting”, (iii) attacks on the
claimant’s family, and (iv) the persecutor’s close family member
being a serving police officer;
3) Question 3 raises the question of whether, in assessing the
viability of internal relocation, the Court of Appeal erred in
law in (i) treating the non-refoulement claimant’s departure
from India “without difficulty” in September 2005 and travel
since May 2005 (all before the FIR dated 14 November 2005) as
negating future risk, and (ii) distinguishing Gurinder Preet
Singh [2022] HKCA 587, without proper consideration of (a) the
time required for a Lookout Circular to be issued and
operational after the issue of a FIR, and (b) the claimant’s
lack of knowledge of the FIR at the time of departure;
4) Question 4 raises the question of whether the Court of Appeal
erred in law in holding that the availability of alibi evidence
and a trial in the country of origin negates refoulement risk,
without considering the real and immediate risk of arrest,
detention, torture, or of the Applicant being handed over to non-
state actors before any trial can take place;
5) Question 5 raises the question of whether, in assessing
credibility, the Court of Appeal erred in law in treating the
claimant’s use of false identities as decisive, without properly
weighing (i) his cooperation as a prosecution witness in a Hong
Kong murder trial, whose evidence was accepted by the High Court
and led to a conviction, and (ii) his status as a victim of
human trafficking, whereby travel agents arranged passports in
different names, as explained to the Immigration Department and
the Torture Claims Appeal Board; and
6) Question 6 raises the question of whether the Court of Appeal
erred in failing to consider the fact that the Applicant’s
refoulement to India would constitute a substantial and grave
injustice, such that the appeal ought “otherwise” to be
submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for determination, given
(a) his role as a prosecution witness, (b) the accepted facts of
a false FIR and alleged police “watchlisting”, (c) ongoing
threats to his life and attacks on his family, and (d) the
impact on his child’s health if separated from him.
4. The Applicant’s contentions in the Notice of Motion are elaborated in
his written submissions dated 18 August 2026.
5. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1, we determine the
present application for leave to appeal on paper without an oral
hearing.
6. Under s 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap
484, an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the
discretion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal in any
civil cause or matter if, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal or the
Court of Final Appeal (as the case may be), the question involved in
the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public
importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final
Appeal for decision.
7. We do not consider that leave to appeal ought to be granted in respect
of any of the 6 questions raised by the Applicant.
8. Question 1 is a new point which was not advanced in the proceedings at
first instance or in the Applicant’s appeal to this Court. We see no
good reason why the Applicant should be permitted to raise this new
point for the first time in an application for leave to appeal to the
Court of Final Appeal. In any event, we can see no proper foundation
or basis for the contention that the Hong Kong Government owes to the
Applicant any special legal and/or constitutional duty in the context
of non-refoulement protection merely because he previously gave
evidence as a prosecution witness in a Hong Kong criminal trial.
9. Question 2 is not a question of great, general or public importance.
Further, the Court of Appeal did not characterise the Applicant’s
alleged risk as arising from a “personal dispute” without state
involvement. What the Court held was that the Applicant had failed to
raise any valid basis to disturb the Board’s findings (with which the
Judge agreed) that there was no state involvement in the Applicant’s
dispute with Dilbag, and state protection would be available to him in
India (see §21 of the CA Judgment).
10. Question 3 is not a question of great, general or public importance.
At §11 of the CA Judgment, the Court explained why the case of
Gurinder Preet Singh relied on by the Applicant was distinguishable.
The Court did not undertake its own assessment of the viability of
internal relocation afresh in the present case, but took the view that
there was no valid basis to interfere with the Judge’s holding on the
issue of internal relocation (for the reasons set out at §§10-17 of
the CA Judgment).
11. Question 4 is likewise not a question of great, general or public
importance. The Court did not undertake its own assessment of
refoulement risk afresh in the present case. The Court referred to
the Board’s view that the existence of an alleged false charge against
the Applicant had little bearing on the assessment of a future risk of
harm in his case because he could prove his innocence with alibi
evidence and through an independent judicial system in India with
legal representation. There was also no reasonably arguable basis to
show that the Applicant was unfairly targeted by the Indian
authorities because of the alleged false charge filed by Dilbag or
under the alleged influence of Dilbag on the Indian Police (see §11 of
the CA Judgment). The Board was entitled to come to such view.
12. Question 5 concerns the assessment of the Applicant’s credibility by
the Board on the particular facts of the present case, and plainly
does not give rise to any question of great, general or public
importance.
13. Questions 2, 3, 4 and 5 are, in substance, attempts by the Applicant
to re-argue the merits of his claim for non-refoulement protection.
The relevant arguments ought to be ventilated before the Director and
the Board, who are the primary decision-makers, and not before the
court in an application for leave to apply for judicial review.
14. Finally, in respect of Question 6, the “or otherwise” limb in
s 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance is
reserved for exceptional cases. We see no basis to grant leave to
appeal on the “or otherwise” limb in the present case. In any event,
it is the well settled practice of the Court of Appeal to defer
consideration of the question of whether to grant leave on the “or
otherwise” limb to the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal.
We see no good reason to depart from this practice here.
15. We are also satisfied that the Applicant’s intended appeal has no
reasonable prospect of success.
16. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal is refused and the
Notice of Motion is dismissed.
|(Anderson Chow) |(Winnie Tsui) |
|Justice of Appeal |Judge of the Court of |
| |First Instance |
The Applicant, acting in person
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MAHAL HARPREET SINGH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD
CA · [2026] HKCA 2064
This judgment